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BENEDICT DE SPINOZA.

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TRACTATUS THEOLOGICO-POLITICUS, a Theological and Political Treatise, showing under a series of heads that Freedom of Discussion may not only be granted with safety to Religion and the peace of the State, but cannot be denied without danger to both the public peace and true piety. By Benedict de Spinoza. 8vo. London, 1862, pp. 359. An emended edition, 8vo. London, 1868, pp. vi. and 359.

On the SPECIAL FUNCTION OF THE SUDORIPAROUS AND LYMPHATIC SYSTEMS, their vital import, and their bearing on Health and Disease. By Robert Willis, M.D., Member of the Royal College of Physicians, &c. 8vo. London, 1867, pp. viii. and 72.

NATHAN THE WISE; a Dramatic Poem, by G. E. Lessing. From the German (in verse); with an Introduction on Lessing and the Nathan, its antecedents, character, and influence, by R. Willis, M.D.

'Would you see Religion portrayed as apprehended' by Spinoza, you have only to turn to the Nathan of Lessing.'—Dr Kuno Fischer: History of Modern Philosophy.

'In the Nathan we have an Ideal of Religious Liberty, far surpassing any that has ever existed in the world.'—Dr Carl Schwartz: History of Modern Theology, and [illegible]

'Cre[illegible]essing as Theologian.

[illegible]tions like the Nathan, coming to us as from a better world, wherein opposites are for ever reconciled, and the differences that still so aimlessly divide mankind are set at rest, are not given to us for purposeless enjoyment or mere æsthetic contemplation. Much rather are they ours as pledges that the battle of life, fairly and fearlessly waged, is ever eventually crowned by victory; that humanity, however slowly, and with whatever occasional backslidings, still advances from darkness into light, from bondage into freedom; and further, that he only counts for one among the combatants who in some wider or narrower sphere shows himself forward to hasten the coming of this glorious day, the advent of this kingdom of God upon earth.' Dr D. F. Strauss: Lessing's Nathan the Wise.

BENEDICT DE SPINOZA;

HIS

LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE, AND ETHICS.

25976

BY

R. WILLIS, M.D.

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Ἡ Ἀλήθεια ἐλευθερώσει ὑμᾶς.—JOHN viii. 32.

Yy. K. 2

LONDON:
TRÜBNER & CO., 60, PATERNOSTER ROW.
1870.

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Soleo et in aliena castra transire, non tanquam transfuga sed tanquam explorator.—*Seneca.*

Sometimes I ramble through my neighbour's fields,
To note his skill, mark what his labour yields.

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JOHN CHILDS AND SON, PRINTERS.

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

BY WAY OF PREFACE.

OBJECT OF THE WORK.—SOURCES OF SPINOZISM.—SPINOZISM ITSELF AND PARTICULARLY OF THE IDEA OF GOD.

THE object of this volume is to afford the English reader an opportunity of forming an estimate, on somewhat extended grounds, of the distinguished individual whose name stands at the head of its title-page. Spinoza may, indeed, be said to be a name among us and nothing more. It is much if he be remembered as a man of Jewish descent who had an evil theological reputation while he lived. Save the two or three summary notices referred to in my pages, we have nothing in English calculated to convey a true idea of the life and writings of the man who nevertheless continues, two centuries after his death, to influence the philosophy and religious thought of Europe more powerfully than any individual who has lived since the days of Luther. 'Father of the speculation of our age,' says Dr Strauss,* 'Spinoza is also Father of our Biblical criticism;' and philosophy and religion—assuming the Bible as the exponent of religion—are the poles around which revolves the intellectual and emotional world of man.

In the following pages I have, therefore, given the Life of Spinoza, deriving my chief information from the common source of every biography of the philosopher yet published: 'La Vie de Benoit de Spinoza,' by Colerus; adding to and eking out the scanty tale with such further particulars as have been furnished by others,† and the writings of Spinoza himself supply.

It is admitted on all hands that the moral character of a man is nowhere seen to greater or less advantage than in the

* Strauss, Glaubenslehre, B. I. S. 193.

† Boullainvilliers, Lucas, Bayle, and Van Vloten.

letters he may have written in the confidence of private friendship, and on matters of everyday interest or of none save to the writer or the party addressed. The letters of distinguished individuals acquire additional significance when they touch on subjects with which the name of the writer is intimately connected. Now the Correspondence of Spinoza is of the highest importance in both of these directions,—first as giving us an insight into the intimate and individual nature of the MAN as he was known among his friends, and then as helping us to appreciate and understand the AUTHOR as he presented himself before the world in his works. I have consequently made a point of giving all the letters of Spinoza and his friends that serve to bring him and them in their living presences before us; and I trust my readers will agree with me in the estimate to be formed of the kindly, considerate, pious, and gifted nature of the philosopher from this source alone.

In addition to the letters of his correspondents I have further given some information of the men who wrote them, and whom Spinoza called friends—*noscitur à sociis* is an old but pertinent adage—and these men, had they had no claim of their own to consideration, though in some instances they have the very highest, would still have been objects of interest to us in their intimacy or relationship with our philosopher.

I have then gone on to speak of the Revivers of the memory and philosophy of Spinoza, which had lain forgotten for nearly a century; and traced the influence his writings have exerted on the philosophic and religious thought of some of the great minds of Germany especially and of our own country down to the present time. My survey in this direction is necessarily imperfect; for a volume instead of a few pages would scarcely suffice to do it justice; and then I am far from books and authorities—a physician, too, with scant leisure, and know myself, besides, to be without the reading and philosophic lore that might qualify me to undertake the task in its completeness.

But the grand object I have had in view in this volume has been to give the English reader a version in his mother tongue of the 'Ethics' of Spinoza; 'Man's revelation to man of the dealings of God with the world,' as the book, made the subject of their most intimate studies, has long been held by our German brothers and by some few among ourselves.

No work of human genius ever emerged whole and entire from the conceptive mind of man like Aphrodite from the sea or

Pallas from the brain of Jove. It has always been a growth, and been travailed for before it saw the light, not only by its immediate author but by a long line of predecessors. The Ethics of Spinoza is no exception to this rule. That the philosopher himself advanced as he continued to speculate, there can be no question; and the sources whence he may have derived his inspirations have of late been eagerly inquired into. There is no difficulty in detecting the germs of the Ethics in the first publication Spinoza gave to the world as his own—the *Cogitata Metaphysica*, appended to his exposition of the Principles of the Cartesian Philosophy (1603), in the letters of earliest date which we possess (1661-2-3-5); and still more distinctly, because more fully developed, in the lately discovered 'Treatise on God, and on Man and his Well-being,' a Dutch translation of the epitome of his views which Spinoza circulated, in Latin undoubtedly, among his most intimate friends and admirers.*

Spinoza's meeting with the works of Descartes has very commonly been spoken of as the commencement of his proper philosophical life. But he must have been already well versed in Jewish and mediæval philosophy before he had seen a page of Descartes, and he certainly owes far less to the French writer for the distinguishing features of his system than to the study of Averrhoes, Aben Ezra, and the writers of his own people. He has also been held to have been largely indebted to the writings of the Cabbalists for his views; and there can be little doubt of his having been influenced to some extent by these, though he only speaks of their authors to scout their mystical trifling. As to the notion lately put forth that he had the Rabbi Creskas, Alpakhar for his particular master,† the statement seems to have been ventured on the strength of his having once quoted Rabbi Creskas to differ from him.

There is one writer, however, who is not mentioned by Spinoza, to whom he was unquestionably largely and immediately indebted. This is Giordano Bruno, of Nola,‡

* Korte Verhandeling van God, den Mensch, en deszelfs Welstand, first published complete by Dr Van Vloten in his Supplementum ad B. de Spinoza Opera, 12mo, Amst. 1862, with a Latin translation. Subsequently by Dr C. Schaarschmidt (the Dutch Text), with an admirable preface. 8vo. Amst. 1869.

† Don Chasdi Creskas' religiös-philosophische Lehre, &c., dargestellt von M. Joel. 8vo. Breslau, 1866.

‡ The several works of Bruno are of extreme rarity; but they have been collected and published in two neat volumes by Dr Ad. Wagner: Opere di Giordano Bruno Nolano, raccolte da Ad. Wagner Dottore. 8vo. Leipzig, 1830.

a man of genius and learning, theologian, metaphysician, natural philosopher, and poet in one; deeply versed in classical and mythological lore, familiar with all the science of his age, interpreter of the views of Copernicus to his countrymen and so the herald of Galileo, but an opponent of the Aristotelian philosophy, hostile to the Church, and doomed to a fiery death by the cowled bigots whom he despised, because of his avowed belief that this earth is but one among a multitude of worlds, the work of God's power and the ceaseless objects of his care.*

To Jacobi,† who had so great a part in rescuing Spinoza from the neglect in which he had long lain, is due the credit of having first shown certain points of resemblance between the views of Spinoza and those of Bruno. Jacobi quotes but one of Bruno's works, however; and there are others extant of still higher significance than that he cites. These have all been carefully studied since he wrote; by none so ably or so fully as by Dr Chr. Sigwart, and Dr R. Avenarius.‡

On turning to Bruno we are indeed amazed to find so much which seems to constitute the very essence of Spinozism, that in the present day we should hold the man who borrowed so freely as our philosopher has certainly done from his predecessor to be guilty of unmitigated plagiarism did he fail to acknowledge his obligation. In Spinoza's day, however, it was not customary to quote authorities or to refer to predecessors; and our philosopher's general acknowledgment of his indebtedness to the many able writers who had preceded him may suffice to acquit him of any idea of arrogating to himself the thoughts and conclusions of others.

The idea of God as the sole and only Being or Substance,—the very heart of Spinozism, is most distinctly enunciated by Bruno. It is, however, much older than either Bruno or Spinoza; lying as it does at the root of the Oriental, Jewish, and mediæval philosophies, with which Bruno, follower of Marsilio Ficino, Pico de Mirandola, Abelard, and the Schoolmen, had been indoctrinated, and our Spinoza, student of the Talmud and the Jewish and

* Berti, Vita di Giordano Bruno, p. 282, et seq. Rl. 8vo. Torino, 1868.

† Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza. 8vo. Breslau, 1789.

‡ Spinoza's neuentdeckter Tractat von Gott, dem Menschen, und dessen Glückseligkeit. Von Dr Chr. Sigwart. 8vo. Gotha, 1866. Ins Deutsche übersetzt. 8vo. Tübingen, 1870.

Ueber die beiden ersten Phasen des Spinozistischen Pantheismus, und das Verhältniss der zweiten zur dritten Phase. Von Richard Avenarius, Dr Ph. 8vo. Leipzig, 1868.

Arabian writers of the Middle Ages, was made acquainted by his Rabbinical teachers of Amsterdam.

Bruno is full of the Unity of Being. Everything is *One*, says he, and this unity is the end and aim of all philosophy.* God is the Infinite All; the prime and universal Substance, of himself excludes all delimitation, and is not to be sought beyond the universe and the infinity of things, but within this and these.† No clearer enunciation of the Immanence of God in nature can be made than this. Elsewhere he proceeds: Why think of any two-fold substance, one corporeal, another spiritual, when in sum these have but one essence and one root; for corporeal substance, which manifests or presents to us that which it involves, must be held a thing divine, parent of natural things: if you think aright you will find a divine essence in all things.‡ To Bruno, consequently, the ideal and the real, thought and extension, have the same significance as to Spinoza. To both alike the world of ideas is no greater and no other than the world of things. Power, too, is consentient with act: whatever *is* was possible, and all that *was possible* is. How should we imagine that God had ever been passive or indifferent, and not done that which he had the power to do—*essendo in lui il possere et il fare, tutto uno*—power and performance being one in him? §

Spinoza, nevertheless, went beyond Bruno in his conception of the Intimate Oneness of all things, of the Infinite and the Finite. Bruno could sever the transcendental from the formal or real; Spinoza, in the Ethics, at least, never sees them save as inseparable. Bruno sometimes even speaks of the supernatural, a word unknown to Spinoza. 'The highest contemplation which transcends nature,' says Bruno, 'is impossible and null to him who is without belief; for we attain to this by supernatural not by natural light; and such light they have not who hold all things to be corporeal and who do not seek Deity beyond the infinite world and the infinity of things, but within this and these.' ‖

* Opere da Wagner, Vol. I. p. 275.

† Ib. II. p. 25, 28, 30, and I. p. 130, 237, 275.

‡ Ib. I. p. 264. § Ib. II. p. 25.

‖ Want of space forbids me to pursue this subject further. The reader is therefore referred to the treatises of Sigwart and Avenarius, the titles of which are given above, and to Dr Schaarschmidt's edition of the Korte Verhandeling, for further information, if he would rather not turn to Dr Wagner's Opere di Bruno, which will be found no less interesting than important, and stript of their pleonasms without the obscurity that has been connected with them.

To understand Spinoza, and even to find an apology for the repulsive form in which he has chosen to set forth his philosophy, we must appreciate to the full the influence which the mathematical idea had upon his mind.* Mathematical science was the peculiar study of the age in which Spinoza lived, and truth, Spinoza thought, would even have lain hid from mankind for ever, had they not had the mathematics as a guide in its research—God himself was even spoken of as the great Geometrician. In the hands of Kepler, Galileo, Newton, and Leibnitz, the higher analysis had wrung, as it were, and was still wringing from nature many of her most remote and, as it seemed, most inaccessible secrets; and that which had been achieved by its means in the world of matter was believed to be within reach of its powers not only in the world of mind, but of the sphere presumed to transcend both mind and matter.

The mathematician and metaphysician seem, it is true, to ordinary minds to have the subjects of their intellection in most dissimilar spheres; but our philosopher makes light of any such distinction, and proceeds to treat of mind and morals, intelligence and emotion, God and the nature of things, precisely as if they were 'figures, areas, and solids.'

To the mathematician nothing is or can come to pass that may not be investigated; and all that is and that happens is as necessary as the conclusion which follows from a theorem demonstrated. Taking in hand the weapons supplied by the mathematical armoury, the metaphysician therefore postulates the power to know, and the knowableness of things; he recognizes no existence that may not be demonstrated, and no conclusion that is not necessary. In the same way, further, as mathematical truths bear no relation to time, do not flow out of one another, but are all consentient and co-existent, the sequence in which they present themselves to us is equivalent to eternal co-existence as well as necessity. When, for instance, from the nature of the triangle or the circle we deduce one property after another, we do not conceive the truths elicited to follow each other in time, or to depend on one another; all were simultaneously comprised in the nature of the figures investigated; all the conclusions attained in succession were pre-existent, and are necessary and eternal.

* This point is very ably treated by Dr K. Fischer, whom I follow here, in his Geschichte der neuern Philosophie, B. I. 2te Abth. S. 215, et seq. 2te Aufl. 1865.

It is not wonderful that a system of mind and morals, and of the relations between the human and divine, treated on such a basis, should have a rigid and repellent look, and should so constantly have alarmed the timid and emotional among mankind. The form in which Spinoza presents his philosophy is, in truth, as Dr Kuno Fischer has aptly said, the Gorgon's head from which men turned averse. Yet it was Impersonated Wisdom, with the cold grey eyes, that bore the head upon her breast; and man could not look on her even lovingly without beholding the snaky hair as well, finding not death alone, but healing also—death to ignorance, life in knowledge won; for so it is assuredly with him who reverently questions nature, who lifts with pious hands the veil of truth and looks her boldly in the face: in God's ordinances, which are absolute truth, there is neither death nor discomfiture, but freedom and life. And even so do I regard Spinozism. The truth that is in it is salutary and eternal, for it is of God; the error is of a kind that cannot harm; and the stoicism and rigidity are more in appearance than in reality: pity and commiseration are foolishness and objectionable, but he who feels not pity and commiseration is not human (Ethics, Schol. to Prop. L. Pt IV., and Schol. to Prop. XXVII. Pt. III.).

As each new proposition in the mathematics follows one that has gone before, this another that has preceded, and this yet another and another, until the chain of sequences leads back to a fundamental proposition or axiom, so, if the order and mutual relations of the universe of things and of mind be conceived mathematically, or as a system of sequences, the aggregate of these must lead back to a First Cause, no effect of any antecedency, but Primordial Efficiency, Unconditioned Cause of itself and of all things else. As the sum of mathematical truth is comprised in the axiom, so is the sum of Being comprised in its Prime; and the universe then follows in the same way as mathematical truth follows from axiom. The fundamental axiom or postulate in Spinozism, therefore, is a Self-Existing First Cause, in which is comprised, on which depends, from which follows the universe of things; and using the words depends and follows here, sequence in the same sense as mathematical dependence and sequence is implied: the universe is not to be conceived as arising, or beginning to be; it IS, and from eternity it WAS; and is consequently understood by Spinoza as both necessary and eternal.

The views of Spinoza, entirely rational, lead him to pre-

sume that the intellectual powers of man, properly applied, are adequate to solve the problem which philosophy proposes, viz. the clear and certain knowledge of natural things and of their mutual relations and connections. Spinoza's views have, therefore, nothing in common with the scepticism which denies the possibility of all philosophy, or the mysticism that would explain nature by supernatural revelations and incomprehensible fancies. They recognize the perfect accordance between the knowable and the real, acknowledge no gap between idea or mental conception and its object. In such comprehensive cognition is involved the existence and order of things conceived as Cause; and it is the manifestation of power in the existence and order of the universe, referred to a First Cause, which brings the system of Spinoza under the characteristic designation of *Pantheism*. When we have not only conceived no chasm between God and the world, but, on the contrary, have assumed a connection that is appreciable, the pantheistic idea is a necessary sequence; so that pantheism, rightly understood, is nothing more than the assertion of the Divine omnipotence, or the opposite of the popular Dualism —God on the one hand, the world on the other; as it is also the reverse of the Atheism which denies a first cause, and refers power and action alike to the brute matter of the universe. Pantheism and rationalism, therefore, stand side by side and correlated. Solving the problem of rational knowledge in his particular way, as Spinoza essays to do, his system by its nature is necessarily pantheistic.

Pantheism, however, is by no means the distinguishing feature of Spinozism, as commonly supposed. By Spinoza God is indeed assumed as at once the eternal orderer and the eternal order of the universe; but wherein the order consists is an open question: it may be natural or moral, material or spiritual, assume the eternity of nature, or recognize creation in time. And when we know that Spinoza conceived SUBSTANCE as the sole essence and entity, and find him using the words substance and God as synonymous terms—Substantia sive Deus, we want nothing more to bring his doctrine under the title of pantheism in the most comprehensive sense of the word,—doctrine, however, as old as the speculative thought of man, of all the ancient and influential philosophers of civilized Greece, and the poet philosophers of Rome, of the Hebrew prophets, as Spinoza himself believes, of Jesus of Nazareth, as interpreted by the Neoplatonic author of the Fourth Gospel, of the great apostle and second founder of Christianity, St Paul,

and forced upon, as it is consciously or unconsciously adopted by, almost every free and gifted mind. Vide Note at end of General Introduction.

'Substance or God,' Essential Being, says Spinoza, 'is that which is in itself and is conceived by itself; or is that the concept of which requires the concept of nothing else from which it is formed.' The Idea of God is therefore assumed as an intuitive conception of the mind of man; it is the object, ideate, or reality of a power possessed by him. GOD, consequently, IS. How is God to be more nearly known by apprehensive man? by what properties may he be recognized? God, says our philosopher, is the Absolutely Infinite Being, or Substance constituted by an infinity of attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence.

Absolute Infinity is the Absolute All. Outside of infinity there is nothing; within it nothing but itself: the ONE and the ALL therefore. Were there more substances than one they must differ in some way from one another; one would be what the other is not, not be what the other is; each would be limited, its character of infinity annulled, and the unconditioned infinite cease to be what it is—which is absurd. There is no plurality of substances, therefore, but one substance only,—or, as Spinoza has it himself: 'Save God no other substance can either be or be conceived to be.' But the one substance, he says, comprises or is constituted by an infinity of ATTRIBUTES. What are these?

Entity *per se* is mere matter of unconditioned consciousness to us—Substance, God *is;* but we know not WHAT God or Substance is. We attain to some knowledge of the kind by the power we possess of comprehending one or more of the *infinite attributes* comprised in and expressive of the nature of Essential being. An attribute, therefore, has been held to be a property which the understanding apprehends in the Essence of Substance, or as a principle in its nature, and so present in the percipient mind rather than in Substance itself. God, nevertheless, as thinking entity, must himself have ideas of all that pertains to his essence.

Of the infinity of Attributes which pertain to Substance we particularly apprehend two only—Thought and Extension. God is conceived as Thinking Substance when he is apprehended by the mind under the attribute of Thought; and as Extended Substance when he is conceived under the attribute of Extension. But thinking substance and extended substance are not two substances distinct from one another, but

the One substance apprehended by the mind of man now under this attribute, now under that; and Spinoza held that the human understanding was competent to cognize God under none other of his attributes save these two; and because of this: that the percipient mind or the idea of the body existing in act has nothing in itself but thought and extension (vide Letter LXVI.).

The One and the All, beyond which nothing is or can be —God, must comprehend the universe of things in himself. But God is the Infinite, the world is the Finite, and finity consorts not with infinity; for limitation implies negation, and refers to nonentity, not to being. Finite things, therefore, are no existences *per se;* they are realities only in so far as they are the varied expressions or forms of the changeless Substance. In metaphysical language they are entitled MODES or AFFECTIONS of Substance. And Mode or AFFECTION is then defined to be that which is in something else by which it is conceived (Ethics, Pt I. Def. 5). The immediate antecedent to Mode is Attribute, and attribute is the concept which the mind forms of substance, i. e. of God; so that mode is in God, and is only conceived through God (Ethics, Pt I. Prop. XXIV.). All that is, therefore, is in God; and nothing is and nothing can be conceived to be without God (Ethics, Pt I. Props. XV., XVIII., and XXIII.), so that modes are to substance very much what its waves are to the ocean,*—appearances on the face of reality, not things apart from but merged in it; expressions in certain definite ways of the attributes of God in his oneness and infinity.

Infinite, changeless, and eternal, God is cause of himself and of all things else. Nothing, therefore, exists independently or in virtue of power inherent in itself; all is dependent on and determined by God. God is consequently to be conceived as at once necessary and Immanent or abiding, not as extrinsic or Transient cause; for he is not only the efficient but the essential cause of the existence of things. God, however, as cause of himself and of all things is further to be accounted Free cause of all. That is Free, says Spinoza, which exists by the sole necessity of its nature, and by itself alone is moved to action, as that is Constrained which is determined by another to be as it is and to act as it does. Now as God is cause of the existence and action of the

* Erdmann, Wissensch. Darstell. der Gesch. der neuern Philosophie, B. I. 2te Abth. S. 64. 8vo. Leipz. 1836; and Grundriss der Gesch. d. Philos. B. II. S. 51. gr. 8vo. 1866.

universe of things, and as it is in this divine efficiency that the power of God resides, no distinction can be made between the Essence and the power, the Being and the Act of God. Things *being*, could not therefore but *be*; and being *as they are* they could have been *no other than they are*; for God acts freely and necessarily at once; his freedom being equivalent to eternal power, his necessity to eternal existence: primordial self-cause and so free cause of all, and all necessary because all is as it is. The freedom which Spinoza connects with the nature of God is therefore that of Cause, not of Will. God with him is *causa libera*, not *libera voluntas*—free cause, not free will; for in his system the ideas commonly connected with freedom and will in reference to God as powers arbitrarily to do this or that, to leave this or that undone, have no place. God exists necessarily, yet freely; for he exists by the sole necessity of his nature; and acting as he has acted, could not in virtue of his perfection have acted otherwise. 'You see therefore,' says he, 'that I place freedom here, not in free resolve, but in free necessity' (Letters XXIII. and LXII.). 'I hold,' he continues elsewhere, 'that from the infinite power or infinite nature of God all has necessarily followed, or by the same necessity follows as from eternity it has followed and from eternity it will follow that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles.'

From the foregoing conceptions of infinite substance follows of mathematical necessity the conception of infinite efficiency, as from the idea of extension follows that of infinite space—of limitless being or existence, therefore; for as space infinite can have no boundary within which it is, outside of which it is not, it is even as impossible to conceive limits to infinite existence:—to conceive aught out of or beyond God, and so to determine or limit him, were virtually to deny him; for all determination is negation.

The absolutely infinite being, then, is also and necessarily indeterminate, unconditioned, without form, parts, or proportions. 'If the nature of God consist not in this or in that *kind* of being, but in *all* being, then must the predicates referred to such a nature also express absolute, infinite, and necessary being' (Letter XLI.). But without determination of any kind, without a single condition whereby one being is distinguished from another, there can be no self-determination, no self-consciousness as distinct from endless existence. Such ideas as individuality and personality, therefore, are incompatible with the idea of infinitely existing being:

Infinite, Unconditioned, God is necessarily Impersonal.

'To the speculation of the present day,' says the highest living authority on such abstruse subjects, God is as little a person beside or over other persons as he is mere universal substance, in the Divine essence of which to conceive implanted personality (Insichsetzen der Persönlichkeit) were an incongruity. God is the eternal movement of the universal ceaselessly becoming subject, first attaining objectivity and true reality in the subjective, and so comprehending the subject in his abstract individuality (Fürsichsein): Infinite and eternal or abstract personality gives issue from himself to his other self,—Nature, in order that he may return eternally as self-conscious idea or spirit to himself. The personality of God, therefore, must not be conceived as an individuality. Instead of personifying the absolute, we must learn to conceive the absolute as personified in the infinity of things.*

The denial of personality to God is of course much older than Spinoza, and forms no peculiar feature of his doctrine. Passing by the views of older writers † we find Descartes, when he follows the Church to which he professes adhesion, speaking of God as apart and distinct from the world; but when he presents himself as philosopher he uses such language as this: 'Par la nature considérée en général, je n'entends maintenant autre chose que Dieu même, ou bien l'ordre et la disposition que Dieu a établi dans les choses créés.'—Sixième Méditation.

Descartes was, therefore, pantheist at heart, and has very generally, and by way of reproach, been held to have been the writer who inoculated our philosopher with his pantheistic ideas. Leibnitz also professed to believe in God as an extra- or supra-mundane intelligence, though there are passages in his works that readily bear a different interpretation. Spinoza finally, following Giordano Bruno and using his very language, conceives God as the Immanent cause and essence of all things, extrinsically manifested in nature, and only acquiring self-consciousness, will, and understanding—or what we conceive as personality—in the universe of things at large and in the mind or soul of man in particular. As first efficient immanent and ever present cause God is therefore designated by him *natura naturans;* as manifested in what we call creation he is spoken of as *natura naturata.* In

* Strauss, Christliche Glaubenslehre, B. I. S. 502.

† Many of whom are quoted by Dr Strauss in his Glaubenslehre, I., 502.

so far, therefore, as cause is distinct from effect, God, according to Spinoza, is not the material universe, but its cause—he denies emphatically, indeed, that he believes God and the material universe to be one and the same (Letter XXI.). Spinoza's view as interpreted by the present writer appears to accord very closely with and may have anticipated the result of that which Dr Strauss delivers as the result of modern speculation on the nature of God. The God of philosophy, therefore, is not the God in whom unspeculative man believes, —a Prince and Ruler, seated on a throne with angels and archangels around him to do his bidding, but Cause and Effect in one, Efficiency primordial and persistent, manifest in the sum of things and in the apprehensive mind of man.

With personality inconceivable and so denied, all that can only be connected with personality is logically detached from the philosophical idea of God. 'To the nature of God,' says Spinoza, 'belongs neither understanding nor will' (Ethics, Pt I. Prop. XVII. Schol.). But when we have THOUGHT as one of the two attributes of God whereby he is immediately known to us, when we conceive that thought without consciousness is a nonentity, and find repeated references to the 'infinite intelligence of God,' to the 'love wherewith God loves himself,' it is only such understanding and will and sense as pertain to the nature of man that are denied to Deity. Terms of comparison as between the understanding and will of God and the understanding and will of man, are in fact wholly wanting. The qualities and powers so designated have really nothing in common but the titles; they are as little alike as the constellation Sirius or the Dog star in the heavens is like the barking animal we call dog upon earth (Ethics, Pt I. Prop. XVII. Schol.).

And let the distinction of our philosopher be noted here which leads in another sense to the denial of understanding and will to God as the infinite substance. Predicates, determinations, conditions, according to him, consort not with the essential nature of God—the Self-existing, Unconditioned and Absolute; they only belong to the nature of things—the effects or actualities of God. Will and understanding are modes of God's attribute of thought, and God himself or substance is logically anterior both to attribute and mode: attribute being that through which we attain to some conception of God, mode an affection which we conceive in attribute. If God conceived as efficient nature be distinguished from God conceived as affected or passive nature,

will and understanding as things determinate must pertain to the latter, cannot be connected with the former. 'Are will and understanding within the realm of determinate things,' says our perfectly consequent reasoner, 'it is clear that they act as determined and necessary, not as free causes. And as God cannot be brought within the sphere of the conditioned or constrained, it is obvious that his acts are not acts of volition; for will as mode and so determinate can be free cause of nothing' (Ethics, Pt I. Prop. XXXII.).

With will and understanding thus logically abrogated, action on the part of the Supreme towards definite ends, and particularly with what is called *The Good* in view is as matter of course denied. God does not act in view of ends or aims; neither, in especial does he act in respect of *The Good—sub ratione boni*, as so constantly maintained. If we recognize the applicability of the mathematical method and admit the premisses on which the reasonings that lead to the foregoing conclusions are based, we cannot refuse to go along with our philosopher; and if we conceive, as we are intuitively and even logically forced to conceive, God as the absolutely infinite and perfect being, every perfect attribute with its inherent modes is necessarily involved in the divine nature. God consequently had never to think and to conclude, to ponder and contrive, in any human sense; self existent, free cause of all, absolute omniscience and omnipotence were his, and his act—the universe—followed not of fore- but of cognate thought and will: things as they are, each determined to be as it is, must therefore be regarded as the effect of the understanding, will, and act of God in one; or, as Goethe has it, using the word nature in the sense of God:

> In Nature see nor shell nor kernel,
> But the ALL in All and the Eternal.

God over all, in all, free yet necessary cause of all, things are necessarily determined in their essence as in their existence to be as they are: apt for the parts they have to play in their several spheres, weaponed for the ends they have to accomplish, and determined in their powers of action. They have no power of self-determination; for each depends on an antecedent cause, this on another, this on yet another, and so on to infinity, until we reach the First cause, cause of itself and cause of all = God. There is therefore nothing in the nature of things that is contingent—all is necessary and eternal: being as it is, nothing could have been other than it is; and efficient cause and final cause—power, purpose, and act—are one.

This absolute necessity and fitness of things is the consequence, and to us the assurance, of the perfection of God. Result of consummate perfection, the constitution and order of the world are necessarily perfect, and perfectly necessary. To conceive that these might have been other than they are, were equivalent to conceiving God possessed of another nature than that wherewith, in view of his perfection, we are forced to believe him endowed. But were it even conceded that God acted as Will not as Cause, it would nevertheless follow from his All-perfection that things could have been no other than they are, and connected and correlated no otherwise than as they are. All acknowledge that it is by the decree of God that each several thing is what it is; and further, that all the decrees of God are from eternity. But as in eternity there is neither a when, a before, nor an after, it follows from the perfection of God alone that he never did aught and never could have decreed aught otherwise than as he has done and has decreed. The divine decree as it has ever been what it is, so will it ever be what it is—changeless and eternal. A different decree would imply a different nature in its author, i. e. a God other than the God we know in the world. The order and nature of things ordained of God, therefore, was and is even as necessary and unchanging as himself: in a word, the will, the decree, and the act of God are consentaneous and eternal,—all is as it could best be; ends to be accomplished and accomplished ends (the copulates or means to ends implied) are coëxistent and consentaneous.

The view that subjects all to indifferent, arbitrary, or capricious will, however, to a will that might have been other than it is manifested to be—Spinoza declares to be less wide of the truth, than the opinion of those who think that God does all *under the idea of the Good*, the good of man being especially implied. These persons, says he, seem to put something beyond God, which does not depend on him, to which he looks as a pattern, at which he aims as a mark. But this is neither more nor less than to subject God to a kind of fate, whereby the necessity of things is not explained, but the freedom of God is abrogated. How shall such conceptions be entertained of God, first, sole, free cause of all things? 'Let us not waste words in refuting such absurdities,' says our rarely indignant philosopher.

If God act not as will but as cause, then is the world no work of divine volition; and if he act not for ends, it is no stage for the display of divine purposes. It is, in brief, the

effect of the divine agency, nothing more; and the order of nature is then to be conceived as indissolubly bound in the chain of causation. Nature—the Universe—is the power of God in outward act; and the power of God being the very essence of God, we arrive at the equation: God and Nature—God, Cause, primordial and unconditioned; Nature, Effect, conditioned manifestion of his power; differing therefore in so far as Cause differs from Effect, but consonant inasmuch as Cause and Effect are inseparably correlated and conjoined in God. 'I think I show,' says our author, 'with sufficient clearness that all follows from the infinite nature of God by the same necessity as from the nature of the triangle it follows that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles.'

Over all, in all, all in all, there is, there can be nothing outside of or beyond God. Were it otherwise he would not be what he is—the Infinite and Eternal. He would be no more than the Hebrew Elohim, or Jehovah, with the world beside or beneath him. The dualism of God and the world of the Hebrew writers, therefore, disappears before the unisonous conception of Spinoza. Elohim may indeed have come, as he did come at length, to be regarded not merely as the greatest among the gods, but as the one God by the elite of the barbarous Semitic tribe whom the course of events in the world has conspired to give to Europe as its masters in historical religion. But the Jehovah of the later Jew, one though he was, had still the world beside or beneath him. He ruled, moreover, like a sovereign prince at his good will and pleasure, having his partialities and preferences, taking from one, giving to another, having mercy on whom he would have mercy, and so on—no infinite being, in a word, but conditioned and finite; not the true God, therefore, but an idol in human form, possessed of powers surpassing those of man, indeed, but obnoxious also to most of the passions and weaknesses of humanity—jealousy, anger, &c.

If Spinoza sees it impossible, with his Semitic forefathers, to conceive God as a personality outside the universe and One, neither can he conceive him as more than one, individualized and still further subjected to the bonds of finality, in consonance with the Aryan idea which has so largely and unhappily interfused Christianity. God to him is the absolutely infinite being who neither dwells alone nor in company with others his peers or subordinates in heaven, but fills the universe with his presence. He is no being, therefore, with whom mankind can reason, to whom they can address petitions

for rain or sunshine, for success in their schemes, for help in their troubles, for the discomfiture of their enemies and even the supply of their most material wants. And though Spinoza himself informs us that he does not deny the use of prayers, the use, the profit is to the mind of the party praying; for to suppose that his prayer influences the Supreme were childish. Spinoza's own and only prayer was meditation on the infinite perfections of God, his worship obedience to the eternal laws ordained by Him for the government of the world.

And this leads us here as in our text to note one of Spinoza's special claims to the consideration of mankind, viz.: his broad assertion of the eternal changeless character of the natural laws of God,* accepted unconditionally now in the world of science, still very far, it is much to be deplored, from being admitted in the world of morals and religion. Well would it assuredly be for mankind were God preached to them as the author of eternal, changeless, and inexorable law, and neither a deity to be bought off from his resolves, by a price of any kind, even the sacrifice of that which is nearest and dearest, as the Jews of old conceived him; nor by lip-service or even heartfelt repentance to be induced to pardon sin, condone misdeed, and take the evil-doer into his favour, as the modern Christians hold. God verily is no king or minister of state who, at his arbitrary will and pleasure, remits the sentence of the righteous judge. God never forgives transgression, but exacts to the uttermost the penalties he has attached to every infraction of his eternal decrees: abusing our natural powers and appetites, or exposing ourselves to influences inimical to health, we fall sick; taking poison, we die; putting to sea in leaky and over-laden ships, we are drowned. God, in a word, is not one

> Who turns pre-ordinance and first decree
> Into the law of children;

and were this great truth insisted on in the world, men might very fairly be expected to be more reasonable than they are, less the slaves of their lusts and passions, and more observant of all that is due to others.†

Spinoza's assertion of the eternal and changeless nature of the laws of God leads him consistently to the denial of miracle. God the same, yesterday, to-day, and for ever, never varied in

* Conf. Tract. Theol. Polit. Chap. V. Of the Divine Law and Ethics, *passim*.

† Conf. the Creed of Christendom by W. Rathbone Gregg, where this subject is clearly enunciated and ably treated. 8vo. Second Ed. Lond. 1868.

his decrees; and as he never intervened himself to hinder one of these of its effect, so did he never suffer intervention to such an end by another. Miracles which by the vulgar and uninformed are accepted as the best testimonies to the presence and power of God, are, on the contrary, to the educated the most certain assurance of the worthlessness of the record to the truth of which they are adduced as evidence. 'Miracles conceived as events contravening the established order of nature are so far from proving the existence of God that they would actually lead us to call it in question; * * * whether conceived as above or contrary to nature a miracle is a sheer absurdity,' *—a conclusion in perfect harmony with the unchanging nature of God as alone conceivable in a consistent philosophy.

The irreconcileableness of Spinoza's conception of Deity with the dogmatic teaching of the Roman Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinistic, and other Christian Churches need not be insisted on. But that Spinoza himself and his pious friends the tolerant Mennonites did not think it incongruous with the views of the founder of Christianity, in other words, with the religion of Christ in contradistinction to the various systems of religion called Christian extant in the world, there can be no question.† Spinoza oftener than once refers to Jesus of Nazareth as an embodiment in time of the eternal wisdom of God, i. e. as a man so largely gifted with all the higher powers of mind, that when he spake it was as if the Supreme himself were setting forth his eternal decrees of love and obedience in articulate sounds immediately to the ears of men. 'I have made up my mind,' said Professor Welcker, after completing his great work on Mythology or the origin of human faith in things divine, and but shortly before his death, 'that the essence of pure religion is embodied in Christianity; and the ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY IS MORAL HARMONY WITH GOD THROUGH LOVE OF HIM AND OF HUMANITY.' The mythical and legendary tales and beliefs, accretions of an ignorant age about a great and truly divine man, will all fall away from his teaching and be lost in the lapse of time. But the example he set in his life, the truths he enunciated in the two great commandments of God, the mercy he required and the freedom he proclaimed, will live for ever. Such is the conclusion to which all the teaching of

* Tr. Th. Pol. Chap. vi.

† Vide Pref. to B. de S. Opera posthuma by Jellis and Meyer. 4to. Amst. 1777.

Spinoza tends; such was the faith in which he lived and died.

Passing from the consideration of Substance or Deity, and of attribute and mode, in the abstract, Spinoza in his SECOND PART proceeds to investigate so many of the infinities that follow from the eternal and infinite nature of God as refer to the mind of man. By *body* he understands a mode which expresses the essence of Deity considered under the aspect of extension—by *essence* that without which a thing can neither be nor be conceived to be. By *idea*, again, is to be understood a conception formed by the mind as a thinking entity; and by individual things, things finite and having a determinate existence.

Thought and extension being attributes of God, God has necessarily an idea both of his own essence, and of all that follows of necessity from his essence, and this in virtue of his attribute of thought alone, and because he is a thinking entity, not because he is the object of his thought; and the modes of each attribute have God for their cause in so far only as they are modes of the attribute under which he is considered. It is in virtue of this law that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things; that God's power of thought is equivalent to his power of action; and, further, that the ideas of individual things must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God. The idea of an individual thing existing in act has, therefore, God for its cause; not, however, as he is infinite, but as he is considered to be affected by the idea of another thing existing in act, of which God is also the cause, this second by a third, and so on to infinity.

Substantive being, therefore, belongs not to the essential nature of individual things.

Finite thinking and extended being, in the midst of the infinite, and without substantive being, man is constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God which express the Divine nature in certain determinate ways, and which without God could neither be nor be conceived to be. Now the Prime which constitutes the reality of the human mind is the idea of a certain something existing in act. But idea is prior to mode, mode inhéres in attribute, and attribute pertains to substance—i. e. to God. The mind of man, therefore, is part of the infinite mind of God; so that when we say the mind perceives this or that, we say, in fact, that in the mind of God, in so far as it constitutes the essence of the mind of man, there is present this or that idea. Merged in the divine

essence, man is here seen deprived by Spinoza of his rightful individuality to which he was first restored by Leibnitz and Lessing, Rousseau and Fichte. Spinoza's psychology, nevertheless, though undeveloped, leads to far higher notions than that of our greatest English philosophers—Locke, Berkeley, and the sensationalists generally.

Every idea has its ideate or object—the order and connection of ideas being the same as the order and connection of things—and whatever occurs in the object which is the ideate of the mind, must be perceived by the mind. Now, the object of the mind being the body or a certain mode of extension existing in act, everything that takes place in the body beyond mere organic act, such as digestion, circulation, nutrition, &c., is cognizable by the mind. Were this not so, ideas of the affections of the body would not be in God in so far as he constitutes the essence of our mind, but as he constitutes the essence of something else—i. e. ideas of our bodily affections would not be in our minds; but as we have such ideas, therefore is the actually existing body the object of the idea of the mind. From this it clearly follows that man consists of mind and body, and that the body exists as object of our mental consciousness.

In this way we not only come to know that mind and body are inseparably united, but learn what is to be understood when the union of mind and body is spoken of. To have clear and adequate knowledge of this kind, however, it is necessary to have a thorough knowledge of the body; for beyond question the more perfect the body, and the wider its sphere of perception, the greater is its power of action, and the more competent is its associate mind to perceive, to understand, and to act. From this, and because one body, or, to be more particular, one brain—'the soul's frail dwelling-place,' is more perfect than another, we understand how one mind excels another. The body capable of more, and more varied perceptions, the mind has its ideas augmented in the ratio of the various ways in which the body is affected. The more perfect the organs of the external senses and the parts of the encephalon or brain-mass on which the mental faculties severally depend for their manifestation, the more perfect and powerful are the faculties of the mind.

The mind is only conscious of the existence of the body through ideas of the affections by which the body is influenced; and the mind, as idea of the body, being in God in so far as his attribute of extension is considered, and ideas of

the bodily affections being in God, in so far considered as he constitutes the essence of the mind, mental idea follows and is referred to God in the same way as is the idea of body.

All ideas in so far as they are referred to God are true; and every idea in the mind of man that is adequate or that has, without reference to an object, the intrinsic properties of a true idea, is also true; for in saying we have an adequate idea we say nothing less than that in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of our mind, there is present an adequate idea. And this is the norm or standard of *truth* which we possess. The *false*, on the other hand, is due to the absence of clear and distinct conceptions, proceeds from inadequate or truncated and confused ideas; for there is no reality or thing which constitutes the form or reality of falsehood,—no such mode of thought being conceivable in God. Yet falsehood cannot consist in mere privation; for minds, not bodies, are said to err or to be deceived; neither can it consist in ignorance; for to be ignorant and to err are not one and the same thing. It is the absence of true knowledge involving inadequate conceptions or ideas that is the cause of the false, and perception of the true implies detection of the false; for the true shows the false even as light illumines the dark.

Besides the ideas spoken of thus far and designated common ideas or notions, there are others present in or conceived by the mind which are entitled *transcendental*. These arise from the limited power we have of forming distinct images of many things at once. Beyond a certain limited number the images get confused and blended with one another, and are then grouped together and conceived under one property as it were, and designated *entity, thing, something*, &c. In the same way are attained those notions that are styled universal,—such as *man, horse, dog*, &c.; that only wherein each individual included in the group agrees with its congeners being taken into account by the mind, when an idea confused or inadequate to the last degree is the result.

The knowledge we have from particulars represented confusedly, imperfectly, and without order to the mind is to be entitled knowledge from *vague experience*, as is that also derived from *signs*, from what we *hear, read of*, &c. Such knowledge depends on opinion or imagination, and is characterized by Spinoza as *knowledge of the first kind*. The knowledge we have from common notions and estimates of the properties of things, again, he designates knowledge of the *second kind* or on the ground of reason. In addition to

these two, there is a third kind of knowledge, of the highest order, which he speaks of as *intuitive*, or as 'issuing from adequate ideas of the attributes of God to adequate knowledge of the essences of things.' 'In so far as our mind perceives things truly, it is part of the infinite intelligence of God; and it is as much matter of necessity that all clear and distinct ideas of the mind should be true, as that the idea of God in our mind is a truth.'

As regards REASON, it belongs to its nature to contemplate things as necessary, not as contingent. It is by the IMAGINATION that things are considered as contingent, and this because they are associated in the mind with notions of the past or the future. It even belongs to the nature of Reason to contemplate things under a *certain species of eternity*; for things regarded as necessary are regarded as ever present and as true, i. e. as they are in themselves; and such necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God. Every idea, consequently, of every actually existing body or thing involves the eternal and infinite essence of God, and the knowledge of this essence involved in such idea is adequate and true.

As regards the WILL:—absolute or free will does not pertain to the human mind. For being determined to will this or that by a cause which is itself determined by an antecedent cause, this by a third, and so on to infinity, the mind of itself has no power of willing or of not willing: as a certain determinate mode of Infinite Thought, it is determined to will this or that by a cause without or within itself; and if determined by any cause, it is not free.

Neither is there any absolute faculty in the mind of *understanding, desiring, loving*, &c. These terms either refer to fictitious powers or they are metaphysical or universal titles related to the imagination. Each power of the mind, if it be intellectual, understands or perceives; if it be emotional, it desires, loves, hates, &c. In the mind there are no volitions affirmations or negations other than those which the ideas or conscious perceptions of the mind as such involve. Volition and individual faculty of mind are therefore inseparably conjoined in one.

Having treated of the nature of the mind or soul in so far as thought, idea, perception, and volition enter into its constitution, Spinoza proceeds in the Third Part of his Ethics to speak of its nature as manifested in the Affections or Emotions and of the various characters possessed by these.

Adequate causes he defines to be such as can be clearly and distinctly apprehended by their effects; *inadequate causes*, such as cannot be apprehended by their effects alone.

We *act*, he says, when something takes place within us of which we are ourselves the adequate cause; we *suffer*, on the contrary, when anything takes place within or without us of which we are only partially the cause.

By *Affection* or *Emotion* is implied a state of the body whereby its power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or controlled. If the adequate cause of an affection be in ourselves, an *action* is to be understood; otherwise a *passion* in the sense of suffering is implied; so that as we have adequate ideas our mind *acts*, as we have inadequate ideas it *suffers;* the degree of action being in relation with the extent of the adequate ideas, the measure of suffering in the ratio of the inadequate ideas.

The body has no power of determining the mind to think, nor has the mind any power of determining the body to action—i. e. to motion or rest. For the mind as a mode of God's attribute of thought has God for its cause as thinking, not as extended, entity; and the body as a mode of extension has God as extended, not as thinking, entity for its cause. But that which determines the mind to think is a mode of thought, not of extension; the mind therefore has no power to move the body to action. It is through the attribute of extension, not through that of thought, that the body is moved. Mind and body, however, are virtually one and the same thing, conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under that of extension; so that the order of the actions and passions of the body is of like nature with that of the actions and passions of the mind. Is the *pre-established harmony*, of which Leibnitz and his school have made so much, anything more than is expressed in the above sentence?

Most men, nevertheless, are persuaded that it is the mind which moves the body to action; but in ignorance of what the body can effect by the laws of its proper nature, they who maintain that this or that act of the body is produced by the mind, which is then presumed to have a kind of supremacy over the body, know not what they say. If they hold that the body would be wholly inert were not the mind efficient, we may ask, in turn, whether if the body were inert the mind would not be incompetent for thought, perception, &c.? The mind certainly is not alike apt for thought, &c., at all times; and without integrity in the instruments of its manifestations

it would be unapt at any time; even as the more perfect these instruments are, the more perfect are the acts of the mind. Mind and body are in truth correlatives, and, referred to man, are consentaneous as co-existent, a perfect mind never having been seen save associated with a perfect body or so much of the body perfect as is necessarily connected with the manifestations of the mind. Perfect body—perfect brain being more particularly implied, on the other hand, is necessarily accompanied by the phenomena of mind—perception, emotion, self-consciousness, &c., &c. Many organic acts, however, proceed without our knowledge or consciousness: the heart circulates the blood, the stomach digests the food, &c.

When we say that thought and the other phenomena of mind are connected with or even dependent on organization, we but state an irrefragable truth. Locke, great in intellect, pious in sentiment, virtuous in life, did not think it derogatory to the power or perfection of God to believe that he had seen fit to institute organization as a condition necessary to the manifestation of thought; and the latest and highest of our living authorities on life and organization regards 'thought as bearing the same relation to the brain of man that electricity does to the battery of the torpedo. Both are forms of *force* and effects of the action of their several organs.' *

When we regard things in themselves we discover nothing that can bring them to an end; for the definition of a thing is involved in its essence, which is imperishable, and destruction must therefore imply the agency of an external cause. Every individual thing consequently strives of itself to preserve or to continue in its state of being; and as a mode expressive in a certain definite way of an attribute of God, were there no external agency opposing it and tending to bring it to an end, it would continue in its state for an indefinite length of time.

The effort made by individual things to continue in their state when referred to the mind is spoken of as WILL; when referred to the mind and body in common, it is called APPETITE or DESIRE, which is, therefore, nothing less than the very essence of the nature of things in general, of the human being in particular; it is the principle whence every en-

* Owen, Anat. of Vertebrata, Vol. iii. 8vo. London, 1869. The conclusion here attained, however, is not universally admitted. Some are still of opinion that psychical power is independent of organization. Vide in particular Lotze's Microcosmos, p. 170.

deavour that subserves our preservation flows. We consequently do not desire or strive after anything because we think it good; we think it good because we are moved to strive after and desire it.

The present existence of the mind implying that of the body, whatever increases or diminishes the power of the body to act, also aids or restricts the power of the mind to think. By this we understand how the mind may suffer mutations, now in the sense of greater now in that of less perfection, and so satisfactorily interpret the affections characterized as *joy* and *sorrow*, or pleasure and pain; joy being to be apprehended as an action in which the mind passes to a higher state of perfection, sorrow, on the contrary, as a passion in which it passes to a lower degree of perfection. This view of our philosopher might possibly be expressed in brief did we say that every faculty of the mind and body being active, when gratified in its action, is a source of joy or pleasure, when ungratified or contravened it is a source of sorrow or pain.

The mind is naturally disposed to cherish such thoughts and to imagine such things as augment its powers of action, and indisposed to entertain such thoughts and imaginings as lessen or restrain these powers; and thus do we apprehend how *likings* and *dislikings* arise. To like is to love, and comes of the affection of joy associated with the idea of an external cause; to dislike, again, or to hate, proceeds from the passion of sorrow associated with the idea of an external cause.

Everything may by accident or circumstance be the cause of joy, sorrow, or desire from the mere fact of its bearing relation to something which we love, hate, or desire. Hence arise the feelings of *sympathy*, *antipathy*, and others compounded of these two, when the mind is said to fluctuate between contending emotions.

Joy and sorrow are not connected with events or things present only, but may be associated with such as have passed or are yet to come. In this case there is an obvious element of uncertainty introduced, whence arise the emotions of *Hope* and *Fear*, and various others compounded of these, associated with affections and imaginations of various kinds, such as the grief felt for the loss of that we love, the joy experienced when disaster befalls that we hate, and so on.

The whole of this section of mental philosophy is treated at such length and so clearly by Spinoza that analysis is not wanted to make it easily understood. I would only remark by the way that the word passion is not used by Spinoza in its

common acceptation of excess in the action of one or other of the emotional faculties of the mind, but in its etymological sense of suffering or imperfection due to the influence of confused or inadequate ideas. Anger or rage, for instance, is not owing to exaggerated action of the combative and destructive elements in our nature, but to a state of suffering induced in the mind by confused and inadequate ideas connected with the object of our anger or rage.

The above view of the nature of Passion leads our author immediately to the next part of his Philosophy, in which he treats of the Strength or Predominance of the Passions, which he regards as the Source of human Slavery.

The Fourth part is prefaced by some considerations on Perfection and Imperfection; that being regarded as perfect which agrees with the most general idea we form of a thing, that imperfect which falls short of or does not accord with this. Perfection and imperfection, consequently, are modes of thought merely, not anything in objects themselves—prejudices rather than matters of fact or products of true knowledge. And it is even the same with the things we style *good* and *bad*, goodness and badness being nothing in things considered in themselves but notions or modes of thought originated in the mind from contrasts made between different objects, and conclusions drawn as to the degrees in which they accord with or differ from the ideas we entertain of them. That, however, which is truly useful to us may fairly be styled good, and that which is opposed to this be spoken of as bad.

That by which we are moved to do anything is considered as *appetite* or *desire;* and the capacity we have of doing aught that may be apprehended by the laws of our nature is *virtue* or *power;* but no power can be conceived in the nature of things so great, that another stronger than it may not be imagined. The power of man to continue in existence, for example, is limited and infinitely surpassed by the power of things or causes external to himself. As a part of nature he is, therefore, obnoxious to changes that cannot be understood from his proper nature, but that are due to causes other than any of which he is himself the source. For the power of nature is the power of God himself, not as he is infinite only, but as he is manifested in the nature of individual things—in the present instance, in the essence of man. Were not man obnoxious to changes other than those that may be apprehended from his nature alone, it would follow that,

existing once, he would continue to exist indefinitely, and so be both eternal and infinite—which is absurd. Hence it follows that man is liable to suffer, dominated as he is by external nature, bound to follow its common order, to accommodate himself to its requirements, and to provide for his wants in harmony with its decrees.

The essence of passion, therefore, is no power tending to continue us in our state of being; but the power of an external cause opposed to one within us, and of such potency, it may be, as to surpass it. None of our affections, however, can be either restrained or repressed except by others opposed to and more powerful than those by which we are influenced.

The affections, whose cause is imagined as present to us, are always stronger than those the cause of which is imagined as remote; and those we connect with something we think necessary to us are as a rule stronger than those we imagine as possible or contingent. The desires, moreover, that spring from pleasurable affections are, *cæteris paribus*, more powerful than those that proceed from sorrowful emotions.

Those desires that spring from true knowledge of what is good and what is bad for us, may be ruled and restrained by various desires arising from affections that move us to action. But knowledge of this kind in itself cannot be overruled or restrained by any affection. Hence the significant words of the poet:

> Video meliora proboque, pejora sequor.
>
> We know and we approve the good, and yet the worse pursue!

From the principles thus far enunciated we understand how it comes that men are what they are—obnoxious to passion, inconstant in their resolves, and rebellious to the precepts of reason, though these make no demands against nature, but rather require that every one love himself, strive after that which is truly useful to him and tends to raise him in the scale of existence. Virtuous life indeed is nothing but action in harmony with the laws of nature. The foundation of all true virtue, of all true happiness, lies within the sphere of these laws and their perfect observance; the first and greatest of all, being that which impels us to preserve our minds and bodies in a state of integrity as respects ourselves, in a state of harmony as respects our fellow-men and the things of nature at large. Virtue is therefore to be sought and prized for its own sake, there being nothing more excellent in nature, nothing more advantageous to ourselves,

nothing more beneficial to others: they who live virtuously or by the rule of reason, in benefiting themselves in the highest degree, also benefit the rest of the world to the uttermost.

And here it is that the power of the understanding comes into play; for to act virtuously is to act from knowledge of that which is best, or from adequate ideas, in other words, from appreciation of that which constitutes our proper humanity.

The highest mental good that man can have is the knowledge of God,—the Being absolutely infinite and perfect, without whom nothing is, nothing can be conceived to be. That which is best and most useful to us must therefore be knowledge of this kind; and since it is only as the mind knows that it acts, and only as it acts virtuously that it can be said to act absolutely, the absolute virtue of the mind meets us as understanding. But the sum of all that the mind can know, is God; therefore to know and acknowledge God is the highest faculty or virtue of the mind.

As things that differ entirely in their nature from the nature of man can neither add to nor take from his power of acting, and that which has nothing in common with his nature can neither be good nor bad to him, whilst that on the contrary which has something in common with his nature can not only not be evil but must necessarily be good; so passion, as implying impotency or negation, can not only not aid but must necessarily restrain action. Now as men, in so far as they are subject to passion, cannot be said to accord with nature; and as their passions are various both in kind and degree, therefore are they changeable, inconstant, and oftentimes opposed and hostile to one another. It is only, indeed, and in so far as they live by the rule of reason and are obedient to the higher sentiments of their nature, that men accord and dwell together in peace and amity. So dwelling, by the pre-established harmony of nature or providence of God things are so correlated that that which each individual desires for himself and enjoys as truly good, may also be desired and enjoyed by all. For mainly, if not wholly as involving all, does this consist in love of God, in ceaseless efforts to attain to a higher knowledge of the Supreme as he is manifested in the material universe and the mind of man, and in yielding willing obedience to his eternal laws.

These grand and comprehensive views lead our philosopher to the consideration of man's relations with the things and circumstances surrounded by which he lives; all that is

desired and all that is done in so far as man has the Idea of God and acknowledges God supreme over all, being referred to RELIGION; all that is desired and done well, in so far as our fellow-men are concerned, and as we ourselves are disposed to lead lives in conformity with reason, being referred to PIETY (*Pietas, Honestas*), whence the FAMILY, SOCIETY, and the POLICIED STATE. Spinoza therefore interprets Religion less as a *Cultus*, than as Morality. Everything consequently that conduces to amity and good-understanding among men is as commendable and advantageous, as that is objectionable and injurious which leads to difference, hatred, and hostility. Such emotions as joy, cheerfulness, mirth, are therefore good; whilst hatred, anger, revenge, and the like, are bad. 'Cheerfulness and merriment are the sunshine of existence, and nothing but sour and sorry superstition denounces and calls them evil.' 'No Divinity, none but an envious demon, could take delight in my misery. Nor do tears and groans and superstitious terrors—all signs alike of impotency of mind, ever lead to virtuous life; the more, on the contrary, our minds are joyfully possessed, to the higher perfection do we rise, the more truly do we participate in the divine nature.'

The emotions of *Hope* and *Fear* are not good in themselves; hope being always associated with doubt, which is a sorrow, and fear being a very positive form of evil. [Yet hope in the midst of the sorrow that comes of lacerated affection and unmerited misfortune is a good, as it keeps the mind elate; and the fear that is akin to caution may prove of real service. And then are there truly any emotions that are either good or bad in themselves? Is it not rather the use of our powers under given circumstances that deserves the titles good and bad?—we may do well to be angry, to feel contempt, &c.]

Pity and *commiseration* are closely allied to sorrow and pain, so that the acts to which they lead are not always truly good. 'He who lives by the rule of reason and knows that all things come to pass by the necessity of the divine nature in virtue of eternal changeless laws, finds nothing in his path that truly deserves hatred, contempt, or pity; he strives to do well and passes on his way; whilst he who is readily moved by the sorrows and misfortunes of others often does acts at the moment of which he sees reason to repent him afterwards. I here speak, however, of the man who is led by abstract reason; for he who should be moved neither by reason nor pity to be serviceable to others would rightly be called inhuman.' [Our philosopher's stoicism therefore is but skin deep; though it is

indeed a grave question whether indiscriminate charity—statutory and private—is not a great and growing evil, productive rather of profligacy and improvidence than of good.]

Spinoza's assertion of self-preservation as the first of human virtues unless restricted, is inconsistent with much of his philosophy. As regards the mere animal nature it may be accepted; but it grates against the higher nature and the moral sense of man. In their self-sacrifice for the cause of right and truth as they apprehended it, noble-minded men have made the world their debtors for ever, and in their fiery deaths 'have kindled flames that can never be put out.'

Partiality for worth and *contentment* consort with reason and are good; *discontent, self-abasement, pride, vain-glory,* are generally evil; and *penitence* as akin to grief is to be accounted evil: 'he who repents is twice miserable; for he has suffered himself first to be misled by base desire, and then to be overcome by sorrow for his deed. Nevertheless as men rarely live by the rules of reason, humility and repentance may bring more of good than evil in their train.'

Pride, Haughtiness, Self-elation, and their opposites *abjectness, despondency,* &c., are indications of ignorance and poverty of spirit, and as they are unreasonable so are they evil.

Ambition and the *love of glory, vanity* and the desire of distinction, though working mischief in the world, yet may they also do good. Sources of care and anxiety and so evils to the individual, they still spur men on 'To scorn delights and live laborious days' to the advantage of the world at large.

Most or all of the acts which follow from emotion or passion, may also proceed from the dictates of reason, and thus be absolutely good. Were men free in fact as they believe themselves to be, they would have no conception of good and evil. He who lived by the rule of reason would have adequate ideas only, and as he could form no idea of evil, neither could he have any of its opposite—good: he would be absolutely free. It is only when he departs from reason, and acts from inadequate ideas, that he learns to distinguish between Good and Evil; that he falls from a state of innocency into one of sin, yields like the brutes to his lusts and passions, has his eyes opened and loses his freedom. Such is the interpretation our philosopher puts on the tale of the First man, as conceived by the writer of the second history of Creation contained in the Book of Genesis. The state of freedom is recovered, however, when man, led by the Spirit of Christ, in other words, by the Idea of God, desires that the

good he covets for himself should be enjoyed by others also, when he vanquishes hatred by love, knows that all things come to pass by the necessity and perfection of the divine nature, and that everything impious, unjust, and base—in a word, Evil, arises from perturbed, confused, and truncated conceptions of the things and laws of the universe.

This conclusion brings us directly to the Fifth Part of the Ethics, which treats of the power of the Understanding, or Human Freedom.

It is in the same way as the thoughts or ideas of things are ordered and concatenated in the mind that the affections of the body or the images of things are ordered and connected in the body. Affections cease to be passions so soon as clear and distinct ideas of their nature have been formed in the mind, and are ever the more under control as they are better apprehended. Every man, consequently, has the power, if not absolutely, yet in a very considerable degree, of preserving himself from falling under the dominion of his passions.

When we contemplate things as necessary, the power of the mind over the affections is increased. The grief felt for the loss of some good, for example, is mitigated if we see that it could by no possibility have been retained; and torn by our affections in excess, we are brought to think of and call into play such powers as we have of ordering and controlling them in consonance with reason and understanding. Thus, when we think of all the benefits that accrue from friendship and the social state, consider the peace of mind that springs from a good and reasonable life, and know that men act by the necessity of their nature, we shall not be disposed to repay hate with hate, or injustice with injustice, but much rather to overcome hatred by love, injury by magnanimity, &c.

In such a properly human line of action we are greatly strengthened when we reflect that all the affections of the body, or the images of things, are ultimately referable to the Idea of God, immanent in all; for we know and are assured that all that is, is in God, and that without God nothing can either be or be conceived to be, inasmuch as there is but one Substance conceivable by and through itself, and that modes or affections are impossible without the existence of substance, i. e. without the being of God. He who clearly and distinctly knows himself and his affections, therefore, and who lives up to the standard prescribed by reason, in loving himself loves God likewise, fills his mind brimful of this love, and mounts

ever higher in the scale of being; for man living under the influence of such love, which has nothing in its nature of selfishness, of envy, or of jealousy, would have all men linked with the Supreme in the same loving bonds as himself, assured that in so loving and so willing he fulfilled his destiny and tasted the highest joy that can be known.

As there is no effect without a cause, and no manifestation of mind without concomitant corporeal existence, we can imagine nothing, remember nothing, save whilst the body endures. But as God is the cause not only of the existence but of the essence of the body, and God himself being by his essence eternal, so must the essential element in the nature of man be conceived through him under a certain aspect or form of eternity, and in this way be believed to escape the dissolution that awaits the body. The idea that expresses the essence of the body under the aspect of eternity, indeed, being a mode of thought pertaining to the essence of the mind, is necessarily eternal. And although we have no remembrance of any existence anterior to the present existence of our body, still we have as an element in our nature an intuitive sense or feeling that our thinking part is eternal. And as those things that are intellectually conceived are no less distinctly apprehended than those that are remembered, we conclude that our thinking part is immortal.

Things are in truth conceived by us as realities in two different ways: 1st, in so far as they stand related to certain times and places; and, 2nd, in so far as they are comprised in God and follow by the necessity of the divine nature. Now, things conceived as realities or truths in this second way are conceived under an aspect of Eternity, and ideas of them involve the infinite and eternal essence of God. In so far as our mind apprehends itself and its body under the aspect of eternity, therefore, in so far has it necessarily cognition of God,—knows that it is in God, and that through God it is conceived by and known to itself. The mind is then possessed of that third kind of knowledge which has been spoken of as intuitive, i. e. knowledge which proceeds from adequate and therefore true ideas,—knowledge depending on the mind, itself eternal as portion of the Eternal Essence, its formal or real cause.

All that is understood in this way is as a perennial spring of joy to man; for from this mainly arises that intellectual love of God which engenders perfect acquiescence of

mind, or love associated with the Idea of the Supreme. Were it matter of doubt, however,—did we not know that our soul was eternal, piety, religion, and everything referred to magnanimity, generosity, and our distinguishing humanity, requires us to cherish the belief that it is so in reality.*

Absolutely infinite and perfect God, by the free-necessity of his nature, it is to be presumed, loves himself with an infinite and perfect intellectual love. But the intellectual love of God conceived by the mind of man is akin to the love with which God loves himself, not indeed as he is Infinite, but as he is expressed in the finite mind of man. The love of the soul for God, consequently, is part of the love wherewith God loves himself; and as a corollary to this it follows that God, loving himself, loves man also, and that man's intellectual love of God and God's love of man are terms significant of one and the same thing.

From this we understand that in our love of God and God's love of us we have our soul's health, our blessedness, our freedom, or, as the sacred Scriptures often have it, our Glory. Now, there is nothing in nature that is competent to coerce or destroy such love. On the contrary, the more the body is apt for action in every way, the more able, the more excellent is its associate mind; the wider is the circle of knowledge embraced, the more adequately and truly are the things without us understood, and the less likely are we to fall under the undue influence of the merely animal appetites of our nature—the bad passions, as they are entitled when in excess. In such a state and condition of mind and body alone it is that

* However characteristic of our humanity and consolatory to individuals this sense of immortality, it has nevertheless done mischief in the world; for it has led mankind ignorantly, irreverently, and ungratefully to repudiate the boon of present being they have from God, and to set up claims to joys and pleasant things of their own imagining in a life to come. Hence the monkeries, nunneries, hair-shirtings, scourgings, fastings, the renunciation of the first duties of manhood and womanhood, &c.,—all alike violations of God's eternal laws; insensate doings, selfishly pursued in the view of wringing from God something he may have in store indeed, but has not given, to the neglect of that which he has seen fit in his goodness to bestow. The sense has been further prejudicial by having led the modern world to institute Churches with Hierarchies as paramount moral powers in the State, and then to throw the education of youth almost exclusively into the hands of theologians, who have naturally thought it their especial duty to instil beliefs held by them essential to salvation in the world to come, to the sore neglect of the moral and intellectual training that can alone fit men to play their parts manfully here, and by their good lives to achieve salvation for themselves hereafter.

perfect freedom is enjoyed; for then it is that beatitude is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself.

It is in the light and sunshine of these somewhat mystical but ennobling propositions of this Fifth Part of the Ethics of Benedict Spinoza that all the great minds of Germany for nearly a century now have basked and gathered moral and intellectual strength. It was from the study of these that Lessing, late in life, was enabled to declare that at length and for the first time he felt himself a man; it was in their Sabbath stillness that Goethe, when the storms of passion had been laid, gained strength to make those renunciations that became the final wisdom of his life, and in his noble verse to say:

Entschlafen sind nun wilde Triebe
Mit ihrem ungestümen Thun,
Es reget sich die Menschenliebe,
Die Liebe Gottes regt sich nun.*

It was in these divine sentences that Herder found his chief delight, and inspiration for his philosophical views of human act in history; and that Schleiermacher, when the imaginations and false conceptions of childish years had vanished from his sight, discovered the fresh and invigorating sources of piety hand in hand with reason and knowledge which made him The Theologian of his age; and it was only because he lost heart in the face of his age, less forward than himself in science, philosophy, and pious conception, that the world is still waiting for its Apostle of true religious progress, the reconciler of its beliefs with its knowledge. Wrapt in this Divine love, overshadowed by the sense of present Deity, the dross and baser elements of man's nature fall from him, and he stands forth an immortal spirit in the presence of God. It is as the propounder of such great and ennobling views that I venture to speak of Spinoza, not only as the first philosopher, but as the true religious herald of the modern world.

To accompany a great religious mind like that of Spinoza cannot be without advantage; and it may be a useful occasional exercise to soar with him in imagination to the giddy

* 'Now wild desires are laid asleep,
And stormy passions still'd,
Now with the love of God and man
The soul brimful is fill'd.'

heights of perfection to which he aspires. Yet would I not be understood as identifying myself with Spinozism, nor as proposing it as a complete and perfectly satisfactory solution of the problem of existence. Guide as it has proved to so many great minds, it is yet inadequate to meet all the requirements of modern philosophy. A system deduced mathematically from The Absolute, however clearly apprehensible by thought, is found wanting when confronted with experience; for it affords no scope for contingency; since nothing can be legitimately inferred which is not contained in the premisses; and conclusions from these are sometimes forced on us which a knowledge of the actual world pronounces paradoxical and untenable. The *All* which Spinoza conceived that he had deduced with such unerring certainty from the Infinite Nature of God, does not meet scientific requirement in every particular; and morally speaking we have no assigned grounds for the existence of the modes or varieties of actual being, or even for the existence of the world at all—Spinozism, often mistakenly charged with Atheism, has been much more truly characterized as Acosmism, or a system which ignores the world; in which sense it has the Idealism of Berkeley as its proper offspring.

The equivalence of existence and concept assumed at the outset, again, leads to many anomalies. Substance and causal interconnection, for instance, are made dependent on concepts and ideas; whereas it is now universally admitted that the truth of ideas must be tested by that of things, and that acquaintance with effects must precede knowledge of causes—in a word, that there can be no fruitful *à priori* philosophy dispensing with the teachings of experience, and no true philosophy save that which is founded on observation of the nature of man and of things in harmony with the individual consciousness,—the object which modern philosophy has proposed to itself as the aim and end of its mission, and which it has followed out with more or less, though not yet with entire, success.

But there is another point of view from which Spinozism must be considered. The system is either a moral philosophy, or it is nothing. How far does it satisfy or fall short of yielding satisfaction in this direction? In the growth of theological scepticism, the result of better knowledge in modern times, the only possible stay of European thought was to be found in moral philosophy; and it was inevitable

that there should be a continual endeavour to attain to greater accuracy and certainty in this department in proportion as doubt advanced from hesitation to contradiction and positive denial. Now, all philosophy must have what Kant terms a *metaphysische Grundlegung*, a metaphysical foundation, in other words, a theory of necessary existence and universal order; and Spinoza's theory of universal existence in God may be held as having supplied such a foundation for the progressive and healthy development of modern thought—by progressive and healthy the moral as distinguished from the fixed and effete theological speculation being implied. But the form in which this universality appears in Spinozism is scarcely that of a properly moral order, as generally understood, and such as may come within the scope of human effort and aspiration. God is not before us in the light of Good, but beside and within us as Cause; so that the attitude of the human subject can only be that of resignation and submission. And this was the footing indeed on which Spinoza himself placed his doctrine. God to him is the Infinite, Unconditioned, Free cause and Necessary cause of all that is in ONE, without the predicates attaching to humanity, but immanent and efficient in the universe and its parts,—in the orbs that fill the infinities of space, in the mind of man, in the aptitudes and powers of all living and lifeless things.

It has been argued, I know, that such a theory is insufficient in a moral point of view, which seems to require belief in the Supremacy of a Holy Will, as the basis of human obligation. And to some minds such a view is even felt as a necessity. It must be conceded, nevertheless, that Spinoza, although in another way, viz., by associating God's Will, Purpose, and Act in one, does really supply a basis of the kind required. Admitting the human mind to a place within the sphere of the Divine Thought, and recognizing a plurality of faculties, each with its own volition in its constitution, as he does, he points out the condition on which alone freedom of action is possible to man, and in the inter-agency of these, under the leadership of the understanding, the only course of internal discipline whereby it may be practically attained. Spinoza's system, in short, is not so much a system complete in itself, as the dawn of the new philosophic æra, in the light of which the phantoms of past superstitions could be confidently repudiated, nature and man be thoroughly and freely studied, and an endless vista of progress thereby brought into view.

It is in this sense, and as Spinoza and his system have impressed my own mind, that they are here presented to the English reader.

Barnes, February, 1870.

THE PANTHEISTIC IDEA IN THE SCRIPTURES, OLD AND NEW, AND OF ANCIENT AND MODERN TIMES.

WHEN we get beyond the purely legendary portions of Scripture, comprised in the accounts of God's earliest dealings with the world and man,—Creation, Paradise, the tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil, the Serpent, the Patriarchs, the Covenants, &c., and reach the comparatively modern epochs of the Psalmists and Prophets, we find many utterances that are only consonant with the Pantheistic idea. Take the following: 'If I ascend into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall thy hand lead me,' Psal. cxxxix. 8—10. 'Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hide him in secret places that I shall not see him? saith the Lord. Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord,' Jer. xxiii. 23, 24. 'The Hebrew race,' says Mr Matthew Arnold, 'apprehended God—the universal order by which all things fulfil the law of their being—chiefly as the moral order in human nature;' and he sees that 'Paul preached God in the world and the workings of the world, the eternal and Divine power from which all life and energy proceed; * * * the element in us, around us, and beyond the sphere of what is originated, measured, and controlled by our will and understanding.' See his St Paul, in Cornhill Magazine for Nov. 1869, p. 599. St Paul's teaching as apprehended by Mr Arnold is therefore not different from Virgil's:

> 'Mens agitat molem, magnoque se corpore miscet, &c.
> Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo,' &c.

'Know ye not,' says the great Apostle of the Gentiles himself, 'that ye are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?' 1 Cor. iii. 16; and the historian of his doings further report him as using these remarkable words approvingly: 'For in God we live and move and have our being,' Acts xvii. 28. In the writings ascribed to the 'Disciple whom Jesus loved,' again, we have such expressions as these: 'Hereby know we that we dwell in him and he in us, because he hath given us of his Spirit,' 1 John iv. 13; and, 'He that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him,' 1 John iv. 16.

Dr Strauss quotes many sentences from the Fathers and orthodox writers to the same effect; among others: 'All in heaven, in earth All, in no place contained, but All in himself and everywhere.'—Augustini Epist. 187, ad Dard.

'God is in all things—as agent he is present in all he does.'—Thos. Aquinas, I. 8. 1.

'How is the Divine Essence in all things? Not as a body, nor yet as a Spirit; but in a Divine and entirely incomprehensible manner.—Quenstedt, I. p. 288.

'If the Essence of God be so great as said (i. e. Infinite), then cannot we understand how and where any created essence can exist. For created is not Divine essence; and if not so, then is it this essence itself, and all things are God and Divine Essence.'—Episcop. Inst. Theol. IV. 2, 13. Conf. Strauss, Christliche Glaubenslehre, I. p. 553.

Our own poets are full of the same idea. In Wordsworth it appears oftener than once, and will be found particularly referred to on p. 210.

In his Essay on Man Pope has these lines:

'All are but parts of one stupendous whole,
Whose body nature is, and God the soul.
That, changed through all, and yet in all the same,
Great in the earth as in the ethereal frame,
Warms in the sun, refreshes in the breeze,
Glows in the stars, and blossoms in the trees,
Lives through all life, extends through all extent,
Spreads undivided, operates unspent,
Breathes in our soul, informs our mortal part,
As full, as perfect in a hair as heart;
To him no high, no low, no great, no small,
He fills, he bounds, connects, and equals all.'

In our own day Mr Tennyson, in his short Ode entitled 'The Higher Pantheism,' sings thus:

'The sun, the moon, the stars, the seas, the hills, the plains,
Are not these, O Soul, the vision of Him who reigns?

* * * *

Is not the vision He, tho' He be not what he seems?
Is He not all but thou that hast power to feel "I am I?"'

The first of living naturalists, speaking of 'Natural Selection,' characterizes it as 'the Divine, immanent in all things.' He speaks of it again as 'an Active power or Deity;' and by 'Nature,' he says, 'I mean the aggregate action and product of many natural laws; and by Laws the sequence of events as ascertained by us.'—Darwin, Origin of Species, 4th Ed. p. 92.

To conclude: 'Pantheistic Immanency properly considered,' says one of the most learned and philosophic writers of our time, 'effaces unworthy notions, and places the reward of virtue in virtue itself. The idea satisfying the scientific or intellectual, answers to the moral craving, on condition that faith regards the universe as a system of wisely beneficent though inflexible order—a special providence, better providing for the individual through the perfect arrangements of the general, than by responding to the short-sighted appeals of selfish devotion.'—R. W. Mackay. The Tübingen School, p. 70, 8vo. London, 1863.

BENEDICT DE SPINOZA.

INTRODUCTION.

THE life of Benedict de Spinoza has always been regarded by his admirers as a subject of peculiar interest, not only beautiful in itself, but calculated, when truly presented, to exert a favourable influence on mankind. Type as he was of the perfectly independent man, intellectually, morally, religiously—Spinoza, when more intimately known, still meets us in every relation of life as an impersonation of the grand ideal which he himself had conceived, and this was no less than a being, the highest, the holiest, that can be enshrined in the likeness of humanity.

The reverence felt for Spinoza among those who have made his life and works their study, is therefore entirely founded on the sense with which they are impressed of the truthfulness, integrity, courageousness, and consistency of the man; of his modest, patient, self-sufficing nature; of his gentle, conciliatory, and candid disposition; his inborn religiousness, unmixed with mysticism; his freedom from prejudice of every kind; his great intellectual powers, and the vast importance to the world of the works he left behind him.

The dislike, or to make use of the stronger and more appropriate word, the aversion, it was so long the fashion to express for the name of Spinoza never rested on any better grounds than ignorance of the character of the man, misapprehension of his views, and misinterpretation of his efforts to grasp the Infinite and Absolute, and to impart to others his own conception of things that, perchance, transcend the powers of man to comprehend. Spinoza, nevertheless, and in spite of the world's long reluctance so to acknowledge him, is unquestionably one among the very greatest of those master-minds to whom is mainly due the intellectual, moral, and religious freedom now enjoyed on some few favoured spots of earth; and for the full possession of which all of truly civilized humanity is still seen eagerly struggling against the ignorance, selfishness, timidity, and superstition that withhold it. Spinoza is, in very truth, THE GREAT RELIGIOUS PROPHET of the modern world. Jerome and Huss, Bruno, Savonarola, Servetus, Vanini, and the rest—honoured for ever be their names and deathless memories!—who paid for their better beliefs in their fiery deaths, Wicliff, Luther, Melancthon, Calvin, and others who haply escaped so dire a fate, were but reformers of the Old, no inauguraters of the New. All in freeing the world from fetters of the antique fashion, they had others of a different make at hand, which, eagerly donned at first, and worn without murmurings for awhile, have at length become galling and heavy impediments to higher and more helpful conclusions in matters the most interesting and important to mankind.

Spinoza, on the other hand, lineally descended from that wonderful people who, in their triumphs and their misfortunes alike, have exerted so vast an influence on the history of the world,—in the example they set to all time when they burst the bonds of their Egyptian task-masters and betook themselves to the wilderness for freedom, in their sacred writings

of unapproached sublimity, in the crowning event in the religious history of the ancient world which occurred among them towards the end of their existence as a nation,—sprung, we say, from this people, Spinoza meets us as an embodiment of the spirit that animated his far-removed ancestors, which made him, though by it unrecognized, the intellectual and religious leader of his age, and leads us now to acknowledge him as herald of the religious progress achieved since his day. Born and bred within the narrowest pale of Jewish prescription, he yet by the native force of his understanding and the firmness of his moral character, freed himself from the shackles that held fast the rest of his kindred and people. By his intimate knowledge of the Hebrew language and literature, his familiarity with the Jewish Scriptures in particular, and his bold but always respectful criticism of their contents, although encountered by opposition in its most blighting form, Spinoza gave a new and lasting impulse to that spirit of inquiry which had already found a tongue in the Reformation, but which, for lack of another original mind to give it a fresh impulse in a new direction, had for a century and more been silent save in varied janglings on the same unvaried theme.

Left with an antique volume in human speech, the work of human hands, as sole record of the dealings of God with his creatures, the religious world of the Reformation had only exchanged an infallible living head and exponent of its creed for an infallible, tongueless, lifeless book. But Spinoza came, rare student of the sacred writings of his people, with mind unbiassed, and the hardihood to see and own to himself that these must needs be of merely human and not of Divine origin; his eyes unsealed by the vain attempts he discovered in the writings of the highest authorities to reconcile discrepancies and supply defects,—seizing moreover on the enigmatical expressions in the works of other commentators which even hinted

at errors and inconsistencies—reading the Hebrew Scriptures, in a word, as he read Livy or Suetonius, he discarded the idea of these writings as possessed of any absolutely Divine authority, and sent man back—Jew, Papist, and Protestant alike, from traditions and parchment records to the inner light of the soul, for such knowledge as the Finite might attain of the Infinite, of divine, eternal, changeless law, and of the free necessity that pertains to the nature of God as manifested to us in Creation. To the mind of man, in harmony with the world around, he referred as the sole but all-sufficing testimony to the existence of God, to the revelation he makes of Himself, and of the relation in which he *stands*—not in which at some particular by-gone time he *stood*—towards his creature man and the universe at large. Spinoza is in fact the founder of our modern school of biblical criticism and exegesis. More than this, and of yet higher import, though but the necessary consequence of such antecedents, he is also the true original of those more rational views now entertained by better minds of the real import of the teaching of Jesus of Nazareth, and of the sense in which he is to be apprehended as an incarnation of Deity and the way of everlasting life to man. Finally, by the vigour of his understanding, the wide scope of his intellectual vision, and the precision of his logic, Spinoza may be regarded as the source whence all the systems of philosophy that have sprung up since his day have had their rise. 'Quidquid sani de his rebus ad hunc usque diem fuerit dictum ex Spinozæ fontibus emanâsse videantur,' says one of the editors of his works.* Another great—and because so great so much decried—writer, speaks of Spinoza as father of the speculative philosophy of our age, and father also of our biblical criticism; † and

* Gfrörer: B. de Spinoza Opera om. Philosoph. in Præf. p. viii. 8vo. Stuttgard, 1830.

† Strauss: 'Vater der Speculation unserer Zeit; er ist auch Vater der biblischen Kritik.' Christliche Glaubenslehre, B. 1, S. 193.

the accomplished author of the History of Modern Philosophy, himself the exhaustive critic of Spinozism, says of its author, 'Spinoza's philosophical greatness once acknowledged, the nobility of his nature as a man came next to be seen as a bright exemplar for imitation, and the curse which in the name of religion had weighed on him so long was forthwith not only removed but turned into a blessing.'*

Spinoza, however, did by no means exhaust the work he began. All in the nature of man and the outcome of his powers, cannot, as he believed, be comprehended under the guise of 'figures, lines and solids.' The mathematical method is not of universal applicability, and does not truly touch the world of affection and emotion; still less does it embrace the faith we have in things unseen, the consciousness of which is no less subjectively real than is the intellectual persuasion we own of the bond between a cause and its effect. It is when we see our philosopher supplemented by a Lessing, a Herder, a Schleiermacher, and a Strauss, on the one hand, by a Leibnitz, a Fichte, and a Hegel on the other, that we become fully aware of the influence he has had on the evolution both of the religious and philosophic idea among mankind.

And though it is much the fashion in the England of the present day to decry such studies as mental philosophy and metaphysics, these subjects are nevertheless found possessed of such inherent attractions as to engage many of the highest order of intellects among us who are not occupied with inquiries after simple physical truths, or devoted to the pursuit of mere material interests. The most highly cultivated and the best informed are still seen reverently looking up to the niches in the library or the fane wherein the busts of the Bacons and Descartes, the Spinozas and Leibnitzes, the Lockes and Humes, and their successors stand enshrined.

* Fischer: Geschichte der neuern Philosophie. 1ster Bd. 2te Abth. S. 96.

Philosophy, indeed, in relation as it is with the peculiarly human element in our nature, can but raise and ennoble the man who devotes himself to its conquest. Philosophy, divining the unseen through the seen, is to the intellectual what faith is to the emotional nature of man. Like the skyey influences, barren in themselves, yet apt to quicken the germs that would else lie dormant in the ground and never burst into bloom and ripen into fruit, Philosophy fits the mind to arrange the scattered elements of human knowledge, and to give the symmetrical proportions of scientific doctrine to that which had hitherto lain without cohesion and correlative significance. Philosophy can never be neglected by cultivated man with his aspirations after knowledge of the causes and essences of things, of the world of thought and feeling whereof he is himself the centre. Surely then the Life of one who as Philosopher was second to none the world has ever seen, and the Work in which he still survives and influences mankind, ought to be found in our English tongue, and in a form accessible to all.

THE PENINSULAR JEWS, AND THE EXODUS TO THE NETHERLANDS. MEN OF NOTE AMONG THE EXILES.

For several centuries during the middle ages Spain had been found a second land of promise to the expatriated Jews of Palestine. In almost every considerable city of the Peninsula they dwelt in large numbers and in such affluence —fruit of security—that besides their everyday industries they found leisure, as they had disposition, to devote themselves to letters, philosophy, and natural science, addicting themselves particularly, it would appear, to the humanizing study and beneficent art of medicine, so that for ages they supplied almost the whole of Europe and the East with physicians. Among the noble Moors, aliens but intruders, not exiles like themselves, possessed of so much that was fairest in the

Peninsula, and cultivating letters and the arts of peace with such success, the Jews always seem to have met with friends and protectors. Jews and Moors were in fact of kin not far removed; sprung of the same Semitic stock, they had much more in common than either of them possessed with the Aryan race that mainly peopled Spain. It was as natural therefore that the two alien races should find it easy to live in peace together, as that all the signs of their superiority and prosperity should prove eyesores to the older and more numerous but less cultivated possessors of the soil. Intruders of other blood, and differing in religion, the Moorish inhabitants of the south of Spain could never have been regarded with other than hostile feelings by the Celtic or Latin populations of the north and west, and it is not surprising therefore that we find the extermination or expulsion of the Moor assumed as the grand object of their lives by many successive occupants of one or other of the divided thrones of Spain. Every effort to this end, however, had still proved unavailing, until the crowns of Aragon and Castile became united in the persons of Ferdinand and Isabella. It was then that the spirit of patriotism and fanaticism combined, fanned into an all-pervading flame by the ultra-catholicism and heroic bearing of the Queen, led to the final crusade against the intruders, and the long-continued strife was brought to a close. Boabdil el Zogoibie succumbed; and he and all that remained of his kindred and people had to seek a new home in other lands.

But he may be said to have been even amply avenged in his defeat; for it was now that the Spanish nation and their rulers contracted that chronic distemper of religious intolerance that proved rife with such disastrous consequences to themselves, and so much suffering to the rest of Europe and the Indies. With the expulsion of the Moors, the most industrious, peaceful, and ingenious of her population may be said to have disappeared from the realm of Spain; with the

establishment of the Inquisition fell the long night of repression and ignorance that precluded the possibility of progress at home; and with the sanguinary proceedings of Philip the Second and his officers in the Netherlands, came the revolt of that country and its final emancipation from the Spanish yoke.

But all this was not enough to satisfy the cruel spirit of bigotry and intolerance. There were yet other aliens in blood and religion dwelling on the sacred soil of Spain, and the work of purging this from all but true believers seemed still imperfectly accomplished so long as they remained. An edict accordingly went forth in the course of the ensuing reign commanding the gathering into the Catholic fold by any and every means of the scattered children of Israel. The sword was not the weapon required against the peaceful Jews, they were not a nation like the Moors and Netherlanders, and in their case neither extermination nor wholesale expulsion appears to have been contemplated. They were assailed by argument and persuasion in various shapes and disguises, but conform they must to the established religious system of the country if they would continue to live in peace; nay, they must not only conform, but express assent to, and inward conviction of, the truth of the Christian doctrine as it was propounded to them by their masters, if they would retain possession of their homes. Herein lay the hardship of the terms, the utter impossibility of compliance, made all the more difficult, too, by the nature of the conditions annexed; for, conforming, and avowing belief, the Jews were not only guaranteed the peaceable possession of their homes, and protection in their callings, but informed that every avenue to rank and worldly distinction lay as freely open to them as to their fellow-citizens, the Spanish children of the soil.

The conditions were tempting: the reward for their acceptance was incalculably great, and the penalty for their rejection

fraught with every kind of misery present and prospective. Conformity as an outward act was possible, indeed, but inward acknowledgment was out of the question. How could the Spanish Jew of cultivated mind and scholarly acquirements, the philosopher, the naturalist, the physician, descend from the grand conception of Deity he had inherited from the later prophets and poets of his country, as the ONE, the Infinite, the Ineffable, whose very name might not be uttered by the mouth of man, of whom no likeness or image might be made, whose dwelling was the heaven of heavens, and whose footstool was the earth—how could even the meanest Jew bow down to such portraitures of incarnate Deity as he had presented to him in the extenuated form of a human being stretched dying or dead upon a cross, crowned with thorns, pierced with wounds, and streaming with gore? How could the educated Jew, whose God was from everlasting to everlasting, prostrate himself before such an idol, or address his prayers to such another as he heard designated 'Mother of God,' and saw symbolized in the image of a woman tricked out with tawdry or more costly finery? The thing was then, as it is now, and ever must remain, impossible. But home and country and comfortable existence, and all that binds the heart of man to old familiar things, were at stake: lip-service might outwardly be rendered, whilst in the home sanctuary the lamp of their own far purer faith, as they might well believe it, should still be kept alive, if not more brightly burning. The Jews had outlived many changes; better days might dawn; the present generation gathered to its rest, their children or their children's children might again be permitted the free and open exercise of the religion they had inherited from Moses and the prophets of Israel. And shall not the Jehovism of the cultivated Jew, the worship of one God whose spirit he believes to interfuse and originate all human thought and action, and to actuate all animal, vegetable,

mineral, and elemental existence, be conceded of purer and nobler nature than the crude miscalled Christianity of vulgar Spain?

Outward conformity to catholicism, then, became somewhat common among the Jews of the Peninsula; and a certain small minority, in whom the religious sentiments were weak, and who succeeded in shaking off the beliefs of their fathers, were gradually absorbed into and lost amidst the general mass of the people. But the Hebrew communities at large, and all who had piety as a guiding principle in their souls, continued secretly to cling to the ancient faith, and in private even to celebrate its more essential rites.

Lip-service and outward profession, however, when the heart is otherwise engaged, never yet deceived suspicious eyes, and with the sharp looks of the order of St Dominic steadily fixed upon them, the mere professors of Christianity were not likely long to escape detection. Many of the Jewish converts, consequently, and as matter of course, fell under suspicion, and were torn from their homes and immured in the dungeons of the Inquisition. Nor was arbitrary and unlimited sequestration all that had to be endured; the rack and the stake were further brought into play against those among them who on very slender testimony could be shown to have relapsed from the faith imposed, as well as against seceders from the dominant Church to the blasphemous doctrines, as they were called, of the heretic Luther.

The system of persecution once inaugurated, soon reached its climax, and it was while Philip III. occupied the throne that the Jews of Spain began in multitudes to leave their native homes, and to scatter themselves again over Europe and the East. Strange to say, many found shelter in Rome itself and the Papal States. Their presence there was even found advantageous in a money point of view; for their communities paying the cess imposed on them and conforming to

the exceptional, bigoted, and generally cruel ordinances imposed in their behalf, were suffered to live in peace and to worship God in the way they pleased. But it was to the united Netherlands that the main stream of the emigration turned, and among the numbers that took the northern way were the parents of Benedict de Spinoza.

The Spinozas or d'Espinozas of Spain, fugitive Jews of the present, must however in earlier times have been among the more open conformers to the Christian system; for we have information of more than one of the name who filled public offices in the gift of the state; and these, as well as the prefix De to the name, could only have been won by compliance with the behests of authority.

The Netherlands having themselves suffered so much and so lately from the bigotry of Spain, were at first and naturally suspicious of the strangers, arriving in crowds upon their shores. Coming straight from Spain and Portugal, too, countries catholic beyond ordinary catholicism, the immigrant Jews were actually suspected to be possible catholics in disguise, spies at the least, if not destined to show themselves anon in the more formidable guise of armed enemies. But the fugitives were accompanied by their wives and children; their demeanour was peaceable; they showed nothing of a proselytizing spirit, and their religious assemblies having been visited, and none of the pomp and ceremonial of the old enemy being apparent, the worship consisting as it seemed in nothing more than prayers addressed to the Most High God and reverential reading of the Scriptures, freedom to hold communion with the Creator in so unobjectionable a manner was forthwith conceded, and the exiles bidden welcome to their new abodes.

The settlement of the Jews in Holland indeed soon proved a source of new prosperity to the States. Their communities throve in the cities; industries of various kinds sprang up and took root among them, synagogues were built and schools

established; the printing press was set to work, and the Portuguese Jews, as they were called, of Amsterdam in especial, by-and-by attained a not undistinguished place in the republic of letters. They were eager traders, too, and took an active part in the colonial enterprises by which the Dutch sought to extend their influence over other lands. Having need of almost everything from abroad, the Dutch were traders of necessity; and the industry and ingenuity of the people, the indispensable preludes to the supply even of their most necessary wants—to say nothing of the elegancies and luxuries of life—out of the relatively worthless raw materials produced among themselves, the hemp and flax of their fields, the milk, wool, and skins of their flocks and herds, wrought the articles that brought them in return corn and wine and oil, the spices and other products of the tropics, gold and silver, pearls and precious stones,—wealth unknown, beyond the bounds of Spain, in any other country of Europe at the time.

In all these grand and civilizing mercantile enterprises the Jews bore an active and distinguished part. The Spanish or Portuguese Jews of the Low Countries, indeed, long maintained a character of superiority which seemed to sever them from their co-religionists of other European lands. They ever bore themselves proudly, haughtily; and vaunting themselves on their descent from the regal stem of Judah, they rarely contracted matrimonial alliances with their brethren of the German and Polish stocks. In their Low-country trading, too, they conducted things on a larger and more liberal scale than was customary among their people in other lands. Besides commerce, moreover, they continued to cultivate medicine as their especial professional calling, and always showed themselves more than commonly attentive to the arts and elegancies of life. They were distinguished from other Hebrew communities by this, too, that they

showed less than the taste prevailing among these for the mazes of theological mysticism. The Cabbala, a great subject of study with the Jews in general, appears to have had few charms for them; they rather give their minds to Aristotle, and the learned Arabian writers, Averrhoes and Avicenna; and their religious reading, after the Bible and the Talmud, they found especially in the works of Maimonides and Aben-Ezra, men of original mind; the former entirely orthodox according to Hebrew pattern, in his views and comments, but possessed of many of the resources of modern exegesis, and only reconciling his belief with the outside sense of Scripture by an ingenious method of torturing the text, and upon occasion bringing nay to signify as much as yea. Aben-Ezra, on the contrary, appears to have been a man capable of reading the sacred books of his people without prejudice or foregone conclusion; though he only ventured to hint at the difficulties and discrepancies he discovered there in language so enigmatical as not to be understood of the many. These were the two writers who unquestionably exerted the greatest influence on the mind of the young Spinoza; they are both repeatedly quoted by him in his writings,—Maimonides mostly with dissent, Aben-Ezra as generally with approval.

It is matter of amazement that with the example of two such men before them, the Jewish communities of Spain should have gone to sleep for so many generations, and scarcely more been heard of in the world of letters, out of their own restricted pale. It was only when they came under the vivifying influence of the Reformation, after their emigration to the Low Countries, that the Jews of the Peninsula showed themselves true sons of the men who had given the psalmists and the prophets of Israel to the world. Nor did the Spaniards themselves, as commonly supposed, by any means escape that spirit of inquiry, that aspiration after more light, and greater intellectual, moral, and religious freedom,

which about the end of the 15th and beginning of the 16th century began to be so generally felt over central and northern Europe. The religious wars with the Moors, however, and the legacy of bigotry and intolerance these had left behind them, appear for a season to have absorbed almost the whole mind and energy of the nation; and when, at length, a spark from the steel of the Reformation did reach them from the Netherlands, and seemed disposed to kindle into an animating flame, it was immediately and remorselessly trodden out by the despotic rulers of the country, who, having succeeded in putting an end to Cortes and municipal councils, could stifle, without let or hinderance, all expression of opinion on matters pertaining to religion.

DISTINGUISHED MEN AMONG THE JEWS OF AMSTERDAM.

It was only, then, with liberty won by flight to the Low Countries that the Jews of Spain once more showed the world that they were possessed of souls above the level of petty traders in rags, pinchbeck, and imitation gems. The Rabbi Menasseh Ben-Israel (born 1604, died 1659) would indeed have been a person of mark in any country, and in his day was a notable member of the Jewish community of Amsterdam. Educated as a physician and practising his profession, he was besides a gifted preacher, and filled the pulpit of the synagogue for twelve years with ever-increasing reputation. On terms of intimacy with most of the men of note in his day—with Hugo Grotius, Vossius, Caspar Barlæus,* and others, he was one of the associates of Grotius in his scheme for bringing about a reconciliation among the various Christian professions, and it would appear that he even thought it not impossible to comprehend the Jews in this new covenant of love

* It is in an ode addressed to Menasseh Ben-Israel, that Barlæus is found expressing himself in such fine and comprehensive terms as these :

Si sapimus diversa, Deo vivamus amici.
Differing in Creed, live we as friends in God.

and universal brotherhood. To have conceived such an idea, dream though we must regard it even in the present day, impresses us with a sense of the noble and generous nature that belonged to the man, and in such a co-adjutor as Menasseh Ben-Israel he was certainly associated with a spirit akin to his own.*

Menasseh Ben-Israel was indeed an admirable specimen of Hebrew humanity, and so true a lover of progress, that he kept a printing press at work in his house throwing off books for the enlightenment of his countrymen. In such esteem did this great and good man live among his fellow-citizens that he was chosen by them as delegate to Cromwell, to make arrangements for the toleration and return of the Jews to England, from which they had been ruthlessly expelled in the reign of Edward the First, four centuries before.† The negotiations, however, failed through the bigotry of the Puritan clergy. Cromwell himself, with his great heart, would have been well content to welcome back the exiles, but was checked in his generous wishes by his council; and the further discussion of the question having been postponed, and the indisposition and death of the Protector following soon after, the Jews had to wait according to their wont for better days, and the prevalence of more tolerant ideas. And these, under the all-humanizing influences of civilization and enlightenment have at length not only dawned, but have even well nigh attained their noon. It may be said, indeed, that it now remains with the Jews

* Grotius is best known among us by his book, 'De Veritate Religionis Christianæ,' which has often been reprinted. The work from his hand, however, that would especially interest an inquirer in the direction above alluded to, is that entitled, 'Via ad Pacem Ecclesiasticam,' sm. 8vo, 1642—an interesting production, and in advance of some since written in the same view, but with a much less liberal aim — the Irenicons, Apologias, &c., of the present day.

† Conf. Auerbach, Leben Spinoza's, S. 24. The 'Athenæum' of April 10th, 1869. I have before me a reprint of the text of the Addresses of Ben-Israel to the Protector from the press of Melbourne, New South Wales, sm. 4to, 1868.

themselves, by the abandonment of absurd rites, and the vain pretensions that every day in the history of the world's progress shows to be not only more remote but to be even impossible of attainment, to find themselves members of the great family of civilized man, with God for the common object of adoration and acknowledged impartial parent of all that live.

Another man of mark, a native of Spain, of Jewish origin, settled at Amsterdam, was Isaac Orobio de Castro. He, too, was a physician and doctor in philosophy. The child of parents who had made profession of Christianity, he was baptized by the name of Balthasar, and having subsequently been knighted, he added the title of Don to his name, and, by-and-by, but still as a very young man, was advanced to the chair of philosophy in the university of Salamanca. In this public capacity, however, with the necessity of proclaiming himself every day from the house-tops, as it were, he found his position so irksome that he resigned his professorship and established himself as a physician at Seville; but not, as it seemed, before he had aroused suspicions of the sincerity of his Christian professions; for accused of a relapse to Judaism at Seville, he fell into the hands of the Inquisition, and was cast into one of their loathsome dungeons, whence he only emerged more dead than alive after an imprisonment of three years' duration. Liberated by some means at last, he escaped to Toulouse, where he became professor of medicine; but finally, attracted doubtless by the freedom and privileges his countrymen enjoyed in Holland, he made his way to Amsterdam. Here, with liberty regained, and once more among countrymen and kinsfolk, Isaac Orobio openly resumed his profession of Judaism; and whilst devoting himself truly to his calling of physician, he still found leisure to show himself the zealous defender of religion, both against the narrower, and, as he conceived them, over free-interpretations of the

subject beginning to appear in his day both among Jews and Christians. Orobio was personally acquainted with Spinoza, and among the number of his correspondents.*

Auerbach signalizes yet another individual actively engaged in the theological controversies of the time, notable in a certain way in the Jewish community of Amsterdam, and therefore influential within his sphere. This was Gabriel or Uriel d'Acosta, a native of Lisbon, grandee of the country and officer in the service of the state. Such distinction and public position could of course only be held by one who made open profession of Catholicism; but it was no more than profession, for d'Acosta having quitted Lisbon with his mother and brothers at the age of twenty-five, came to Amsterdam, where he forthwith cast off the slough of his assumed Christianity and became reconciled to the religion of his fathers. The man, however, was of an unsettled, violent, and sceptical disposition, and soon got into difficulties with the Rabbins and the synagogue, which led on two different occasions to his excommunication; nor was the ban in either instance removed until he had humiliated himself to the dust and made the most contrite expressions of repentance for errors past. D'Acosta nevertheless was a man of some learning, and possessed of a subtle and inquiring turn of mind, which doubtless proved the cause of all his troubles. He published a work on the 'Traditions of the Pharisees contrasted with the written Law,' —a very delicate subject according to Jewish notions,—which gave great offence to a large and influential party of his co-religionists. By-and-by he appeared with another, impugning the common Jewish belief in the immortality of the soul, which was no less angrily received by the party he had already offended, and not more favourably by that he might have hoped to conciliate. Uriel d'Acosta, in short, became involved in controversy on all hands; and having had the

* Vide letter, xlix.

folly in a fit of passion to discharge a pistol, happily without effect, at one who had always shown himself his most active opponent and enemy, he put an end to his life with his own hand in 1647.

These notices suffice to give us an idea of the state of feeling prevalent among the members of the special religious community into whose midst Benedict de Spinoza was born, and by which as he grew to man's estate he was necessarily influenced; for every man is that which he is in the end, in virtue of the constitution, bodily and mentally, he receives from his parents, and the circumstances amidst which he lives.

When we observe the writings of the Jews, this stereotyped race of men, if there be any such in the world, deeply tinged with the questioning and controversial spirit that followed the Reformation, we shall be prepared to find the whole literature of the Low Countries partaking of the same character. It may be said indeed that no one during this epoch in the history of European progress was altogether indifferent to the subject of religion, however the word might be interpreted; and if the hostility of the Tiara was inevitably aroused by heresy and innovation, the fear and enmity of Crowns and Sceptres were no less certainly excited by the aspirations after civil liberty that never fail to accompany assertion of the right to private opinion in matters of religion. Freedom of religious belief and profession, indeed, an imperious want in every sincere and thoughtful mind, is necessarily accompanied where not preceded by aspirations after civil liberty. Hence the inevitable alliance between hierarchies and despotisms on the one hand, and the enmity necessarily felt by cultivated free men against theocracies and absolute monarchies on the other.*

* The Archives of Simancas have lately yielded to the perseverance of Mr Bergenroth, a tale of one of the most portentous and terrible of the many

BIRTH AND EDUCATION OF BENEDICT DE SPINOZA. INFLUENCE OF THE JEWISH WRITERS MAIMONIDES AND ABEN-EZRA ON HIS MIND.

Amid such circumstances, with a community agitated by such contending elements, was Baruch, or, as he afterwards called himself by the Latin equivalent of the name, Benedict de Spinoza, born in the city of Amsterdam on the 24th of November, 1632. He was the eldest of a family of three children—himself and two sisters, Miriam and Rebecca. His parents, natives of Spain, as before said, were among the number of the Jewish fugitives from the persecution carried on by the Inquisition under Philip III., and especially directed against Jewish converts to Christianity, suspected of a lingering or more decided attachment to the religion of their forefathers.

The father of our Spinoza resided in a detached house on the Burgwal, near the old Portuguese synagogue, and must have been in comfortable if not in affluent circumstances,—so much was proclaimed by the character and position of the

portentous and terrible tragedies ever enacted on the stage of the world under the combined influences of state-craft and the religious bigotry that knows nothing of natural affection or human pity. Joanna, daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain, heir to the crown of Castile in right of her mother, wife of Philip of Burgundy, a sovereign prince of the empire, and mother of Charles the Fifth, emperor of Christendom, who was kept a close prisoner and treated as a madwoman for more than forty years, is now discovered to have been all the while in the perfect possession of her faculties, and all the tales of her insane proceedings spread abroad, to have been mere fabrications to give colour to the extraordinary treatment she received. But the grounds of this are not far to seek. In the first place, Joanna's title to Castile, asserted as it must have been, if not by herself, yet by her husband, would have been followed by a dissolution of the union between Aragon and Castile effected in the persons of her parents. Philip, her husband, had therefore to be provided for, lest he should prove troublesome; and this in due season was accomplished,—by poison, there can be little doubt; whilst Joanna, to be rendered incapable of reigning, was made, in outward show at least, to play the maniac, accompanied as she was in her various journeys in the night season from one prison to another by a coffin presumed to contain the body of her husband, from which she refused, as was said, ever to be separated by night or day. In the second place, and weighing as much with Isabella especially, the hapless Joanna would seem to have had something like pro-

dwelling-house; but whence the income was derived we are not informed, most probably it was from trade, as among the Jews generally. The only one of Spinoza's biographers (Lucas) who mentions the elder Spinoza, speaks of him as 'a man of excellent understanding,' and of this he gave evidence enough in the care he took to secure to his son the best education the Jewish schools of Amsterdam afforded.

clivity to free thought in matters of religion, and even to have shown a disposition to tolerate the heretical and blasphemous doctrines, as they were held, of Luther. She had been beyond the bounds of Catholic Spain, and in Burgundy and Flanders had seen pious and orderly persons professing the principles of the Reformation, so that she may well have surmised and given utterance to her thoughts that there were other things in the world besides Papal supremacies and sovereign rights to rule over benighted and submissive populations. Joanna must, in fact, have been in advance of her surroundings, and even of her age, as respects toleration of religious dissidence; and may be said to have paid in the way in which alone she could be made to pay the penalty of her superiority: she was treated as insane of mind, had the *discipline*, as the scourge is euphemistically entitled in Roman Catholicism, and was *racked* by the *cuerda*—suspension by the wrists with weights attached to the feet till the joints of the arms and legs are dislocated. For long years she was farther kept immured in chambers into which the light of day never penetrated, cut off from intercourse with the outer world in every shape save that of the so-called nobleman and Duke who acted as her jailer, of the bigoted priest, who visited to worry her, or the still more repulsive form of less excusable intolerance in the shape of Cardinal and Archbishop, for by such was she visited, and to such must the true state of the unhappy woman have been perfectly well known. And all this iniquity perpetrated by a *father* and *mother*, *king* and *queen*, in their own right, with the knowledge and consent of a *son*, the most powerful prince of his age, and without a word of remonstrance in so far, as appears, of the Cardinal Archbishop, who by-and-by became Pope under the title of Adrian the sixth. A father and mother entitled The Catholic *par excellence*, a son, the inheritor of the religious zeal that won for his mother her distinguishing title, and a Hierarch, infallible head of the Christian world as represented by Roman Catholicism, actors and accessories in this terrible drama—

Tanta Religio potuit suadere malorum!

How much longer will it be before mankind consent to see that the religious are not the only nor even the chief elements in the emotional nature of man which serve to keep him in the path of right and duty? The religious sentiments are in themselves as blind as the love of offspring or the desire of distinction, and need association with the faculties proper to man, and the guidance of the understanding, before their activity can conduce to good. Religion itself has only become moral and humane as men have advanced in civilization and refinement. Vide Mr Bergenroth's volume, in the series published under the auspices of the Master of the Rolls, and a paper by M. K. Hillebrand entitled, Une Enigme d'Histoire, in the Revue des Deux Mondes, No. for June 1st, 1869.

The instruction in these Jewish seminaries at the period of Spinoza's birth, beyond the most necessary rudiments, appears to have been entirely religious in its character. Apparently exhaustive in this particular, several branches then held most indispensable to a liberal education in Christian communities, were entirely overlooked. The classical languages of Greece and Rome had no place in the Jewish curriculum, and though arithmetic was taught, geometry and the mathematics generally were neglected. The omission of the learned languages—of that of Rome especially—was a much more serious matter in those days when the learned of different lands had but one, or used but one means of communication, than it could prove at the present time, when one or more of the principal languages of Europe are almost as regularly taught in every good school as the mother tongue, and are consequently available among men of letters generally. But when we know that there were physicians and naturalists in numbers among the Jews, we know also that the Latin in particular could not have been interdicted to them, as was the Greek at one time by the Christian hierarchy to the faithful; and Baruch de Spinoza, as a youth of superior parts, found means by-and-by to supply himself first with Latin and then with Greek. In learning the Latin, he is said to have had first a German teacher, under whom he mastered the rudiments of the tongue, and subsequently Dr Francis Van den Ende, whose school he attended for farther instruction. Having made such progress in the language as to read Descartes, whose philosophical writings were then much in vogue, and greatly struck, it is said, with the rule he found there so emphatically enunciated, that 'Nothing is ever to be accepted as true that has not been proved to be so on good and sufficient grounds,' he may be said already to have found the chart and compass that were to serve him as guides through the rest of his life.

In the Jewish schools of Amsterdam, however, the Hebrew Scriptures and the Talmud, with the commentaries of Raschi and Maimonides, and the writings of others among the orthodox theologians of Jewry, were the only books put into the hands of the pupils. But those on the upper form, as we should call it, are said to have had 'the use of a well-furnished library'—the most important privilege perhaps that can be accorded to the dawning intelligence of a boy—in addition. Our Spinoza doubtless availed himself to the full of the opportunities for self-culture which this afforded him.

The whole education of the Jew, then, was religious, and when we think of the narrow Levitical code which regulated Jewish every-day as well as Sabbath-day life,—the outgoings and the incomings, the acts, and, by use and wont, the very thoughts in every the most trifling particular of the grown man, we may imagine how closely the child was kept within the circle prescribed for him. How could originality show itself, how make head against such a system of training? Genius alone of the highest order could have divined a world beyond the prison within which self-satisfied dogmatism would have confined the heart and understanding. But such genius the youthful Spinoza possessed, and this, with the Latin language, and access to the 'well-furnished library,' was doubtless the means of setting him free.

The superintendent and occasional teacher in the upper division of the school was the Rabbi, Saul Levi Morteira, a man of talent, an eloquent preacher and esteemed writer among his people. But Morteira still belonged to that class of theologians who only acknowledge the lead of reason so long as it runs level with accredited views and serves to aid conclusions in accordance with these: his mind was narrow and intolerant on all matters that touched on Jewish orthodoxy. Coming into somewhat intimate contact with the more advanced pupils, Morteira did not fail to remark the promise

of young Spinoza, and is said to have taken more than the usual pains in aiding and directing his studies; so that even in his 15th year Baruch d'Espinoza was already remarkable for his proficiency in Biblical and Talmudic lore. Morteira doubtless flattered himself with the hope of seeing his pupil one day assume a distinguished place among the teachers of Israel; and such a place he did indeed achieve, although the distinction was of a kind far other than that intended, and of scope much wider than the world of Jewry. Doubts suggested, and either shirked or unsatisfactorily answered, scarcely fail to excite suspicion and to find solution of some sort in inquiring minds; and it is even more than probable that the More Novachim (or Guide of the Perplexed) of Maimonides, one of the books put into the hands of advanced pupils in Jewish schools, aided, it may have been, by the preaching of the Rabbins in the synagogue, proved the immediate means which led Spinoza as a boy to independent thought and self-interpretation of the sacred text. Preachers indifferently or ill informed, as they unhappily are in so many cases, seem to take a kind of perverse delight in obtruding difficulties on their audience, and are little aware of the distress they occasion among the more advanced of these, by the illogical, superficial, foolish, or dishonest way in which they meet them.*

The More Novachim, though in no wise so designed, is nevertheless particularly calculated to engender doubt and arouse reflection in susceptible minds. Were it not conceived, in so far as the letter goes, in the most strictly orthodox sense, it might be held a daring commentary upon the books of the Law, an exposure, with some of the resources of modern criticism at command, of the many obscure and contradictory passages and expressions to be discovered in the Old Testament when read by other eyes than those of unquestioning

* Vide the Essay, Truth *versus* Edification, in Mr Greg's 'Judgments Social and Literary,' 8vo. London, 1869.

faith. The work, in fact, embodies what would now be called a half-rationalistic interpretation of the volume which is presumed to record the dealings of the Deity with mankind. Allowance made for difference of epoch, (for Maimonides lived and wrote in the latter half of the 12th and beginning of the 13th century!) this remarkable book has the very stamp of those writings of the present day in which we see orthodoxy vainly struggling with the impossible; the light of natural understanding striving hard to put itself out under the extinguisher of blind belief; the truths of modern science wilfully ignored, and the eternal, harmonious, and unchanging laws of God set aside, because they clash with oriental expression and imagery, or more plainly contradict accounts of uncommon or imagined incidents recorded in the hieratic writings of a rude people who flourished some three or more thousand years ago.

As a mere youth, then, and by reason of his very talents and proficiency, we see that Spinoza must have been forced on the consideration of difficulties which, passed over unheeded by ordinary intellects, never fail to arrest understandings of a higher order. Common natures may be, and mostly are, satisfied with the intellectual fare that is set before them; but those of better stamp always incline to cater for themselves, and scarcely fail to find food for their cravings more satisfying than the husks that are too frequently supplied by preceptors. The comments and explanations and modes of reconciling differences advanced by the Eagle of Cordova, as Maimonides was styled, could have been little satisfactory to the Eaglet of Amsterdam; and Spinoza, in the course of his independent reading, having made acquaintance with the writings of Aben-Ezra, a more modern commentator on holy writ, and moreover a man of a much more unfettered spirit than Maimonides, was introduced to diversity of view, and opposition to the conclusions come to by those who had been given to him

emphatically as his guides. Now did the student make the discovery that good and learned men were not all of one mind, as he had been taught to believe, in their estimate either of the purpose, the purity, or the historical reliability of the Hebrew Scriptures. Maimonides made him familiar with the difficulties there abounding, but gave him no aid, or such aid only as he mistrusted or refused, in overcoming them. Aben-Ezra, on the contrary, he found ready in many cases with a helping hand.

When therefore in his riper years he takes up the pen in his Tractatus Theologico-politicus as an independent writer, his mind teeming with Scriptural and Rabbinical lore, and comes to ground already trodden by predecessors, Spinoza discusses the proper method, as he himself conceives it, of interpreting the text, inquires into the authorship, authenticity, and authority of the Pentateuch, and is found frequently referring to both Maimonides and Aben-Ezra. But it is always to disagree with the former; to take what we should call the rational and more obvious, instead of the arbitrary but more orthodox, view of the matter at issue; to dispute the premises assumed or the conclusions come to by the great Rabbi.

Aben-Ezra is met in a very different way; in him Spinoza seems to encounter a kindred spirit, sharp-sighted as himself in respect of imperfections, but less daring in giving utterance to his discoveries; for Aben-Ezra only ventures his statements in truncated and enigmatical phrase, which Spinoza does not hesitate to render into connected and intelligible terms. If Maimonides therefore had, as we presume to believe he had, a great share in the mental development of Spinoza on the negative side, Aben-Ezra as certainly had a no less decided influence on the still more important positive side. Maimonides in his attempts to explain and clear away difficulties seemed often but to make them more conspicuous; Aben-Ezra, again, though

shrouding his sense in enigmatical language, only puts on a transparent veil which hides no feature of the truth that lies beneath. Biblical criticism might therefore with great show of right be said to have had its birth from Maimonides and Aben-Ezra; but it lay with them in swaddling-bands, or for three centuries after them continued in a trance, from which it was first recalled to life by Spinoza, touched himself by the vivifying influence of the Reformation. Now only does the subject meet us with the scope and proportions, and in the questionable shape that entitles us to speak of him as its author and original to the modern world.

In the present aspect of the religious question there is no subject so important as biblical criticism and exegesis. It does in truth underlie the whole of Theosophy and Theology, taking these words in their largest acceptation; for as the civilized world of Europe has by the course of history and the sequence of events been brought to take its religious standpoint on the Hebrew Scriptures and the Hellenistic interpretation of one leading idea prominent therein, it is obvious that a perfectly truthful interpretation of their history, composition, import, and absolute worth, morally and intellectually, is as indispensable to accuracy of conclusion in regard to the relations hitherto presumed to have been entertained between God and man, and to farther progress in the Religious Idea, as it is that the eye be clear in order that it prove receptive of the light of day.*

* An entirely truthful and authoritative interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures is an imperative want of the age in which we live, and has now become the first condition required to enable the world to escape from the slough of superstition on the one hand and of irreligiousness on the other, in which it is helplessly sunk or is sinking more and more deeply every day, despite the well-meant efforts of the pious laity and zealous ministry of all denominations. We have set *authoritative* beside *truthful* in the sentence above; for we are possessed of even more than one perfectly truthful and exhaustive but of no authoritative interpretation of the Hebrew Scriptures and Greek Testament; neither can the world at large have any such until the hierarchies of the several Christian churches agree to associate themselves with Spinoza, Semler, Lessing, De Wette, Ewald, Strauss, Baur,

It has been held by some superficially acquainted with the character of Spinoza's mind and overlooking what he says himself in his works, that he was greatly influenced in his educational development by the study of the mystical writings known under the name of the Cabbala; but better acquainted with the philosopher we find no trace of the mysticism that lies at the very core of these lucubrations, and when we turn to the contemptuous and disparaging terms in which he speaks of the visionary and incomprehensible matter that makes up the cabbalistic system, we feel

Kuehnen, Keim, Renan, and Colenso—critics and scholars all, men of noble lives, clear heads, and pious souls, who from the fulness of their hearts and depths of their understandings have spoken to their fellow-men in terms which all might understand, but which ignorance, superstition, and false direction prevent them from apprehending in their inappreciable worth and importance. Authority would indeed seem indispensable to the mass of mankind; but no holy re-union of cultivated men for such a purpose is possible unless it be based on acknowledgment of the common fatherhood of God, and recognize the revelation he makes of his being and attributes for all time in no mere spoken words or written records, but in the mind of man, the order of the universe, and the great laws that by his fiat rule it necessarily, changelessly, and everlastingly. To the biblical scholar the ignorance apparent in the writings of popular orthodox commentators of the Scriptures in our own country is simply disgraceful, as the glozing and dishonesty often exhibited are appalling: as if the truth ever needed to be bolstered by a lie, or the false escaped detection by cunning efforts to make it seem what it is not. No Irenicon, outcome of the narrow mind and superstitious soul, is capable in these days of proclaiming the ABSOLUTE RELIGION under whose shelter children of the universal parent—Jew, Christian, Mussulman, and Buddhist alike, purged of their ignorance, arrogance, and superstition, but enlightened by science and truly civilized, may meet and give each other the right hand of fellowship.

The names of the accomplished individuals given above have undoubtedly done much to emancipate the European mind from bigotry and error; but to what a relatively limited circle are their writings known! by whom but somewhat kindred spirits are they understood?—spirits strengthened and solaced by their works, not initiated into the sanctuary of truth by their means. The outer and far wider circle, the uneducated religious public, has not yet been reached save to have their fears aroused, and would even seem to be well nigh inaccessible; for contentment with their own blind aspirations and narrow conclusions, and the ungenial assurance in which they live, that all who differ from them in their views of God's religious and moral government of the world are Atheists, Infidels, and villains doomed to everlasting perdition, entrench them within ramparts weak enough in themselves, God wot! but in the confident hearts behind them made well nigh impregnable.

assured that if Spinoza did ever seek to gather fruit from that wierd stem, he found nothing within his reach but husks and empty shells, to be cast away as soon as gathered. He only refers to the Mystics indeed with contempt. 'Whether they speak through foolishness,' he says, 'from anile devotion or self-conceit and for evil ends, I know not; but I find no taste of mystery in all they advance, nothing but childish fancies. Having moreover lately made the personal acquaintance of certain cabbalistic triflers, and even read some of their productions, I can only say farther, that I am at a loss for words to express my amazement at their ravings.' * This does not look like giving in to the mystics; and when we refer to his writings, we see that all that has been taken for mysticism in them has proceeded from the misconceptions of minds incapable of grasping the recondite but perfectly logical and necessary intellectual conclusions to which he had attained. Spinoza, in fact, was not compounded of the clay that is fashioned into the shape they please by others. It was by independent thought and eager inquiry, by drinking of none but the head waters of the stream, that he slowly, painfully arrived at the results he afterwards embodied in his writings: even in his philosophy he cannot well be said to have had a master; for Descartes, who has been given to him in this capacity, was no more than an index of the way he was to take, but which he was laboriously to hew out and level for himself.

Still far from the 'Mezzo cammin della nostra vita,' Spinoza had, nevertheless, arrived at the watershed between childhood and manhood; he had attained to consciousness of his own inherent powers, and become sensible of the difference between the views he took himself of the religious question especially, and those his teachers would have instilled into his mind. The strife within the breast of the clever and in-

* Tract. Theol. Polit., ch. ix. p. 195, Eng. Version.

genuous youth was doubtless long, and far more painful than pleasant in its issue; for it is ever distressing to the young to have to break with old and take up with new and untried associations; to find the staff put into the hand as a strong and trusty prop, no better than a brittle reed. They only, who themselves have passed through the ordeal Spinoza was now required to stand, can appreciate to the full how painful the feelings that attend on the awaking to the new life that then presents itself and calls for recognition. These Spinoza must have felt most keenly; for in one of the rare instances in which he refers to himself in his writings, he says, 'I aver that though I long sought for something of the sort (viz. consonance between reason and the text of the Hebrew Scriptures) I could never find it. And although nurtured in the current views of the sacred Scriptures, and my mind filled with their teachings, I was nevertheless compelled at length to break with my early beliefs.'* Arrived at such a point, the entire foundation of the Jewish system was seen to be of sand, and the dogmatic structure reared on it incapable of longer supplying peace to the religious aspirations of his soul. This he must seek elsewhere; the strait-meshed net of rite and belief within which he had been bred was broken through, and he was already lost to his people.

HE IS REMARKED FOR INDEPENDENCE OF THOUGHT, BECOMES AN OBJECT OF SUSPICION TO THE HEADS OF THE SYNAGOGUE, AND IS EXCOMMUNICATED.

In the state of mind depicted in the words quoted above, it is not surprising that Spinoza became known among his fellows as one who had thoughts of his own on many delicate matters, nor that he with his scholarly reputation should have been consulted by some of them as better informed than

* Op. cit., chap. ix. p. 194, Eng. Version.

themselves. Common report, indeed, must have made him an object of suspicion at an early period to the watchers of Israel; so that he had to become cautious and reticent in his intercourse with his teachers, the Rabbins, and the elders of the congregation. But as he now abandoned his regular attendance at the synagogue, and could only be induced by persuasion to show himself there occasionally, he was doubtless regarded by his kindred and their more intimate friends as a perverse youth, having wayward and wicked fancies, fearing neither God nor man, and therefore devoted to perdition.

The independent, undutiful, and impious behaviour of the young man, as it was called of course, proved, we may readily imagine, a source of much grief and vexation to Spinoza's father. The Jewish synagogue in those days, like the Christian church of the present, was a passport to a certain social position, and whilst affording scope for superior talent, it secured bread at least, and a respectable standing even to the mediocrity that entered on its ministrations. Spinoza's father was anxious that his son, with the scholarly aptitudes he evinced in such rare perfection, should turn these into the accustomed channel, and devote himself to theology and the synagogue. But dogmatic theology is precisely the thing that repels the moral constitution we observe in Spinoza, when associated with intellectual power. He had already escaped from the circle within which the instruction that is not education so commonly retains the vulgar mind. The Old Testament, and the writings of the expositors of its text as the goal of all study, were already left behind. He had found means to initiate himself into a knowledge of the mathematics, and to acquire the rudiments of the noble Latin tongue, as at a later period he did also of the still nobler Greek; and once able to read Virgil and Tacitus, Cicero and Seneca, Homer and Thucydides, in the original tongues, he

got far beyond, and so made his escape from, his old masters the Jewish Rabbis.

Spinoza's meditations and studies thus leading off from the beaten track, the conclusions to which he had come even as a youth must have been either hinted at or more openly expressed; for he appears, as before said, to have been consulted by others, inquirers beyond the common, and his assistance sought in the way of guide out of the labyrinth of theological difficulty in which reflective youth so commonly finds itself entangled. Among the number of these, two young men of his own age and people are particularly spoken of as having pressed him on some of the most delicate topics of their faith. They in the first instance were probably led to do so in perfect sincerity and for their enlightenment; but Spinoza, it appears, was not disposed to unbosom himself freely to them, and for all answer to their inquiries referred them as good Jews to Moses and the Prophets for the information they desired. This, however, was not what they expected: they wished farther to know what he himself thought of the nature of God? was God corporeal or incorporeal; were there, in truth, any incorporeal existences? Were there such beings as angels? Was the soul of man really immortal? and so on.

Spinoza's motto '*Caute*' proclaims him to have been of a cautious disposition, and several incidents in his after-intercourse with the world, to which we shall have occasion to allude, proclaim him not to have 'worn his heart upon his sleeve for daws to peck at.' He seems even to have felt something of that instinctive repugnance towards these young men which honour and true nobility of nature scarcely fail to experience when brought into contact with aught that is capable of baseness and treachery. He had misgivings at all events of the moral hardihood of the youths in question, as was shown by the way in which he evaded answering their inquiries as

from himself, though he met them freely with texts of Scripture, of which he had an ample store at command. With so much, therefore, they had to be satisfied meanwhile; but they proposed farther discussion at another time, opportunity for which, however, Spinoza always contrived to avoid or postpone. This conduct on his part first gave offence, and then engendered hatred in the minds of his would-be friends, who now, unable to insinuate themselves into his confidence, resolved on revenge for his mistrust.

These young men accordingly first spread rumours to the disadvantage of Spinoza, and then denounced him to the heads of the Jewish synagogue, as one in whom public opinion had been entirely mistaken, and who, instead of proving a prop and pillar of the Tabernacle, as had been imagined, was much more likely to pull it down and lay it—if such a thing might be—in ruins; for they declared that he nourished nothing but contempt for the law of Moses, and believed in everything but that which was most imperative on a Jew. Calumny of any kind is but too apt to be taken for true on the very slenderest testimony by the world at large, and accusations of heresy and infidelity appear to be mostly accepted as well-founded on the simple ground that they are made. Such appears to have been the case with Spinoza. Cited before the Elders of the Synagogue, he found himself already judged before he had been heard. It was in vain that he simply denied the truth of the statements made against him. Sharply reprimanded, he was ordered to make instant submission, and to acknowledge his wickedness. But as he still stood unabashed, declaring emphatically that he had never given utterance to such words as were imputed to him, the elders, instead of pausing to make inquiry and sift the evidence, seem to have given way at once to anger, and threatened the contumacious youth with excommunication if he did not yield forthwith to the behests of those who knew so much more and so much better

than himself. Such procedure accompanied by such a threat was insufferable to the truthful nature of Spinoza. He could but retire from the presence of his prejudiced judges and seek such solace as his own better thoughts and convictions left him free to entertain. He could make no submission.

After the interval in such cases allowed to the party incriminated, the heads of the Synagogue had no course open to them but advance on that upon which they had entered. The formula of excommunication according to Jewish ritual was, consequently, pronounced against him, and Baruch d'Spinoza was driven under anathema from the congregation of the faithful in Israel.

There appears to have been great indisposition on the part of the Jews in those days, or soon after, to divulge the formula of excommunication used on such occasions. Colerus solicited the sons of the old Rabbi Chacham Abuah, who pronounced the anathema against Spinoza, in vain for a copy; they always excused themselves, declaring that they could find nothing of the sort among the papers of their late father, 'though I could easily see,' adds Colerus, 'that they were not minded to communicate or part with it to me.' Dr Van Vloten was more fortunate in his application to the present secretary to the Portuguese Jewish church of Amsterdam, I.v. Raphael Jesschurun Cardozo. This liberal-minded gentleman,—virum plurimum venerandum, says Dr Van Vloten,—living in an age of greater enlightenment, made no difficulty in furnishing the Doctor with a copy of the instrument, taken in all likelihood from the very one that was used against the recusant. It is in the Spanish language, and headed:

'Herem que se publicon da Theba em 6de Ab contra Baruch de Espinoza'—Anathema pronounced from the place of Prayer on the 6th of the month Ab [July, 1656] against Baruch d'Espinoza.

Van Vloten has given the original of this interestin
ment entire, as well as a Latin translation, which w
turn into English for the satisfaction of our readers.

'The heads of the Ecclesiastical Council hereby
known, that already well assured of the evil opinions and
ings of Baruch de Espinoza, they have endeavoured in sun
ways and by various promises to turn him from his
courses. But as they have been unable to bring him to any
better way of thinking; on the contrary, as they are every
day better certified of the horrible heresies entertained and
avowed by him, and of the insolence with which these heresies
are promulgated and spread abroad, and many persons worthy
of credit having borne witness to these in the presence of the
said Espinoza, he has been held fully convicted of the same.
Review having therefore been made of the whole matter be-
fore the chiefs of the Ecclesiastical Council, it has been re-
solved, the Counsellors assenting thereunto, to anathematize
the said Espinoza and to cut him off from the people of Israel,
and from the present hour to place him in Anathema with
the following malediction:

'With the judgment of the angels, and the sentence of the
saints, we anathematize, execrate, curse, and cast out Baruch
de Spinoza, the whole of the sacred community assenting, in
presence of the sacred books with the six hundred and
thirteen precepts written therein, pronouncing against him
the Anathema wherewith Joshua anathematized Jericho, the
malediction wherewith Elisha cursed the children, and all
the maledictions written in the book of the law. Let him be
accursed by day, and accursed by night; let him be accursed
in his lying down, and accursed in his rising up, accursed in
going out, and accursed in coming in. May the Lord never
more pardon or acknowledge him; may the wrath and dis-
pleasure of the Lord burn henceforth against this man, load
him with all the curses written in the BOOK of the LAW, and

raze out his name from under the sky; may the Lord sever him for evil from all the tribes of Israel, weight him with all the maledictions of the firmament contained in the book of the law, and may all ye who are obedient to the Lord your God be saved this day.

'Hereby, then, are all admonished that none hold converse with him by word of mouth, none hold communication with him by writing; that no one do him any service, no one abide under the same roof with him, no one approach within four cubits length of him, and no one read any document dictated by him, or written by his hand.' *

But these hard and cruel words were not all in the formidable ceremony of a Jewish excommunication. Other terrible sounds were superadded; and as the imagination is even more painfully impressed through the eye than the ear, matter for sight as well as hearing was supplied; during the reading of the curse, the wailing and protracted note of a great horn was heard to fall in from time to time; the lights, seen brightly burning at the beginning of the ceremony, were extinguished one by one as it proceeded, till at the end the last went out—typical of the extinction of the spiritual life of the excommunicated man—and the congregation was left in total darkness.

Such was the procedure in the Cherem, the second form of excommunication, which we now know was the one made use of in Spinoza's case. It was not the Schammatha, the third and most terrible formula of all, reserved for blasphemers, as stated by Colerus, in which the lights were smoky torches of black wax, extinguished one by one by being reversed over a bucket of blood!

To the anathema thus definitely launched against him Spinoza is said to have sent a reply in Spanish, a copy of which Van Vloten searched for eagerly, but in vain, among

* Van Vloten, Ad. B. de Spinoza op. Supplement, p. 290.

the papers from the orphan asylum of Amsterdam, put at his disposal; hodie saltem non amplius extat—it is now no longer in existence, says he (Suppl. p. 293). This in all likelihood is literally true; but there is as little question that virtually we have his answer enshrined for ever, and in a more extended form, in the Theologico-political Treatise.

The excommunication was published on the 6th of July, 1656, when Spinoza consequently was 24 years of age. Its immediate effect must have been to expel him from the shelter of his father's house. No orthodox Jew could continue beneath the same roof with one—were he even his own son—under the ban of excommunication. Spinoza must therefore quit his home, if he had not perchance already left it, as is most likely, and find countenance and shelter among others than his own people, who had now cast him out from amongst them for ever.

Spinoza, it is to be presumed, must have been fully prepared for the bolt that had been launched against him; and bore it with the fortitude and equanimity that belonged to his character. But sensitive natures, though entrenched in truth as in a citadel, do not fail to feel; and with all his outward stoicism we may imagine but can never know the sufferings endured by the inward man. Excommunication in the free city of Amsterdam, and of a Jew in the midst of a Christian community, was, however, a very different affair from what it had been in the olden time and among the people of Palestine. When informed of his excommunication—for he was not present to hear it read—he is said to have replied: 'Well and good; but this will force me to nothing I should not have been ready to do without it.'

Henceforth, then, Spinoza separated himself entirely from the Jewish communion; but he never attached himself to any other. Beyond the circle of individual minds, the Church of which he was a member had in his day no existence upon

earth, as it is still without a standing and a name. Its principles, indeed, were extant in the sacred Scriptures as he read and understood them, visible there in the prescriptions of love to God and love of our neighbour so frequently repeated, conspicuous in the life and teaching of the Christ with whom, as he believed, God communed in the way of mind with mind, and who was thus the guide at once and the way of life to man; but there was no community then, as there is none in aggregate numbers now, who comprehended God and his relations with the universe at large and with man in particular, as did Spinoza. He had therefore to worship alone in the sanctuary of his own pure soul, in the oratory of his lucid understanding. Referring in one of his letters to the subject of his studies, which were in truth his devotions, he says: 'Though I were compelled to admit that the fruit I gather by my natural understanding was oftentimes unreal, yet would not this make me unhappy; because in the gathering I have my joy, and so pass my days, not in sighing and sorrow, but in contentment and peace, and thereby mount a step higher in existence. I acknowledge, meanwhile —and this, indeed, assures to me the highest satisfaction of spirit—that all happens by the power of the MOST PERFECT, and in conformity with his eternal and unchangeable decrees.' In the same fine epistle, he proceeds: 'As for myself, I give offence to no one, or I strive to give none; to do otherwise were in opposition to my proper nature, and would remove me from the love and knowledge of God.'*

And here let us give particular attention to the remarkable words of the penultimate sentence in the paragraph just quoted. Spinoza, to the best of our knowledge and belief, is the first among the moderns who insists on the universality, the necessity, and the unchangeable nature of the laws ordained by God for the government of the universe and its parts.

* Ep. xxxiv.

Beginning in Spinoza's day to be generally recognized in the physical world, under the lead of the astronomer, and next of the chemist, their existence in the domain of morals seems to have been altogether unsuspected; God was presumed to do and undo at his will and pleasure, and almost at the will and pleasure of those who called themselves his worshippers. But Spinoza proclaimed the moral laws to be as fixed and unalterable as the physical law that makes all the radii of a circle equal to one another. With him there was no escape from these commands, and no remission of the penalty attached to their infraction. Obedience to their behests secures existence and well-being, violation of their decrees entails the punishment implied in misery, misfortune, and death. 'In consonance with great, eternal, changeless laws, we all must tread the circle of our being,' says the greatest poet of his age and country, who was also the student and interpreter of our philosopher.*

HE FINDS EMPLOYMENT AS TEACHER WITH DR FRANCIS VAN DEN ENDE; BUT HAS LEARNED A HANDICRAFT, AND LEAVES AMSTERDAM FOR THE COUNTRY AFTER HIS LIFE HAS BEEN ATTEMPTED.

Spinoza's acquirements in the classical languages stood him in good stead in the conjuncture of his affairs that had now arrived, for he seems at once to have found an engagement in the educational establishment of Dr Francis van den Ende, which at this time enjoyed a great reputation, the sons of many of the wealthiest and most distinguished persons of Amsterdam being among the number of his pupils.

Van den Ende had had the education of a physician, and

* Nach ewigen, cheren, grossen Gesetzen
Müssen wir alle
Unseres Daseyns Kreise vollenden.
Goethe in his Ode entitled THE DIVINE, which will be found translated on a later page.

appears to have been a man of superior attainments in every way, of a bold character, and extremely liberal in all his views. He may possibly have lived without the pale of any of the narrow-minded orthodoxies of his day, and so have become obnoxious to the charge made against him by Colerus, of not only entertaining atheistical views himself, but of teaching these to his scholars. He was a man of irreproachable life, nevertheless, and on terms of intimacy with the most advanced and influential politicians of his country—the De Witts and others—a connection which, joined to the evil reputation in which he stood with the bigots, had first the most disastrous influence on his fortune, and finally cost him his life. For the school getting into evil odour, had finally to be given up, and the master, quitting Amsterdam and falling back on his profession of physician, established himself in Paris, where he lived for several years by his practice, hardly enough, we may presume, like other exiles, but unmolested in his opinions, amid the crowd of the great city.

Van den Ende, exile though he was, must nevertheless have achieved for himself a certain social position, and acquired a reputation for talents among the learned of his new home; for he had become intimate with the celebrated Jansenist Arnauld, and was visited by Leibnitz, during his sojourn in Paris; and this would not have come to pass had the doctor not been a person of consideration. Leibnitz says of him that 'he was held excellent in dialectics, and he told me, when I paid him a visit,' he continues, 'that he would engage always to keep an audience attentive to what he had to say. The Jesuits began to show themselves jealous of his reputation (influenced doubtless by his intimacy with Arnauld, the Jansenist leader); but he lost himself soon afterwards, having got mixed up in the conspiracy of the Chevalier de Rohan.'*

* Vide Leibnitz, Theodicée, § 376. Van den Ende was in all probability sought out in his Parisian retreat by emissaries from the States-general of

With a man of tolerant views like Van den Ende, the reputation Spinoza had acquired for free thought, and with the ban of excommunication on his head in addition, could have proved no obstacle to intercourse. The young man's moral character was unimpeached, and his scholarly attainments were sufficient. Van den Ende—if we may be allowed to eke out what we know historically of the man by the aid of imagination—must even be presumed to have found a friend as well as assistant in his new associate; and he, ripe in scholarship himself, with the training of the physician, well versed in physical science, and of a generous and daring temperament, doubtless exerted a further fostering influence on the mental development of Spinoza, to the detriment, it may perchance have been, of his own social position; for if it happened that he was at this time suspected of heterodox leanings, association with an excommunicated Jew who had made no profession of Christianity, could hardly have been advantageous to his school.

With Dr Van den Ende, however, Spinoza did not continue long. He was already possessed of a handicraft that made him independent of the drudgery of an usher's place in a school as a means of earning his bread; and we have it

Holland, and induced by them to put himself in communication with the Chevalier de Rohan, M. La Truaumont, Madame de Villiers, and others, heads of a secret conspiracy against the tyranny of Louis XIV., which was to have proclaimed itself and shown front in Normandy, and one or more of the neighbouring provinces. Louis shortly before this time had burst in aggressive war upon the Low Countries, and was lying with his armies in possession both of towns and territory within their boundaries. The States-general, on overtures made to them by the French conspirators, doubtless, with a view to disconcert Louis at home, and secure breathing time for themselves, taken at unawares and torn by internal distractions as they were, lent their countenance to the purposed revolt, and promised the assistance of a fleet on the coasts, and a contingent of troops for land service. But the plot having been discovered, though the Dutch fleet showed itself duly on the coast, according to agreement, there was no rising; La Truaumont was shot in the attempt to arrest him, Rohan was arrested and lost his head by the axe, whilst Madame Villiers, the luckless Van den Ende, and several subordinates, were publicly hanged at Paris.

under his own hand at a later period that he never felt his vocation to be that of an instructor of youth. In Jewish schools it was not held enough that the pupils should be filled with book lore, and turned out as merely learned youths; they must either be prepared for professional life, or, when not destined for business or trade, initiated into a handicraft in addition, by which they might live as actively useful members of the community, independently of their learning. We must presume that Spinoza, one of a family not overburdened with wealth, long before he had reached the age of twenty-four was either maintaining himself, or doing something towards so necessary an end. He had, in fact, and long ere this, acquired the art and mystery of grinding and polishing lenses for optical purposes—spectacles, reading-glasses, microscopes, and telescopes—and soon acquired such proficiency in his business that his manufactures were inquired after, and found adequate in the money returns they brought for the supply of all his modest wants.

Certain incidents, moreover, which occurred shortly after the excommunication, may have led Spinoza to feel that his life was not altogether safe in his native city, could it have been even more agreeable than we must surmise he found it, when coming into daily contact, as he must have done, with his late co-religionists, whose scowls he had to brook, and whose avoidance of approach within four cubits' length of him he could not fail to observe. A hot-blooded and probably crazy fanatic waylaid him one night on his way towards home (from the theatre, says Bayle, from the Portuguese synagogue, says Colerus on the authority of Van den Spyck, which yet it could not have been, for at this time he was excommunicated) and attempted his life. Spinoza happily perceived the gesture of the villain as he raised his arm to strike, turned himself sharply round, and received the thrust of the dagger though the collar of his coat instead of in the throat, at which it was aimed, and

so escaped with a trifling wound on the back of his neck. He long preserved and showed the coat in illustration of the terrible spirit that can actuate superstition and fanaticism.*

THE HEADS OF THE SYNAGOGUE ATTEMPT TO WIN HIM BACK TO THE JEWISH FOLD.

Nor could the chiefs of the synagogue themselves yet forget or overlook the lamb that had strayed from their fold. They still showed themselves eager to recover the son of Israel, once looked on as of so much promise, and made overtures for reconciliation backed by the promise of a pension: would he but acknowledge himself in error and submit to the mildest censures of his ancient Church, the ban of excommunication should be removed, and 1000 florins per annum guaranteed to him for the rest of his life. But they who made such proposals to Benedict Spinoza had formed no true estimate of his character. Difficilius a vero abduci possit quam sol a cursu suo,—it had been easier to turn the sun from his course than Spinoza from truth,—says one of his editors;† he could acknowledge no error where he knew of no crime, and money was the last thing on earth that could influence the independent spirit of the philosopher. He had his beautiful art, at once mechanical and scientific, to fall back on; like Paul, the apostle and tent-maker, his own handiwork sufficed for the supply of his daily wants; in the sweat of his face he could honourably earn his bread,—as

* The reader may not object to be reminded that the patriotic Monk Paul Sarpi of Venice, who so ably assisted the Doge and Senate of his native state against the encroachments of the Pope and the Romish hierarchy, was attacked in precisely the same way as Spinoza. He, however, had a much narrower escape than our philosopher; for Sarpi was assailed by a practised hand, a well-known bravo and stabber, hired at Rome by heads of the Church to do the deed of blood for a money price. Sarpi barely escaped with his life, and only after a long and dangerous illness in consequence of the wound he received. The assassin, perfectly well known, was never even put on his trial, much less punished for his crime, but lived protected and doubtless pensioned by his employers.

† Gfroerer, in Præf. ad Op. Philos. p. ix.

he did indeed honourably earn his bread to the end of his days,—beholden to no man for his essential support; but in his industry making the world his debtor, inasmuch as that he gave was of more worth than the gold with which it was repaid.

THE HEADS OF THE SYNAGOGUE MOVE FOR HIS BANISHMENT FROM HIS NATIVE CITY.

Censure and excommunication having failed to move him, flattery with offers of a bribe been found of no more avail, and the assassin's knife glancing harmless from his body, the heads of the Jewish synagogue seem not yet to have been satisfied. Hate, of the sort they had conceived against Spinoza, indeed, is never satisfied. He was still at large, and among them as of yore. The dew and the rain still fell upon his head, the quickening sun shone brightly on his path, he was still seemingly as much an object of his heavenly Father's care as he had been before the interdict, even as when he lay an infant on his mother's lap, or moved, a thoughtless child, among others of his age at play. This was galling enough, and felt as a reproach. Could the heads of the Jewish synagogue of Amsterdam have had their way, Spinoza would assuredly have been laid safe enough in a dungeon below the level of the sea, if worse fate, perchance, had not befallen him. But in the republican city of Amsterdam every religious denomination was not merely tolerated—all were at liberty openly to worship God in the way they pleased, provided always there was nothing in the rites that outraged propriety. Spinoza therefore could not be coerced.

But the Jewish community were not content to suffer even the peaceful and unobtrusive residence among them of one who had fallen under their supreme displeasure, and are said to have petitioned the civic authorities for his expulsion from the city. The case was new, however; no crime or mis-

demeanour was laid to the young man's charge, and there was no precedent for the banishment of any one from the free city of Amsterdam for having become obnoxious to the heads of the Jewish synagogue. To escape the dilemma apparently of disobliging an influential element in the city, or of perpetrating a harsh and arbitrary act, the magistrates referred the case to the Synod of the reformed church, for their advice and opinion. The decision here might have been foretold; for when was any religious denomination found in favour of toleration, save when itself oppressed? The Synod recommended that the obnoxious individual should be ordered to withdraw from the city, for a time at least. Whether the authorities acted on this advice or no, we are not informed; it is to be hoped that they did not; but certain it is, whether they did or not, that Spinoza had left Amsterdam by the end of 1656,—a few months only after the excommunication, therefore,—and taken up his residence with a friend, a member of the Christian sect known as Mennonites, in a house on the road from Amsterdam to Auwerkerke.

Among other interesting documents to which Dr Van Vloten obtained access in the orphan asylum of the Mennonites of Amsterdam, he found a manuscript Life of Spinoza, embracing various particulars not mentioned by Colerus or any other of the biographers; it is from this we learn that one of the motives Spinoza had for leaving his native city, was the attempt upon his life,* and that when, in 1660, he removed to Rhynsburg from his first retreat, it was still in company with the same friend in whose house he now came to reside. It is yet to be seen at the west end of the village of Rhynsburg, in the lane that runs beside the brook between the carriage-way and the footpath leading to Katwyk on the Rhine, and is distinguished by a verse of the poet

* Van Vloten, Supplem. p. 293.

Kamphuysen, cut in stone, let into the front or gable-end of the house, to the following effect:

'Ach, waren alle menschen wijs
En wilden darby wel,
De Aard waar haar een Paradijs,
Nu is ze meest een Hel.'

'Were all men only good and wise,
And willed but to do well,
This earth were then a Paradise,
As now 'tis most a Hell.'

The name of the true and tolerant friend here referred to—the sectarian Christian who could yet bear with the excommunicated Jew—has not come down to us, but the memory of the philosopher's residence on the spot is not yet forgotten among the country folks, the lane in which the house stands being still known under the name of Spinoza-lane.*

SPINOZA IN RETREAT, AND LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS OF HIS FUTURE WORKS.

We now lose sight of Spinoza for several years, viz. from 1656 to 1660, at the last of which dates we find him residing at Rhynsburg, where he was visited in the course of the following year by Henry Oldenburg. Wherever passed, and there is reason to believe that he was at intervals, though never for any great length of time, domiciled in Amsterdam among his old friends, these years comprised an important period in the life of Spinoza; for it was during this that all the works with which his name and fame are associated must either have dawned upon him, or taken more or less perfect shape and proportion in his mind. The implements by which he earned his daily bread were easily carried about from place to place, and occupied little room when set up and brought into play; and we shall certainly not err when we say that with the hands at work in fashioning and polishing

* Spinoza laantije—Van Vloten, Supplem. p. 294.

his lenses, the brain was not only not unoccupied, but was ever busy weaving abstractions and revolving problems in the world of thought, the proper sphere of our philosopher. No occupation indeed could have been more happily chosen than the one he followed for leaving the mind at liberty whilst the body was engaged. We who love and reverence Spinoza have our joy in drawing a mental picture of the sage—poet, maker in one of the highest and noblest senses of the word—seated at his work, his hands plying their light and easy labour, his mind absorbed in meditation, 'the forms of things unseen,' embodied visions of the abstract and infinite, rising in peaceful succession before him, and finding fit reflection to the world without from the stainless mirror of his soul; for the finite world, if it be all the understanding comprehends and knows, is not yet all that the soul within us divines, there is an infinite without and beyond it. If you ask me, says our philosopher, whether I have as clear an idea of God as I have of a triangle? I answer, yes. But do I form as distinct an image of God as I do of a triangle? I answer, no.

It is indeed mostly in the few first years after his escape from pupilage that the man begins to know himself, and proclaims to the world more openly or more inferentially what he is or is to be. The germs of great discoveries and of noble works have very commonly presented themselves to the mental vision of the mere youth, and that this was the case with Spinoza there can be no question. In the letter of the earliest date that we have from his hand we already see the "Ethics," the work of his life, alluded to, in the very shape too in which it has reached us; and in the accident of his having been engaged to give lessons in philosophy to a young gentleman, but to whom, as still youthful and of unstable character, he was indisposed to impart his own particular views, we find occasion given him for the elaboration of the first work he presented to the world: the Principia Philosophiæ

Renati des Cartes more geometrico demonstrata; accesserunt Cogitata Metaphysica, per Benedictum de Spinoza. 12mo. Amst. 1663. Here it was too that in the change of name from Baruch to its Latin equivalent Benedict he took the opportunity of proclaiming his entire separation from Judaism.

HE STAY KEEPS UP HIS INTERCOURSE WITH HIS FRIENDS IN AMSTERDAM, AND BECOMES ATTACHED TO MLLE VAN DEN ENDE.

In his retreat between Amsterdam and Auwerkerke, working hard at his handicraft and his own more special philosophical studies, Spinoza did not neglect his friends in the neighbouring city. He still visited Van den Ende at intervals, and formed friendships with Dr Louis Mayer, a physician, Henry Oldenburg, a merchant, Drs Bresser and Schaller, physicians, Simon de Vries, a young gentleman of fortune, Walter von Tschirnhaus, a young German nobleman, and several others of his own age and tastes, members of a society for the discussion of philosophical questions and the study of the natural sciences.

By mental constitution, or as we might say, speaking physiologically, by cerebral conformation, Spinoza was a born metaphysician and dialectician, but he had also a decided natural talent for the mathematics; he was an excellent geometrician, and well versed in algebra, the value of which as an instrument of analysis he commends in his treatise 'De Arcu in Cœlo,' long presumed to have been burned by the author shortly before his death, but lately rescued from oblivion by Dr Van Vloten. He was further entirely at home in Optics. General physics he had certainly studied, and must have given his mind at one time to chemistry also, as is shown by his criticism of Mr Boyle's book on Nitre, &c. We do not observe that he ever shows any particular taste for the study of natural history as we now understand the term. Natural

history, indeed, in Spinoza's day was still to be created; Linnæus and Jussieu, Buffon and Cuvier, Cavendish, Black and Lavoisier, Werner, Hutton and William Smith, had not yet brought their revelations of nature in her outer and inner aspects and true relations to mankind. But he had looked with delight on the 'beauteous bow that spans the sky,' 'sign to the theologian,' as he has it, 'of a solemn compact between God and man; to the naturalist, an effect of the refraction and reflection of the sun's rays by innumerable drops of rain in conformity with the laws attached by God to things created.'* He had studied 'the subtle pencils of light, beautiful creations of God,'—'subtiles isti luminis penicilli Dei insignes creaturæ,' as Dr Van Vloten elegantly designates them, and must have often stood wrapt in contemplation of the midnight sky, inlaid with glorious stars, suns in the infinite of space, and watched

> 'Those other wandering fires that move
> In mystic dance,'

finding new assurance in all he saw of the Being, Will, and Act in One, of the Self-sufficing Cause of material things, and of the great, eternal, and harmonious forces we call Laws, whereof God is at once the institutor and ever-present and sustaining power.†

On his first acquaintance with Van den Ende, and when assistant in the school-room, Spinoza, we are informed, was not

* Vide Præf. ad Iridis computationem in Van Vloten's Supplement, p. 258.

† David Hume, honoured and beloved by his friends, called atheist and infidel by the vulgar, had many traits intellectually and morally in common with Spinoza. As he walked home one glorious night in company with Adam Smith, pressing his friend's arm closer to his breast, and pointing to the stars, he exclaimed, Oh, Adam, man, tell me, who made all that! Despite of the Positivists, we for our poor part do opine that an undevout astronomer, and we add anatomist, if not positively mad, as said, has yet something defective in his cerebral organization. 'Are you a Theist, Mr Abernethy?' said a distinguished zoologist to the no less distinguished surgeon. 'No anatomist, Doctor, can be an Atheist,' was the reply; and to this *toto corde* do we assent: laws are not of themselves; neither are effects without causes,—the most admirable effects without the most admirable causes.

there alone. The doctor had a daughter, a girl of 12 or 13 years of age, but already so far advanced in classical lore that she could lend a certain amount of aid among the younger pupils. She is even said to have been left in charge of the school during the occasional absences of the master; and this may doubtless have been the case at a later period, though it could hardly have been so, as stated by Colerus, at this time. Spinoza and Jufvrow Van den Ende, thrown much together in the class-room, became intimates of course; and attachment to the child ripened as time ran on, into so much of a warmer feeling on the young man's part for the budding maiden, that he seems to have cherished hopes of one day finding himself in a position to ask her to share his fortunes and become his wife. But 'the course of true love never did run smooth;' Spinoza in after years was not the only suitor; he had a rival in a certain Dietrich Kerkering, a few years older than himself and a much wealthier man. He, perceiving the attentions of Spinoza, redoubled his own, and backing these with handsome presents—a pearl necklace, with appendages of price, is particularly mentioned by Colerus as having had much to do with the final decision of the maiden,—he carried the day against our scholar, was accepted as favoured suitor, and in due course made the lady his wife. 'It is more than poetical hypothesis,' observes Herr Auerbach, in connection with this incident, 'to presume that this attachment to Van den Ende's daughter stirred Spinoza in the innermost depths of his nature. He, a Jew by descent, powerfully attracted in youthful love to a Christian maiden, must needs have been forced painfully to remark the wall of separation which diversity of race, and still more of religious faith, had raised between them. Had he never thought of the subject of religion before, he must have begun to reflect and to make inquiry now; pressed between the tenderest of all life's aspirations on the one hand, and diversity of views in matters

of faith on the other, he must now meet face to face the question that could not fail to arise in his mind, and clear himself a way through the doubts and difficulties that beset him.' *

Spinoza, however, as we have seen, had not now to meet the momentous question here referred to for the first time. It had long engaged his thoughts; and with what amount of mental suffering and social privation he had nevertheless bravely clung to the solution of the mystery to which he had arrived, we may partly conjecture, but can never wholly know. And then, as it turns out, the opposition between born Jew and Christian maiden would not have proved the only obstacle to his union with Mlle Van den Ende, had his suit even thriven in a far greater degree than we have any reason to believe it ever did. The Jufvrow must have been 'tant soit peu bigote' in her special Christianity. For before consenting to her union with Kerkering, she made it a point that he should renounce the Protestantism in which he had been born and bred, for the Popery which was the fashion of her own religious garb. But Spinoza never could have won the maiden on such terms as these. The student of Maimonides and Aben-Ezra, and far more the man of his own independent thoughts, the future author of the 'Tractatus' and the 'Ethics,' who had broken with his family, his kindred, and co-religionists, could never have made professions that belied the deliberate conclusions of his heart and understanding.

Spinoza's wooing, then, was at an end; Kerkering had apostatized, and carried off the prize; and though the rejected suitor may have made light of his disappointment, and even spoken of his attachment as one more of the head than of the heart, yet natures like Spinoza's never fail to feel deeply the smart of unrequited affection. He is reported to have said to one of his friends, that 'he had made up his mind to ask Mlle

* Auerbach—Leben Spinoza's, S. xxxiv.

Van den Ende in marriage, not carried away by her charms as one either of the most beautiful or faultlessly formed of women, but admiring her, loving her, because she was rarely gifted with understanding, possessed of much good sense, and moreover of a pleasant and lively disposition.' He could even play with the subject of love-favour later in life, as we see in the Scholium to Proposition X. Part V. of the Ethics, where he says: 'The lover who is ill received by his mistress thinks of nothing but woman's fickleness, inconstancy, and other accredited defects; but all such fancies vanish the moment he is again taken into favour.'

We may however be allowed to regret that Spinoza encountered obstacles, either now or at another time, to the accomplishment of that part of man's destiny which consists in the assumption of those duties that fall on the husband and head of a house. 'It is not good for man to live as a recluse; and though the definition of the human being as "a social animal" has often been laughed at, men do, nevertheless, more readily obtain the aid they so often require, and better show front to the dangers that threaten them, when banded together than when living solitarily.' Eth. Pr. xxxv., Schol. Spinoza, transcending most men in intellectual power and moral sentiment, was not wanting besides in any of the less elevated feelings that go to the constitution of proper humanity.

HE LEAVES RHYNSBURG FOR VOORBURG, AND SETTLES FINALLY AT THE HAGUE.

Spinoza appears to have quitted Rhynsburg in 1664 for Voorburg, within about a league of the Hague. Here he resided for a year or two, still pursuing his studies and meditations, but greatly interrupted latterly by the visits of his friends and the calls of the curious travelling through Holland; for he had now become a celebrity, and all the world desired to see and to have a word with the expounder of the Cartesian

philosophy, then a subject of particular interest with all classes of the educated European public. Spinoza, moreover, already numbered some of the most accomplished and influential men of his native country among his friends; and his correspondence, both foreign and domestic, had become so extensive as to occupy a considerable share of his time. His letters, indeed, happily preserved to us in certain numbers—would that they had been more! are most interesting, not only from the importance of the subjects they handle, and the explanations of his views they supply, but from the insight they give us into the amiable, kindly nature and sound common sense of the man. Nothing can exceed the pains he takes in replying to the queries and difficulties propounded to him, even when it is obvious that he and his correspondents live as it were in different spheres; nothing can be conceived more candid than the way in which he unbosoms himself on the most delicate subjects, though he knows that what he shall say will not raise him in the favourable opinion of the party he addresses, and cannot even be communicated without detriment to himself.* The ladies, too, are said to have been fond of engaging the gentle bachelor in a philosophical discussion; and in the days and country of the accomplished Anna Maria von Schurmann there were doubtless many women of talent and acquirement whose converse could not have been otherwise than agreeable to the philosopher. All this however could only be indulged in, as he himself regrets, to the serious interruption of his more important studies.

It is a great mistake, then, to suppose that Spinoza was nothing more than a solitary dreamer, living to himself and taking no interest in the world around him, or in the events that transpired in his native country. In his retired and thoughtful life Spinoza was still no hermit, no shunner of his fellow-men. On the contrary, he was, as we have just seen,

* See letter II. to Oldenburg, towards the beginning.

accessible to all from without, and thoroughly sociable in the home circle that surrounded him; he had made a special study of politics besides, had clear and definite views on the subject, and was a republican on principle. Slave to none of the lower passions that agitate humanity, he was yet keenly alive to all the worth and beauty of existence, grateful for the boon of being he had from God, the giver of all things, and ever disposed to taste its sweets in harmony with his nature and within the bounds prescribed by the golden rule of 'not too much.'

When he first settled at the Hague, Spinoza boarded with the widow Van Velden in a house on the Veerkaay, occupying the rooms in which Dr Colerus, his biographer, afterwards lodged. 'The chamber in which I study,' says Colerus, 'at the back of the house on the second floor, is the one in which he dwelt, and made at once his bed-room, his work-shop, and his study.' Here he often remained secluded for two or three days together without seeing any one, absorbed in his occupations, and causing his meals to be brought to him. Finding, however, that the cost of living and boarding with Madam Van Velden was rather more than he could conveniently afford, he changed his quarters, and took a lodging with Henry Van den Spyck, a painter, in a house that overlooked the Pavilion Canal; and here it was that he passed the rest of his days, he himself supplying all he required in the way of sustenance.

It is perhaps even more than probable that to the accident of Colerus's occupation of the very rooms in which Spinoza had lived, we owe all we now possess that is most interesting and reliable in the biography of the philosopher. Here, may Colerus have said, dwelt the redoubtable opponent of the theologies and accredited religious notions of the world at large; here did the book take shape that has stirred our Christendom to the core! Had the Tractatus Theologico-politicus not already fallen in his way, it was assuredly purchased now

and perused; a sermon was preached and published against certain views therein contained; * inquiries were instituted into the life and conversation of its author; the acquaintance of Van den Spyck, the painter, and his wife was made, and the skeleton biography of the Lutheran pastor, with little reference to anything beyond what was known to himself, took form and substance, the kind folks with whom Spinoza had lived for some twelve years or more, and in whose house he died, being his biographer's chief informants.

HIS ABSTEMIOUSNESS AND ECONOMICAL HABITS.

The bodily wants of Spinoza were even too easily supplied 'It approaches the incredible,' says Colerus, 'with how little in the shape of meat and drink he appears to have been satisfied; and it was from no necessity that he was constrained to live so poorly; but he was by nature abstemious.' From certain memoranda found after his death, he seems to have lived for a whole day on a basin of milk porridge with a little butter, costing about three half-pence, and a draught of beer, at the price of half as much, in addition. On another day he partook of nothing but gruel flavoured with raisins and butter, costing fourpence. His consumption of wine never exceeded two pints a month. Once a quarter he regularly settled his accounts and paid outstanding debts, carefully balancing his expenditure against his income, so as 'to make both ends meet, like the snake that forms a circle with its tail in its mouth,' as he playfully said; and having no care to leave more behind him than should suffice to bury him decently.

* La vérité de la Resurrection de Jésus Christ, defendu contre Spinoza et ses sectateurs; avec la Vie de ce fameux philosophe, 8vo. La Haye, 1706. 'Ici à La Haye,' says he, 'où le Seigneur a son Tabernacle et fait sa demeure comme au tems d'Abraham dans la plaine de Mamré, il s'est élevé en nos jours un second Goliath, a sçavoir, Benoit de Spinoza, lequel a bien osé de combattre l'Israel Chrêtien sur cet article de sa foi,' p. 13. The worthy pastor cannot resist the opportunity Spinoza's name affords him of playing on the word: 'Nullus Spinozo fructus decerpitur agro:' and again: 'Inter Spinas serere frustraneum est,' p. 47.

Careless about money all through his life, Spinoza was yet liberal according to his scanty means; nay, he must even have had the wherewithal to show himself in the prominent light of a lender; for having heard that one to whom he had lent 200 florins had become a bankrupt, his only observation was: 'Well, I must economize, and so make up the loss; at this cost I preserve my equanimity.'

HIS MANNERS, CONVERSATION, DISINTERESTEDNESS, AND RELIGIOUSNESS.

Spinoza was unquestionably one of Nature's gentlemen. Henry Oldenburg, a man of rank and family, envoy from the circle of Lower Saxony to the Court of the Protector, secretary to the Royal Society, and moving in the highest social and scientific circles of London, alludes in one of his letters not only to the attainments but to the distinguished manners and amiable disposition—rerum solidarum scientia conjuncta cum humanitate et morum elegantia quibus omnibus Natura et Industria amplissime. te locupletârunt — of his correspondent, which secure to him the love and esteem of all right-minded men. Accessible and courteous to strangers, Spinoza always showed himself communicative and lively in the small circle of his home—'his humour pleasant,' as Madame Van den Spyck informed Colerus, 'his raillery so tempered and sweet, that the most refined and sensitive natures were alike delighted with his company and conversation. He was never seen either sorely depressed or greatly elated. Was any one afflicted or indisposed in the house, he never failed to visit and do all in his power to console the sufferer, encouraging him bravely to bear the ills of life as dispensations of the providence of God. He recommended the youthful to go regularly to their place of worship, punctually to fulfil all their religious duties, and, occasion presenting, admonished them of the beauty of dutiful and obedient behaviour to their parents. On

the return of the members of the family from divine service, he would inquire the text from which the sermon had been preached, and always expressed a hope that the discourse had proved edifying.' 'He had a great regard for my predecessor, Dr Corder,' says Colerus, 'and never failed to speak of him as a learned and naturally good man, of exemplary life and conversation.' He himself went occasionally to hear Dr Corder preach, and used especially to commend the learned way in which the Doctor explained the Holy Scriptures, and the sensible applications he made of their teaching to the practical duties of life. 'Never miss the preaching of so excellent a pastor,' said he to his host and the other members of the family.

Spinoza, philosopher and gentleman, was of course perfectly tolerant of the opinions of others; he had none of that arrogance which leads narrow-minded and ignorant men and women to think that all the world are in error save themselves. Neither had he any of that immoral spirit of proselytism which is ever on the watch to make converts to its own particular views, and feels no compunctious visitings whilst breaking in on the sanctity of home confidences the nearest, the dearest, the holiest that lodge in the heart of man. Madame Van den Spyck, aware that her lodger had a great reputation for learning, took occasion one day to consult him upon the form of religion she professed, inquiring anxiously whether he thought it sufficient to secure her eternal happiness. 'Your religion,' he made answer, 'is a good religion; you have no occasion to seek after another; neither need you doubt of your eternal welfare so as, along with your pious observances, you continue to lead a life of peace in charity with all.'

He was never exacting or troublesome to the people of the house, passing almost the whole day in his room, engaged in his handiwork, his meditations, or his writing. When wearied with these, however, he would join Van den Spyck and his

family in the evening; smoke a pipe of tobacco with the master, and chat on ordinary and indifferent topics with the rest.

Lodging with Van den Spyck, a painter, Spinoza acquired the art of drawing, and kept an Album in which were many sketches, and the portraits of several of his friends, as well as of himself, from his hand. One is mentioned in particular in which he had represented himself as Masaniello, the revolutionary Neapolitan fisherman, with the net over his shoulder, &c., the likeness, according to Van den Spyck, having been striking. This book of the philosopher's sketches has of course been anxiously sought for, but always, unhappily, in vain.

He was fond of using the microscope, and drawing conclusions from what he saw in accordance with his views. Another of his amusements recorded by his biographer, which, as it is usually interpreted, seems out of harmony with his nature, was the pleasure he is said to have taken in watching the battles of spiders. 'These,' says Colerus, 'afforded him so much entertainment, that he would even laugh heartily at the spectacle.' The prisoner and the recluse have in various instances, and for fault of better company, cherished the mouse and the spider that shared their solitude. But we do not read of their ever encouraging their companions to strife, and very certainly none of our house spiders are combative, like the dog and domestic cock. What our gentle Spinoza looked on with so much interest was in truth the *loves*, not the *wars*, of the spiders, a business very curious to behold, and certainly not unlike a combat, the approaches of the male being made with every appearance of wile and as if bent on mischief. But he is not so: he is only intent on matrimony; and woe betide him if he venture on his mistress at other than a pliant moment, or linger in dalliance for an instant after the brief espousals! his life is the inevitable forfeit of imprudence or delay. The writer has oftener than

once in a summer morning wasted half-an-hour in watching, as Spinoza did, those spiderly proceedings so commonly regarded as battles. That our philosopher once caught and threw a hapless fly into the net of its enemy we can believe; for if spiders are to live it is necessary that flies should become their prey; precisely as it seems necessary in the great waters that the small fishes should be eaten by the large,* and that man should make beef and mutton of the ox and sheep he pastures in his fields.†

Moderation and independence were the jewels Spinoza especially prized in life. We have seen him spurn the bribe to apostasy from the truth that was in him at the very beginning of his career, and the same indifference to pelf distinguished him to the end of his days. His friends many times proffered him their purses, but he seems invariably to have declined availing himself of their liberality. Mr Simon de Vries, a young man of ample means, fond of philosophical studies and greatly attached to Spinoza, desired upon one occasion, in presence of Van den Spyck, to present him with a

* Vide Tr. Th. Pol. p. 270. Eng. Vers.

† Too much has been made of this reported pastime of Spinoza, with a view generally to put him in an unfavourable light and show him wanting in humanity. I have however explained the meaning of the presumed 'battle between two spiders,' which is amusing certainly, but not cruel; and Spinoza could never have laughed at the struggles of the fly to free itself from its enemy the spider, as it is said he did, for the fly never does struggle to free itself from its enemy. On falling into the net indeed it tries to get loose, but the owner of the net, whose meal depends on despatch, is down on the luckless insect, closes with it, twirls it rapidly round between its legs, and envelopes it in a silken shroud in an instant, and there is no more struggling than Dr Livingstone tells us he made when he lay on the ground with the lion over him. Narratives get embroidered as they are repeated. Spinoza may once upon a time have laughed over the proceedings of the male and female spider, and he may *once* have thrown a fly into a spider's web; and so, as there is not much to tell of the habits and amusements of the philosopher, once becomes many times, and a casual incident is turned into a habit. Just as one of the foolish biographers with bad taste, by way of heightening his picture, and against the philosopher's own words, makes him negligent of his dress and person—the vile body not being worthy of fine garments. But Spinoza did not think the body vile—he looked on it as the necessary condition to the display of mind, one of the noblest works of God, and so deserving of every care. He always dressed soberly and neatly, like the burgher of his age.

purse of 2000 florins to spend upon comforts and fancies; but he civilly declined the offer, declaring that he had need of nothing more than he possessed, and that the ownership of so much money would assuredly divert him from his business and his studies. 'Nature,' said he, 'is satisfied with little, and if she be so, even so am I.' Subsequently, the same De Vries, stricken with a mortal malady in the flower of his age—pulmonary consumption—and conscious that his end was at hand, wished to constitute Spinoza heir to his fortune; but the philosopher, in pointedly declining the generous proposal for himself, took occasion to remind De Vries that he had a brother in Scheidam who was his natural and rightful heir. De Vries accordingly, so honourably advised, left his wealth to his brother, with the proviso that Benedict de Spinoza should be paid an annuity of 500 florins as long as he lived. But this, too, was more than the philosopher would accept: he desired that the amount should be reduced to 300 florins, as 'sufficient to meet all his wants.' And this sum he continued duly to receive to the end of his life. All honour to the memory of the noble Simon de Vries! nor can it be out of place to add that the Scheidam brother showed himself both a true and a grateful man; for he not only acquitted himself honourably of his obligation to Spinoza during his life, but on hearing of his death, sent immediately to the Hague to provide for funeral expenses and the liquidation of all outstanding debts and liabilities—honour and grateful remembrance to his memory also!

Indifferent to pelf, incapable of standing between another and his rights, Spinoza still was not the man to turn his cheek to the insolent smiter, or tamely to put up with injustice to himself. On the death of his father (who, we may surmise from hints of business distractions contained in Spinoza's letters of the date when it occurred, appears to have fallen into difficulties towards the end of his days), his two sisters

disputed his right to share with them in the succession, prompted to do so in all probability by the importance they attached to the ban of excommunication under which he lay, and which, like other charitable formulæ of the sort, would have taken from him the right to breathe the common air, but which he himself continued to endure with the most provoking indifference. To open and bigoted injustice Spinoza could not submit. He first simply asserted his claim to share in the inheritance of his father; but as the women held out and would not yield, he went on to establish his title by legal process. This done, his title vindicated, he immediately withdrew all claim to participate to the extent of his right, and only selected a single article of household furniture—a bed with its hangings,—which, Colerus naïvely informs us, 'was to be sure a very good one,' for his portion. Everything else he left to his sisters.

Besides the income from his handicraft and the annuity from Simon de Vries's heir, Spinoza was in the further receipt of 100 florins per annum from the Grand Pensionary Jan de Witt—a trifling sum which he could well accept without loss of self-respect, from the chief magistrate of his country. But he declined the offer made him through Colonel Stoupe of a further pension from the French king, which was to have followed on the dedication of a book to the monarch. After the lamentable death of De Witt, as the heirs of the great man showed some hesitation to continue the payment, Spinoza forthwith returned to them the instrument under which the pension had been granted, and abandoned all claim to its continuance. It is proper to add, however, that payment was resumed and continued during the rest of the philosopher's life.

HIS RELIGIOUS CONSTITUTION.

The prominent feature of all in Spinoza's moral constitution was religiousness. His whole nature was religious. Re-

ligion in the sense of the relations of man to God, afforded the chief food of his meditations; and the idea of God, the sense of present Deity, seems scarcely at any time to have been absent from his mind. Wholly religious, he was nevertheless anything but submissive to much that was taught in the name of religion; he could not consent to hide, to slur over or explain away, unreason, incongruity, and contradiction; he could not accept as truths the arbitrary explanations and fanciful interpretations of critics and commentators of writings put into his hands as the record of God's dealings with his creature man, and of the rites and observances he required in return for the boon of conscious being he had given. Hence all the troubles of our philosopher; but hence also the halo that surrounds his name, and gives to his short appearance upon earth a deathless significance to the sons of men. Incapable themselves of distinguishing between religion in the abstract and particular phases of the religious nature of man exhibited in Elohism, Molochism, and Jehovism, the Theistic morality of Jesus, and the Christology of Paul and his successors, theologians foolishly concluded that Spinoza in boldly criticizing the Hebrew Scriptures, and referring man back to his own nature and the universe around him as the grand and incorruptible revelation which God had made of himself in time, had discarded religion altogether from his soul and understanding.

But it was far otherwise. Spinoza, Jew by birth and training, was even and in truth much more of a Christian, when we interpret the name by the simple teaching of Jesus of Nazareth, than any or all of his detractors. The views he took and propounded two hundred years ago of the teaching of the Divine Man sixteen hundred years before he lived himself, are not different from those that have since been vindicated by such men as Lessing, Herder, Paulus, Channing, Theodore Parker and others in successive generations—views that

already command assent from almost all the pious, intelligent, and really educated minds of Europe, and that must spread and penetrate the general understanding in order that Christianity may be brought back to its true significance and continue the religion of the civilized world. 'It is very necessary,' said Lessing, 'to distinguish between the religion of Christ and the Christian religion;' a view in which he has been followed by many distinguished writers of the last and especially of the present age.*

The candid reader who has never heard the name of Spinoza coupled with other terms than those of atheist and blasphemer, will doubtless be surprised to find such words as these in the writings of the calumniated man: 'God, I opine, revealed himself immediately by the mind of Christ to the Apostles, as he had formerly mediately made himself known to Moses by articulate sounds. The voice of Christ, therefore, even as the voice which Moses is said to have heard, may be called the voice of God. And in this sense also may we say that the wisdom of God, in other words, the wisdom which is more than human, put on humanity in Christ, and that Christ consequently is the way of life to man. If therefore Moses, as is believed, spoke face to face with God, as man speaks face to face with man, by means of corporeal organs, Christ, it must be maintained, communed with God immediately in the way of mind with mind.' 'Christ,' he goes on to say in another place, 'is not a prophet in the same precise sense as are the other prophets. They only attained to a knowledge of divine things by intermediate means and the aid of imagination, whilst Christ knew them without utterances and without imagery. Christ may be said to be the wisdom of God enshrined in humanity.'†

* Vide, among others, Chips from a German Workshop, by Professor Max Müller.

† Tr. Theol. Pol., Eng. Vers., p. 97.

In speaking thus of the divine Jesus it must not be understood that Spinoza really means more than would be intended by a pious modern interpreter of God's intercourse with man who declared himself in similar terms; for in another part of the same work he says: 'As to what certain churches assert in regard to the nature of Christ I frankly confess that I do not understand them:' and in a letter to Oldenburg, where he touches on the same subject,* he says farther: 'As to what is said of God taking on himself our human nature, I had as soon speak of the triangle taking on itself the nature of the square.' It is in the same fine epistle that he lays open his whole thought to his inquisitive correspondent, and observes: 'It is by no means necessary to salvation to know Christ according to the flesh; for of the eternal son of God, that is, of the eternal wisdom of God manifested in all things, in the mind of man especially, and most especially of all in Jesus Christ, I hold that very different views are to be entertained.' Spinoza's general philosophical views leave him quite free to speak of Jesus of Nazareth as a more especial manifestation of Deity; as the one among the sons of men, and therefore among the sons of God, possessed of the highest powers, morally and intellectually, that can be conceived in the shape of humanity.

HIS POLITICAL AND ECCLESIASTICAL VIEWS.

Spinoza, we have said, was not always absorbed in abstract study, or forced, by the necessity of providing for his physical wants, to sit so constantly at his lens-polishing as to leave him no leisure for thoughts of other things. He took a lively interest in the political concerns of his country, was upon intimate terms with the Grand Pensionary Jan de Witt, with Van den Hoof, or De la Cour, as his name was

* Letter xxi.

given in Dutch or French,* and with several other of the liberal statesmen of the period. He is even said to have been occasionally taken into the counsels of De Witt on the best courses for upholding the liberties and advancing the status of their common country. There are in the Theologico-politicus many allusions to events that had occurred in the United Netherlands within no great space of time. John Olden-Barneveldt is certainly particularly referred to in the 20th chapter, where the writer speaks so manfully and so feelingly of the disgrace that befalls a state when worth and talent are crushed, and a life of true nobility is ended on the scaffold, under the sanction of bad laws and arbitrary stretches of authority. 'What,' says Spinoza, 'can be more disastrous to a state than that men should be accounted enemies and condemned to death not because of any crime they have committed, but merely because they are of liberal mind? What, I say, more disgraceful to humanity than that the scaffold, which should be the terror of evil-doers only, should become a stage for the display of exalted virtue and resignation? He who knows himself guiltless of all crime has no felon fear of death; he condescends not to ask for grace or pardon; for his soul is not oppressed by remorse for evil deeds, and instead of shame he feels it honour and glory to lay down his life for the good cause he has at heart!' †

* Van den Hoof was author of many works; of one in particular that made a great noise in its day, entitled, Lucii Antistii Constantis De Jure Ecclesiasticorum, published in 1665, which has often been ascribed to Spinoza. Van den Hoof and Spinoza were, however, of the same political persuasion, republicans, opposed to the Orange faction, denounced and decried from all the Calvinistic and Popish pulpits in the Netherlands, and with such effect as to lead at length to the murder of the De Witts by the mob.

† There is even more in this passage than to the mere eye immediately appears. No petition for pardon or a commutation of sentence had been presented to the Stadtholder either by Olden-Barneveldt himself or his family. Subsequently, his two sons took up arms to revenge the death of their father. One of them fell in the field; the other was taken prisoner, and, as rebel to the state, was adjudged to die. On this, the mother threw herself at the feet of Maurice and interceded for the life of her son. 'How is this, madam,' said Maurice, 'that you are so instant with me for the life of your son, and never

Accusations of being implicated in plots to betray the country were indeed but too common in the Netherlands long after their emancipation from the Spanish yoke. The people divided into two great political parties, violently opposed to each other—Republicans on the one hand, Partisans of the house of Orange on the other,—to political differences superadding the element of religious hate, the Republicans being mostly Arminians, liberal and progressive, the Orangists generally Roman Catholics, monarchical and conservative. Without the religious element, used by ambitious men upon occasion as a means to gain their ends, Maurice of Orange could not have compassed the death of Olden-Barneveldt, a fact that will enable the reader to understand Spinoza's invective against shameful acts perpetrated under the sanction of law cloaked by religion.

In Spinoza's day Jan de Witt, his friend and patron, stood towards the house of Orange nearly in the position which Olden-Barneveldt had occupied about half a century before. De Witt, too, was at the head of the Republican party; and it was only by his strenuous opposition that the Prince of Orange failed in his purpose of having himself elected Stadtholder for life, the grand object of his ambition. When Louis XIV. fell without warning or provocation on the Netherlands in 1672 with a great host, the country was so much distracted by political animosity and religious strife, as to be almost without means of defence; and to make matters still worse, each of the opposed parties accused the other of tampering with the hated French. De Witt, in particular, as leader of the Republicans, falling under the suspicion of the Orange party on this account, the prison into which he had been thrown was attacked by an infuriated mob, and he

moved to save your husband?' 'Alas!' answered the mother, widowed by him whom she addressed, 'my boy is *guilty*, and I can sue for mercy; my husband was *innocent*, and I had no such ground of appeal to your Highness' clemency.'

and his brother, being dragged into the street, were literally torn in pieces by the rabid multitude.

HE VISITS THE FRENCH HEAD-QUARTERS AND IS SUSPECTED OF UNPATRIOTIC TENDENCIES.

We have seen Spinoza an object of curiosity with his countrymen and friendly visitors to the Netherlands; we should scarcely have surmised, however, that he could have been seen in the same light by his country's enemies; but such was in fact the case. Among the troops in the service of France there was a regiment of Swiss, commanded by Lieut.-Colonel Stoupe, a man of some mark both socially and intellectually, for he was one who—

> 'Did not build all his faith upon
> The holy text of pike and gun,
> Decide all controversy by
> Infallible artillery,
> And prove his doctrine orthodox
> By apostolic blows and knocks.'

Stoupe, on the contrary, was a man of education, interested in literary and philosophical matters, and to whom Spinoza's name and writings must have been familiarly known. He appears to have made the Prince de Condé, Generalissimo of the French army, acquainted with Spinoza's fame as a philosopher; and anxious, in all probability, himself to know and converse with the man, he induced the Prince to send Spinoza an invitation to head-quarters, then established at Utrecht. Spinoza accepted the compliment, and after a while proceeded to Utrecht under cover of a French pass. He did not, however, see the Prince de Condé, who had been unexpectedly summoned to Paris by the king, but he was courteously received by the general of the French army de facto, the Marechal de Luxembourg, with whom, as well as with Colonel Stoupe, he had many conversations. There being no prospect of Condé's speedy return to the army,

Spinoza, after staying a week or ten days at Utrecht, took his way back to his home at the Hague. But he was encountered by no friendly welcome on his return, and at one time was like to have paid dearly for the curiosity of the Switzer and his friends; for the populace of the Hague, aware of the visit he had paid, and understanding nothing of scientific and literary curiosity, could only imagine intercourse with the enemy as treason to the state. They therefore spoke of getting rid of another traitor and spy, as they had already got rid of the DeWitts; and must have made some threatening demonstrations against the philosopher, for his host, Van den Spyck, became greatly alarmed, and was even anxious that his lodger should quit the house, lest it should be attacked and plundered by the mob, and his own life perchance made the forfeit. Spinoza assured the timid man as best he could, and bade him fear nothing; 'for,' said he, 'I can easily clear myself of all suspicion of treason. There are persons enow at the Hague who know the motive of my journey, and who will right me with my townsmen. But be this as it may, should the people show the slightest disposition to molest you, should they even assemble and make a noise before your house, I will go down to them, though it should be to meet the fate of the De Witts.' Spinoza's name, however, never having been connected with politics, the ill-feeling in the minds of the Haguers soon subsided, he himself lived on unmolested, and Van den Spyck suffered no molestation on account of his inmate.

Spinoza, we have said, was a republican on principle; the republican form of government approaching, in his opinion, most closely to that which nature intended should obtain in civilized communities. His views, however, were speculative and Utopian only, not practical. He did not read aright the great religious and democratic movement that took place in the neighbouring country of England under his own eyes, against

the tyranny of the despot in the First Charles, and the tyranny of the priest in Laud and his associates,* preachers of the divine right of kings to govern wrong, and assertors of priestly authority derived from Christ to outrage the consciences of mankind.

The community, Spinoza held, should suffice in every case for its own protection; and he therefore advocates the arming of the people for their security and defence: every citizen in a free state, he maintains, should be trained to arms; he is emphatic in pointing out the danger to liberty at home from standing armies,† and, by implication, the threat to the freedom and prosperity of neighbouring states in their existence. And the far-seeing man was in the right, for the curse of Europe at the present hour is in the millions of armed men in the prime of life who live on the industry of the occupied, and have nothing to do but practise the art of killing with the best effect. Aggressive warfare, in other words, murder with intent to steal, is of course never so much as contemplated by our philosopher.

Spinoza is incessant in his assertion of the supremacy of the civil power in every contingency. Intrusted with the supreme authority by the community at large, the civil power, he maintains, has the unquestionable right to command in matters of religion also. ‡ A religious system, he maintains, can only acquire legal existence by the decree of the ruling power in the state, and must necessarily be settled in conformity with and in subordination to the other institutions of the commonwealth. 'Whoever,' says he, 'denies to the state the right to arrange its religious system divides the commonwealth against itself, and this can on no account be suffered.' In advocating a religious system by ordinance of the state, however, Spinoza is careful to declare that he does so in no

* Vide Trac. Theol. Pol. p. 324, Eng. Vers.
† Tr. Th. Pol., p. 298. ‡ Ib., ch. xix. p. 327.

such sense as a hierarchy would understand the subject, viz., the supremacy of some particular confession whose tenets should be compulsorily subscribed to by all and sundry, under threat of pains and penalties for non-compliance. 'Of piety,' he says, 'in itself, of the frame of mind that disposes to devotion, and of the means whereby the spirit is inwardly disposed to love and reverence God, I do not speak; for herein is every man his own authority; and his right in this direction is of such a nature that it cannot be given up or transferred to another.' This pointed assertion of the supremacy of the civil over the ecclesiastical power in every case without exception, independently of proper theological grounds, has probably had not a little to do with the persistent ill-will hitherto entertained with rare but signal exceptions by the clergy of every denomination of Christians against Spinoza. It is the condition against which Anglicanism, as it is called, is loudest in its denunciations; but as it is precisely the condition the maintenance of which is seen to be most indispensable to the religious peace and freedom of the country, it is as resolutely insisted on by the community at large as it is persistently railed against by a certain short-sighted section of the Church of England clergy. In entire consistency with the rest of his views Spinoza might very well have maintained that the duty of the state was to leave religion to itself, and only to secure to every one freedom to worship God in his own way, provided always that moral propriety was not outraged, and the peace of the community not interfered with in the act. It is indeed very possible to interpret the whole argument of the philosopher on this topic as leading to such a conclusion. Religion is an eternal element in the nature of man, and no more needs nor brooks state support or interference than any the most intimate of the relations of social life.

HE RECEIVES A CALL TO THE CHAIR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG.

As years rolled by, Spinoza's fame continued to extend. He was now a man of mark in the republic of letters, the 'Principia Philosophiæ Cartesianæ' was a kind of text-book in the schools, and if every one of liberal education did not openly express approval of the Tractatus Theologico-politicus, many did so, and all read it.

It was early in 1673 that Spinoza received an invitation through the learned J. L. Fabritius from the Prince-palatine, Charles Louis, a man of liberal mind and higher accomplishments than are always possessed by princes, to fill the chair of Philosophy in the University of Heidelberg, then vacant.

Fabritius addresses Spinoza as *philosophus acutissimus ac celeberrimus;* informs him that he is desired by his most excellent master the prince to ask him if he were disposed to take on himself the duties of professor of philosophy; that if he were so inclined he should enjoy the same annual honorarium as the other professors in ordinary, and have entire freedom in philosophizing, which the prince believes would not be abused to the disturbance of the established religion of the country. Fabritius very handsomely seconds the invitations of the prince, adding that unless things turned out much otherwise than he anticipated, Spinoza would assuredly find himself in a position at Heidelberg becoming a philosopher.

In his answer to Fabritius, and it was not despatched in a hurry but only after mature deliberation, Spinoza shows himself obviously flattered by the compliment paid him, and even requests a little longer time for consideration before sending a final answer; but the general tenor of his letter shows that he has already made up his mind not to accept the proposal, and the request for delay is but to soften the seeming ungraciousness of declining the offer of a prince.

He feels and acknowledges that his vocation is not that of a professor and instructor of youth; and then, the freedom of philosophical discussion was *not* unconditional: the professor of philosophy was expected to use his opportunities for speculation on delicate subjects within certain limits only, which, as susceptible of diversity of interpretation, Spinoza foresaw must inevitably lead to discussion and difference; and anything like discord, both for his own sake and the sake of others, he was determined to avoid. Spinoza therefore courteously declined the chair, 'not knowing,' as he says in his answer to Fabritius, 'within what precise limits the liberty of philosophizing would have to be restricted.'

HIS PERSONAL APPEARANCE.

In Colerus's day there were many persons still living at the Hague who had been well acquainted with Spinoza. They spoke of him as a man of middling height and slenderly built. His features were regular, his forehead broad and high, his eyes dark, large, and lustrous, his eyebrows black and bushy, his hair of the same hue, long and curling, and his complexion swarthy,—the whole physiognomy unmistakeably proclaiming descent from the Jews of the southern Peninsula. The prevailing expression of the face, judging from the engraved portraits given by Dr Paulus in his edition of the philosopher's writings, and Fr. H. Jacobi, in his book, Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza, is that of thought overcast with melancholy. This is particularly the case in Dr Paulus's portrait, which is much the finer of the two; and though somewhat defective in the drawing of the left eye, yet giving, we imagine, a true likeness of the man as he appeared in life. To this portrait we should not hesitate to append the verse which Dr Van Vloten found attached to one pasted into a copy of the philosopher's Tractatus de Deo et Homine, to the following effect:

'Here art presents us with Spinoza's face,
Wherein deep lines of sober thought we trace;
Yet is the mental likeness better shown
To those who read and make his works their own.'*

In this sweet and placid countenance bigotry has nevertheless not failed to find signs of reprobation and enmity to everything held sacred by man; to which Hegel replies: 'Reprobation if you will, but reprobation only of the weakness and wickedness of mankind.' There certainly was nothing else of reprobation in Spinoza's nature, and even that was largely tempered with pity.

He dressed like a simple citizen, soberly and plainly, and we have his own words (against the statement of one of the more foolish of those who have commented on his life) to assure us that he was even careful of his personal appearance. 'It is not a disorderly and slovenly carriage,' he says, 'that makes us sages; much rather is affected indifference to personal appearance an evidence of a poor spirit in which true wisdom could find no fit dwelling-place, and science only meet with disorder and disarray.'

HIS LAST ILLNESS AND DEATH.

Always of delicate constitution and feeble health—and how with his habits could he be otherwise?—Spinoza appears to have suffered at one time from repeated attacks of the prevailing distemper of his country—intermittent fever, that insidious underminer of the general health. In one of his letters to Dr Bresser he speaks of having lately suffered from the disease, and says that he will 'be looking for a little of that same conserve of roses,' the qualities of which, as a remedy in such circumstances, the doctor would seem to have been

* Ad. B. de Spinoza Opera Supplementa, ad finem:

Hier schaduwt ons de Konst in prent Spinoza's wezen,
En beeldt 's man diep gepeins in 't zedig trony af;
Terwijl de vrucht zijns geest, en 't geen 't vernunft hem gaf,
Best wordt gekend van hun die zijne schriften lezen.

lauding. But pectoral infirmity, a form of disease as frequent in the Netherlands as ague itself, was the besetting enemy of Spinoza. During the last years of his life he would even appear to have been positively affected with a chronic form of pulmonary consumption, which brought him to his end at last. From the beginning of 1674 he seems to have led the life of a confirmed invalid. It was then that he first complained to one of his correspondents of not feeling well; still he went on with the work of various kinds he had in hand, very much as he had hitherto done. He must also have left the Hague for Amsterdam for some short time in the course of 1675, when he had his Ethics ready for press, and meant to have published this the grand labour of his life, had he not been prevented by the false reports set afloat as to the nature of the work, and the selfish fears of the clergy. With the coming in of 1677, he did not appear to those about him more seriously indisposed than usual, and no one thought his end so near as it proved to be, in fact. On Saturday, the 20th of February, he joined Van den Spyck in the evening, smoked his pipe of tobacco as usual, and had a long conversation on the sermon, from hearing which the painter and his wife had just returned. Spinoza must have felt more than usually indisposed, however, for he had written on the same day to his friend, Dr Louis Meyer, of Amsterdam, requesting a visit from him on the morrow. On the morning of Sunday the 21st, he was still able to leave his room, and chatted for a while with Mynheer and Madame Van den Spyck, as they were preparing for church, intending to partake of the Lord's Supper. Early in the day Dr Meyer arrived, ordered, among other things, a mess of chicken-broth for his patient; and finding him, we may presume, much worse than either he himself or the people of the house imagined, remained in attendance on him through the day. The sick man, nevertheless, took some of his chicken-broth at noon, and even ate a little of

the meat. The Van den Spycks went to afternoon service, leaving Dr Meyer in charge of the house and the invalid; but they never saw their friend in life again: he had been seized with a sudden difficulty of breathing soon after they went out, and passed peacefully away about three o'clock in the afternoon of Sunday, the 21st of February, 1677, aged forty-four years and three months.

The funeral took place on the 25th, the remains of the philosopher being attended to his last resting-place in the new church on the Spuy by a numerous train, among whom were to be seen many of the most respectable inhabitants of the Hague.

Dr Meyer, who, as a friend of Spinoza, has of course no place in the good opinion of Colerus, and no good word from him, returned to Amsterdam by the night boat, which Colerus insinuates he was all the more disposed to do speedily, as he had appropriated a ducat and some silver, as well as a silver-bladed knife which he found on the table of his deceased friend. This piece of poor spite on the part of the Lutheran parson is to be regretted. Physicians do not rob their patients after their death, though they have sometimes been charged with picking their pockets during their lives; Meyer was a man of character and eminence in his profession, and would not have been the trusted friend of Benedict de Spinoza had he been capable of conceiving a mean, to say nothing of perpetrating a dishonest, action.

Colerus, however, has been more just to the memory of Spinoza than to the honourable character of Dr Meyer, by giving the lie on the testimony of the Van den Spycks to the false reports that were raised by the malevolent touching the manner of the philosopher's death; such as that he kept a preparation of opium by him to be taken when he felt his death approaching, and so ending the strife more speedily; nay, that he had actually taken mandragora, and so passed

into eternity during the sleep and unconsciousness it produced; that he had been heard to exclaim: O God, have mercy on me, a miserable sinner! and given directions that no minister of religion should be permitted to approach him on his death-bed, and more besides of the same sort.

'I inquired carefully into the truth of these reports,' says Colerus, 'and upon several occasions asked his host and hostess, who are still living, what they knew of them; but they both replied that they were certain all such reports were simple falsehoods. There was no one with him in his room when he died but the physician from Amsterdam already mentioned. No one in the house had ever heard the words put into his mouth; he had never spoken to his host or hostess about refusing any one access to him who sought it; he had never been heard lamenting his state and invoking the name of God; on the contrary, in all his sicknesses and particularly since his health and strength seemed to have given way entirely, he had shown nothing but a truly stoical indifference to suffering.' Colerus seems to have inspected the druggist or apothecary's account for medicines supplied to him either on his own requisition or according to the prescriptions of the Amsterdam physician, and there found mention made of tincture of saffron, balsamic tincture, &c., but not a word of any opiate, mandragora, or other poisonous thing.

Van den Spyck appears to have heard from John Rieuwertz, printer and bookseller of Amsterdam, immediately after the death of Spinoza. Rieuwertz mentions Mr De Vries of Scheidam by name, and authorizes Van den Spyck to discharge all the funeral expenses and outstanding debts, promising payment, moreover, of whatever might be owing to Van den Spyck himself at the time of his late lodger's demise. The amount of these several items, transmitted through Rieuwertz to Mr De Vries, was immediately returned to the bookseller, and by him handed over to the painter.

Spinoza left little of this world's goods behind him. He had had nothing from his parents, he said, and whoever might be his heir was to look for little from him. His sister, Rebecca de Spinoza, however, did present herself as his nearest of kin, and laid claim to whatsoever he might have died possessed of. But as she refused her security for payment of the funeral expenses and outstanding liabilities—and this must have been before Van den Spyck had had any communication from Rieuwertz and De Vries—Van den Spyck seems to have been forced to take measures to protect himself legally against her interference and rapacity. After looking narrowly into the state of affairs, and seeing that, after much trouble, there would probably be little or nothing over when all demands were paid, Rebecca de Spinoza finally declined to administer to the estate of her brother, whose household furniture, personal apparel, a few books, and a number of lenses were then brought to the hammer and sold by public auction; the whole proceeds of the sale amounting to four hundred florins, or about £40 sterling.

Spinoza had doubtless for some time past been conscious that his end was approaching. The only matter upon which he appears to have felt any anxiety was the safety of the papers he should leave behind him. These were all contained in a writing-desk, which he had requested Van den Spyck immediately on his death to transmit to Jan Rieuwertz of Amsterdam. Van den Spyck was true man enough to obey the injunctions of the deceased philosopher to the letter; for the very day after his death the desk was on its way by water-express to the custody of the worthy bookseller, and safe from the clutches of Rebecca de Spinoza, whose mode of dealing with the 'Ethics,' the priceless treasure locked within it, we may readily imagine. Rebecca did not fail, when she heard of the despatch of a box to Amsterdam the morn-

ing after the death of her brother, to make particular inquiries after its contents, fancying, doubtless, that it contained treasures of the sort she prized; but being certified that it really enclosed nothing but written papers, letters from friends, &c., she seems, happily, to have troubled herself no more about it.

SPINOZA'S FRIENDS AND CORRESPONDENTS.

EPITOME AND CRITICISM OF THE LETTERS.

DR FRANCIS VAN DEN ENDE.

Of Spinoza's first friend in his time of need, Dr Van den Ende, and the tragical conclusion of his life, we have already had occasion to speak.* Did any letters pass between him and our philosopher, as in all probability there did, they have not come down to us. But the shelter which the good physician gave to the excommunicated man entitles him to an honourable mention of his name in this place.

From the hints we have through Leibnitz, we may presume that Van den Ende in his new home, besides practising as physician, had resumed his old occupation of educator, for which he was acknowledged to have shown such aptitude in his native country. It could, indeed, only have been as an educator that he attracted the attention and aroused the jealousy of the Jesuits, who have always arrogated education as their own peculiar province, and have certainly pursued it, not without success, in impeding the real progress of the world. Theologians are, in truth, by training and habits of thought, the least fitted of all the lettered classes to have the duties of education intrusted to them. Their ideas of education seldom go beyond indoctrination; with them the pupil is not to doubt and to question, but to believe and take on trust what is told him by his master. It should not be forgotten that the education of France before the Revolution was wholly in the hands of the clergy, and that under them king and court, nobility and gentry, had attained to such a

* Vide p. 38, et seq.

height of immorality, frivolity, wickedness, and unreason, whilst the mass of the people were sunk in such a slough of ignorance, poverty, and superstition, that nothing short of the desolating tempest which swept over the country could have sufficed to give it a chance for restoration to health.

Van den Ende, the physician, had been trained in another school; one in which nothing is taken for granted, nothing received without inquiry, on the dictate of a master; hence his success as an educator. Bitter experience, however, had doubtless taught him caution in his new position, so that in connection with the more reticent instructor of Paris, we hear nothing of the atheism that had been wickedly charged, to his discomfiture, against the liberal and outspoken teacher of Amsterdam.*

HENRY OLDENBURG.—THE HON. ROBERT BOYLE.—SPINOZA'S CHRISTOLOGY.

Oldenburg is the earliest and most interesting of all the correspondents of Spinoza, whose letters have reached us. It is through him especially that we seem to penetrate the very inmost thoughts of the philosopher; and though we should certainly have inferred nothing about him but what was favourable either from his writings, from the way in which

* The world has, in fact, long outgrown the necessity for the priest in any guise or disguise as the educator of the community; there are plenty of liberally educated men among us conversant with natural and social science, unhampered by the dogmas of traditional prescription, and better fitted in every way for the duties of the educator than the clerk. It would probably be well did the people of England now cease to think it indispensable to have a gentleman with the title of Reverend attached to his name as the instructor of their children, and that our magistrates began to see it possible to have more efficient guides and regenerators of the erring humanity that peoples our prisons and reformatories, and the poverty and misfortune that crowd our unions and great charitable institutions for the young, than the clergy who have so long had a monopoly of these all-important duties. The efforts of these good, zealous, unquestionably pious and most respectable men to educate the youthful and amend the erring, to impart the kind of knowledge and moral principle that might suffice as the rule of life, have hitherto been remarkable for nothing but their signal want of success.

he is always addressed by his correspondents, from those he called friends, or the overtures that were publicly made to him, without Henry Oldenburg we should still have had no directly expressed and competent testimony to the talents, acquirements, moral character, and loveable nature of the man.

Originally engaged as a merchant at Bremen, Oldenburg came to England as envoy to the government of the Protector from the circle of Lower Saxony. Of liberal education and acquirement, and interested in natural philosophy, he soon made many friends in London, and joined the small knot of gentlemen, the majority of them being physicians, who, according to the original programme, 'met once a week at each other's lodgings to discourse and consider of Philosophical Inquiries, Physic, Anatomy, Astronomy, Navigation, Statics, Magnetics, Chemics, and Natural Experiments; of such subjects as the Circulation of the Blood, the Valves of the Veins, the Lymphatic Vessels, the Copernican Hypothesis, the nature of Comets and new Stars, the Satellites of Jupiter, the Oval of Saturn, the Spots in the Sun, &c.; the Improvement of Telescopes, the Weight of the Air, the possibility or impossibility of Vacuities and Nature's horror thereof, the Descent of heavy bodies, and divers other things of the like nature.' What a world of undiscovered truth lay before these men, and how much are we in the present age beholden to them for the way in which they followed up each lead as it presented itself, and gathered and garnered up the materials that, falling by-and-by into their several places and rationally co-ordinated, have so essentially served as the foundations of our modern science!

Oldenburg must soon have been seen by his associates of the philosophers' club as a man of parts and apt intelligence, affable, industrious, and of insatiable curiosity—the very man, in a word, for the secretary's place in such an infant association as subsequently grew into 'The Royal Society of London

for the cultivation of natural knowledge.' To this most excellent institution, to which the world of science owes so much, Henry Oldenburg was accordingly appointed Secretary after its incorporation by Charles the Second; and he was really a conspicuous and most useful member, the very life and soul of the association, during the earlier years of its existence; not only catering for the entertainment of the Fellows at their meetings, but editing and superintending the publication of their lucubrations under the title of Philosophical Transactions.

Oldenburg had, in fact, a conversational knowledge of almost every branch of Physics; and, if not more deeply informed in mental, moral, and religious philosophy, he was yet apparently as much interested in this as in natural, mathematical, and mechanical science.* He was one of the most indefatigable of correspondents, keeping up through the medium of the Latin tongue, which he wrote fluently and well, an intercourse with almost every man of scientific or literary note in Europe. Whether he were French, Dutch, German, or Italian, Oldenburg had him in his list of correspondents, and sedulous as he was himself in communicating all that was going on among the experimental philosophers of England, so was he urgent and incessant in seeking for information in return from them—'the particulars of any new fact in chemistry, of any experiment in mechanics that might be mentioned or shown at the weekly meetings of the society, an account of any new book that had lately appeared,' &c. &c.†

* His letters to Newton, Wallis, Huygens, and others, of which many hundreds are preserved in the Royal Society and British Museum (and among which we have searched in vain for any unpublished that had been addressed to Spinoza, or by Spinoza to him), show him to have been a really profound mathematician. The only letters of Spinoza to Oldenburg preserved in the Archives of the Royal Society, are the two Nos. vi. and viii. as originally published by Meyer and Jellis in the Opera Posthuma, containing critical remarks on one of Mr Boyle's works, which are of no interest in the present day. What became of Oldenburg's papers after his death?

† There is an excellent portrait of Oldenburg in the Rooms of the Royal

Though it has been stated that Oldenburg was acquainted with Spinoza in Van den Ende's Amsterdam days, we should rather imagine, from the style in which he addresses the philosopher in his first letter of August, 1661, and the proffers of friendship he then makes, that he, like other curious and educated persons, had sought out Spinoza in his retreat at Rhynsburg, five years after his departure from Amsterdam, and then and there made his acquaintance for the first time. Oldenburg, like all Spinoza's other correspondents, approaches him as one in advance of himself, from whom he was to receive information and guidance, not as one to whom he might presume to offer either. 'At Rhynsburg,' says Oldenburg in his first letter, 'we spoke of God, of Thought and Space Infinite, of their Attributes and the agreements and differences of these, of the union between the Soul and the Body, and of the principles of the Cartesian Philosophy.' In this sentence we have the themes that supplied matter for all the subsequent correspondence; and, in connection with Oldenburg's questionings and insatiable curiosity not only to *learn* but to *see* what the philosopher is about, we become spectators, as it were, of the production and publication of his two first works, and farther learn why the 'Ethics' was not given to the world in his lifetime.

The first of Spinoza's works, the 'Principia Philosophiæ Cartesianæ more geometrico demonstrata,' was what may be called a mere occasional production, put together in the first instance for the use of a pupil to whom, because of his youth, inexperience, and unsteady disposition, the philosopher was indisposed to communicate his own views. The MS. having been seen by some of his friends and admirers of Amsterdam —Dr Louis Meyer, Dr I. Bresser, Dr Schaller, Simon de Vries, Walter Von Tschirnhaus, and others, all then young men, who

Society. It is that of a full-faced, intelligent, and gentlemanly man; with a certain air of sober dignity about him that impresses the beholder favourably.

had formed themselves into a society for the discussion of philosophical and literary subjects—Spinoza, during one of his visits to his native city, appears to have been seized upon by them, and requested to extend and publish the work. This he very amiably consented to do, provided one or other of his young friends would, under his own eye, polish the style a little, write a preface such as he should approve, and see the work through the press. Dr Meyer gladly undertook the office of literary accoucheur and preface-writer, and the Principia Philosophiæ Cartesianæ, with an appendix of original metaphysical thought, was produced.

This little work is interesting in more respects than one. Besides being an admirable summary of the philosophical principles of Descartes, it is the first instance—would that it had been the last! in which the geometrical method is applied to the study of intellectual and moral phenomena, the first in which intellectual and emotional powers, products of the mind of man, are treated as if they were 'lines, areas, surfaces, and solids.' The change of the name of Baruch into its equivalent Benedict, which here occurs, and by which Spinoza meant merely to proclaim his final and entire separation from Judaism, was probably that which led the outside world to believe that he had also embraced Christianity.*

The publication of the Principia brought Spinoza much fame, and a great accession of friends. The work appears to have attracted an extraordinary degree of notice at the time, and made him so extensively known, both at home and abroad, that after his return from Amsterdam to his hitherto quiet home at Rhynsburg, he complains to Oldenburg of being scarcely left his own master for a day, by reason of the number of friends who honour him with their visits.

From Spinoza's letters to Oldenburg, and Oldenburg's

* The Principia Cartesiana proper, it is to be noted, appear without Spinoza's name on the title-page; it is only in front of the Cogitata Metaphysica, his own work, that we have his name in full.

urgent and repeated expostulations with him for his delay in giving a second and more important work to the public—a work which should be no epitome of another man's thoughts, but the mature production of his own mind, the views and conclusions of which he should acknowledge as his own—we see that the Philosopher must have had others of his works preparing or ready for publication long before they saw the light. Witness to the eager and angry strife that was waged around him, to the animosity and mutual hate engendered between men of merely opposite views though taking their stand upon the same common ground of belief, we may imagine that Spinoza, from his habits, would shrink from the fresh storm of theological hate which must inevitably burst upon him when, from the new position assumed, he should have, besides his old enemies and co-religionists the Jews, the whole orthodoxy of Christendom arrayed against him. The student and peaceful man would ever gladly shun such turmoil and contention, such interruption to pleasant and congenial pursuits. But this cannot be; the penalty for original and independent thought has ever to be paid; the leader has his post in the van, and his harness, when he wears any, like that of the meanest footman, has joints that may be pierced. But Spinoza, after all, may either not have recked much of clerical dislike, or may not have anticipated the effect the Tractatus would have on the theological world; for in an extract from one of his letters to Oldenburg communicated to Mr Boyle, he is found informing his correspondent that he 'is now engaged in the composition of his work on the Scriptures, and is moved to the undertaking, 1st, in order that he may combat the prejudices of theologians, these being prime obstacles to the extension of philosophical studies; 2nd, that he may disabuse the public mind of its idea that he entertains atheistical opinions; and, 3rd, that he may assert the common right to free inquiry and publication.

It is then that Oldenburg urges him to show himself openly. 'Why do you hesitate, what do you fear?' asks he; 'go forward, most excellent sir; throw aside your dread of giving offence to the pigmies of our day; the battle with ignorance has lasted long enough; let true science now advance on her own course, and penetrate more deeply than she has yet done into the innermost sanctuary of nature. Your inquiries may surely be freely published in Holland—so free in the permission of philosophical speculation, and as I do not imagine that they can contain any matter of offence to the learned, if you have but them as friends—and I promise you most confidently that you will have them so—wherefore fear the dislike of the ignorant mobility?' In a subsequent letter he proceeds: 'I entreat you, by our friendly compact, by all the rights of truth to be proclaimed and spread abroad, that you hesitate no longer to communicate your writings to the world.'

Spinoza replies, that having now made himself known to a wider circle than his more intimate and immediate friends, there may perchance be found persons of influence in the country desirous of seeing what else he had written and was ready to acknowledge as his own, and who would be powerful enough to secure him against danger or annoyance did he come forth with these. 'With such countenance,' he proceeds, 'I shall, I doubt not, publish before long; but if I cannot have the backing I desire, I will rather keep silence than make myself enemies by obtruding my views upon the world against the wishes of my fellow-countrymen. I beg you, therefore, my esteemed friend, to hold yourself in patience a little longer, and you shall shortly either have my Treatise in print, or an epitome of the same, according to your wishes.'

Among the men of influence in the country to whom Spinoza here alludes so guardedly, there can be little question but that Jan de Witt, Grand Pensionary of Holland, with

whom he had now become acquainted, was included. That the Tractatus was not published until the countenance and approval of the authorities of the Netherlands had been secured, is implied by what is said both in the preface and at the end of the work;* and if the letters, from 57 to 60, be from one of those persons in authority, as we much suspect that they are, both from the style in which Spinoza is addressed and that in which he replies, we must think the more highly of the liberality of the individual who was a believer in ghosts and hobgoblins, in the spirit of his age, and at the same time the friend and protector of Benedict Spinoza. Contact with the truly great will raise even the credulous and uninformed to something of a higher and more worthy level.

Still delaying to publish—and war intervening to interupt communication between England and Holland—it was not till the middle of 1675 that Oldenburg received a copy of the Tractatus; for, in his letter of June that year, he speaks of having, with grateful thanks, already acknowledged its receipt, but expresses doubts of his letter having reached its destination.†

From this epistle we see that Oldenburg must have been alarmed by a first hasty perusal of the Treatise. With time for further study, however, he acknowledges to having been precipitate in his judgment; for he now says, 'It struck me at first, and so long as I meted with the measure supplied by theologians and the current confessional formularies, that you had been over-free in your strictures; but since I have reviewed the subject, I see that far from attacking true religion, you strive to vindicate and spread abroad that which is the real purpose of the Christian faith. Believing, as I

* Superest tantum expresse monere me nihil in eo scripsisse quod non libentissime examini, et judicio Summarum Potestatum Patriæ meæ subjiciam. Tr. Th. Pol. in Præf. et ad fin. Eng. Trans., p. 30 and 353.

† Vide the note appended to the letter in question.

now do, that such is your intention, I earnestly entreat of you to keep your old and candid friend—who breathes the most ardent vows for the success of so excellent an enterprise—informed by frequent letters of all you are now doing, or are still intending to do in this direction. Meantime I shall do my best to prepare the minds of good and wise men for the reception of the 'truths you will by-and-by set in a clearer light, and endeavour gradually to remove such prejudices as may be entertained against your views and conclusions. * * * Farewell, most excellent sir, and continue to cherish thoughts of me, who am the zealous admirer both of your doctrines and your virtues.'

This letter of Oldenburg we cannot help regarding as extremely interesting. Escaping for an instant from the ecclesiastical fetters that usually held him bound, and that soon got rivetted on him again, he now catches a glimpse of the real man with whom he is holding communion, and of the sole end and object he had in all his writings, in all his sufferings: the enunciation of better and more reasonable conceptions of God's dealings with his creatures, as essential means to the attainment of nobler ideas of life and its duties, and the progressive elevation of mankind in the scale of being.

The Honourable Robert Boyle, with whom Oldenburg was on terms of the most friendly intimacy, and to whom all Spinoza's letters appear to have been regularly communicated, shows himself, it is curious to observe, even from the first, indisposed to hold direct communication with Spinoza; he sends him his greetings repeatedly through Oldenburg; he also forwards him his works as they appear, but he never writes. This is greatly to be regretted, for the correspondence of Robert Boyle and Benedict Spinoza would have been a legacy indeed to posterity.

Boyle had of course been informed by Oldenburg of Spinoza's attitude towards his old co-religionists the Jews, and the circumstances under which he had left their communion. Doubtless, too, he had been made acquainted with that first conversation which Oldenburg had had with the philosopher at Rhynsburg, in the course of which such delicate topics were touched; and from this, as well as all the subsequent correspondence, he must have seen that Spinoza was no common man, and that his views of God, the world, and religion, were not those either of Jewish or Christian communities in general. Scion himself of a noble family, indoctrinated in the formularies of the Church to which with his parents he belonged, he must, as matter of course, have felt alarmed at the views of Spinoza as they were imparted to him. Sincerely pious by nature even as was Spinoza, Boyle's religion was nevertheless that of emotion and prescription mainly, not the outcome of his own free and unfettered thoughts, like that of our philosopher. Educated through the medium of the classical literature of Greece and Rome, and with the habits of mind induced by the training English gentlemen receive both in the home circle and their universities, which are not favourable to originality and independence of thought, Boyle may be excused for having felt fearful of getting upon too intimate a footing with so bold a thinker, so self-sufficing a character, as all his antecedents proclaimed Spinoza to be. Turncoats and deserters of their colours are very distasteful personages in English political life, and renegades from their religion, on whatever good grounds, are scarcely more favourably regarded, save by the proselytizer into whose pitfall the victim has fallen; otherwise the language of the poet is mostly adopted when he says:

> 'Ralph, thou hast done a fearful deed
> In falling away from thy father's creed.'

Boyle may possibly have been even less disposed to hold in-

tercourse with the seceder from Judaism than he would have been with the unemancipated Jew, his brow phylactery-bound and the border of his garment enlarged to the uttermost.

Naturalist as he was, however, accustomed to search for truth within his own province for its own sake, and to follow up each new lead as it appeared without regard to authority or ulterior consequences, Boyle could by no means have escaped the moral influence of Spinoza brought so incessantly to bear upon him by the curious and communicative Oldenburg.

Among the additional letters published by Dr Van Vloten in his Supplement, there is one to Spinoza from Dr Schaller, that is extremely interesting from this point of view. Schaller has lately paid a visit to England, where he learned, through a mutual friend of his own and the philosopher, that Boyle and Oldenburg had formed some strange ideas of the character of Spinoza, and of the purpose and true meaning of his writings, particularly of his Theologico-political Treatise. Of these false estimates and mistaken conceptions Dr Schaller's informant, a German nobleman, Von Tschirnhaus by name, and upon terms of intimacy with both Boyle and Oldenburg, had exerted himself so successfully to disabuse them, that they came at length to speak 'in the highest terms of the philosopher, and greatly to commend his Work.' Minds even of a very high order require assistance to escape from grooves of habitual thought; and it is even more than probable that by the indirect as well as more direct influence of Spinoza, Boyle was brought to look at the religious question from a point of view other than that from which he had hitherto been accustomed to regard it.

Initiated into the as yet untrodden fields of biblical criticism and exegesis by our philosopher's letters to Oldenburg and the Tractatus; finding little aptitude in himself to discuss,

with a view either to abet or refute the statements therein set forth, and obtaining no help from those to whom he proposed his difficulties, it may not be going too far to surmise that Mr Boyle conceived that, by appealing to a wider circle than the one filled by his own immediate friends, and furnishing means to secure the freest discussion of the subject, the truths of Christianity as dogmatically established in the Church of England would be made to appear more and more clearly. We venture to add in behalf of abstract truth, loadstar of the naturalist, and as only due to the noble nature of the man himself, that he may also have had misgivings about the worth and validity of some things at least that were presented to him in the name of religion, and been anxious that the world should be enlightened upon them.

Of the true piety of Robert Boyle and his adhesion to the Christianity of his age there can be no question. But as naturalist he was at the same time an inquirer, a doubter, a sceptic in the best and most legitimate sense of the word. Pious as he was, we have it under his own hand that 'he was yet not so constituted but that the shades of doubt did sometimes cross his mind.' His writings show us further that he made various attempts to reconcile scientific methods and established natural truths with the received religious opinions and formulated beliefs of his day.* What if Benedict Spinoza,

* Overtaken, in the course of his travels through Dauphiny, whilst yet a very young man, by a tremendous thunderstorm, Boyle seems to have been excessively alarmed; and, in face of a possible sudden death from a flash of lightning, was led to take a survey of his past life, and then and there to dedicate himself to virtue and the service of religion. Under the influence of the moral and religious sentiments of his nature, excited by fear, he appears at this time to have experienced that peculiar emotional movement which certain Christian communities connect with a special interposition of the Deity and entitle *Conversion*, subjective emotion being here, as usual, transferred from within to without.

Had *the Naturalist* been as firmly established at this time in the mind of Robert Boyle as subsequently, he would not have been affected in the same way by the thunder and lightning, though the course of his life would not have been other than it was. But the idea of *miraculous inter-*

the rejected of Judaism, the denounced and vilified of Christendom for a century and more after his death, should have been mainly influential with Robert Boyle in the foundation of those Lectures that are still annually delivered in London in vindication of the doctrines of Christianity? the lecturer himself for the time being standing forth as champion of the faith, bound to answer all cavillers, and to be aidant in every enterprise the object of which is the spread of religious knowledge.*

Be this as it may, we feel free, without inference of any sort, to maintain that Spinoza in the far wider circle of European culture has not only proved the great mover in that spirit of inquiry into primary religious truth whereby the world is on its way to arrive at definite conclusions on the question of its relations to Deity, but has furnished us with the means of meeting the difficulties we encounter. His brave example, too, might give us courage to decide that the simple teaching of the great Prophet of Nazareth, as interpreted by our philosopher himself and by the Lessings, Pauluses, Chan-

position had not yet given way even among men of science to that of *fixed law*; thunder and lightning were still particular manifestations of divine power, and admonitions to the wicked, not mere evidence of disturbance in the balance of the electricities through changes in the relative temperatures of different strata of the atmosphere or in those of the earth and the atmosphere at large. Vide the Life of Boyle, by Dr Birch, appended to the edition of his Works in 6 vols 4to, Lond., and Buckle's Hist. of Civilization, vol. i. p. 339.

* By the terms of Mr Boyle's Will these Lectures were to be delivered in one of the London churches by a clergyman of the Establishment, on the first *Monday* of Jan., Feb., March, April, Sept., Oct., Nov., and Dec. By an arrangement with the Bishop of London, they are, however, now delivered in the Chapel Royal, Whitehall, in the course of the afternoon service of the eight *Sundays* immediately after Easter. The Mondays may probably have been given up through want of auditors. Nevertheless we venture to think that in the new arrangement the testator's intentions are not fulfilled. With the renovated interest taken in the religious question in the present day, a competent lecturer, duly announced and keeping in view the object at which Mr Boyle most obviously aimed, would scarcely show himself without hearers; they might not be many indeed, but they would be significant. And then to deliver the usual Sunday afternoon sermon, and call it a Boyle Lecture, looks ominously like taking the fee without performing the duty. We venture to commend this matter to the consideration of the present trustees under the Will of the Hon. Robert Boyle.

nings, and Theodore Parkers, his legitimate successors, might now be made advantageously to supersede biblical legend and mythical tale; Pauline, Petrine, and Johannine gloss; patristic and papal prescriptions of the Middle Ages; and the dogmatic formulæ of Luther, Calvin, and other more modern reformers. The teaching itself is plain enough, and will bear no two interpretations: 'Master,' said the lawyer, 'what shall I do to inherit eternal life? Jesus said unto him, What is written in the law? how readest thou? And he answering said, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy strength, and with all thy mind; and thy neighbour as thyself. And he said unto him, Thou hast answered right: this do, and thou shalt live.' *

The teaching here is certainly plain enough, and very unlike much that is held imperative at the present day. But it is far easier to do lip-service and say the 'Quicunque vult' than to accomplish the precepts enjoined. The men, however, who are content to abide by these without saying the 'Quicunque vult,' and consequently to differ in their religious views from the ignorant many and the ill-informed and narrow-minded among theologians, are no longer successfully, though they be still persistently, held up to the world as atheists, infidels, and reprobates. They are beginning to be seen for what they are in truth, not only as among the most enlightened and reasonable, but as among the most truly pious and virtuous of mankind. Better, might it be said, that the mystery of God and of existence remained unsolved or were accepted as insoluble, than that the solution foisted on the world from a benighted antiquity, and outraging both the intellectual and moral sense of man, should continue to be received. When Jewish converts were first made to their beliefs by the followers of Jesus of Nazareth, it was from

* Luke x. 25—28.

ritual observance to holiness of life, from circumcision to uncircumcision, as was said, from the idea of a leader and deliverer from oppression in person and substance to a spiritual deliverer from sin and misery through faith in and true following of a noble exemplar. There were no gospels in those days, and neither Apostles' nor Nicene nor Athanasian Creeds, lingering remnants of the older polytheism mingled with the metaphysical conceptions of a later age.*

Between the date of the last of the letters above referred to and the next that follows, there now occurs the long interval of ten years, during which the correspondence between Oldenburg and Spinoza was interrupted, from what cause we do not know, unless it was the war, to which we observe allusion made as impending and likely to involve the whole of Europe, in the last letter of the year 1665. The communication, however, is suddenly and unexpectedly renewed in the July of 1675 by a letter from Oldenburg in reply to one he had shortly before received from Spinoza. By this we can see that others must have passed between them which unfortunately have not come down to us.

The subjects of the renewed correspondence are the same as before; but there is at first a singular change in the tone of the busy secretary to the Royal Society. Spinoza had by this time published his Theologico-Political Treatise, and appears to have informed his correspondent that he had his 'quinque-partite work'—meaning the Ethics, undoubtedly—ready for the press; and further, to have proposed sending a

* We have heard a characteristic anecdote of a late genial and liberal archbishop which is significant enough to merit repetition. On a certain clergyman making difficulties about undertaking the duty in the reading-desk on one of the days on which the Athanasian Creed is ordered to be read, and asking whether the dignitary held it imperative that the rubric should be adhered to in this particular, he is said to have replied, 'Well, well—*Quicunque vult!*'

few copies of the work to Oldenburg for distribution among his friends. But the chill that now comes over the formerly ardent Secretary is very remarkable; from bold and encouraging, he is at once cold and unsympathizing; from eager to smooth the way for the reception of new truths, he is well content to leave the world alone in its old conclusions. He has still so imperfect an appreciation of the moral and religious nature of the great man with whom he corresponds, that he actually entreats him 'to let nothing appear in the forthcoming work that might be construed into disregard of the religious virtues.' For the rest, he does not decline to take a few copies of the book that is ready; but he requests the philosopher to address them to some Dutch merchant resident in London, who, on application made, would deliver them to him. 'It is not necessary, moreover,' he adds, 'to speak of books of the sort being sent to me.'

This, of course, is very poor-spirited and greatly to be regretted; but Henry Oldenburg has his old Lutheran prejudices ingrained in his nature, and could never sustain himself long at the height of the independent philosophical speculations of the man he loved and admired, yet never thoroughly understood. Oldenburg does not even imagine the grounds of Spinoza's judgments. He constantly assumes as absolute truth that which the clear and unfettered intellect of Spinoza apprehends as mere report by unknown persons of events which they could only have heard had happened in times gone by, and which they believed to be true. It is not every one who can shake himself free from the superstitions of his day: all are not free, even of those who mock their chains; and Oldenburg can only oppose the theological dogmas he has imbibed as a child, to the revelations fresh from the mind of the seer. The science of philosophical criticism, indeed, had but just been called into existence by Spinoza himself, and was as yet universally unknown in

the domain of morals and religion. The scientific mind, it is true, had been awakened by Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Newton, and others, but had scarcely as yet advanced beyond the sphere of *doubt;* it had not achieved such knowledge of the eternal, changeless laws of nature as entitled it absolutely to deny the possibility of any interruption of their sway. But Spinoza had said that faith in the Divine or natural law required belief in no historical narrative, in no historian;* an axiom that Lessing was subsequently to give the world of truth-seekers for its own sake as their Shibboleth in the memorable words: 'Zufällige Geschichtswahrheiten können der Beweis von nothwendigen Vernunftswahrheiten nie werden—Contingent historical truth can never be the equivalent of rational, necessary truth.'† Accomplished scholar, virtuoso in physical science, Oldenburg still lacked something of that which would have enabled him fully to appreciate Spinoza. He is alternately attracted and repelled by the spirit he has evoked. He would at one time use such words as these when urging the philosopher to immediate publication: 'Why hesitate, my friend? What do you fear? Advance, assail, carry this position of so much moment, and you will see the whole phalanx of philosophers rally to your side,'—and tell him at another that there was no need to let the world know he received such things as his writings! But let us not speak unkindly of Henry Oldenburg. He was not altogether of the stuff that makes a man able

> 'To be the same in his own act and valour
> As in desire;'

but the faulty strand in the rope of his life was not properly his own; it was insinuated by the training he had received. And then, in truth, a century and more had to elapse be-

* Conf. Tr. Theol. Pol., Eng. Version, p. 94.

† Lessing, Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft; repeated in another shape in the Nathan. Vide Lessing's Nathan the Wise, by the writer, p. 109. 12mo. Lond. 1868. Trübner & Co.

fore men dared to avow acquaintance with Benedict Spinoza or his works.

The correspondence happily restored, soon acquires something of the old cordiality on the part of Oldenburg, and presently becomes even more interesting than before. The receipt of a copy of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus brings him at once on theological ground; he has been alarmed by a first hasty perusal, but is reassured by a second; yet he hopes that nothing in the meditated forthcoming work will be found to contravene, as if something in that he has in hand did contravene, the religious virtues. This gives our philosopher the opportunity first of thanking his correspondent for his friendly admonition, and then of asking categorically what the matters are which in his opinion prejudice or might prejudice religious virtue; for he, for his part, believes that all that is accordant with reason is at the same time conducive to virtue. Oldenburg informs him that many think he confounds God with nature; that he detracts from the authority and value of miracles, 'sole assurances of divine revelation,' and that he does not speak clearly of Jesus Christ as the redeemer of the world, and of his Incarnation and Propitiatory Sacrifice.

Spinoza replies that he does indeed entertain ideas of God different from the neoteric Christians, but accordant with the older views of the Hebrew prophets and of the apostle Paul, who says expressly that all things are in God,—living, moving, and having their being in him; that he—Spinoza—regards God as the immanent not the extraneous cause of all, and that they who think he means to say in the Tractatus that God and nature—nature being understood as a certain material mass or mere corporeal matter—are one and the same, are totally mistaken.

'As to miracles,' he says, 'I have spoken of them at sufficient length in the 6th chapter of the Tractatus, where I have

shown that to me the assurance of a divine revelation is comprised in the excellence of the doctrine; the chief distinction between religion and superstition being this: that whilst the former has wisdom for its foundation, the latter rests on ignorance alone: and I believe that the reason why Christians are not distinguished from other religious persuasions by their faith, charity, and other fruits of the Holy Spirit, is because they mostly appeal to miracles, i. e. to ignorance, source of all evil, and so turn their faith, true though it be, into superstition.

'To give you my mind clearly and unreservedly on your third topic, I say that to salvation it is by no means necessary to know Christ according to the flesh; and that a very different conception is to be formed of that eternal Son of God, that is, of the eternal wisdom of God which manifests itself in all things, in the human mind especially, and most especially of all in Christ Jesus. Without this conception no one can attain to the state of beatitude; inasmuch as it alone informs us of what is true or false, good or evil. As to what certain Churches add when they declare that God assumed our human nature, I say advisedly that I do not know what they mean; and, to own the truth, they seem to me to speak as absurdly as would he who should tell me of the circle assuming the nature of the square.'

Oldenburg is not satisfied; he clings to the literal and orthodox interpretation of the New Testament Scriptures, and to the dogmatic formulæ elicited from these and imposed by hierarchies as articles of belief upon the world. He further charges Spinoza with subjecting actions and all things else to fatal necessity, whereby the nerve of law, religion, and virtue is divided, and merit and demerit, reward and punishment, are made to appear as incongruities and inconsistencies.

Spinoza replies, 'I now see what it was you desired I should not divulge. But be assured that I do by no means

subject God to fate or destiny of any kind; for I hold that it is from the nature of God that all things follow of inevitable necessity, even as all conceive that it follows from his nature that God necessarily knows himself. No one denies this, yet does no one therefore conceive that God is constrained by fate to know himself; on the contrary, all admit that God knows himself freely yet necessarily.

'And then this inevitable necessity of things abrogates neither divine nor human law. For moral truths in themselves, whether they have or have not the form of human law or of commandments from God, are nevertheless divine and salutary; and whether we receive the good which follows of virtue and the divine love from God as a law-giver and judge, or as a sequence from the necessity of his divine nature, it will neither be more nor less desirable; even as the evil that comes of wicked deeds and depraved appetites is not the less to be feared because it flows of necessity from these.

'Moreover, men are inexcusable before God for no other reason than because they are in the power of God as clay in the hands of the potter, who of the same lump makes one vessel to honour, another to dishonour.'* Spinoza in this does but advance a view analogous to the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination. The man who sins does so, he thinks, by the necessity of his nature, precisely as on the Calvinistic theory some are born children of the devil and foredoomed to eternal perdition. 'The man,' says Spinoza, 'who cannot control his passions is undoubtedly excusable on the score of his infirmity of nature, but he is not the less on this account hindered of the beatific vision of God, and of necessity is lost everlastingly.' By an extension of the same idea, the incorrigible criminal among men, though he may be pitied, is not the less to be guarded against, and every measure sanctioned by humanity taken to protect society against his misdeeds.

* Rom. ix. 21.

Miracles and ignorance Spinoza puts on the same footing, inasmuch as they who, by miracles, seek to prove the existence of God and inculcate religion, attempt to demonstrate one obscure thing by another still more obscure, and so introduce a new style of argument, reducing matters not, as they say, to the impossible, but to ignorance or the unknown.

He observes that Christ after his crucifixion is not said to have shown himself to Pilate, to the Council, or to any unbeliever, but to the faithful only; that God has neither right hand nor left; neither does he dwell here rather than there, but is in essence ubiquitous, and does not manifest himself in any imaginary extra-mundane sphere. The apparitions of Christ, therefore, which are spoken of in the Gospels, were not different from the one in which Abraham believed that God appeared to him, when he saw certain men at his door, and invited them in to partake of his meal. The apostles, however, as Oldenburg urges, believed that 'Christ rose from the dead and verily ascended into heaven;' that they did so Spinoza does not dispute. For Abraham believed that God had sat at table with him, and the Israelites generally believed that God had descended on Mount Sinai surrounded by fire and spoken with them immediately, to say nothing of many other similar apparitions, of which narratives adapted to vulgar capacity are extant.

He concludes, therefore, that the resurrection of Christ from the dead was truly spiritual and revealed to the faithful alone, according to their capacity, viz. that Christ, endowed with eternity of being in virtue of the peculiar holiness of his life, the excellence of that he taught, and the example he set to man, may be said to have risen from the dead and to live for ever. It is in this sense that he understands the text, 'Suffer the dead to bury their dead;' Christ virtually calling his disciples from death to life in so far as they followed the pattern he set in his life and in his death.*

* Grand as is our philosopher's interpretation of this obscure text, we

The texts his correspondent refers to in the Gospel according to St John, and in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which seem opposed to what he says, are so, he considers, only because oriental forms of speech are measured by European standards; although John wrote his Gospel in Greek, he *Hebraizes* nevertheless; and if the body of Christ is spoken of as the Temple of God, it was, as already said, because God manifested himself therein most especially; and it is this truth which the author of the fourth Gospel, to be more emphatic, expresses in the phrase, 'The Word was made flesh.' We venture to add that the writer of the Gospel according to St John, imbued with Hellenistic ideas, may also have meant the phrase more literally.

Oldenburg in reply now exclaims: εῦ πραττειν—well done, rem tetigisti acu! But he is not yet assured, reiterates the same question in different shapes, and adds various others not before propounded. But enough has been given to show the very core of Spinoza's Christology. The letters themselves may therefore now be referred to. The concluding paragraph of the philosopher's last letter as given by the editors of the Opera Posthuma is, however, so pertinent, that at the risk of iteration it is here subjoined.

'The passion, death, and burial of Christ I receive, as you do, literally, but his resurrection I understand allegorically. I admit, indeed, that it is narrated by the Evangelists with such circumstances as make it impossible to deny that they themselves believed that Christ rose from the dead and ascended into heaven, there to sit at the right hand of God; and, further, that Christ might even have been seen by

have sometimes thought it might mean no more than this: that it were often well to let the past be the past; or, as the poet has it in his fine Psalm of Life:

'Trust no Future, howe'er pleasant!
Let the dead Past bury its dead!
Act,—act in the living Present,
Heart within, and God o'erhead!'—LONGFELLOW.

others than the faithful, had they been present in the places where he appeared to his disciples,—a matter, however, in which they might have been mistaken, the doctrine of the Gospel remaining unassailed. St Paul, to whom Christ subsequently appeared in a vision, glories in this, that he had known Christ not according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit.' *

Without Oldenburg's persistent, almost indelicate, curiosity we may say that we should not have known nearly so much of Benedict Spinoza as we do. We might, indeed, have surmised what he must needs have thought on these interesting topics, but we should not have had a statement of his views under his own hand. Oldenburg may therefore be said to have been present and aided at the birth not only of that great society for the cultivation of *Natural* as opposed to *Supernatural* knowledge, which began the sap against the gloomy fortress which Superstition had made her stronghold, ignorance to wit of the nature and qualities of things, and of the changeless and harmonious laws that rule the universe; but, further, to have forced in some sort the modest philosopher—true herald of its religious progress to the modern world—to present himself more distinctly before it than his unobtrusive nature would otherwise have permitted him to do. Familiar with many of the great laws of nature, intimately convinced of the necessity and changelessness of these as ordinances of the One infinite, eternal, changeless God, Spinoza, the Semite in heart as by descent, like all of the stock whence he sprang, could not conceive God as especially incarnate in an individual man. To him indeed all men, as all things else, were modes or manifestations of the Divine Essence, whereof one might have a larger measure than another, but of which nothing having reality was utterly devoid. Whilst he had no difficulty in admitting that Jesus

* Conf. 2 Cor. v. 16.

of Nazareth had a larger infusion of Deity than the average of men, it was therefore as impossible for him to conceive that Jesus was God as it was for him to conceive that the triangle should assume or present itself with the properties of the square. Though always spoken of as an offshoot of Judaism (and in its fundamental Messianic idea it is wholly Jewish), Christianity, as presented in the synoptical Gospels, and as it meets us in the modified form it assumed at an early period of its history, and in which it spread over Europe and still continues to exist, has really more in it of the Pantheon than of the Temple, more of Athens and Alexandria than of Jerusalem in its constitution. The writers or compilers of the Synoptical Gospels must almost as necessarily, as it seems, have been Greeks, as it appears impossible they could have been Jews. The whole spirit of the New Testament is as certainly Aryan, i. e. Greek, as it is not Semitic, i. e. Jewish.* The cosmopolitan

* The large infusion of Greek, i. e. Aryan, idea, and (save the leading notion of a royal deliverer of the Jewish people from their oppressors) the general absence of Semitic, i. e. Jewish, spirit and principle in the Synoptical Gospels has, of course, been observed, and has furnished ample occasion to the harmonists and exegetists for the exercise of ingenuity in accounting for it. The miraculous conception and obscure birth, beneficent career and violent death, fall in as naturally with the ideas of minds familiar with Zeus and Here, Dionysos, Heracles, Adonis, and the rest—types all or newer forms of the Devas, Agni, Uschas, Varitri, and other divinities adored by the far-off ancestors of the Greeks from the banks of the Oxus and Indus,—as they are incompatible with the ideas of the Eloha, Moloch, or later Jehovah present in the mind of the Jew. The very element of humanity and refinement so conspicuous in the New Testament would appear to be entirely derived from Hellenic sources. Slavery indeed existed among the Greeks, but it was truly the mildest of domestic institutions; among them there was no polygamy, no recognized concubinage, no torture, no human sacrifices. Women were objects of the highest reverence and respect; what may be called professional prostitution was unknown; adultery was held in horror, and the marriage bond was a sacred compact for life.[1]

How different all this from that which obtained among the Jews! There the slave was the master's 'money,' and might be beaten to death without many questions being asked. There human sacrifice, practised from very early times, was continued even to a late period of their history. There women were without consideration, toys, or mere objects of lust to the stronger sex. There polygamy—degradation of the woman, and concubinage—corruption of the man, were the rule. There the marriage tie was treated so lightly

[1] Vide Juventus Mundi by the Right Honourable W. E. Gladstone, pp. 395 and 409.

Semite, Spinoza, far from the land of his forefathers, severed even in his native country from his kindred and their religious beliefs, though with heart overflowing with love and reverence

that on any or no ground of dislike or distaste the wife received a letter of divorce from her husband and was driven from his door. The priestesses of Artemis and Hestia, again, were virgins vowed to chastity, with the Greek. The priestesses of Aschera (whose emblematic column (ὁ φαλλός) was planted in front of the altar of Jehovah), the Kadeschas, were prostitutes by profession and in virtue of their office, and the cells in which they lodged were attached to the Temple, &c. &c.

The singularity, the anomaly of so much being exclusively Greek in the Synoptical Gospels, has not, of course, passed unnoticed by observing and classically educated men. Jesus himself and his immediate followers were Jews, and from their social position cannot be supposed to have spoken any language but that of their native country — Hebrew, or a dialect of the same. To meet the difficulty here, a learned Neapolitan theologian has endeavoured to show that the language Jesus used habitually was *Greek*.[1] To account for the concordances and discrepancies notable in the Synoptical Gospels, again, an original gospel in the *Hebrew* tongue has been postulated.[2] From this gospel of the Nazarenes or Hebrew gospel, the writers who, thirty years or more after the date of the incidents recorded, assumed the names of Matthew, Mark, and Luke, are presumed to have derived the chief points of their information, each intercalating such additional facts as reached him in the way of tradition or from sources unknown to the rest, and omitting the mention of such incidents as had escaped his knowledge. But, as a learned and able writer has observed, 'When Christian biography got among Greek minds, the tale took up Greek elements as naturally as, on ground more exclusively Jewish, it filled out the tale of the deeds and sufferings of Jesus from stores of incident found in the Old Testament.[3]

The admirable talent with which Dr Strauss has exposed the mythical vein that pervades the New Testament, and shown it derived from the myths and legends of the Old, is known to every reader interested in religious history. But that the Hebrew Scriptures are not the only source of the matter in the Gospels of which so much by the concurring testimony of all competent authority is not historical, is made every day more and more apparent. It will be imperative on future writers to transcend the Greeks, and to make study of the treasures contained in the Sanskrit literature as the original sources whence almost everything in Greek mythology has been derived, and as possibly destined to shed much new light on the composition of our Christian Gospels. We are forcibly reminded of this possible truth by an interesting paper from the pen of an able orientalist, M. Emile Bournouf, which lately appeared in the pages of an influential contemporary periodical, in

[1] Diodati: De Christo Græce loquente, 8vo, Neapoli (?); reprinted in London a few years back. The writer refers to the possible influence of the Greek colonies planted by Alexander in Syria, on the language of the country, and refers to the *success* which William the Conqueror achieved in *suppressing the Saxon tongue in England and replacing it by his own Norman-French*, in support of his thesis!

[2] Lessing, with his wonted ingenuity, is the writer who has developed this idea most completely. Neue Hypothese über die Evangelisten als blos menschliche Geschichtschreiber betrachtet. 1778. This is one of Lessing's *gymnastic* exercises. It is indeed well entitled Hypothesis. Vide Werke von Lachmann. 11ter Band. 2te Abth. S. 121.

[3] W. Watkiss Lloyd: Christianity in the Cartoons, p. 210, 8vo, Lond. 1865.

for Jesus of Nazareth, could not fall in with any of the accredited interpretations of the significance of the great moral teacher's appearance on the stage of existence and in the history of the world. Neither could he by his mental constitution receive as adequate, rational, and intuitive truth, tales embodied in narratives, discrepant in themselves, composed long after the events they recorded had occurred, utterly discordant in so

which he suggests that Aryan beliefs and poetical images following the course of Indian migration through Persia by the eastern shores of the Mediterranean may have found expression at length in the language of Greek settlers in the north of Palestine.

'Le Feu,' says M. Bournouf, 'avait été allume par le frottement de deux morceaux de bois choisis exprès, et habillement taillés, l'un en fossette, l'autre en pointe. L'homme qui les avait preparé le premier, fut un grand artiste, qui transmit son invention à ses successeurs, et qui fut appellé, ainsi qu'eux, par excellence, *le Charpentier*,—*Twashtri*. Quand on vint à reflechir que l'operation accomplie par lui une première fois, avait engendré le feu, il en fut justement nommé le Père. Bientot la Théorie, s'emparant des faits, degagea le principe igné qui vit dans le végétal, et constatat qu'il a son origine dans le soleil. Le feu de l'autel fut des lors conçu comme ayant deux pères,—l'un celeste ou divin, l'autre humain. Quand la Théorie Aryenne du feu fut devenu la théorie du Christ, c'est à dire de l'oint (ankti, Sansk., unctus, Latin), et qu' après avoir longtems subsisté en Asie, elle se transmit à l'Europe par l'orient de la mediterranée, l'antique charpentier prit chez les Semites le nom de Jousouf ou Joseph et se retrouva dans le père nourricier du fils de Marie.' Emile Bournouf, Science des Religions, Rev. des Deux Mondes, Juillet 1^er^, 1869.

Fire and light worship was undoubtedly one of the most widely diffused of the modes in which a Divine existence was recognized by man when he had attained to the status of a reflective being; and the most sacred of the personified powers of nature to the primitive Aryan race of mankind was Agni (Ignis, Lat.) Fire, symbol of Deity, not yet extinct in the world, as witness the ever-burning lamp in Roman Catholic churches, and the blazing candles set in broad daylight upon their altars, the Beal-fires whose embers may be said still to smoulder on the hills of Scotland, and the Feu de St Jean, still to be seen in certain parts of France on the eve of St John, when the sun attains his highest northern meridian altitude.

Another of the most sacred and widely worshipped of the powers of nature in the earlier ages of the world emerged from savagery, was the Reproductive Principle, so extensively symbolized in the Phallus and Joni-Lingam. Neither has all recognition and adoration of this mysterious power died out from among mankind: it still prevails as the popular religion among millions in central and north-western India, and even lingers among ourselves in the mystic ring of the marriage ceremony when treated as a religious rite.

But I must not pursue this subject any farther. Enough has been said to arouse reflection in minds capable of thought, and to excite research—if this were wanted—in those with the taste that leads to and the leisure that permits the cultivation of oriental literature.

many particulars with all he had imbibed as a Jew in earlier years, and at variance with so many of the conclusions at which he had arrived through his own independent studies. Let us understand all this, and we shall have found a key to the Life of Spinoza and his writings, see as inevitable all that befell him, and heartily join S. T. Coleridge in saying that 'never was great man so hardly and inequitably treated by posterity as he.'

SIMON DE VRIES.—SPINOZA WRITES THE PRINCIPIA PHILOSOPHIÆ CARTESIANÆ.

We have already had occasion to mention the name of Simon de Vries,* a young man of generous nature and superior talents, devoted to Spinoza personally and an ardent student of his philosophy. Spinoza, on his part, appears to have been no less sincerely and confidingly attached to his young friend, from whom he has nothing in secret, but everything at command. The original editors of the Opera Posthuma give but one of the letters of De Vries to Spinoza, and a couple of Spinoza's in reply, and these even truncated in parts, but all of them much inferior in interest to those that have lately been brought to light, or that have been completed and published by Dr Van Vloten in his 'Supplementum.' These appear, nevertheless, to have been passed over by Meyer and Jellis among other papers as of minor importance, being marked as 'van geender waarde,' of inferior value. De Vries' letter to Spinoza, however, and Spinoza's immediate reply, bring us face to face with these two men who lived so long ago, and make us more intimate with the good and lovable characters of both. De Vries has long desired to find himself again beside his friend; but various occupations and the bitter wintry weather have stood in his way. 'I often regret,' he proceeds, 'that we live so far apart; how

* Vide the Life, p. 59.

happy must that inmate of yours feel himself, living as he does under the same roof with you, and finding occasion at meals and leisure hours of discoursing with you of high and holy things.' He then goes on to speak of the constitution of their debating society at Amsterdam, in which the Principia Philosophiæ Cartesianæ would seem to have afforded constant subjects for discussion.—In case of difficulties or obscurities encountered, the philosopher is to be referred to, and his guidance sought, for means to defend the truth against all superstition. 'Backed by you,' he says with youthful confidence, 'we feel as if we could withstand the arguments of the whole world.' In this letter of De Vries of February, 1663, we also find another assurance that the 'Ethics' had already taken shape and substance; for he gives the philosopher thanks for his writings communicated to him by P. Balling, which he says 'have indeed afforded me much pleasure, particularly the Scholium to Proposition xix.' * We thus see that even the more youthful correspondents of our philosopher were men of thoughtful minds, and occupied with nothing trivial or unprofitable. But how could it be otherwise with such a guide as Benedict Spinoza superadded to natural aptitude and inclination? See how De Vries concludes his letter to his friend: 'I have entered the anatomical class and got half through the course; chemistry I shall certainly begin anon, and so, with you as my adviser, go through the entire medical curriculum.' Dr Van Vloten, referring to Edmund Scherer, is emphatic in his recommendation of theological studies as means of enlarging the mind: 'De Godgeleerdheid, door den wij den omvang der studien waartoe zij aanleiding geeft, tot de vruchtbaarste uitkomsten leiden *kan*.' 'Theology, in the wide circle of studies to which

* To the following effect: 'From the demonstration it appears that the existence of God, even as his essence, is an eternal truth.'

it serves as introduction, *may* be productive of the most fruitful results'—surely; but we see that the *kan* which we render y *may* is italicized by Van Vloten: we should like to know how many Descartes had come out of the Jesuit school of La Fleche, how many Spinozas out of the rabbinical seminary of Amsterdam, how many Van Vlotens out of the theological colleges of our day. For our own part we think Spinoza's direction of his young friend to the study of the structure and functions of the animal body and of the qualities and constitution of things by far the more likely course to lead to satisfactory results.

Spinoza's reply to De Vries is very interesting. He, too, regrets his separation from his friend and their mutual friends; but is glad to know that his writings are of any use to them. 'Thus, you see,' he says, 'that though absent yet do I hold communion with you all. Nor need you envy my inmate; for there is no one who is really more distasteful to me, none with whom I am more on my guard; so that I would have you and our other more intimate freinds advised not to communicate my views to him until he shall have attained to somewhat riper years. He is still too much of a youth, without fixed principles, and eager for novelty rather than truth. These youthful defects, however, I hope will be amended with the lapse of a few years. In so far as I may judge from his parts, indeed, I believe that this will very surely come to pass. The disposition of the youth meantime admonishes me to love him.'

There can be little question that the young gentleman here referred to, and whose character is so clearly appreciated, was no other than that Albert Burgh for whose use the Principia Cartesiana was composed, and who, as if to prove the accuracy of our philosopher's diagnosis, subsequently suffered himself to be seduced from the Protestant Christianity of his

parents in which he had been educated to the discipline of the Church of Rome.* Had Spinoza familiarized Burgh with his own great conceptions, might not his intercourse with the young man perchance have had different results?

The rest of this letter, as well as the one which follows it, though highly important as illustrating our philosopher's metaphysical views, gives us no further insight into the characters or relations of either of the correspondents, and need not therefore be referred to more fully in this place.

LOUIS MEYER, SPINOZA'S PHYSICIAN, EDITOR OF THE OPERA POSTHUMA.—EVIL REPUTE OF THE PHYSICIAN WITH THE CLERGY.

Dr Louis Meyer we note as among the earliest of Spinoza's friends, and he certainly remained one of the truest, as he was the very last, for we have seen that he closed the eyes of the philosopher in death. Meyer wrote the preface to Spinoza's first production, the Principia Philosophiæ Cartesianæ, and along with his friend Jarig Jellis that also to the Opera Posthuma. More than this, he was almost certainly the author of the Latin versions of the letters as we have them, a very considerable proportion of these having been originally written in the language of the country. He is generally believed, and we imagine correctly believed, to have been the author of the book entitled, Philosophia Sacræ Scripturæ Interpres, 12 mo. Amst. 1666,† often attributed to Spinoza; and Dr Van Vloten speaks of him further as influential in the language and literature of the Netherlands, referring at the

* Vide Letter lxxiv. It is published separately with an introductory notice under the title—A Letter expostulatory to a convert from Protestant Christianity to Roman Catholicism. 12mo. Trübner. 1869.

† I possess a copy of this work appended to an 8vo edition of the Tr. Theol. Pol. of 1674. The title is as follows: Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, cui adjunctus est Philosophia S. Scripturæ Interpres. Ab authore longe emendatior. 12mo. A. D. 1674.

same time to a Word-treasury and Dramatic Poems from his pen.*

Dr Meyer, as one of the editors of the Opera Posthuma, has seen fit to suppress all but one of the many letters which we may feel assured must have passed between him and Spinoza. The one he has published is the long and abstruse epistle numbered xxix., on the Infinite, and will be found particularly referred to by a German gentleman, Von Tschirnhaus by name, of whom we shall have occasion to speak by-and-by.

Dr Meyer's suppression of his correspondence is to be regretted as the result of mistaken delicacy; but still more have we to regret that he did not think of leaving behind him some particulars of the life of Spinoza and of the intercourse he had enjoyed with him. No one could have undertaken such a task so advantageously as he, no one have performed it so well. Colerus, as we have hinted, might only have entered on it from finding himself in possession of the very rooms in which Spinoza had lived when he first reached the Hague, and published the life as a sort of corollary to the sermon he had preached against the theological views of the philosopher, and as affording an opportunity for rebutting the assertion of Colonel Stoupe, in his book on the Religion of the Dutch, that no one among the Reformed clergy of the Netherlands had been found with courage or accomplishment enough to come forward as defender of his faith against the statements of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus.†

* Boven dien op het gebied der Nederlandsche taal en letteren werksaam. Men herinnere zich zijn Woordenschat en Tooneeldichten.—Baruch d'Espinoza, zijn Leven, &c., p. 48.

† Conf. what is said on a subsequent page under the head of Lieut.-Colonel Stoupe. In an English version of Colerus' Life of Spinoza (12mo, Lond. 1706) in my possession, I find that of the 92 pages of which it consists, 10 are given to an account of the several forms of excommunication in use among the Jews; 10 to a translation of the form of excommunication called Schammatha from Selden, which, as it was not the one pronounced, is out of place; and 12 to a summary of the various *refutations*, as they are styled, of the

Meyer to his acquirements as physician added those of poet, philosopher, moralist, metaphysician, and theologian. We do not see that he, like so many others of Spinoza's friends, was attached to the Mennonite or any other Christian sect. More of a philosophic religionist and less of a pietist, he was perhaps better suited than a member of any of these communities to be the confidential friend of Spinoza, while as author of the volume entitled Philosophia Sacræ Scripturæ Interpres, he had a further bond of attachment to the writer of the 'Tractatus' in the dislike of the clergy: they feared philosophy as interpreter of holy writ. Colerus only refers to Meyer by his initials—L. M., not giving his name at length, and we can easily see that the philosophical physician was in no favour with the Lutheran pastor. With Chaucer he might indeed have admitted that

> 'As doctoure in physike
> In all the world ne was ther non him like—
> He was a veray parfite practisour;'

but he could not have said as the old poet says of his doctor, that

> 'His studie was but litel of the Bible;'

for Meyer had only studied it too closely, and doubtless in too suspicious company for the theologian. Hence the dislike of the Lutheran pastor.

But the dislike of men of the clerical order for those of the medical profession is of much older date than the days of Colerus, though it is rather remarkable to observe the father of our English poetry possessed by the idea that 'Doctoures in physike' were not religious men as measured by the common standard. The adage 'Inter tres Medicos duo Athei,' was probably originated in the Church of Rome (and has not yet by any means been universally repudiated by Churches

Tractatus that had appeared; so that we have a remainder of no more than 60 small pages dedicated to the proper life of the philosopher. The ostensible purport of the book, therefore, is to some considerable extent counterbalanced by what would seem to have been the writer's more immediate aim.

styled reformed) when Science began to raise her head, and to show how impossible it must henceforth be to maintain all the statements of Scripture and the dogmas of mediæval theology in their literal sense. The proper interpretation of the phrase, however, is this, that among three physicians two will almost certainly be found to have opinions of their own on religious matters, different indeed from those of their calumniators, but not always less accordant with reason and the essence of holy writ than theirs.

The liberally educated physician is necessarily and under all circumstances found in the van of every progressive movement, in the forlorn hope, among the 'enfans perdus,' as the French have it, when an assault is to be made upon old error and superstition, and so is he the butt of all in possession of the strong places whence these are defended. As a distinguished writer, Dr Marx of Göttingen, speaking of the physician, says: 'Son of Æsculapius, he is also a descendant of Phœbus Apollo, and so is it in his blood that he seeks and does battle for the light; a disposition, however, that is seldom ascribed to him as a virtue, and is not unfrequently even laid to his charge as a crime.' *

Meyer, then, we must presume to have been attached to no sectional denomination of worshippers, but to have been one who would have replied, with Frederick Schiller, when questioned on his religious belief:

'Welche Religion ich bekenne? Keine von allen
Die du mir nennst. Und warum keine? Aus Religion.'

'You ask me what Religion I profess?
Well—none of all you've named. What, none of all!
And wherefore? Even from Religiousness.'

JARIG JELLIS, CO-EDITOR OF OPERA POSTHUMA.

J. J., as we have the initials of his name in the Opera Posthuma, was another of the earliest friends of Spinoza, and,

* Mittheilungen über Aerzte. 8vo. Göttingen, 1867. S. 72.

along with Louis Meyer, editor of these works; Jellis, as it is said, having written the preface in Dutch which Meyer turned into Latin. And this statement, judging from the character of the preface, is probably correct; for Jellis was himself an extremely pious man, and seems to have thought he would be doing a sacred service to the memory of his deceased friend, by showing his views accordant in the main with the teachings of the New Testament; and this, however opposed to the dogmas of the scholastic theology and its heterogeneous offspring, they unquestionably are. Jellis knew what the life of the philosopher had been, and through the eyes of his own love and reverence saw nothing but the holy nature of his friend in his writings.

Jellis in early life was engaged in trade—had been one of the guild of pepperers and spicers, dealers in colonial produce, then pouring from the east and west into Holland,—grocers, as they afterwards came to be called by us,—Kruideniers-winkelers, as they styled themselves in Flemish. He had, however, been enabled to retire early from business, severing himself from commerce and its anxieties, bidding adieu to money-making, and retiring into privacy, to occupy himself with theological and philosophical contemplation.* Jellis, as well as Peter Balling and Jan Rieuwertz the bookseller, others among the truest and most trusted of Spinoza's friends, was a member of the peaceful and tolerant sect called Mennonites—Teleo-baptists, and may have been the friend with whom Spinoza came to live in the cottage on the roadside to Auwerkerke after leaving Amsterdam.† He was a man of excellent parts, and, though we find our philosopher employing the vernacular in his correspondence with him, a competent Latin scholar, and well versed in physical as in metaphysical science,—a man of liberal education and acquirements, therefore, and every way worthy to have

* Van Vloten: Baruch d'Espinoza, &c., p. 89. † Vide p. 44.

been the friend of Benedict Spinoza. Besides writing the preface to the Opera Posthuma, Jellis executed and published in the course of the year in which the original appeared, a translation of the same into the Dutch language; and soon after his own death, which happened from consumption in 1683, there appeared, under the friendly care of Jan Rieuwertz, a small pious work from his pen entitled, 'Belijdenis des Algemeenen en Kristelijken Geloofs—A Guide to General and Christian Faith,' which he had put into the hands of a friend shortly before he died as a sort of literary last will and testament.*

Jellis seems not to have been quite sound on the subject of the transmutation of metals—one of the insanities of the age in which he lived,—for he writes to Spinoza inquiringly about the matter, though it could only have been in the way of curiosity and not with a view to profit; for we have seen that he had already given up the unquestionable art of transmuting cloves and nutmegs, cinnamon and pepper, sugar and tea,† by simple industry and intelligence, into the precious metals. He is, however, speedily set right by Spinoza, and after the first letter we hear no more from him on the subject. The other matters handled in the correspondence are the more congenial ones of Ideas, the existence of God, &c. But dioptrics is another of the subjects touched on, and certain hydrostatical experiments are described, which show the two philosophers occupied with the world of matter as well as

* Van Vloten: Baruch d'Espinoza, &c., p. 89.

† It was some few years before this, if we remember rightly, that tea had been introduced into Europe from China by the Dutch East India Company. But the article accumulated as a drug in their warehouses,—no one knew its worth, or cared to buy it as a curiosity, until the cunning traders employed Dr Bontekoe to write a treatise on its virtues. These were extolled to the skies, and with the effect of speedily emptying the magazines. Dr Bontekoe's treatise, which I remember to have partly perused very many years ago, was entitled, I think, Tractaat van het voortreffelijk Kruid Thee. The Doctor, it is pleasant to think, was handsomely rewarded by the traders, who made money themselves, and introduced the public to the article that has now become a necessary of life.

engaged in the transcendental region of mind and abstract being.

It is to Jellis also that Spinoza writes, desiring him to interfere and do all he can to prevent the publication of a Dutch translation of the Tractatus Theologico-politicus, which had been spoken of, lest, being thus made accessible to the illiterate, the fears of the State authorities should lead them to order the suppression not only of the translation but of the original work as well. By this we learn that the Tractatus was never interdicted by the authorities of the Low Countries, as is often erroneously stated.

He next proceeds to criticize a book with the title Homo Politicus, then making some noise in the world, which one of his friends had sent him for perusal. He found it, he says, one of the most pernicious books that can be conceived, worldly wealth and distinction being, according to the writer, the summum bonum of human existence; and when we are informed that, as means of attaining these, all inward sense of religion may be discarded so that outward conformity be but observed; that faith is to be kept with others only in so far as by doing so our own interests are served; that it may be found needful to lie upon occasion, and to swear falsely, &c., we can fancy the disgust which the inculcation of such principles aroused in the pure mind of our philosopher. 'I was minded,' he says, 'when I had read the book, myself to indite a treatise indirectly against its author, in which I should have treated of the true happiness of man,—shown forth the unquiet and miserable lives of those who covet wealth and distinction as the ends of existence,—and on the most obvious grounds of reason, backed by numerous instances from history, exposed the insatiable nature of the lust for money and distinction, and the dangers to the state inseparable from its over-eager indulgences.' Content with so little, Spinoza would have had the world as moderate in its desires as he was

himself; but after all, and in the pre-ordained harmony and universal fitness of things in this God-governed world, we are greatly the better for the trader and money-maker, who in enriching himself necessarily enriches and renders powerful for good the land in which he lives;—and again, if love of distinction may lead to evil, the emotion out of which it springs also ministers to good: combined with benevolence and veneration it is a prime ingredient in good-breeding, makes intercourse between man and man easy and agreeable, and is indeed a necessary element in civilization.

PETER BALLING.—ON OMENS AND SPECTRAL APPEARANCES; SPIRIT, SPIRITUALITY; SOURCE OF THE IDEA OF GOD.

Of Peter Balling we know little or nothing. Enough for us that he was on terms of intimacy with Benedict Spinoza, and in his affliction for the loss of his child gave the sage an opportunity of sending him the charming letter full of kindness and wisdom that has happily come down to us. Balling writes in Dutch, and Spinoza replies in the same language; so that he may not have been a man of learning, and could therefore scarcely be expected, any more than the learned, to be above the superstitious beliefs of his day. He thinks he has had an omen or warning of the approaching death of his child, and writes to Spinoza on the subject. But Spinoza refers him to the state of his mind, and doubtless also of his fevered body—distempered through watching and anxiety,—as adequate to have engendered within himself the sobs and groans he imagined he heard from without. 'Fever and other bodily derangements,' says the philosopher, 'are causes of delirium, and they whose blood is distempered think or dream of strife, disaster, and death. The imagination indeed is governed by the state both of the body and the mind. We have almost no perception of which imagination does not fashion an image or counterfeit; and this being so, I main-

tain that the acts or operations of the imagination which proceed from corporeal causes can never be regarded as omens or prognostics of events to come, inasmuch as their causes involve no contingency or future thing.' 'The mind may, however, imagine things as vividly and fixedly as if they were actually present, and it is in this way that we may have presentiments, although obscure and confused, of events about to happen.'

How is it that man has come universally to conceive what is called SPIRIT or SPIRITUALITY as in or beyond the world he inhabits? Spirit is defined as immaterial, essential, incorporeal, and consequently inappreciable by sense—invisible and inaudible as intangible. Yet men in all the bygone ages of the world have believed in the existence of spirits, thought they had seen apparitions, and heard supernatural sounds. No two men, however, so far as we recollect, are ever said to have seen the same apparition, or to have heard the same supernal voice at the same moment, and no one has yet grasped the form he saw. The vision, therefore, comes from within, not from without; it belongs to and is part of the individual seer; the product of his own inner life, and precisely of the same character as the strange or familiar forms and faces that visit and are seen of us amid the darkness in our dreams. In the same way, the other senses of relation acting of themselves in virtue of inherent power, bring forth impressions that have no proper reality: the nerves or nervous centres appropriated to hearing, being spontaneously active, we have sensations of noise or of more articulate sounds, shaped even into words and sentences with definite meanings; or it is seraphic music to which we listen all entranced. The nerves of taste again spontaneously active, we sit at wonderful banquets, eat of delicious meats, &c.

But we conceive spirituality in a still wider sense. There is something mysterious or spiritual in the influence exerted

by the mind of one man over that of another, something of the same kind owned in the awe and respect experienced in the presence of one intrinsically great and good, or possessed of what is called a powerful will, though he perhaps is neither truly great nor truly good. There is something spiritual in that by which we know through each other's looks whether we are pleased or angry, whether what is said is truly meant, is spoken in irony, or is falsely uttered. The orator, the preacher, sways by an unseen or spiritual power the assembly he addresses; nor have the words he utters always the greatest share in the mastery he exerts. These set down with perfect truthfulness are often found cold and lifeless on perusal, though from the lips of the living speaker they had moved every mind to sympathy and made every heart to throb with emotion.

We have therefore no assurance of the existence of any spirit or any spiritual thing in the vulgar sense in the world around us, other than that which is the product of the activity of our own inherent natural powers. The special forms wherein the spontaneous agency of the mental faculties enshrine themselves, such as voices, visions, apparitions, angels, demons, &c., are consequently objectively unreal, though subjectively they are real enough; that is, they are realities to the individual conscious of them, but only to him; to others they are non-existent. But for the exigencies of his drama, Shakespeare would not have had Macbeth and Banquo spectators together and at once of the apparition of the Weird Sisters—embodiments of one of the superstitions of the age; neither would he have had Marcellus and Bernardo, Horatio and Hamlet, together in presence of the Spectre of the Royal Dane. When he can, and with the intuitive knowledge that was his nature, he shows himself aware of the true, or what we should now call the subjective, grounds of apparitions. It is when he is alone that Macbeth

sees and apostrophizes the air-drawn dagger; and as his fancy goes on creating, makes him fleck 'its blade and dudgeon with gouts of blood which was not so before,' and even bids it 'marshal him the way he was to go.' The Ghost of the murdered Banquo is seen by none but the guilty King in midst of the crowded assembly at the 'Solemn Supper.' His father's Spirit is seen only, heard only, by Hamlet in his mother's chamber, 'come to whet the almost blunted purpose of his irresolute son, and bid him step between his mother and her fighting soul.' To the o'erwrought brain of Brutus alone in his tent at midnight, reviewing the past of his life, in anticipation of the doubtful issues of the coming day, dwelling on the terrible deed that had brought him to stake his fortunes and his life on the morrow's battle, and stung by recollections of the last words of the falling tyrant and his friend—et tu Brute! the apparition of the 'bald Cæsar' peers forth from the gloom upon his fevered brain, and he exclaims:

'How ill this taper burns!—Ha! who comes here?
Or is't the weakness of mine eyes
That shapes this monstrous apparition?
It comes upon me! Art thou anything?
—Some God, some Angel, or some Devil
That mak'st my blood run cold, my hair to start?
Speak to me—what art thou?'

Thus, too, has the religious enthusiast in all times had visions of the things he revolved in his mind presented to his outward eyes. Paul of Tarsus, for example, eager defender hitherto of the faith in which he lived, aider and abettor in the murder of Stephen, guard over the clothes of those engaged in the cruel business, himself perchance even casting a stone, and still ready to aid in the good cause of Pharisaic Orthodoxy, is on his way to Damascus, armed with the powers of the Inquisitor to hunt out and to crush the growing superstition. But with leisure for reflection on the road, with no more congenial company perhaps than his own thoughts,

the better element in the soul of the intellectual and educated man—pupil of Gamaliel and not untinctured by the humanizing influences of Greek letters—wakes up within him. He begins to reason and reflect, to question and to doubt. The last dying look of his latest victim recurs to his mind in connection with the wonderful tales he has heard of the life, death, and resurrection from the dead of the Chief and Teacher of the new persuasion. His heart is softened; hesitation takes the place of resolute purpose; pity, of the zeal that would slay; and then and on a sudden the spectral image of the Crucified One himself takes objective form to his eyes, his thoughts shape themselves into the words, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? and he falls self-vanquished to the ground as if shattered by a thunderbolt.

Thus does man, in tune with his mental state, for good or for evil, 'body forth the forms of things unseen, and give to airy shapes a local habitation and a name.'

Is it not from a subjective, intuitive revelation of this kind, that the Idea of God arises and has even a *necessary* place in our minds? We have a sense of something beyond ourselves; what, we cannot define, but a something beyond 'this ignorant present,' which the uncivilized and the vulgar personify and anthropomorphize, but which the philosopher conceives and reasons out as the Self-existent, Eternal, and Infinite Cause of All. The Idea of God consequently is no effect of teaching or revelation from without, as commonly said; but is the product of a sense we possess immediately from the Author of our being. Revelation indeed could only be another evidence of the existence in the mind of man of an inherent primary power whereby he rises to the conception of a Revealer, of a God in whom he lives and moves and has his being. God needed not, therefore, to reveal himself in the vulgar acceptation of the term; for God needs not ever to supplement his work, each thing in the sphere of being it

occupies sufficing by his fiat for its state; an[illegible] apprehending the Idea of God — as it is im[illegible] doubt that he is,—man is also necessarily furnished [illegible] faculty to form it. Were he not so furnished he wo[illegible] without the power to apprehend the Idea were it propoun[illegible] to him. But even in the lowest aspects of humanity we see that an Existence beyond himself has ever been conceived by man. This he endeavours to bring nearer to himself by giving it a form and ascribing to it qualities. Endowing it with power transcending his own, he then seeks to render it propitious by rites and ceremonies of various significance: offerings of things useful to himself—fruits of the earth, products of his industry; the young of his flocks and herds reared by his care; and, mounting in his blind devotion and to secure still greater blessings to himself, the offspring of his body—the son or daughter newly born to him, and much beloved! Escaped from this terrible stage of barbarism, in which the Hebrew people appear to have lived for so many centuries, when all that opened the womb was Cherem and irredeemably dedicate to Jehovah,* man next sought to make himself

* The redemption clauses in the Hebrew Scriptures have been held to be interpolations of a later date; and the story of Abraham and Isaac, of which so much has been made, as an episode introduced at a relatively modern epoch in the history of the Jewish people to show that Jehovah was verily more merciful than he had been conceived by their remote forefathers. The rite of circumcision had the same significance: a part was sacrificed instead of the *whole*, to the reproductive power of Nature, a still earlier object of worship with the Jews than Jahveh or Eloah, as of so many other barbarous tribes, under its symbol the Yoni-lingam.[1] It is no less than wonderful to observe with what persistence in foregone conclusions the Sacred Books of the Jews are still perused in the present day. In spite of the obvious incongruity of the *optative* clauses after the *positive* injunctions,—such texts as these from the writings of the later Prophets: 'I polluted them in their own gifts in that they caused to pass through the fire all that openeth the womb, that I might make them desolate,' &c., Ezek. xx. 25, 26; 'Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?' Micah vi. 7; 'They built the high places of Tophet, to burn their sons and their daughters in the fire,' Jerem. vii. 31; and the terrible tale of Jephthah's

[1] Conf. Ghillanij, Die Menschen Opfer der alten Hebräer. 8vo. Nürnb. 1842.

acceptable to God by building gorgeous Temples to his service, by singing psalms and hymns in his praise, by making sweet music, and diffusing the perfume of frankincense for his gratification, and with all this abasing himself in the dust, calling himself a miserable sinner, and entreating God, as if He were an impersonation of vengeance, for compassion. Emerging at length from childishness and superstition, man begins to know and acknowledge God as Supreme Cause of All, to whom nothing is due and to whom nothing can be rendered but OBEDIENCE. Conscious denizen himself of this globe, he studies to discover the great eternal, changeless laws ordained by God for the government of the universe and its parts in one harmonious whole; believes that in striving to know and in implicitly obeying these, the primal ordinances of Almighty power, he does what in him lies to render himself acceptable to his Maker, and so accomplishes the end of his existence—lives in such bodily and mental health as the nature of his organization and surrounding circumstances allow, and closing his eyes when the term of his years has run, gratefully returns his being to God from whom it came,

hapless child, in the comparatively modern age of the Judges,—a distinguished English critic of the Hebrew Scriptures had overlooked the fact that human sacrifices still formed a part of the Jewish ritual in times not long before the Christian æra, until a friend directed his attention to the subject, and lent him Ghillanij's book to clear his vision. So able a writer as Harriet Martineau, in a volume of literary essays and criticisms but just published (Midsummer, 1869), speaking of Opie's picture of Jephthah's daughter, in which the high-priest is represented standing beside the beautiful victim duly armed with a formidable knife as instrument of the immolation, observes: 'As if human sacrifices were ever performed by the Jews!' Miss Martineau may be well assured that they were; up to a comparatively recent period in their history, too; and if she will but follow the train of thought which mention of the subject suggests, she will not fail to discover the influence it has had in a later dispensation than the Jewish.

In the Roman Catholic Mass we have indeed ample evidence of the hold which the idea of sacrifice still has on the mind of man. There the ministering priest in the linen robe of a Jewish sacrificator symbolizes the sacrifice of a son to a father in the shape of a wafer and a little wine; and professing to turn these by his incantations into the body and blood of an incarnate God, he takes them into his mouth and swallows them!

with such hopes of further conscious life as the whisperings of another of his intuitive faculties lead him to entertain.*

WILLIAM VAN BLEYENBERG.—SPINOZA THINKS HE HAS MET WITH A KINDRED SPIRIT, A LOVER OF TRUTH FOR ITS OWN SAKE, BUT FINDS THAT HE IS MISTAKEN.

William van Bleyenberg introduces himself to Spinoza; and what we know of him we have from himself. He was a merchant of Dort, in comfortable circumstances, and spending his leisure time in metaphysical studies, for which he expresses much fondness. He was evidently a man of superior talents, though not of much learning. He writes in the vernacular, not Latin, the only language of the learned in those days, and is answered by Spinoza in his mother-tongue. 'He is one,' he says, 'who, longing for pure and simple truth, strives with all his might to gain a firm footing on the

* Mr Baring Gould sums up the modern philosophical conception of Deity in these terms: There is an Infinite God, impersonal and yet personal, immanent in Nature, and yet not of or by Nature, omnipotent, omniscient, influencing the material world—the world in him, he in the world.

God can be seen in his creatures, for he communicates himself to man through Nature. He is in the works of creation by his essence, which is that by which they have their being. He is in them by his power, as cause of their motions. Thus it is God who enlightens through the medium of the sun, and warms through the fire, and nourishes through bread. God is present in every force in Nature—in heat, electricity, attraction, gravitation. Not that heat, electricity, &c., are God, but that they are effects of God's action on the bodies he has given us and the things around us. Thus all creatures are Sacraments, or outward and visible signs of the invisible being of God veiled under them. 'What do I see in Nature?' wrote Fenelon, 'God—God everywhere, God alone.'[1]

Instead of attempting to define God, however (all determination in Spinozism implying negation), we perhaps comport ourselves more reverently when we speak of The Supreme in the abstract, as the Ineffable and Incomprehensible Being, and in acknowledging ourselves and the world in a way inscrutable to us as the work of his power, declaring it the business of our lives to study and to obey his decrees. 'Reason,' says Hobbes, 'dictates one name alone which doth signify the Nature of God, that is the EXISTENT, or we say simply that HE IS, and one in relation to us, namely GOD, under which is contained both King and Lord and Father.'

[1] The Origin and Development of Religious Belief, Pt. i. 8vo. Lond. 1869, p. 291.

grounds of science, and would make this the stepping-stone neither to distinction nor to wealth, but by its means attain to that peace of mind which truth alone can give.' This was certainly approaching our philosopher on his most accessible side, and he in his reply to his unknown friend (Amice ignote!) shows himself pleased with the idea of entering on a correspondence with one who speaks of himself as a lover of truth for its own sake. 'I esteem nothing more highly,' he says, 'than to have friendly relations with lovers of truth. The love of truth for its own sake is indeed the sweetest and highest of all things not under our own control, for nothing but love of truth has power to knit in bonds of harmony diversity of view and disposition.' He then proceeds at great length and with much minuteness to answer all his correspondent's queries, and to give him an insight into his own large and liberal interpretation of the Scriptures, explaining to him how it comes that the prophets have often made God to speak after the manner of a man, describing Him as a King and Lawgiver, setting down as laws certain means which are nothing but causes, and declaring salvation and perdition, which are but effects flowing from these means, as rewards and punishments. 'Such language,' he adds, 'is adapted to the many; and need not, therefore, be objected to by philosophers and those who are above the law or are a law to themselves; who, in other words, follow virtue for its own sake, and not because it is prescribed, but from love and persuasion of its intrinsic excellence.'

Bleyenberg, good and amiable as he must have been, in his answer to the philosopher's beautiful epistle shows himself staggered at first by the flood of light that has been poured upon him: he was disposed on a first hasty perusal of the letter to reply at once and take exception to many things, but the oftener he reads it over the less does he seem to find for objection. He proceeds, however, to communicate the

rules he prescribes to himself in philosophizing, and so, but all unconsciously as it seems, belies everything he has said of his disposition to pursue truth for its own sake and irrespective of consequences. The first rule he prescribes to himself is, To have clear and definite intellectual conceptions; the second, To keep the revealed word or will of God in view. With the first he advances as a lover of truth; with the two, as a Christian philosopher; 'and if,' he proceeds, 'I find my natural understanding either opposed to the Scriptures or little in accordance with them, such is their authority with me that I rather abandon the ideas I have formed—clearly and distinctly as I imagined—than presume to set them up in opposition to the truths I find prescribed to me in The Book.' In consonance with his first rule, therefore, he admits that he finds many things in his correspondent's letter which he must concede; 'but my second rule,' he adds, 'compels me to differ from you entirely.'

Spinoza's eyes are forthwith opened to the mental state of the man who has been addressing him, and whom he in turn had addressed, believing him, on his word, to be a lover of truth for its own sake, bound by the fetters of no prescription, and swayed in his reasonings by no foregone conclusions. The philosopher's reply is masterly, kindly, conciliatory, candid. 'On reading your first letter,' he says, 'I thought that our opinions nearly coincided, but now I see that this is far from being the case; and that we are not only not of one mind in regard to consequences flowing from first principles, but that we even differ in regard to these principles themselves. I scarcely believe, therefore, that any amount of writing will enable us to come to an understanding; for I see that you will accept no conclusion, were it even the most irrefragable by the laws of demonstration, which you yourself or the theologians of your acquaintance find does not accord with your interpretation of the text of Scripture.' Did he take the

same view as his correspondent, however, did he think that God spoke to us more clearly in the Scriptures than he does through the natural understanding with which he has endowed us, then would he too bring his mind, as his correspondent does, to the level of the views he ascribes to Holy Writ; but, avowing candidly and without reserve, that though he had spent many years in the study of the Scriptures, he does not understand them; and, as it has never happened to him when he had once attained to a firm and definite conclusion, to fall into such a state of mind as led him to doubt of its truth, so does he comfort himself and rest satisfied with what his understanding shows him.. It is in this letter that the fine passage occurs in which the philosopher says, 'And though I were at times to find the fruit I gather by my natural understanding to be unreal, yet would not this make me dissatisfied; for in the gathering I enjoy, and pass my days not in sighing and sorrow but in peace, serenity, and joy, and so mount a step higher in my sense of being.'*

He then goes on to show his correspondent how little he understands him, and somewhat sharply to clear himself from misinterpretation; avowing his belief that as intelligent beings we are bound to submit ourselves, mind and body, to God, which may be done without a shade of superstition, and without a denial of the usefulness of prayer, 'for my understanding is too limited to take in all the means that God may have provided whereby men are brought to the love of him—in

* Lessing, who after acquaintance made with the writings of Spinoza declares that he 'now begins to feel himself a man,' had probably this passage in his eye when he himself penned the fine one quoted in the Introduction to my version of his Nathan, where he says: 'By the pursuit, not by the possession, of truth is man ennobled and his powers enlarged. Were the Almighty Father to appear with all Truth in his right hand, and in his left the power of attaining truth with the liability to err attached, and say, Son, take thy choice, I should reply: Father, Truth Absolute is for Thee alone; the power to search and the gift to apprehend bestowed by Thee suffice for man. I choose the left.'

other words, whereby they may achieve their proper salvation.' The reader is particularly referred to this letter for insight into the innermost recesses of our philosopher's pious mind and lucid understanding.

Bleyenberg, in reply, complains of having been somewhat sharply handled by Spinoza. His letter is able and in very good taste, but in great part a repetition of what he has already said. He is hampered by his foregone conclusions, and cannot reach the heights of pure reason and independent speculation on which the man he addresses sits secure. For the remainder of the interesting correspondence with Bleyenberg, illustrative, as it is, both of the views and character of our philosopher, the reader is referred to the letters themselves.

The letters numbered xxxix., xl., and xli, may have been addressed to Chr. Huygens, though of this we have no certainty. They are important, to whomsoever they were written, in the development they give to the arguments for the unity of God, and though abstruse, are deserving of careful perusal. Huygens was one likely to have been consulted by Spinoza on the subject of the moulds used in grinding and polishing lenses, and further, as versed in the science of Optics, on the best form of a lens, subjects which we find spoken of particularly at the end of the forty-first epistle.

J. BRESSER, M.D.—ON THE CONDUCT OF THE UNDERSTANDING AND METHOD OF ARRIVING AT TRUTH.

Dr Bresser was one of the early friends and admirers of Spinoza. This is testified by the lines which appear on the reverse of the title of the Principia Cartesiana, signed with his initials. He was also an original member of the debating society of Amsterdam. In letter No. xlii. he has written to

Spinoza inquiring if there were extant, or might be devised, a method whereby we might advance easily and securely in a knowledge of the highest and most excellent things; or if the mind, like the body, was obnoxious to contingency, and our understanding ruled by accident rather than by fixed and definite laws. We see, therefore, that Spinoza's more intimate friends do not write to him about trifles. Spinoza replies, as we might have foreseen that he would, by saying that there must necessarily be a method of conducting the understanding truly, of correlating such clear and definite conceptions as spring up within our minds, and that the understanding is not subject, like the body, to chance or contingency. He then proceeds to show that such a method is to be attained through adequate knowledge of pure Reason, its nature and its laws, to arrive at which it is enough to arrange a short history or summary of the mind or perceptions in the manner taught by Bacon.

But a letter more important than that which has just engaged us was rescued from oblivion by Dr Van Vloten, here numbered xlii. *a*, giving us, as it does, another opportunity of knowing that Spinoza was no selfish recluse occupied with himself alone, but interested in all that interested his friends and the world at large. He urges Bresser immediately to set about the important work of which he had spoken, and so to dedicate the better part of his life to the cultivation of his heart and understanding. He refers to his own health, which had suffered of late; but says he is now better; and sends MS. of the Ethics as far as the 80th proposition, for the perusal of his correspondent and his friend De Vries;—should either of them like to translate what he sends, they are welcome to do so. He further alludes to the state of public affairs, then greatly disturbed, and breathes a wish that all, by the providence of God, may be directed for the best.

ISAAC OROBIO, M.D.—LAMBERT VAN VELTHUYSEN, M.D., CRITICIZES THE TRACTATUS THEOLOGICO-POLITICUS, AND SPINOZA REPLIES.

We have had occasion to speak of Dr Orobio already. He who could voluntarily assume the trammels of Judaism, submitting himself in years of maturity to all its essential rites, and abjuring the baptismal name of Balthasar he had received in Spain, for that of Ishak, in Holland, could not have been of the stuff fitted heartily to sympathize with the man who had renounced the Baruch he received with circumcision for the Benedict he assumed when he freed himself from his Jewish chains. Isaac Orobio, however, was doubtless a sincerely pious man, but also a narrow-minded member of the persuasion of his forefathers, which he had now adopted, and he may in his secret soul even have abetted those who had excommunicated our philosopher.

The occasion of the one letter of Spinoza to Orobio which we have, arose out of a communication to him by his correspondent of a lengthy critical analysis by Dr Lambert van Veldhuis of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, written with a foregone conclusion, in an entirely hostile spirit, and oftentimes with manifest misapprehension of the meaning of the author. He thinks that Spinoza, to escape the reproach of superstition, must have cast aside all religion; fancies him at best a Deist, but immediately after and very illogically charges him with atheism—Deist and Atheist at once; makes it a grand reproach against him for maintaining that everything happens in virtue of the eternal and changeless decrees of God, so that God cannot be supposed to be moved by prayer to alter any one of these; for speaking of miracles as interpretations by ignorant men of natural phenomena; and for holding that the power of God is most conspicuously manifested in the uniformity of natural law, any interruption of which he thinks

would bring God into contradiction with himself, which is an absurdity, and so on, winding up by denouncing him 'as teaching, by glozing arguments and counterfeit shows of reason, mere atheism.'

Spinoza's reply is all that might have been expected from him; it is able and complete. He does not pretend to divine what his critic understands by religion, but asks, 'If he can be said to cast off religion, who rests all he has to say on the subject on the ground that God is to be acknowledged as the Supreme Good, that God is with entire singleness of soul to be loved as such, and that the love of God is our highest bliss, our best privilege, our most perfect freedom. Farther, that every one is to love his neighbour as himself, and to be obedient to the laws and the authorities of the land in which he lives?'

In conclusion, he says that he had only brought himself to reply to the particular adverse criticism now sent him—many of the same sort being extant—because he had pledged his word to do so.

Orobio subsequently took up the pen himself against a certain J. Bredenburg, who, it seems, entering on the study of Spinoza, full of the vulgar notions and mistaken conceptions of the character of his works, with the view of confuting him, was himself confuted; and very honestly, but with expressions of much regret, confessed that he found the man he had been taught to look on as an atheist and dangerous person, on a nearer acquaintance to be both pious and moral, and his system so skilfully put together as to be impregnable. The book he wrote against Spinoza is entitled: Enervatio Tract. Theol. Polit. una cum Demonstratione Naturam non esse Deum. 4to. Rotterd. 1675. We are not able to say whether this was the work, or another published subsequently by Bredenburg, which Dr Isaac Orobio attacked in a small but able treatise, entitled, Certamen Philosophicum propugnatæ

veritatis divinæ ac naturalis adversus J. B. principia. Amst. 1684.*

There is a letter misplaced, as it seems, by the editors of the Opera Posthuma, and followed in this by all their successors, addressed by Spinoza to Dr L. v. Veldhuis, which has been brought into juxtaposition with the other two to which it bears reference. It is interesting as affording further evidence of the candour of Spinoza's disposition and of his fearlessness of criticism. He desires permission from his critical adversary to publish his letter, and begs him to communicate what further observations he might be pleased to make on the Theologico-political treatise. We had thought at first of withholding Veldhuis' letter as an unfair and mistaken effusion; but seeing that Spinoza would himself have produced it had he found the opportunity, we have felt it our duty to give it in its proper place, viz. in connection with Spinoza's letter to Orobio.

LETTER L. SPINOZA TO ——. THE ONENESS OF GOD.

We do not know to whom this letter is addressed; it may have been the correspondent to whom Nos. xxxix.—xli. are referred, and with whose veiled form we have ventured to connect the name of Christian Huygens; though our faith in the propriety of so doing is greatly shaken by the character of the letter that now follows. The letter numbered l. in the Opera Posthuma itself is interesting metaphysically, and serves as a comment on one of the propositions in the Cogitata Metaphysica, in which the Oneness of the Deity is mentioned, and which seems to have arrested the attention of the philosopher's correspondent, as it, or the corresponding part

* The treatise of Orobio is said by Dr Paulus to be extremely rare; when met with at all it is, as I myself possess it, appended to the 'Refutation des Erreurs de Spinoza par M. de Fenelon, le P. Lami, et M. le Comte de Boullainvilliers avec la Vie de Spinoza écrite par M. Jean Colerus.' 12mo. Bruxelles, 1731.

of the later work, the Ethics, did subsequently arrest the thoughts of Lessing.

The book of the Utrecht professor, to which Spinoza refers at the end of the letter, is that of Regnier van Mansveld, entitled, Adversus Anonymum Theologico-politicum, Liber singularis. 4to. Amst. 1674. Our philosopher speaks very slightingly of its significance, although it made much stir at the time. He seems to have seen the book exposed and open in the window of a bookseller's shop, and from the page or two he could have read there to have concluded that it was not worthy of any further or more careful perusal,—'Relinquebam ergo librum ejusque auctorem,—I therefore left the book and its writer alone, mentally revolving with myself that the ignorant are everywhere the most presumptuous and the most ready with the pen. * * * * it strike me, must be showing his wares as hawkers do theirs—bringing out the most worthless first. The devil, they say, is very cunning, but these folks seem to me far to surpass the devil in their craft. Farewell!'

GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ.—OPTICAL SCIENCE.—NATURE OF LIGHT.—IMPROVEMENT OF THE TELESCOPE.—INTERCOURSE WITH SPINOZA.

Leibnitz, as all the lettered world is well aware, was one of the most remarkable among the many distinguished men of the age in which he lived—the age of Robert Boyle, of Isaac Newton, and Christian Huygens. Leibnitz, in his day, was as much extolled as Spinoza was decried, and made for himself as great a reputation for orthodoxy by writing in a popular and ecclesiastical sense, as our philosopher, by severing himself from vulgar notions and opposing the priesthood in their pretensions to civil power and their interpretations of the relations between God and man, got an evil name for infidelity—or rather, as the measure with which theological

hatred metes is never of insignificant dimensions—for atheism.

The editors of the Opera Posthuma have published no more than one of the letters, with the reply to it, that passed between Leibnitz and Spinoza; whether they had more at their disposal or not we do not know, but that others were interchanged between the parties we may be assured from those which passed between Dr Schaller and Spinoza, first published by Dr Van Vloten in his Supplementum.

Letter li. is addressed by Leibnitz to Spinoza as an optical philosopher and fashioner of telescopic lenses, though in the superscription of the letter he is styled, 'distinguished physician and profound philosopher.' With the discovery of the microscope first, and next of the telescope, lenses both of smaller and larger dimensions, of purer material, more perfect form and exquisite finish, came into very general demand, and their fashioning was exactly the art in which a mathematician and man of science with a delicate hand was sure to excel. No wonder, therefore, that glasses of Spinoza's make soon came to be inquired after, and that his fame as a skilful manufacturer reached the ears of Gottfried Leibnitz. 'Among your other titles to consideration,' writes the lordly man to Spinoza, 'the fame of which has spread abroad, I learn that you are especially skilled in the science of optics. This induces me to send you a copy of an essay of mine on the subject, assured that I can submit it to no more competent judge.' He then enters upon an account of a kind of lens which he thought would have 'the property of reuniting equally all the rays proceeding from points without as well as within the optic axis, and so permitting the apertures of telescopes to be as large as we pleased, without detriment to their defining power.'

In Spinoza's reply we see him not only on a par theoretically with one of the greatest mathematicians and ablest men of the age, but practically on a higher step of the ladder

of optical science than his correspondent. Leibnitz imagined that by a particular fashion of the object-glass of a telescope inequality of refraction and dispersion might be so far got the better of that the aperture of the instrument, instead of being restricted to a comparatively small space in the centre of the field, might be extended to the entire disc, and the light and power of the instrument thus immensely increased. But Spinoza, master of the subject practically as well as theoretically, immediately asks whether the lenses of his correspondent, which he calls *pandochmic*,* get rid of what opticians style the *mechanical space*,—the space within which the rays reunite after refraction; and whether the space in question remains of the same size, however large the aperture of the glass? 'If they did, then would your lenses be vastly superior to those of any other fashion; but if they did not, I cannot see why you should prefer them to glasses of the common figure.'

Newton's grand discovery of the compound nature of light had not yet been divulged to the world; neither Leibnitz nor Spinoza knew that 'light was not a similar but a heterogeneous thing, consisting of difform rays which had essentially different refractions, and that colours are produced from such and such rays, whereof some are in their own nature disposed to produce red, others green, others blue,' &c.† The prism was a toy until in Newton it met with the inspired interpreter of its powers, and man through him became possessed of a new revelation, and a further means of fathoming God's eternal laws. In the hands of modern philosophers the prism has extended our knowledge to the material composition of the sun, and fixed stars, and even of those galaxies which in their inconceivable remoteness appear as mere patches of luminous dust strewn over points of infinite space. More than this, and

* Doubtless from πᾶν and δοχμόω, to bend or incline universally.

† Newton in Philos. Transact. No. 80, 1672; and Weld's History of the Royal Society, vol. i., p. 237.

interesting especially to us in connection with the views of Spinoza, it has brought us other evidence of the ONENESS and INDIVISIBILITY of the Universe—the SUBSTANCE of the philosopher—and of the all-pervading presence of the INCOMPREHENSIBLE EXISTENCE, which intuition and reason alike bid us conceive as its Cause.*

The problem which we see Leibnitz attempting to solve, but which was in fact unsolvable by the means he imagined —the *simple* lens of any configuration—had indeed been already ascertained to be so by Newton, and abandoned by him in consequence. But it was not insuperable in reality; for the genius of another great English optical philosopher, Dollond, forcing as it were to his purpose the natural law which made the difficulty, showed that with a lens composed of two kinds of glass possessing different refractive powers the unlike refrangibilities of the several rays could be corrected, the 'mechanical space,' as well as coloured rings, got rid of, and object-glasses constructed of any dimensions for which materials in the shape of perfectly homogeneous glass could be obtained. This fine idea was the parent of all the improvements that were immediately made in that most admirable of all optical instruments—the refracting telescope, which may indeed be said to have owed its second birth to the genius of our countryman.

And it is neither uninteresting nor unimportant here to

* I allude to the brilliant discoveries of Kirchoff and Bunsen, and their interpretation of the dark lines that appear in the spectrum. Newton seems to have overlooked these, or if he saw them, did not apprehend their significance and importance.

The prism with which Newton made or perfected his great discovery was of foreign (Dutch) manufacture, and was for some time detained at the Custom House through difficulties experienced in determining the amount of duty to which this novel article was rightly liable. The officers saw a triangular piece of glass intrinsically worth a few pence; the philosopher, however, declared that 'the value was so great he could not possibly say what it was worth; it was, in fact, of inestimable value.' The officers, we may presume, took him at his word, and exacted a good round sum as duty for that which put into the scales and valued by the ounce would have been found almost worthless. Vide Weld's History of Royal Society, vol. i., p. 237.

observe that the difficulties which Newton, in common with others, encountered in obtaining power and definition with an available telescope as then constructed, led the way to everything that has since been achieved with the Reflecting telescope. For, baffled by the unlike refrangibilities of the constituent rays of light, Newton turned to *Reflection* as a means of obtaining telescopic vision; and by his Godlike intelligence conceived, as with his own compliant hands he fashioned and perfected the instrument, which, increased in size, has since enabled the elder Herschell to 'gauge the heavens' and show us our sun's place amid the fixed stars, and Rosse to scan the infinite of space and bring us news of spheres and systems in their immensity and remoteness which are almost as incomprehensible as the Godhead itself.*

But to return to our more immediate subject.

By the conclusion of Spinoza's letter to Leibnitz we see him proposing to send his correspondent a copy of the Tractatus Theologico-politicus; this doubtless led to a reply from the great man and the forwarding of his book by our philosopher. And this may possibly be the whole of the correspondence to which we find Spinoza referring in his answer to Schaller.

Dr Schaller, one of Spinoza's familiar friends, has been in correspondence with Von Tschirnhaus, an old member of the Debating Society of Amsterdam and well known to Spinoza. Von Tschirnhaus either is or has been in Paris, where he meets M. Huygens, with whom he is on a footing of friendship. He has spoken of Spinoza with Huygens, who in his turn has mentioned the philosopher in high terms, saying

* Newton's first reflector is still to be seen in the rooms of the Royal Society. The instrument, of some 10 or 12 inches focus, and two inches aperture, is identical with the great achievement of Lord Rosse, 60 feet focal distance, and speculum six feet in diameter! The tube of Newton's precious little instrument is of pasteboard, and moves on a ball and socket joint; the ball of wood, the socket of brass, fashioned, doubtless, by himself or with the help of the Cambridge carpenter and watchmaker.

that he had lately procured a copy of the Tractatus Theologico-politicus, 'which was much commended in these parts, and greatly inquired after.'

Von Tschirnhaus further informs his friend Schaller that he had met with a gentleman in Paris of wonderful talents and erudition, 'well versed in the various sciences, and quite free from vulgar prejudices,' of the name of Leibnitz. With this accomplished person he had contracted a friendship; and finding him 'so far advanced in physics and metaphysics, in the study of God and the mind of man,' he thinks it might be desirable to communicate the writings of Spinoza to him, the consent of the philosopher having been first obtained; for without this Von T. says he will not stir in the matter. 'Leibnitz too,' he goes on to inform Schaller, 'prizes the Tractatus highly,' and Schaller proceeds, addressing Spinoza: 'if you remember, he formerly wrote a letter to you on the subject; I therefore request of you, my dear sir, unless some special reason stands in the way of your doing so, that you will be pleased, in the excess of your goodness, to authorize me to give the permission Von Tschirnhaus desires.'

Spinoza's letter, happily rescued by Fr. Muller and Dr van Vloten (our letter lxvi. *a*), is extremely interesting, but, unless the philosopher had come to something like an unfavourable estimate of the character of Leibnitz, scarcely to be understood. He replies to Schaller, 'I believe I know through letters the Leibnitz of whom Von Tschirnhaus writes. But why he who was counsellor at Frankfort has gone to Paris I do not know. In so far as I could judge by his letters, he seemed to me a man of liberal mind and extremely well versed in science of every kind. But that at this early day I should intrust him with my writings does not seem to me prudent. I would first know what he is doing in France, and have the opinion of Von Tschirnhaus after he has known him somewhat longer and become better acquainted with his moral character.'

Spinoza, as a republican and patriot, may have fancied that the German counsellor was in France for nothing good in so far as Holland was concerned, and that he himself was therefore bound to caution in communicating with him. It is rather strange, however, that in a letter written in 1675, Spinoza should speak somewhat hesitatingly of knowing Leibnitz by way of letters only, and make no allusion to the personal intercourse he had had with him in 1672, for the two men had already met face to face; Leibnitz having gone out of his way on his return home in the beginning of that year for the express purpose, apparently, of paying Spinoza a visit at the Hague.

In a letter to the Abbé Golloys, Leibnitz says openly, that returning from his journey through France and England by way of Holland, he saw and spoke with Spinoza frequently and for a very long time—'Je lui ai parlé plusieurs fois et fort longtemps. Il a une metaphysique pleine de paradoxes.' Spinoza, however, was held to compromise the reputation for orthodoxy—a matter dear to Leibnitz—of every one who had any intercourse with him: 'ut ne multa cum illo "Judæo" imo atheo communicâsse videatur satis sibi cavendum judicavit vir illustris'—the illustrious mans eems to have thought he could not be too cautious in speaking of any communication he had had with this 'Jew,' yea, this atheist by reputation, says Dr Paulus.*

In his popular work, the Theodicée, we consequently find Leibnitz assuming a very light tone, and throwing Spinoza, as the object of his visit to Holland, entirely into the shade: 'Je vis M. de la Cour aussi bien que Spinoza à mon retour de France par l'Angleterre et par la Hollande, et j'appris d'eux quelques bons anecdotes sur les affaires de ce tems-là.' It is very certain, however, that the conversation was not all anecdotic or political, and that M. de la Cour (Van den Hoof)

* Ad vitam Spinozæ Collect. in Op. quæ supers. Om. B. de S. T. ii. p., 674.

perchance was by no means the individual who made it most significant to the traveller.

But Leibnitz, great as we know him to have been in intellect, was not by his moral constitution and habits of life likely to appreciate Spinoza. The Alexander von Humboldt of his age in general knowledge and scientific acquirement, he was yet morally something of a poltroon; made so, doubtless, by his vanity,—for Leibnitz was an extremely vain man, eager for distinction and living for the smiles of the titled and the great. His portrait presents him to us as a very imposing personage in an immense periwig à la Louis XIV., and with an air of supreme self-contentment in the expression of the face. He was of a contentious and jealous nature, too, disputing with Newton his discovery of fluxions; and, while ignoring our philosopher, or only speaking of him disparagingly, deriving from him the germs of his own philosophy; for the Leibnitzian *Monad* is but the transcendental ONE in its infinitesimal minuteness, as the Spinozistic *Substance* is the transcendental ONE in its measureless immensity. And what is the *Pre-established Harmony* of Leibnitz but the universal fitness of things, outcome at once of the omniscience, the will, and the act of God, with all the laws complete that necessarily pertain to being? How could harmony be wanting in any part of the universe of God? If man was to consist of soul and body, how could they have been constituted by their author otherwise than in harmony? If the world was to be peopled by animated beings destined to subsist by assimilated food and inbreathed air, how could they have been fashioned otherwise than with digestive sacs and lungs, or other respiratory apparatus, whilst the earth and the waters supplied the needful nutriment, and the atmosphere the needful air? And all this, and infinitely more if extant, was therefore pre-conceived, willed, and enacted at once by the Supreme Intelligence. Mind and body are not truly, as Leibnitz held, *two* independ-

ent, yet corresponding instruments, but *one* instrument fitted to accomplish the purpose intended; not 'two unconnected clocks,' as Mr Lewes* puts the subject, 'one of which strikes the hour whilst the other points to it,' but one clock that strikes and points to the hour at once. Is Leibnitz' pre-established harmony between soul and body anything more than Spinoza's Idea Mentis and Idea Corporis in another guise?

Leibnitz, however, was the opposite of Spinoza in almost everything both morally and socially; he was a courtier and attendant on the great; not like our philosopher, a contemner of wealth and worldly distinction. Taking the measure of Spinoza by himself, he had so indifferent an appreciation of his character as to think it possible he could have burned all his incomplete works lest, being published after his death, they might detract from the glory he coveted as a writer! Neither did Leibnitz, like Spinoza, always pursue truth for its own sake and without care for consequences. With him religion was rather an engine of state-craft for holding men in bondage, than a means of setting them free;—nearing them to God, and out of their own souls helping them to live virtuously, usefully, happily in this life, and so making them more worthy of the bliss that is whispered to the pious and the good as awaiting them in a life to come. On these great and grave subjects Leibnitz was not entirely to be depended on. Truth was to be presented to the outside world *telle qu'il la faut*—in such shape as was required—not naked and without the trick of ornament.†

* Biographical History of Philosophy, vol. iii., p. 230. 12mo. London, 1846.

† Thus, in the preface to the Theodicée, speaking of himself and his motives for writing, he says, 'qu'il a eu des entretiens la dessus (la religion) avec quelques personnes de lettres et de *Cour, et surtout avec une Princesse des plus grandes et des plus accomplies*, * * * et qu'il avait delibéré quelquefois de publier ses pensées, dont le but principal devoit être la connaissance de Dieu, *telle qu'il la faut* pour exciter la piété et pour nourrir la vertu.'

J. LOUIS FABRITIUS, AND THE OFFER OF THE CHAIR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HEIDELBERG.

The letter of Fabritius is merely official, and therefore interesting less in connection with himself than with his liberal master, the Prince Palatine, Charles Louis, who was not afraid to offer to one with the indifferent theological reputation of Spinoza, a chair in his University of Heidelberg. We have already adverted to this proposal, and spoken of our philosopher's courteous declension of the office.

LETTERS LV.—LX. SPINOZA TO AN ANONYMOUS CORRESPONDENT. —THE WORLD HAS NOT ARISEN BY CHANCE, BUT FROM GOD.

The letters, with the replies, from lv. to lx., are from and to one and the same unnamed correspondent. Starting with the unlikely subject of hobgoblins and apparitions, our philosopher's share in the short series nevertheless gives us an opportunity of looking anew into the very depths of his capacious mind, and of more clearly apprehending some of his views. The reader's attention is therefore particularly directed to these letters. On the subject of omens and spectres we need not again touch, having entered fully on it already in connection with the letter to Peter Balling (p. 115), though we would remark, in passing, on the playful humour which our philosopher can, on fitting occasion, display.

It is, however, when he comes to propound and to answer the question: Has the world arisen by chance? that he falls into his proper province. 'As certain as it is that chance and necessity are two opposites, even so certain is it that he who holds the world to have been formed by the Divine Nature, denies that it is the effect of chance; as he, again, who holds that God might have left the creation of the world uneffected, declares, though in other terms, that it came, or was produced, by accident, inasmuch as it must then have

proceeded from a will that might not have existed. But as such an opinion and such a conclusion are alike absurd, it is now unanimously allowed that the will of God is eternal, and never was indifferent; therefore must it also be admitted —note this well—that the world is a necessary effect of the Divine Nature.'

Here, too, it is (letter lx.) that our philosopher discusses the subject of freedom and necessity. 'To me,' he says, 'it seems unreasonable to speak of *free* and *necessary* as opposites; for no one can deny that God knows himself and all things else *freely* yet *necessarily*. There is therefore a great distinction to be made between compulsion or constraint and philosophical necessity. That man wills to live, to love, &c., is not compulsory, though when he does so will it, is of necessity; and much more does God will to be, to know, and to act freely and necessarily at once.' We, in a word, can no more will this or that, than we can will to be six feet high: would we seem higher than God has made us, we must have heels to our shoes; if we would have black or brown hair as we grow old we must have recourse to artifice.

Here it is, further, that we find an explanation of the sense —so constantly misrepresented—in which Spinoza denies will, intellect, hearing, sight, &c., to God. They are such attributes only as pertain to passive nature, of which man and all things else are manifestations, that are denied by Spinoza. Men do commonly conceive no higher perfections as eminently extant in the Divine nature than they themselves possess; but 'I believe,' says Spinoza, 'that were a triangle gifted with powers of thought and speech, it would in like manner maintain that God was eminently triangular, as would a circle similarly endowed declare that he was eminently circular. And so of each individual thing: each would ascribe its own qualities or attributes to God, constitute God in its own image [as man has done], and hold everything else

less favoured or misshapen than itself.' God, in a word, is God, no being possessed of human qualities even the most exalted, but transcending all knowledge except that HE IS.

It is in this letter, No. lx., to the same correspondent, that the passage occurs (also constantly misquoted or misunderstood) in which Spinoza says: 'To your question whether I have as clear an *Idea* of God as I have of a triangle, I answer—yes; but if you ask me whether I have or can form to myself as distinct an *image* of God as I do of a triangle, I answer—no. *For we do not imagine, but by our understanding apprehend God.** And here I would not be supposed to say that I know God wholly. Some of his attributes, however, are known to me, though neither all nor yet the greater number; but surely ignorance even of the greater number does not hinder me from apprehending several.'

G. H. SCHALLER, M.D.—OF FREE-WILL AND NECESSITY. LOCKE, LESSING, LEIBNITZ.

The letters numbered lxi. and lxii., lxv. and lxvi., have hitherto been commonly assigned to Louis Meyer; but access to the documents put at his disposal has enabled Dr Van Vloten to connect them more truly with Dr Schaller.

Spinoza's reply to the first letter of this series is important, as containing a further development of his views on the much-disputed subject of free-will and necessity, on which his correspondent had asked for light. Spinoza replies: 'I call a thing free which exists and acts by the sole necessity of its nature; and that I call constrained which is determined in its existence and actions in certain definite ways by something else. God, for example, existing necessarily yet exists freely, because God exists by the sole necessity of his nature.

* M. Amande Saintes, for instance, in reference to this passage, says: 'Il declare autant connaitre la nature de Dieu qu'il connaissait la nature du triangle,'—which Spinoza does not say. Hist. de la Vie et des Œuvres de Spinoza, p. 193.

So also does God understand himself and all things freely, because it follows from the necessity of his nature alone that he understands all things. You perceive, therefore, that I place freedom not in free resolve, but in free necessity.' Descending to created things, which are all determined to exist and to act in certain definite ways, let us suppose a stone to have a certain amount of motion communicated to it by an impulse from without; it will necessarily advance through the motion imparted, the impulse of the external cause having ceased. Here the continuance of the stone in motion is obviously compelled, inasmuch as it is defined from the impulse of the external cause. But what is now said of the stone is to be understood of every individual thing, notwithstanding its being conceived as compound and possessed of numerous aptitudes, because every individual object is determined to existence and action in a certain definite way.

'Suppose the stone, further, as it proceeds in its motion ot think and to know that it is striving, in so far as it can, to continue in motion; inasmuch as it is only conscious of its endeavour and by no means of its passiveness, it will believe itself perfectly free, and conclude that it perseveres in its motion from no other cause than that it wills to do so. And this is that freedom precisely of which all boast themselves possessed, but which consists in this alone, that men are conscious of their desires, but are ignorant of the causes by which these are determined. It is in this way that the infant believes it freely desires the breast; the angry boy that he seeks revenge; the timid that he takes to flight. Even so does the tipsy man believe that of free-will he speaks of things on which when sober he wishes he had held his tongue,' &c.

Spinoza's doctrine here would therefore seem to amount to this: that there is no action without a motive, even as there is no effect without a cause. Man is in fact the freest of all beings, because he is possessed of the greatest number

of inherent faculties, each of which may be the motive of an act, the cause of which is necessary. But there is no *fatality* in our actions,—we can do or abstain; doing we act from one motive, abstaining we act from another. Conduct, indeed, we say is fate; but the conduct, whatever it be, is motived, not fateful. Lessing, deeply imbued with Spinozistic ideas, has the following words in one of his minor works: Ich danke dir, Gott, dass ich muss, muss das Beste—I thank thee, God, that I must, must the best. In the 'Nathan,' also, he has the same idea in another shape—

> *Nath.* What—must?—a Dervish must? What must he then?
> *Al Hafi.* That that's required of him, and he finds good,
> That must the Dervish *—

and in the remarkable conversation with Jacobi, reported on a later page, the same matter is adverted to in yet another shape.

Among ourselves, Locke long ago settled the question of freedom and necessity in respect of the will. 'Freedom,' he says, 'belongs as little to the will as swiftness to sleep or squareness to virtue. Freedom to do is one power, will to do is another: will, a power of the mind exerting dominion over some part of a man, by employing it in, or withholding it from, any particular action; freedom, again, a power which a man has to do, or to forbear doing, any particular action. To ask, therefore, whether the will has freedom is to ask whether one power has another power, one ability another ability? A question too absurd to need an answer; for who sees not that powers belong only to agents, and are attributes of substances, and not of powers themselves? The will, in truth, signifies nothing but a power or ability to prefer or choose; and when considered under the name of a faculty or

* 'Nathan the Wise,' from the German; with an Introduction on Lessing, and the Antecedents and Influence of his Nathan; by the writer. Post 8vo. Trübner and Co., London, 1868.

a bare ability to do something, the absurdity of speaking of it as free or not free, will easily discover itself.' *

But there is, in fact, no one particular primitive faculty that wills in the human mind; will is a general term, and belongs to or is expressive of the activity of each of the primitive faculties of our nature—the benevolent faculty being active causes us to will to do good and charitable offices; the reverential faculty being active to will to feel respectfully or reverently; the musical faculty active to will to sing or hear music, &c.; and the willing here is necessary: but whether we yield to the impulse of the benevolent, reverential, or musical faculty and indulge them in their various *willings*, is not so; here we are free, and can yield or abstain as we list.

So in respect of Deity: Spinoza held the will, the intelligence, the foreknowledge, and the act of God to be commensurables, to be *One;* and all, consequently, done of God, to be done of free necessity—i. e. to be the necessary outcome of the absolute freedom and intelligence of the Godhead. Leibnitz, writing for princesses and other great personages, commenting on a passage of J. Bredenburg's book, in which the writer undertakes to prove that there is no other cause for the existence of all things than a Nature which exists necessarily, and which acts by immutable, inevitable, irrevocable necessity; and that he may have a fling at the unpopular Spinoza, makes him answerable for the terms of Bredenburg's proposition and conclusion, and proceeds: 'Did this demonstration go to prove that the Nature which produces all was Primary and acted without Choice or Understanding, I should hold it Spinozistic and dangerous. But did the writer, perchance, mean to say that the Divine Nature is determined in that it produces by Choice and regard to The Best, he needed not to have made himself unhappy about this presumed immutable, inevitable, and irrevocable necessity. Such necessity is, then, *moral*—it

* Essay on the Human Understanding, Book II. ch. 21, § 7—21.

is a *happy necessity;* and far from destroying religion, it shows the Divine Perfection in its highest lustre.' * But what is man, even the greatest in intellect, that he should presume to attach conditions to God's acts, and say that he must do thus and not otherwise, make choice of this or that as *best,* and the like?

Spinoza emphatically denies that he makes God and Nature one.† To him they are inseparable indeed; but when he uses the word Nature in the sense of Deity, it is always understood as Natura naturans, or efficient Nature—*Cause;* the Universe as Natura naturata, or passive nature —*Effect;* a sufficiently wide and important distinction, and adequate reply to Leibnitz's innuendo. *Choice, Best,* and all other conceivable qualities appreciable by our human understanding, are involved in Spinoza's Free-Necessity of God: things being as they are could have been no other than they are, for they are of God the Perfect being, and are therefore the BEST, the most select, in our human sense, that could have been.‡ As regards man, again, there can be no question about the capacity he has of considering, weighing, judging before he acts, whether what he feels disposed to do is allowable or not, right or wrong, praiseworthy or blameable, &c., and therefore to be done or left undone. Here the understanding, reason, or intellect, the ground of moral responsibility, comes into play, and makes the individual endowed therewith answerable to God and his fellow-men. When a man voluntarily and spontaneously does what the moral law requires, then is there that Synthesis, or Union of Liberty and Necessity, which is the characteristic of God, and by attaining to which man partakes of the Divine

* Theodicée, Pt. iii. § 373, 374.

† Letter xxi., to Oldenburg.

‡ Conf. M. W. Drobisch: Die moralische Statistik und die menschliche Willensfreiheit. 8vo. Leipsic, 1867.

nature; the problem of human existence to be ultimately solved by all! *

LETTERS LXIII., LXIV., LXVII.—LXXII.

These are from and to a young German nobleman, W. E. von Tschirnhaus by name, who, coming into Holland for instruction in the military art, appears to have found the study of Philosophy and general Physics more to his taste. He must have made the acquaintance of Spinoza and his youthful friends of the Debating Society, of which he was a member, and kept up his intimacy with several of these, as well as with the philosopher, for many years. His rank as well as his philosophic tastes gave him access at a later period to all the distinguished men of science of the time. He was intimate with Leibnitz, who laments his death, with Christian Huygens, H. Oldenburg, the Honourable Robert Boyle, and others.

These letters are sufficiently interesting as evidences of the difficulties encountered by acute and able minds in following Spinoza in some of his more recondite speculations, and may therefore be referred to by the student of the Ethics for aid in surmounting obstacles; sometimes, too, we apprehend for assurance that such aid as might have been expected is not forthcoming.

Besides the old letters which are given without the name of von Tschirnhaus by the editors of the Opera Posthuma, Dr Van Vloten has been at the pains to publish in his Supplement several that passed between him and Christian Huygens. These we do not see as of any significance in connection with our philosopher himself; but they are so far interesting as that they give an insight into the vainglorious character of the writer, which led him first to assume as his own, certain

* W. Benecke, quoted by H. C. Robinson in his Diary, vol. iii. p. 51.

views of his friend Huygens, in an occasional paper published in the Journal des Sçavans, for which he was smartly handled by Huygens; and in the work produced under the title 'Medicina Mentis, sive Ars inveniendi præcepta generalia, Amst. 1687,' made him so far forget himself as to appropriate the ideas of his old master in philosophy, his generous and confiding friend, without even once making mention of his name. Descartes, Arnauld, and Malebranche are cited, but Spinoza never. Whoever turns to Spinoza's Tractatus de Emendatione Intellectus, however, will readily recognize in 'Ehrenfried Walter von Tschirnhaus, Seigneur de Kisslingswalde et Stolzenberg,' as he is particular in signing himself, the disciple of Spinoza, and in the language he uses the appropriator at times of the very words of his master,—even where the expressions vary the sense remains the same. 'What he would arrogate as his own, indeed,' says Dr Van Vloten, 'I am at a loss to conceive; would, however, that he had shown a more grateful mind to the consummate philosopher, his own benevolent teacher, and not dared to put him among the "nameless others" who, he says, agree with him in his opinions.'*

Nor is this even all. Referring to the mathematical method of demonstration in another place, he has the effrontery to allude to Spinoza as '*quidam*'—a *somebody* who had reduced the first and second parts of the Cartesian philosophy to this form; and to say that there had not been wanting *one* who had even attempted to set forth all his ethical thoughts under an order of the kind. Spinoza with better opportunity would surely have seen through the character of von Tschirnhaus as he did through that of Albert Burgh, and been less communicative—

'Non ragioniam di lor, ma guarda e passa.'

* Van Vloten, Supplem. p. 351, et seq., whom I follow here, not having been able to get a sight of the Medicina Mentis.

THE REVIVERS OF SPINOZISM AND ITS POETS.

FR. H. JACOBI, G. E. LESSING, J. G. VON HERDER, AND J. W. VON GOETHE.

JACOBI and Lessing may be spoken of as the resuscitators of Spinoza.

Lessing was upon the most intimate terms with the Jewish moralist Moses Mendelsohn, and loved and respected him greatly. The two friends must apparently on some occasion have had a conversation, in the course of which the name of Spinoza came up in connection with the subject of the *Oneness of God*, of which Mendelsohn, as a Jew, was necessarily the proper defender. Lessing, on his part, in consonance with that element in his nature which always led him to ask what could be said on both sides of every question, following Spinoza, would seem to have said that 'God could not without a certain show of impropriety be spoken of as one or single; a thing being to be so treated of in respect of its existence only, not of its essence; for things are never conceived under the category of number until they have been reduced to common heads or genera.'*

This view could not have been agreeable to Mendelsohn, and led him, of course, to surmise that his friend was tinctured with Spinozism, to which, though himself extremely ignorant

* Vide Spinoza's Letter No. 1., and Lessing's Education of the Human Race, § 73. Did not Lessing mistake Spinoza's meaning when he proceeds to evolve the Trinity out of what the philosopher has said? God is God, according to Spinoza, in *Essence* neither One nor many; and we speak with no more propriety of *one* God, than we should of *one* universe.

of its tenets, he was nevertheless greatly opposed. Fr. H. Jacobi, labouring at this time under a fit of Spinozistic alarm, seems to have been applied to through a female friend of his own as well as of Mendelsohn and Lessing,—who could hardly have been another than Elize Reimarus, daughter of the renowned author of the 'Wolfenbüttel Fragments,'—as a fit and proper person to make particular inquiry into the matter. Jacobi accordingly wrote to Lessing, proposing to pay him a visit. Lessing replies immediately that he will be delighted to see him under his roof, and hopes he will remain with him for some days. 'We shall be at no loss for conversation,' he proceeds, 'but it might be as well did you give me a hint of the subjects on which it is likely to turn.' Lessing must therefore have known (having probably had an intimation on the matter from his friend Elize) that Jacobi's proposed visit had something of a definite object over and above the friendly interview. And that this was the case very soon appeared. 'On the 5th of July, 1784, in the afternoon,' writes Jacobi, 'I held Lessing in my arms for the first time in my life.'

Next morning Lessing came into Jacobi's room, as he was busy with some letters he had to despatch. 'I gave him,' says Jacobi, 'a few loose leaves out of my portfolio for occupation, till I had done. Having looked over these, on returning them, he asked if I had nothing more that he might read? Surely, said I,—I was on the point of sealing,—here is a Poem for you; you have yourself given so much offence to certain folks, that you may for once in your turn agree to feel offended.' Lessing having read the Ode, as he returned it, said, 'I have taken no offence; I know all that already, and at first hand.'

Jacobi. 'You have seen the Ode before?'

Lessing. 'I had not read it till now; but I like it.'

The Poem was Goethe's Ode, entitled PROMETHEUS,* in

* It is one of Goethe's earlier productions, and the Spinozistic sense which

MS. apparently; so that we see Jacobi leading the way at once to the subject of his visit, and Lessing already aware of it, helping him forward. The conversation proceeds.

both Jacobi and Lessing appear to have attached to it is not to me so very obvious. It strikes me as nothing more than the angry defiance of the Ill-used Fire-finder thrown in the face of his persistent tormentor. Lessing may have spoken as he did of the Ode in order to lead Jacobi straight to the subject which he knew was uppermost in his mind. As the Ode is in rhythmic German only, it is translatable into English, which is hardly the case with the majority of Goethe's minor poems and lyrics.

PROMETHEUS.

Beshroud thy heaven, great Jove,
With murky clouds at will,
And, like the child who tops the thistle,
Shake thou the oak and mountain;
But leave me my earth,
Firm fix'd in its seat, and my hut
Thou hast not helped me to build;
My hearth, too, thou'lt leave me,
Whose glow thou still begrudgest me.

Naught poorer 'neath the sun
Know I than you, ye Immortals!
Your greatness meanly fed
With smoke of sacrifice
And incense of prayer;
And these, too, were surely denied,
Were not children and beggars
Befool'd by their hopes and their fears.

Whilst yet a thoughtless child,
Knowing nothing of why or of wherefore,
Sunward I turn'd my dazzled gaze,
As if over me there were an ear
To hear my complaint,
A heart like mine own
To feel for the sorely oppressed.

But who e'er aided me against
The Titan's insolence?
Who saved me from chains and from death?
Didst not thou, holy, glowing heart,
Achieve thine own deliverance?
Yet youthful, confiding, deceived,
Gav'st thanks to the sleepers above.

I honour thee? For what?
Hast thou yet soothed the woes
Of the oppressed?
Hast ever dried the tears
Of the afflicted?
Or hath not Time, the Omnipotent,

Jacobi. 'I, too, find it good of its kind, else had I not given it you to read.'

Lessing. 'I mean the thing differently. The point of view of the poet is my own. The orthodox ideas concerning God are no longer mine—I have no pleasure in them now: Ἐν καὶ πᾶν !—One and All. I know nothing but this. It is to this that the poem points; and I must allow it pleases me much.'

Jacobi. 'Then are you greatly at one with Spinoza?'

Lessing. 'Did I rank myself with any one, it were with none but him.'

Jacobi. 'Spinoza is well enough; yet is it but a sorry sort of healing that we find in his name.'

Lessing. 'Well, be it so! And yet, know you of anything better?'

The conversation is interrupted at this point, but is resumed on the following morning. 'Having retired to my room after breakfast to dress for the day, Lessing entered. I was then under the hairdresser, and Lessing, without speaking, sat himself down by a table at the other end of the chamber. As soon as we were alone, and I had taken my place at the opposite side of the table on which Lessing was leaning, he began: "I have come to speak with you further on my Ἐν καὶ πᾶν. You were alarmed yesterday?"'

Fashion'd me, man as I am,
And is not Fate, the Eternal,
Thy master and mine?

Didst think, perchance, that I,
Hating my life, would flee
Into the desert,
For all my flowery dreams
Had not aye ripened to fruit?

Here do I sit and fashion me men
In mine own image,
Apt like myself
To suffer and weep,
To love and enjoy,
Caring no more for you
Than I,

Jacobi. 'You took me by surprise; I was confused,—not alarmed; for truly I had no idea that I should find a Spinozist and Pantheist in you, and still more that you should speak so unreservedly as you did. One great object of my visit here was to find help from you against Spinoza.'

Lessing. 'You know Spinoza, then?'

Jacobi. 'I believe I know him as but few have taken the pains to know him.'

Lessing. 'Then is there no help for you? Rather be his friend entirely. There is no philosophy but the philosophy of Spinoza.'

Jacobi. 'This may be true. For the Determinist, if he would be consequent, must be the Fatalist as well; and all that then follows is clear to view.'

Lessing. 'I see—we understand each other. I am therefore all the more anxious to hear from you what you regard as the SPIRIT of Spinozism—I mean that which was in Spinoza himself.'

Jacobi. 'It was no other, I apprehend, than the old *a nihilo nihil fit*, which Spinoza brought prominently forward in conformity with deduced ideas, as the speculative Cabbalists and others before him had done.'

Jacobi then goes on to give his own version of Spinoza's doctrines, from the Cabbalistic point of view, as it would seem, till he is interrupted by Lessing saying, 'Well, we shall not quarrel about our creed.'

Jacobi. 'That shall we not in any case. But my credo is not in Spinoza.'

Lessing. 'I should hope it was to be found in no book.'

Jacobi. 'Not that only: I believe in an intelligent, personal cause of the world.'

Lessing. 'Oh, so much the better! Now I shall hear of something quite new.'

Jacobi. 'Do not flatter yourself too much on this score. I get out of the difficulty by a *Salto mortale;* and you are not likely to find pleasure in any heels-over-head affair.'

Lessing. 'Say not so—if I am only not required to imitate you. But you manage, of course, to come down again upon your feet. So if it be no secret—I entreat you, impart to me!'

Jacobi. 'You shall have it on the nail: the whole matter lies in this, that from fatalism I conclude immediately against fatalism, as against everything connected with it. If there be efficient causes only and no final causes, then has the thinking power on part to play in nature, save as looker-on; its only business were to attend on the mechanism of the acting causes. The conversation we now hold were but a desire or faculty of our bodies; and the whole import of our talk, reduced to its elements, nothing but extension, motion, and grades of celerity, with ideas of these, and ideas of these ideas superadded. I know not how to controvert the man who entertains such opinions; but he who cannot go along with him is at the antipodes of Spinozism. The emotions and passions do not act in so far as they are feelings and thoughts, or rather, in so far as they carry feelings and thoughts along with them; we only believe that we act from love, hate, pity, magnanimity, or from rational motives.'

Lessing. 'I perceive: You would like to have your will free. I, for my part, desire no free-will. Generally, all you have said does not alarm me in the least. It is one of the prejudices of mankind that they regard thought as the first and most excellent of their faculties, and are disposed to derive everything from it. But all—ideas inclusive—depends on higher principles. Space, motion, thought, are obviously based in a higher force, a force that is by no means exhausted when these are named. It must be infinitely more excellent than this or that, or any effect, and so may have a kind of

enjoyment attached to it, which not only far surpasses our comprehension, but which lies without the sphere of comprehension entirely. That we can form no conception of it does not annul its possibility.'

Jacobi. 'You go farther than Spinoza. He held understanding to be supreme.'

Lessing. 'For man! But he was very far from holding our miserable way of acting for ends as the most excellent method, and throwing thought into the bargain.'

Jacobi. 'Understanding, with Spinoza, is the better part in all finite natures, because it is the part whereby each finite nature transcends its finiteness. It might be said that he in some sort ascribes two souls to each existing thing, one having reference to the present particular thing, the other to the universe of things. To this second soul he also ascribes immortality. But all he conceives as pertaining to the One Infinite Substance, has in itself and apart from individual things no proper and special existence. Had it for its oneness—pardon the expression!—any proper, peculiar, individual existence apart, had it personality and life, then were intelligence its better part also.'

Lessing. 'Very good! But how do you conceive your personal, extra-mundane Deity? Is it after the fashion of Leibnitz? I rather fear that he, too, was a Spinozist at heart.'

Jacobi. 'Do you speak in earnest?'

Lessing. 'Do you in earnest doubt it? Leibnitz's conception of truth was of the sort that would not bear being confined within too narrow bounds. Many of his statements flowed from this mode of thought; and it is often extremely difficult even with every possible attention to discover his real opinion. It is for this reason that I think so much of him—I mean from his grand manner of thinking, and not because of this or that opinion he may seem to entertain, or may even entertain in fact.'

Jacobi. 'You are right. Leibnitz was ready "to strike fire from every pebble." But it was some particular Spinozistic view which you said Leibnitz was disposed at heart to entertain.'

Lessing. 'Do you remember a passage in his writings where he says of God that He is in a state of ceaseless expansion and contraction? This must have meant creation and the commencement of the world.'

Jacobi. 'I remember his Fulgurations; but the passage you refer to is unknown to me.'

Lessing. 'I shall look it out, and you will then tell me what a man like Leibnitz thought, could or must have thought, when he set it down.' *

Jacobi. 'Let me see the passage, by all means. But I must tell you beforehand that I bring to mind so many other passages in his writings of a different character that I cannot conceive it possible Leibnitz should have believed in an Intramundane or Immanent, and not in a Supramundane, cause of the world.'

Lessing. 'Here I must give way to you. You will have the preponderance of testimony too; and I own that I may perhaps have said too much. Still the passage I have quoted, and many more besides, present themselves to me as extraordinary. But not to forget! On what ideas do you ground your opposition to Spinoza? Do you think that Leibnitz's Principia make an end of him?

Jacobi. 'How could I, with my firm persuasion that the consistent determinist is not different from the fatalist. Do *you* find that Leibnitz's Principia make an end of him? The Monads with their bonds leave thought and extension, and especially reality, as incomprehensible to me as ever — they help me neither on this side nor on that. For the rest, I know

* It is contained in Leibnitz's letter to Bourguet, Op. ii. P. i. p. 331.

of no philosophical system that agrees so essentially with Spinozism as that of Leibnitz's; and it is difficult to say which of the authors of these has himself as well as us most constantly at advantage. Has not Mendelsohn shown that the Pre-established Harmony is extant in Spinoza? And I undertake to set before you the whole of Leibnitz's psychology from the same source. Both entertain the same views of freedom; and if Spinoza illustrates our feeling of freedom by the stone in motion, Leibnitz's does the same by the magnet, which has a fancy for turning to the north and does so independently of any other cause, unconscious as it is of the magnetic force which determines its motions.'

Jacobi goes on at considerable length to show many other points of resemblance between the views of Spinoza and Leibnitz, till he is interrupted by

Lessing. 'I shall leave you no peace till you give this parallelism to the public! The folks still go on speaking of Spinoza as of a dead dog.'

Jacobi. 'They would continue to speak of him in the same way whether I give it or not. To understand Spinoza requires too long and too laborious an effort of mind; and no one has understood Spinoza to whom a single line of the Ethics remains obscure; no one understands him who does not himself understand how this great man could have had such a firm persuasion of his philosophy as he so often and so emphatically declares that he had. At the very end of his days he wrote: Non præsumo me optimam invenisse philosophiam, sed veram me intelligere scio—I presume not to say that I have discovered the best philosophy, but I know that I understand the philosophy that is true. Such repose of spirit, such heaven in the understanding, as this clear, pure head had achieved for itself, has been enjoyed by few.'

Lessing. 'And you are no Spinozist?'

Jacobi. 'No, on my honour!'

Lessing. 'On my honour, then, you must turn your back on all philosophy.'

Jacobi. 'Why so?'

Lessing. 'Because you are a thorough sceptic.'

Jacobi. 'On the contrary, I withdraw from a philosophy that makes thorough scepticism imperative.'

Lessing. 'And go—whither?'

Jacobi. 'Towards the light of which Spinoza says that it lightens itself and the darkness too. I love Spinoza; for he, more than any other philosopher, has led me to the assured conviction that there are certain matters that cannot be unravelled and explained, in presence of which we are not to shut our eyes, indeed, but which we must take even as we find them. I have no more intimate persuasion of anything than I have of final causes; no more lively conviction than that I do what I think, that I think what I do. With this, it is true, I am forced to presume a source of thought and of action which I can in nowise explain.'

Lessing. 'You express yourself almost as heartily as does the dictum of the Diet of Augsburg; for my part, however, I continue true Lutheran, and yet maintain "the more bestial than human error and blasphemy, that there is no free-will," a conclusion with which the clear, pure head of your Spinoza had also to content itself.'

Jacobi. 'Ay, but Spinoza had to make not a few contortions in order to hide his fatalism in its bearing on human conduct. In the 4th and 5th parts of the Ethics I might almost say he condescends to sophistry in this view. And this was what I maintained, when I said, that the very greatest minds, when they will perforce explain and make everything tally with everything else, must needs come to absurd conclusions.'

Lessing. 'And he who seeks not to explain?'

Jacobi. 'He who seeks not to explain the incomprehensible, but only to know the boundaries where it begins, and acknowledges the existence of these, secures, I believe, the largest field for the discovery of genuine human truth.'

Lessing. 'Words, dear Jacobi, mere words! The boundaries you would set cannot be ascertained; and you, per contra, open up the freest field to dreaming, blindness, and unreason.'

Jacobi. 'I believe, however, that the boundaries I speak of may be known. I would myself set none, but only find out those that are already fixed, and not disturb them. And as to dreaming, blindness, and unreason—'

Lessing. 'Oh, they are everywhere at home where indistinct ideas rule.'

Jacobi. 'Still more where *false* ideas rule. The blindest and least rational belief, if it be not also the most foolish conceivable, has there its place of honour. For he who has once become enamoured of certain explanations, takes each conclusion blindly that follows as sequence from one he cannot interpret with his best endeavours. * * * And then, when we insist on dwelling on that only which can be explained and co-ordinated in the realm of things, there arises a certain phantom light in the soul that dazzles more than it enlightens. We then sacrifice what Spinoza profoundly and exaltedly at once designates knowledge of the first or highest kind; we shut the eyes of the soul, wherewith it sees God and itself, that we may the more undisturbedly look with the eyes of the body only.'

Lessing. 'Good—very good! I too can put all that to use. But I cannot make out of it the thing you do. Your *Salto mortale* in particular, however, delights me; and I conceive how a man of mind may get from one position to another in such heels-over-head fashion. Take me with you, pray, when you next perform the feat.'

Jacobi. 'Would you but step with me on the spring-board that sends me forward, the thing were done.'

Lessing. 'Ay, but a leap besides were wanted, and this I can no longer trust my old legs and heavy head with taking deftly.'

We have thought it well to afford the English reader an opportunity of perusing this celebrated conversation all but verbally, as it is reported to have passed between the speakers. For to it was greatly due the study of Spinoza that soon presented itself as a necessity to every German mind of any capacity, and with consequences that are still far from having reached the goal. It is obvious that Lessing, after showing his own hand for a moment, leads Jacobi on to show the cards he holds, rather than displays those he commands himself. Jacobi, though acute and well informed, was a small man in comparison with Lessing; one of the vain men of the world too; not self-sufficing like him he had the honour to call friend. But we are really much beholden to him for his gossiping book, 'On the Doctrine of Spinoza, in letters to Mr Moses Mendelsohn;'* for it set the worthy moralist to defend Lessing against what he held to be Jacobi's mistaken apprehension of his friend's philosophic views, and so lighted the torch that continues to burn with undiminished brightness to the present hour.

Of Lessing's adhesion to Spinoza there can be no doubt.

* Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza, in Briefen an den Herrn Moses Mendelsohn. Neue vermehrte Auflage. 8vo. Breslau, 1789. It is a carefully-printed, neat volume, ornamented with a portrait of Spinoza as frontispiece; with medallion portraits of Mendelsohn and Lessing on the title-page, and a portrait of the writer at the end. He is a thin-faced, sharp-featured, good-looking man, with ample development of the cerebral regions which, according to phrenologists, are connected with ideality and believingness. The parts appropriated by the same physiologists to reflection are not remarkable as they appear in Spinoza, Mendelsohn, and Lessing. The expression is pleasing, and Jacobi was a good and amiable man. The knowledge he had of Spinoza proved his stay through life, and enabled him to resist the inclination he had to yield himself bound to the Romanticists, and like so many of them to fall into the slough of Roman Catholicism.

The last work of his life, the Nathan, is so thoroughly imbued with the teachings of the great thinker, that Dr Kuno Fischer has felt himself authorized to say that 'whoever would see religion set forth in the spirit of Spinoza has only to look into Nathan the Wise.'*

Though we have seen Jacobi repudiating Spinozism as his own philosophical system, he had, nevertheless, the highest respect for the character and memory of Spinoza himself. In one of his works he apostrophizes him in such terms as these: 'Be thou blessed of me, thou great, yea, thou holy Benedictus! Lose thyself as thou mayst in thy speculations on the nature of the Being of beings and in the maze of words, His truth was ever in thy soul, and love of Him was still thy life.' 'Spinoza,' he says again, 'honoured a Providence, were this to him no more than the order of nature which flows of necessity from its eternal laws; he also referred all to God, the One, the sole Existence, and placed the highest good that man can enjoy in the knowledge, and, above all, in the love of the Infinite Supreme.'

Jacobi could not by his mental constitution be a purely intellectual religionist, like Spinoza and Lessing. He was a sentimentalist, pious through the heart, not by the head; through emotion, and even in defiance of understanding. 'I quit Spinoza,' he says in a letter to Hemsterhuis, 'to throw myself into the arms of the sublime genius who has said: That a single aspiration of the soul after the future, the better, the perfect, is demonstration more than geometric of the Divinity.' He needed not, however, to have turned from Spinoza to Hemsterhuis for satisfaction in the direction of faith. Spinoza's highest joy was to feel himself in rapt contemplation of the infinite perfections of God, of whose necessary existence he had already satisfied himself through his understanding.

* Geschichte der neuern Philosophie. B. i. S. 259.

But Jacobi must have been a still weaker man than we have seen him thus far. In a letter of his to Reinhold found among Schleiermacher's papers, he laments the insufficiency of philosophy to still his doubts, and says: 'Yet I know no better remedy than to go on philosophizing, or else to turn Roman Catholic; I would gladly exchange my feeble philosophic Christianity for positive historical Christianity, but cannot understand why I am never able to do so.' The difficulty is not far to seek. Jacobi had an acute and highly cultivated understanding; but philosophy and Christianity both historical and dogmatic are incompatibles, and such was the constitution of Jacobi's mind that he could not take Lessing's sensible advice, and put his trust in God alone. He was infected with the Romanticism of his day, and would have had the Virgin Mary and the saints to help him, had his better sense only suffered him to degrade himself.

J. G. VON HERDER.

About the same time that Jacobi and Lessing were engaged in the study of Spinoza, the works of the great thinker were occupying the thoughts of another distinguished individual, J. G. von Herder, who, by-and-by, to the no small amazement of many of his less liberal and well-informed brethren, showed himself the intelligent apologist and exponent of Spinoza. Herder's book entitled, Einige Gespräche über Spinoza's System, came out in 1787; appeared in a second edition in 1800; and was edited with additions, after the death of the author, by J. G. Müller, under the title of Seele und Gott. 8vo. Tübingen, 1808.

There can be no doubt about the great influence which this work immediately exerted over the German mind. With the living presence and advocacy of a man of mark like Herder, backed by a reputation second only to that which Lessing, lately dead, had enjoyed; and through the publication

of an excellent edition of the works of Spinoza by Dr Paulus, another of the learned and notable men of his day, our philosopher was at length set upon a height whence he could be seen and known of all, and in a guise to attract, not as of old to repel.

Herder was Court preacher to the liberal and enlightened Charles Augustus, Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar, and more than this, the intimate friend of Wieland, Goethe, and Schiller, and, indeed, of every one in Germany distinguished for talent and acquirement, as by his 'Contributions towards a Philosophy of History' he was known to the whole European republic of letters.

In the course of his survey of Spinozism, Herder insists on the necessity of studying the physical sciences as prime means of escape from false ideas of God and from superstition. As physical science has progressed men have been more and more set free from the notion of blind, capricious, arbitrary power dominant in nature, and have come to recognize the law of wise necessity. 'No sensible well-informed man,' says he, 'now contemplates the end of the world as near at hand; the forces of nature are eternal as the Godhead in which they inhere. The very disturbances in the planetary motions recognized by astronomers, are seen to be complementary and temporary only. All is, was, and ever will be in conformity with beneficent, beautiful, necessary law, twin-sister of Eternal power, mother of all order, security, and happiness.'

The essence of God as conceived by Spinoza, Herder sees in *actuality*, including all perfection in the most perfect way —infinite or absolute thought or intelligence, the most excellent of things,—and self-consciousness conjoined with omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience. And 'it is only,' says he, 'in contrast with these infinities that Spinoza denies to Deity understanding and such conceptive and moral faculties as are possessed by man.' How indeed should Spinoza have supposed

mankind to be possessed of aught that God was without, or imagined that God, who is all in all, could have given that which he himself had not? Spinoza is found continually referring to the INFINITE intelligence of God, in contradistinction to the *finite* intelligence of man; and it was intelligence of the latter sort alone which he refused to ascribe to God. The thought of God primordial, absolute, singular in its kind, 'has no more affinity with the thought of man than the most brilliant star in the northern sky, called Sirius or the dog-star, with the barking animal we call a dog on earth.' Such pure, true, and adequate conceptions as have place in the mind of man, Spinoza, indeed, holds to be *formal* manifestations of the Divine Intelligence; for this it is that is shadowed forth in pure and lofty thought, in rapt contemplation of the being and attributes of the Supreme, and in the moral life of man.

All perfection being perfect in God, Spinoza necessarily conceives no before nor after in his nature; HE WAS, IS, AND EVER WILL BE THE ALL IN ONE, THE I AM WHO AM, as said in the Hebrew Scriptures; and it is in consonance with this conception of the Infinite Perfection of Deity that Spinoza shows himself uncompromisingly hostile to the assumption of design or final purpose in the acts of God. Beginning and End, Design and Purpose, have no meaning for Spinoza in connection with the Idea of God. These are mere fancies, caprices, false assumptions of the finite mind of man when associated with the idea of the infinite God. What God does is done of no forethought, by no choice, for no end; the perfect act flows from the nature of the All-perfect agent, and being what it is, could have been no other than it is,—outcome neither of motived nor unmotived will, of blind nor far-seeing caprice, but of the luminous, efficient, free-necessity involved in the Divine nature, wherein THOUGHT, WILL, ACT, and END are eternally and indissolubly associate in ONE. God neither worked seven days, nor seven years, nor seven times seven

millions of years at the world; but He Was, and with Him was the All of things, pregnant by his fiat with the forces that now meet our receptive minds in the beauty, order, harmony, and seeming discord of the universe. The realm of the *possible* is not the realm of the God of Spinoza; for the thing that is not, is the thing that cannot be. To quote the words of the great teacher himself: 'Since in The Eternal there is neither a past, a present, nor a future, but eternal wisdom and infinite power in one, God never pondered, planned, and chose; all such fancies as plan, preference, partiality are incommensurate with the perfect, the changeless nature of God. Till God was—and when was God not? —what is was not, and without Him what is never could have been. And did God change aught that is, then would he himself change in will and understanding and be other than he is, which is absurd. Aught over and above what is, and to the Supreme was possible and accomplished, is a dream; even as beyond space infinite there is no space, and beyond time unending no time.'

Herder was not fettered by the idea of Personality in connection with the Idea of God. He speaks of the derivation of the word person from the Greek *πρόσωπον*, a mask or disguise, suitable to the character assumed by the stage-player in the olden time. But what, he asks, has this conception of person in common with the Philosophic Idea of God? God is God without parts or proportions, and is therefore no person. When we name the name of God we must forget all the Baconian Idols of time and space and matter.

Herder had a much higher conception of Spinozism than Jacobi, and even, we apprehend, than Lessing. He scouts the association of Atheism with the system and its author. In Jacobi's mind God was a person enthroned somewhere—not even God himself could have hinted or imagined *where*—outside the universe. In great Spinoza's mind, and as Herder

believed, God IS, and is cause of all that is, Very Being, not outside but immanent within the Universe, manifestation of himself.

Herder concludes thus: 'The One Eternal Idea embodied in the word Substance or God, is the foundation of Spinozism. *Attributes* cannot be without inherent reality; *expression* is not without something which it expresses; *modes* of thought are not conceivable without an existent efficient cause or power of thought and of things conceived. The pure conception of the One Indivisible Power which in, through, and out of itself, intimately conceives, knows, and effectuates all that is or can be, is not an empty nothing or a name, but VERY BEING, and this is GOD.'

In his emphatic denial of forethought, calculated purpose, and final causes, we are not therefore to presume that Spinoza closed his eyes to the consonance between means and ends in creation. To him mean and end were one and the same. Each thing he held to be possessed of the aptitudes and instruments needful for persistence in its state; these being mostly, though by no means always, in harmony with surrounding things, and, in some instances, even opposed to all existence other than their own; as witness the poison of the upas and poppy, the fang of the cobra, the coil of the python, the battery of the torpedo, the teeth and claws, the beak and talons, of the carnivorous beast and bird. All things are not verily created, as said by the poet, 'for man's delightful use.' More than 1000 persons perish annually in India alone from snake-bite; and a single tiger desolates a Hindoo village, and compels removal to other quarters. Each extant thing exists for itself in the first instance, and is only made use of, generally to its detriment or destruction, by some other thing for its advantage. The earth and waters yield herb and fruit, each in its own behoof and irrespective of other kinds; animals, higher or lower in the scale, subsist on these, and

yet others still higher or lower live on the creatures so subsisting. There is an endless chain of being, each link distinct and yet connected with the rest, each self-sufficing in its sphere, yet subservient to another's purpose; all subject to the universal law of growth and decay, of life and death; individuals short-lived as the summer's leaves, types persistent as eternity, products alike of the Almighty mind in its unity of purpose and accomplished act.

'As finite beings we dwell in space and time. By the standard which these supply we measure all things, and therefore ascend with difficulty from the creations of imagination to conceptions that exclude appeal to such a scale. The infinite, all-efficient Being of Spinoza is as little the material world, as the absolute of reason and the infinite of imagination are one and the same thing. No part of the world can be *part* of the Deity; for God, in the Spinozistic idea we form of him, is indivisible. And now we see that our philosopher is as unfairly charged with Pantheism as with Atheism. "All things," says he, "are modifications or expressions of one Divine power, manifestations of the eternal agency of God immanent in the world, not parts divided or divisible of perfectly indivisible being."' This view of the philosophic Herder does verily seem to be nearer the truth than that which regards Spinozism as Pantheism. Spinozism is in fact the most purely abstract Monotheism that can be conceived. It is Pantheism only in so far as God is All in all. The Παν and the Θεος may be assimilated, indeed; but individual things and phenomena are no more than manifestations or shows of the Supreme unity. 'What do I see in nature?' asks the pious Archbishop of Cambray: 'God—God everywhere; God alone.' Herder's motto to his book gives us a key to his views:

Est Deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo.—VIRGIL.

It might be made subject of regret that Herder did not or

could not vindicate for himself the place which Schleiermacher by-and-by attained in the religious world of Germany. Not more accomplished or many-sided than Schleiermacher, his judgment was sounder, and his moral nature probably of a higher order. But he was too reasonable a man, too much of a philosopher, and much too little of a mystic, to carry the many along with him. Occupying a pulpit presumed to be orthodox, but happily attached to a liberal and tolerant Court, Herder in his preaching must have kept clear of the dogmatic elements of the Christian faith according to the Confession of Augsburg, even as we see the well-informed among the clergy of the Church of England hold off in their discourses from those set forth in the Thirty-Nine Articles. His own views, we are informed, were wholly Unitarian,* but he never offended the professing Lutherans who composed his congregation, by parading or insisting on the opinions he himself entertained as those only that could lead to holiness of life. In God's kingdom he believed there were places for the good and the pious according to every pattern and persuasion.

J. W. VON GOETHE.—FRIEDRICH SCHILLER.

Goethe has been characterized by the learned Dr Kuno Fischer as the poet of Spinozism. We have seen the use Jacobi made of his youthful ode, Prometheus, and how Lessing, aware of his drift, humoured him in his purpose. Dr Fischer, in his history of modern philosophy, makes repeated quotations to show how much the greatest poet of his country was imbued with Spinozistic ideas—among others the distich:

> Natur hat weder Kern noch Schale;
> Sie ist das All mit einem Male—
>
> Nor husk nor core in nature see;
> The All and All at once is she.

But we do not want testimony at second-hand to assure

* Vide Diary of H. C. Robinson, vol. iii. p. 48.

us of the influence exerted by Spinoza on Goethe's habits of thought. In the course of a journey he made in company with Lavater and Basedow, he falls in with Fritz Jacobi, as he calls him familiarly, on the banks of the Rhine. Jacobi, brimfull of the Spinozism he feared, seems to have led the talk with Goethe as he did with Lessing to the subject that was uppermost in his mind—Spinoza. 'Happily,' says Goethe, 'I had already taken some pains with myself in this direction, and at an early period of my life had even formed certain definite ideas on the character and habits of thought of this extraordinary man—imperfect ideas they may have been, but sufficient to influence me essentially in my views even then, and destined subsequently to exert the most powerful influence on the whole of my intellectual life. I had, in fact, long looked in the world around me for some help in forming a true conception of this mysterious being of mine; but all in vain, until at length I fell upon the Ethics of Spinoza. What I may have got out of the book by reading it, what I may myself have put into it in the course of my reading, I cannot tell: enough that I here found rest and satisfaction for my feelings, and saw a great free prospect over the world of sense and of morals unrolled before me. That which perhaps struck me most at first was the perfect unselfishness of the man, which showed itself on every page of his writings. The remarkable proposition, especially, in which he says, He who loves God, must not require that God love him in return,—with all the propositions that lead up to it, and the corollaries that follow,—took complete possession of my reflecting nature.' *

Schiller, whether as man or poet, shows himself to us much less distinctly in his works than Goethe; he shows

* I have ventured to give a version of the Prometheus which in its daring and irreverent tone, reminds us of some of the more youthful outpourings of our own Shelley. Here I add a translation of another ode—Die Göttliche, the Divine, written some ten years after the Prometheus, and in a tone much more

himself, indeed, almost as little as the author of the Ethics, and though he never speaks of having read that remarkable book, there can be little question of his having done so, and still less of the influence Spinoza exerted not only on his

consonant with what I apprehend as Spinozistic and becoming than the earlier composition.

THE DIVINE.

Let man still be noble,
Helpful and good!
For this alone distinguishes him
From all things else that live.

Hail, thou unknown,
Exalted Being,
Whom we divine!
Let every thought of thee
Teach us this faith.

For Nature's self
Is all unsympathizing:
The sun still shines
On good and bad alike;
The moon and stars
Shed their soft light
On the worst as on the best.

Storm, wind, and torrent,
Lightning and hail,
Rush on their course,
And rend and ravage
All that bars their way.

And Fate, too, gropes
Blindly among the many;
Now takes the clustering locks
Of guiltless youth,
And now the bald
And guilty head of age.

In harmony with great
Eternal, changeless laws
We all must round
The circle of our being.

But man alone
Can compass the impossible;
For man distinguishes,
Selects, and judges,
And to the fleeting hour
Gives perpetuity.

prose writings but on his poetry also. It is impossible, in particular, to peruse his philosophical letters without discovering a disciple of the great thinker. How, indeed, could a man with the innate religiousness of Friedrich Schiller escape the influence of the great religious conceptions of Benedict Spinoza? If Goethe, Welt-kind—worldling—as he designates himself,* could be moved to admiration by the entire unselfishness of the philosopher, how much more must Schiller, the tender and the true, with no spark of worldliness in his soul, have been so moved? 'All the perfections of the universe,' says Schiller, 'are united in God. God, Nature—Infinities complementary and equivalent. The sum of harmonious action existing combined in the Divine substance, is

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He alone dares
Reward the good,
Punish the bad;
He heals and saves,
And usefully constrains
The erring and perverse.

And we give honour, too,
To the immortals,
As though they were men,
Enacting in great
What the best among us
Strive in little to do.

Let the true man, then,
—Helpful and good,
Unwearied in working out
The useful and right,—
Be pattern to us
Of the unknown God
Whose being we divine.

* Und wie die Wallfahrt weiter ging
Mit Sturm und Feuerschritten,
Propheten rechts, Propheten links,
Das Welt-Kind in der Mitten.
Aus Meinem Leben, Buch xiv.

The prophets are Lavater and Basedow. Lavater, minister at Geneva, had just before their setting out been expounding the mysteries of the Book of Revelation to a country parson; and Basedow, professor of moral philosophy at Jena, had been doing his best to convince a recalcitrant dancing-master that baptism was an antiquated ceremony, totally unadapted to the exigencies of the present age.

in nature—image of this substance parcelled out in the endless forms and grades of individual things. Nature—allow me the expression—is infinitely subdivided Deity. Even as the prism decomposes pure white light into seven different duller rays, so has the Divine I AM disparted itself into the infinity of sensible and insensible substances that make up the universe.' *

FRIEDRICH ERNEST SCHLEIERMACHER.

Schleiermacher, if not the first among professed theologians who looked back lovingly to Spinoza as a friend and guide, was the first who from the pulpit ventured openly to vindicate the memory of the man from the calumnies of opponents and the false constructions of the world. 'Offer up reverently with me,' said he on a certain occasion and in the midst of a sermon, 'a lock of hair to the manes of the rejected but holy Spinoza! The great spirit of the Universe filled his soul; the Infinite to him was beginning and end; the Universal his sole and only love. Dwelling in holy innocence and deep humility among men, he saw himself mirrored in the eternal world, and the eternal world not all unworthily reflected back in him. Full of religion was he, full of the Holy Ghost; and therefore it is that he meets us standing alone in his age, raised above the profane multitude, master in his art, but without disciples and the citizen's rights.'

This apotheosis of Spinoza, says Baur,† can best witness to the influence the philosopher already exerted on Schleiermacher, whilst he yet stood on the most abstract standpoint of Idealism. Idealism and Pantheism conjoined interfused his most intimate nature, and led him to views wherein the Universal appeared reflected in the Individual, and the Individual, in entire subjective conciousness, saw itself the

* Philosophische Briefe : Gott.

† Kirchengeschichte des 19ten Jahrhunderts. S. 87. 8vo. Tübingen, 1862.

focus in which all rays of the Universal met and were blent into one.

Of the vast influence exerted by Schleiermacher on the religious opinions not only of his own but of the present age, there can be as little question, as that the estimates formed by his countrymen of the nature of this influence for good or for evil have been different. Set on a level with Luther and Calvin, and even with St Paul, as a religious reformer and benefactor of mankind by one party, he is denounced by another as a Pantheist and subverter of all true faith in Christianity. Whilst at his funeral the coffin containing his mortal remains, with a great open Bible on its lid, was borne lovingly to the grave by relays of devoted students of the University, followed by a hundred equipages of the nobility and gentry, headed by those of the King and Crown Prince of Prussia, a train of mourners on foot more than a mile in length, and a countless multitude lining the ways and looking on; when the centenary of his birth came to be celebrated only a few years afterwards, the doors of the church in which he had ministered for six-and-twenty years were closed; and it was only by the smallest possible majority of one that his friends and admirers were permitted by the Consistory of Berlin to meet and pay pious homage to his memory in a church at all.

The multitude of the funeral procession and the closed church-doors of the centenary proclaim the state of the public feeling towards Schleiermacher with sufficient distinctness. The laity at large and a bare majority of the clergy reverenced his memory and acknowledged the influence of his ministry for good; the administration, the hierarchy, and an all but equiponderant minority of the clergy, disclaimed him as a guide and would gladly have consigned his name and all record of his teaching to oblivion. But the manifestations on these two occasions only afford fresh evidence of the old and still-continued struggle between the party of progress in matters

religious, and the party opposed to all advance. Of the side to which Schleiermacher himself inclined there can be no doubt. He thought there was no more pitiable spectacle on earth than that of a human being existing in vain, 'and he who does not advance, but is petrified and forced to remain what he is, verily exists in vain not only for himself but for others.' No man ever more earnestly insisted on the importance of virtuous doubt and eager inquiry than he; these he held to be the true stimulants of the mind, the fertilizers that brought the fallow into productive bearing. With Spinoza and Lessing, he maintained that the pursuit of truth was pregnant with influences greater and often more important than the mere truths attained. Hence his advocacy of progress in everything, not in science only, but in morals and religion also. 'The coming generation,' said he, 'must consist of a set of miserable creatures, indeed, if all is not much better known to them than it is even to the best among us now.'

It is in this noble and outspoken advocacy of advance that we obtain the favourable view of the character of Schleiermacher, and learn to appreciate the sound Protestant heart that beat in the breast of the sometimes mystical and even hesitating theologian. Science, Protestantism, and progress, he saw clearly to be inseparables, and no more to be divorced without a night of repression and darkness falling on the world. Each has, indeed, its root in freedom of research, its goal in freedom to make known the truths attained, and its title to uphold these as ordinances of God, and adequate only to advantage mankind. Hence the folly and short-sightedness of those of the Reformed Church who say: thus far, but no farther; and who denounce and defame whosoever knows more and is more honest and outspoken than themselves. The very cosmopolitan nature of Schleiermacher may perchance have had not a little to do with the varying and not always favourable estimates that have been made of

his character for candour and truthfulness. He was emphatically what his countrymen call a *many-sided* man. Fluent with the pen in the solitude of the study, eloquent in the pulpit, with words at will, and holding all eyes and ears intent in the social circle by his conversational powers, he was scarcely less at his ease and in his place among the philosophers, philologists, and men of general science of the Academy; he was verily one of those rarely gifted individuals on whose birth all the gods attend:

> Whose eyes by Phœbus, lips by Hermes ope'd,
> And on whose brow Jove sets his seal of power.*

Son of a regimental chaplain, Schleiermacher appears to have felt a *call*, as it is entitled, to the ministry even as a boy; and his father having very intimate relations with the Moravians or Herrnhuters, young Schleiermacher was sent for his education first to one and then to another of their seminaries or colleges. But his rare intellectual endowment soon led him to feel that the education he received both at Niesky and Barby was of too narrow a kind to satisfy his aspirations. As a mere youth he informs his father that he thinks 'the pupils are too narrowly restricted in their reading. In the lectures delivered to us,' he proceeds, 'sufficient mention is not made of the objections, arguments, and discussions raised in the present day in regard to exegesis and dogmatics. Except what we see in scientific periodicals we learn nothing of these subjects; and the fact that they are not alluded to awakens a suspicion in our minds that the objections and innovations must approve themselves to the understanding and be difficult to refute. I do not myself, however, share in this opinion.'

This was written in the spring of one year; but by the

* Welchen Phœbus die Augen, Hermes die Lippen gelöset,
Und das Siegel der Macht, Zeus auf die Sterne gedrückt.
Schiller: Das Glück.

beginning of the next the autumn had come and gone and ripened the fruit of the tree of knowledge, which his teachers, the Herrnhuters, had sought so carefully to keep out of his way, and against which he had been so emphatically warned by his father.* He had found means to gather, and had freely partaken of the forbidden fruit, and, lo, 'his eyes were opened, and he knew that he was naked.' But he had little will so to remain: God had given him the power to clothe himself, and he set manfully about the task of doing so. In the January of 1787, after a long and sore struggle with himself, rending his own heart with the grief wherewith he knew he should rend that of his poor father, he wrote: 'Alas, dearest father! pray to God to give me the faith you believe necessary to peace in this world and to salvation in the next, for to me it is now lost! I cannot believe that he who called himself the son of man was the true eternal God, and that his death was a vicarious atonement, because he never expressly said so himself, or that it was necessary, because God, who evidently did not create men for perfection, but for the pursuit of it, cannot punish them eternally for not attaining it.' † From this it is easy to see that Lessing's works had fallen in the way of the young man, that he was in advance of his Moravian teachers, and must therefore quit their school.

The effect of the information on the father now communicated by his son had not been over-estimated. In the first moment of his grief he writes: 'O my son, my son! into what a state of delusion has the wickedness of your heart plunged you! How deeply do you humble me! What sighs do you call forth from my soul! O my son, whom I press with tears to my sorrowful heart, with heart-rending grief I

* 'Keep out of the way of this tree of knowledge, and of that dangerous love of profundity which would lure you towards it.' The Life of Schleiermacher, from the German by Frederika Rowan, vol. i. p. 45.

† Ib. p. 46.

discard thee; for discard thee I must, as thou no longer worshippest the God of thy father, no longer kneelest at the same altar with him!'

But this was only the first burst of the kindly man's vexation; in the same or the very next letter he is again the 'loving though the deeply compassionate father to the erring son,' as he still insists on calling him: for with the pious by prescription, it is always the *wickedness of the heart*, not *the divinity within him* that leads man on to question and to seek for more and clearer light. Nevertheless, and in spite of what he says, we can see that in his secret soul the old army chaplain sympathizes with his youthful and adventurous son. For he has himself passed through the ordeal the youth was now required to undergo; he, too, has known all the pains and penalties which attend on that awakening of the mind to thoughts and conclusions other than those instilled at the mother's knee and imbibed from infant catechisms. 'As a child, he spoke as a child, understood as a child, thought as a child: but when he became a man he put away childish things.'* 'For twelve years,' he informs his son, 'I preached, though a real unbeliever. I was at that time firmly convinced that Jesus had accommodated his discourses to the notions and even to the prejudices of the Jews; an opinion which led me to believe that I ought to be equally modest in reference to the established popular belief. Never, therefore, did I feel at liberty to dispute the articles concerning the Divinity and atonement of Christ. Although I was not myself convinced of their truth I used to apply them in furtherance of morality and of love to God and man. Should you not come to a decision in favour of the propriety of this proceeding I wish you would at least never publicly attack the doctrines in question.'

The compromising advice here given appears unfortun-

* 1 Cor. xiii. 11.

ately to have found a comfortable resting-place in the conscience of young Schleiermacher, as it does so commonly in consciences fettered by subscription and fear of the world. It may indeed have aided not a little in exercising the unhappy influence which hindered Schleiermacher, great as he was, from achieving the four-fold greatness that lay within his reach; for he had power enough and comprehensiveness of mind enough to have shown himself full-fronted to the world, and not with the half-face he so habitually presented. Unhappily for himself and for us he lacked what the Scottish poet calls

'The stalk of carle hemp in man;' *

the independent spirit that would have enabled him to be

'The same in his own act and valour
As in desire.'

It was only because of his less perfect moral constitution that he was to some extent compelled

'To live a coward in his own esteem,
Letting I *dare not* wait upon I *would*.'†

He might, verily and indeed, have done all he says it was his vocation to do—'Presented to the *general* consciousness that which lies hidden in the consciousness of each *individual* cultivated mind.' This he did not present entire, in its simplicity and consonance with the nature of man and of the world at large. He did not even, in such plain terms as Herder had done before him, present the substantial essence of Christianity as consisting in its *humanity*, as comprising nothing foreign to the nature of man, nothing really supernatural, nothing transcending the power of reason to apprehend, nothing that should hinder it in its essential principles from perfect assimilation with the spirit and the science of the age.‡

* Burns. † Macbeth.
‡ Baur, Kirchengeschichte des 19ten Jahrhunderts, S. 45.

Instead of this, his enemies and the clearer-sighted among his followers and contemporaries have challenged him with wearing a mask or a cloak, with playing the part of a trimmer, and with having been wanting in the truthfulness and candour that are the crown of true greatness. 'He made concessions to supernaturalism in his Christology on the one hand, and to rationalism in his discussion of miracles on the other, that brought him no thanks from either party; for the orthodox saw the Spinozistic orator under the garb of the dogmatic teacher, and the rationalist took the crumbs of his supernaturalism as evidences of time-serving or even of intentional deception.'* 'It is pure mendacity,' says one of his opponents from the ranks of the orthodox,† 'when Schleiermacher heads the chapters of his "Glaubenslehre" with the utterances of our Confessions of faith, as if the discussions that follow contained the same doctrine instead of one totally different. It would have been more truthful had he used as headings propositions from the Ethics of Spinoza.' Referring to Schleiermacher's Lectures on the Life of Jesus, which were only published after his death, so consummate a critic and amiable a man as Doctor Strauss informs us that the conservative party, which increasingly prevailed among his disciples, hesitated to give them to the world, finding them especially weak against the mythical view of the gospel histories, and so truly the clay feet of the brazen image of his whole theology, that it seemed even desirable to suppress them. On the life of Jesus he was an oracle such as the ambiguity of his whole character, in this respect a true Loxias, well fitted him to be.‡

In spite of these unfavourable criticisms and the defects in his character that give them point, Schleiermacher has

* Gervinus, Geschichte des 19ten Jahrhunderts, quoted by the Rev. F. J. Smith in Theol. Review for July 1869.

† Evang. Kirchenzeitung, No. 93, quoted by Mr Smith, ubi supra.

‡ Leben Jesu für's Deutsche Volk bearbeitet, S. 23.

been characterised as a theologian of the importance and magnitude of a Reformer, the founder of a new period in the history both of Theology and the Church, conservative and destructive at once, whose vocation it was to reconcile religion with the freest inquiry and most advanced culture.'* The rare intellectual endowment of the man made it impossible for him to keep on the beaten theological track of his age, indeed, but the emotional and almost feminine nature of which he was also possessed disabled him from taking the attitude of the avowed reformer, and openly proclaiming to their full extent the conclusions at which he had arrived. Such an attitude can neither be assumed without a show of hostility to the world at large, nor without eminent risk of isolation to the individual who appears in it; and from open hostility, and still more from cold isolation, Schleiermacher by his nature shrank instinctively. Student of Spinoza, but with a lower moral organization than his master, though one of his true followers in the sphere of understanding, and clearly apprehending the principle of the Immanence of God in Nature and all the consequences that flow from its assumption, he was neither so consistent nor so truthful as at all times to acknowledge and proclaim them.

He appears, nevertheless, to have emancipated himself at an early period of his life from the cramping influences of the ideas vulgarly connected with the Hebrew Scriptures—the dead-weight that has commonly made advance in true religious knowledge so difficult. Even as a youth he ventured to think that God never cursed the work of his power, imposed commandments on his creatures which he had not given them faculties to obey, or suffered defeat in his beneficent purposes by the devices of a rival.

* Schwartz, in Vorrede zu Schleiermacher's Reden, quoted by Smith, ubi supra.

Freeing himself from the fetters of the old theology which has its root in the Hebrew Scriptures, as he advanced in years and in knowledge, and viewing the New Testament record through the eyes of common sense, his science and general learning enabled him to detach its supernatural and unhistorical narratives from the pure religious teaching and simple morality of 'the man Jesus, the Prophet of Nazareth of Galilee;'* and further and more important than this, of distinguishing between the religion of the teacher himself and the religious conceptions of post-apostolic, mediæval, and more modern interpreters, embodied in the various symbols and confessions of faith, that have been handed down to us.

Schleiermacher, in fact, made no attempt to recall the religious faith of the past. He would 'have nothing to do with pristine beliefs,' and 'cares little for those who amid cries and lamentations attempt to rebuild the ruined walls of their Jewish Zion, or prop it up with buttresses of Gothic construction.' Least of all would he continue to hold with dogmas and systems of any description; declaring roundly that 'the age is in its rights when it protests against such things being set forth as the essence of religion.' The completeness or perfection even of doctrinal beliefs he thinks may imply everything rather than the perfection of religion in itself. He seems as if he could hardly speak of the subject from this point of view without distemper, and laments that the noble in the nature of man is oftentimes by the influence of such formulæ degraded and robbed of its native liberty, the mind then getting fettered by scholastic and metaphysical conclusions, products of barbarous and unenlightened times. 'For what,' asks he, 'are all those doctrinal scaffoldings but works of the constructive understanding, wherein each part is only upheld by the counter-thrust of another opposed to it? Why

* Matthew xxi. 11, and New Testament passim.

look no farther than the scaffolding? Why not turn the eye inwards and find out that of whose existent reality such constructions are but the outward evidence?' *

Religion, according to Schleiermacher, belongs neither to the domain of science nor of morals, is essentially neither knowledge nor conduct, but emotion only, specific in its nature, and inherent in the immediate consciousness of each individual man. Hence comes the vast variety of religious conception and of religious system observed in the world;—variety not only thus to be accounted for, but apprehended as a necessity of human nature. Hence, also, the irrefragable plea for universal toleration, and the sin against God's ordinance committed in every act of persecution for opinion.

This view of Schleiermacher was an immense advance on all previously entertained ideas of the nature and true worth of the religious idea, and has not yet been generally appreciated in all its significance. When we recognize it, however, we readily understand how religious emotion may be associated with crime and immorality, as well as with the highest moral excellence; how a Jacques Clement and a Balthasar Gerard may confess themselves to the priest, and take the sacrament of the body and blood of the Saviour by way of strengthening them in their purpose to commit the crimes that have made their memories infamous; how punctilious attention to Bible reading and devout observance among criminals of a less terrible stamp, do not necessarily imply hypocrisy and cunning, as so commonly assumed, when these unhappily-constituted beings are found again engaged in their objectionable courses. The piety—the religion—displayed, is a perfectly truthful manifestation of the emotional element in the nature of man, which seeks and finds satisfaction in acts implying intercourse with Deity, but neither seeks nor finds satisfaction in acts of honesty and virtuous life in the world.

* Baur, Op. cit., S. 91.

Distinguishing between religious emotion and moral conduct, Schleiermacher understood religion in a more than usually comprehensive sense; every healthy emotion, even, being looked upon by him not as natural merely but as pious also; so that if he widened the domain and spiritualized the essence of religion, in the same measure did he generalize and make it shadowy. 'The conscious contact or communion of the individual with the universal' is, above all things, religion in his eyes. The religious emotion is 'nimble and transparent as the air that breathes the dew on the leaf and flower, modest and gentle as the virgin's kiss, holy and fruitful as the bridal embrace. It is the meeting of the particular with the general, and has no relation either to time or place; for it is nothing tangible; it is the immediate sacred nuptials of the universal with reason incarnate in man:' and more of the like, where we encounter the mystical element that had so considerable a part in the constitution of Schleiermacher's nature, and that, doubtless, also added to his influence with that large section of the community over whom mysticism exerts its magic sway.

His first work, the 'Discourses on Religion,' were addressed 'to its contemners among the cultivated.' And when he wrote, the educated community did in truth appear to have lost all sense of religion, to have no longer believed that religion was anything more than outward show, and in nowise a necessity of existence. But twenty years later so great a change had taken place in the same class of society, that in the preface to his third edition of the 'Discourses' he says, that had he now to write, instead of addressing himself to careless or indifferent souls, he would have to speak to credulous and superstitious believers, to pietists and slaves of the letter. As these discourses, however, were almost the only religious reading in which the general public indulged in all that time, there can be no question of their influence in

having wrought the change. The state of feeling in the Prussian capital and in the universities of Germany when they were first published, appears to have been much akin to that which is so frequent a subject of lamentation with the clergy among ourselves at the present time. The antique interest and faith in the *Old* had been superseded by the ever-advancing science and civilization of the age; and the efforts of the immediate retainers of established churches to keep the fire of faith from dying out, by mercilessly piling dogmatic fuel upon it, instead of alimenting went far to smother it entirely. And this, too, is very much what we observe in our England of to-day. Indifference in matters religious is certainly not commendable; but writings, that served only to supplant apathy by a puling and idiot piety, or left the minds of men in such a state as to make it possible for them to find rest in the superstitious beliefs and observances of the Church of Rome on the one hand, in denial of the most irrefragable truths of modern science on the other, could not have been of the thorough and wholesome sort required to nourish the spirit of TRUE RELIGION in the soul.*

Had Schleiermacher only given utterance to all that was in him, he would have been that in fact which he is credited by his friends and followers with having been, but was not:

* Fr. Schlegel, who for many years was the bosom-friend of Schleiermacher, turned Roman Catholic.

'Do you count me among the orthodox who have lost the old biblical conception of the universe?' inquired Pastor Knak, a preacher in one of the Berlin churches, of Pastor Lisco, another preacher, who had been upholding the truth of the Copernican system. 'Yes,' replied Lisco, 'for you will hardly maintain, with the Bible, that the earth stands still and the sun goes round it.' 'But I do; I acknowledge no other conception of the world than that of the Bible,' was the response of the now famous Pastor Knak.'[1]

This is precisely what Cardinal Cullen and his ultramontane followers in Ireland maintain, when they assert their indefensible right to teach the children that the sun is a fiery ball about three feet in diameter, and at a certain not very great distance from the earth, round which it turns regularly once in 24 hours mean time!

[1] Quoted by Mr Smith in his article in the Theological Review for July, 1869, p. 291.

the Apostle of the Religion which the educated world of the 19th century is anxiously expecting; the Religion that shall flow from the limitless ocean of truth, with trust in God as its first postulate, and obedience to his eternal laws as its last.

EMANUEL SWEDENBORG.

We have spoken thus far of the philosophers and theologians who were students of Spinoza, who played their parts among men of culture like themselves, and influenced the world of letters and of science. But there is a world above, below, or beyond this, the proper sphere of which is the supersensuous and the mystical, which cannot be overlooked, and which found its exponent in connection with Spinoza in the learned and remarkable individual whose name stands at the head of this section of our work.

Swedenborg was a man of gentle birth, of liberal education, and considerable scientific attainments. His writings on mineralogy and mining, natural philosophy, and the mathematics were all much esteemed in their day, and the reputation they gained him was such that he had the title of Baron conferred on him by his king, Charles XII. of Sweden. At a later period of his life, however, when between 50 and 60 years of age, he began to have visions from the upper world. A spirit in human form appeared to him first whilst engaged in eating his midday meal, with the injunction 'not to eat so much;' and visiting him again in the darkness of the night, said to him, 'I am God the Lord, Creator, and Redeemer. I have chosen thee to show mankind the inner sense of holy writ, and will rehearse to thee what thou shalt write.' 'The Lord,' he continues, 'was clothed in purple, and the vision lasted a full quarter of an hour. The eyes of my inward man opened forthwith, and I acquired the power of looking into heaven and the world of spirits, and into hell, where I

saw many persons I had known, some of them long dead, others but a short while departed.'

Swedenborg, with that element in the nature of man which is proclaimed in ideal and supersensuous conceptions, powerful within him, had for some years before this been feeding his mind with cabalistic and apocalyptic reading, and came at length, like visionaries in general, to transform subjective impression into objective manifestation. Instead of the concrete and mathematical sciences, his writings henceforward treat of nothing but the New Jerusalem, the spiritual world, and the last judgment, apocalyptic revelation, the intercourse between soul and body, the true Christian religion, &c. That he himself was firmly convinced of the objective reality of his visions there can be no question; the singular in the matter is that in the middle of the 18th century he should have been taken at his word and received among men professing the Christian faith as the propounder of an immediate revelation from God, and institutor of an entirely new church upon earth; for he professed not, like other religious reformers, such as Wesley, to found a church within the existing church, but to bring in a new epoch, a new 'economy, a *third* Testament to complete, or rather to supersede, the *two* already possessed. For his followers, whilst they weed and winnow the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament, accepting some parts, rejecting others, receive the whole of Swedenborg's writings as sacred and inspired; designating them the Doctrine of the Word and Spiritual Mother; whilst the canonical Scriptures are entitled the Word and Spiritual Father.

Eccentric as Swedenborg's conceptions may appear, they are still pervaded by a certain method; the flights of his phantasy still lie within the limits of that which has a distinct rational interest for mankind; nay, the grounds of his contemplations may be shown to comprise all the elements of

a philosophical system; so that the psychological enigma in the end comes to be this, how such opposites and contradictions as we observe should meet and assimilate in one and the same individual.*

The distinguished writer and critic referred to in the above sentence does not appear to have divined the source of the *method* and *scientific element* which he, nevertheless, detected in the writings of Swedenborg. It was discovered by a man much less known than Ferdinand Christian Baur, following a profession, too, as remote as possible from criticism and scholarly acquirement, a major-general in the army of the United States of America, Hitchcock by name,† and in a quarter where we should hardly have expected to find it, viz., the rigid, unideal, and dogmatic writings of Spinoza.

General Hitchcock appears to have been a student and admirer of Spinoza, and visited England, we have been informed, many years ago with a translation of the 'Ethics' in MS., intending to give it to the world, but failed to find a publisher disposed to aid him in the work. Besides familiarity with the writings of Spinoza, General Hitchcock must also have been well read in those of Swedenborg, which are popular in America, the Church of the New Jerusalem having many adherents in that country. In his pamphlet he says that his object is not to assail or defend either Spinoza or Swedenborg, but to point out some extraordinary resemblances between them; and he remarks by the way on the extraordinary fact, that though resting on the very same ground, 'Spinoza was accounted the arch-enemy of all religion, whilst Swedenborg, on the contrary, is held forth by a considerable body of followers, as a man inspired by God, and sent into the world for

* Baur, Kirchengeschichte der neuern Zeit, S. 642.

† The doctrines of Spinoza and Swedenborg identified, in so far as they claim a scientific ground, in four letters by * * * * *, United States army. 8vo. Boston, U. S. 1846. The pamphlet is therefore published anonymously, but General Hitchcock was well known to be the writer.

the express purpose of teaching the true Christian religion. Reflecting men,' he concludes, 'may see in the following extracts matter worthy of their serious attention; and to this class of readers they are respectfully commended.'

OF GOD ACCORDING TO SPINOZA.

'By God I understand a Being absolutely Infinite; i. e. Substance consisting of Infinite attributes, each of which expresses Infinite and Eternal Essence.' Ethics, Pt i. Def. 6.

'By Substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived by itself, the conception of which requires not the conception of another thing from which it must be formed.' Ib., Def. 3.

'Existence pertains to the nature of Substance' (Ib., Prop. 7); and 'There is and can be conceived no Substance save God.' Ib., Prop. 14.

'Whatever is is in God; nothing is or can be conceived to be out of God' (Ib., Prop. 15); and 'The existence and the Essence of God are one and the same.' Ib., Prop. 20.

'By Self-cause I understand that, the Essence of which involves existence.' Ib., Def. 1.

OF GOD ACCORDING TO SWEDENBORG.

'All things were created out of Substance, which is substance in itself; for this is the real Esse (Being) from which all things that be exist; hence the existence of things is from no other source.' Angelic Wisdom: of Divine Love, par. 283.

'There is an only Substance, which is also the first, from which all things are.' Angelic Wisdom: of Divine Providence, § 6.

'*Esse* (Essence, Being) and *Existere* (Existence) constitute the self-subsisting and sole-subsisting Being.' Ib., § 40—43.

'There is an only Essence from which is all essence, an only Being from which is all being. What can exist without

Being? And what Being is there from which is all being, unless it be Being in itself? But what is Being in itself is also the only Being—Divine Being, Jehovah, the all of all things which are and exist.' Ib., § 157.

OF MODES ACCORDING TO SPINOZA.

'By a mode,' says Spinoza, 'I understand the affection of a Substance, or that which is in another thing by means of which it is conceived.' Ethics, Pt i. Def. 5.

'Particular things are nothing more than modes or affections of the attributes of God, expressed in certain and determinate manners.' Ib., Pt i. Cor. to Prop. 25.

'The Essence of things does not involve existence' (Ib., Pt i. Prop. 24); so that 'There must be a cause for the existence of each existing thing.' Ib., Prop. 8, Schol. 1, 2.

Man and all things else in nature have therefore no necessary existence in themselves, but are modes—things existing in another thing, affections of the attributes of God and only existing in God.

OF MODES ACCORDING TO SWEDENBORG.

Things much compounded take their origin from things less compounded; the less compounded from things still less so; the least compounded of all finally from things simple. But whence or what is this simple? It is the Infinite self-existent cause of itself and operator of effects out of itself. All finite things, therefore, are modes, and so acknowledge a cause prior to the modification whereby they are modified, in virtue of which they are severally what they are and nothing else; having such a figure and no other, occupying such a space and no other, &c. All things out of the Infinite, in a word, have their modifications; but in the Infinite there is no such thing as mode, the Infinite being

the original cause of all modifications. Principia, Vol. I. p. 47, et seq.

OF KNOWLEDGE.

According to Spinoza, in the briefest possible terms, we have knowledge in three ways: 1st, from the senses; 2nd, from reasoning; 3rd, from intuition. Ethics, Pt ii. Prop. 40, Schol.

According to Swedenborg, there are three degrees of Love and Wisdom; the lowest reaching us through the senses; the second being attained to by the sciences; the third and highest reached by the internal perception of truths, both moral and intellectual (i. e. intuition). True Christian Religion, p. 37.

Speaking of the Divine Law and declaring that there is nothing more excellent than 'reason and soundness of mind,' than 'the contemplation and love of God,' Spinoza says that this truth is unintelligible to the carnal man, because in these he finds nothing to touch, to taste, or which in any way affects the bodily senses whence he has his chief delight. Tract. Theol. Pol., chap. ix.

'If a man,' says Swedenborg, 'does not elevate his mind above the things of space and time he can never perceive anything Spiritual and Divine. But he who knows how to elevate his mind above the ideas and the thoughts that partake of space and time, passes from darkness to light, and becomes wise in Spiritual and Divine things. Angelic Wisdom, § 69.

'The intellectual love of God,' says Spinoza, 'is the love wherewith God loves himself; not as he is Infinite, but in so far as he can be explained by the essence of the human mind regarded under the form of eternity. In other words, the intellectual love of the mind of man for God is part of the infinite love with which God loves himself. In so far as God loves himself therefore, he loves mankind; and consequently

the love of God for man, and the intellectual love of the mind of man for God, are one and the same thing.' Ethics, Pt v. Prop. 36.

'The third essential of the love of God,' says Swedenborg, 'God gives to those who receive his love in themselves; for God, as he is Love, is also blessedness, and makes angels happy from himself, and also man after death by conjunction with them. If man becomes rational-spiritual and at the same time moral-spiritual, he is conjoined with God, and by conjunction has salvation and eternal life.' True Christian Religion, pp. 38, 262.

We might proceed quoting General Hitchcock's pamphlet to the end, and exhibit innumerable other and perhaps even more striking resemblances between the writings of the mystic Swedenborg and the rational and naturalistic Spinoza. Swedenborg's works, indeed, in so far as they make any pretension to a philosophical foundation, seem, from the hasty survey obtained of them through the American officer, to be Spinozism wrapt in a cloud of mysticism, and with the assumption of such an intimate knowledge of the nature and doings of God and angels and spirits, the constitution of heaven and hell, and matters metaphysical, as it never entered into the clear, pure brain of Spinoza to entertain. Enough has been given to show how the thoughts of one who was long regarded as the enemy of God and man may be appropriated and so used by another without change in their essentials, as to gain him the reputation of a prophet and inspired interpreter of the Divine will, and give him power to present himself as founder of the Church of the New Jerusalem, which has its disciples, neither few nor without zeal, in Sweden, Germany, Poland, Holland, Great Britain, and the United States.

Although not among the number of his correspondents

whose letters have reached us, there is still an individual, a contemporary of Spinoza, who directed particular attention to the man, and who therefore deserves a passing notice from us. This is Lieutenant-Colonel Stoupe.

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL STOUPE.

We have had occasion to refer to the incident in the life of our philosopher which brought him into contact with this personage, and thereby into suspicion among his countrymen of entertaining unpatriotic sentiments. Stoupe was a Swiss by birth, native of one of the Protestant cantons, and so, Protestant by religious profession. At an earlier period of his life, during the Protectorate of Cromwell, he had lived in England, and officiated as minister to the Walloon church in London. He must therefore have had a theological education. At the time of his meeting with our philosopher, however, he had not only changed his residence but his calling; for he was now stationed at Utrecht as colonel of a regiment of Swiss, in the service of the French king, Louis XIV., then at war with the United States of the Netherlands. Promoted subsequently to the rank of brigadier, Stoupe finally lost his life at the battle of Steenkirke.

Whilst lying with his regiment inactive at Utrecht, the fame of Spinoza, then living at the Hague, could scarcely have failed to reach his ears; and we cannot doubt that the quondam theologian, having read the Tractatus Theologico-politicus, and feeling himself now free from the fetters of the ministry, became desirous of making the personal acquaintance of the writer of the book. From Colerus we learn that 'he wrote several letters to Spinoza, from whom he received several answers;' but as none of these have reached us we have no opportunity of contrasting the man as he

was in fact, with the man as he set himself before the world.*

The Swiss cantons, having in the majority of instances espoused Calvinistic Christianity as their religious system, would appear to have refused the French king the customary privilege of raising men among them for the prosecution of his war against the Dutch. The clergy in particular were loud in denouncing the wickedness that would be perpetrated were Protestant Switzerland to furnish a Catholic king with the means of waging an intolerant war against a people professing the same religion as itself. One of the Swiss clergy, a professor of divinity at Berne, took it on him to write and remonstrate with Colonel Stoupe individually, letting him know that he—the writer—'could not sufficiently express his astonishment that any officer making profession of the Reformed religion, whether he were Swiss or French or of any other country, should consent to show himself in arms against our dear brethren in Christ, the Dutch, and aid in destroying that sanctified republic which had always been the refuge of the reformed religion.'

Stoupe, smarting apparently under the just reproaches of the Berne professor, like persons generally who find themselves in the wrong, seeks to justify himself by vilifying those he is injuring and replying with the *et tu quoque* to his accuser. He first maintains that the revolt of the Netherlands from the yoke of Spain and the secession of the people generally from Roman Catholicism were no consequences of the sufferings they endured under Philip the Second, and the

* This he did in a book entitled: La Religion des Hollandais, 12mo. Cologne, 1673; translated into English, under the same title: The Religion of the Dutch, small 4to. London, 1680. It is rather a clever production; as severe upon the Swiss for their religious intolerance in former times, and their present scruples about selling their sons to serve the bigot king of France, as it is defamatory of the Dutch. I use the English translation, not having seen the original.

better religious convictions to which they had attained, but effects entirely of ambitious designs on the part of the leading nobility of the land, and of the craft of William of Orange, in particular, to accomplish certain selfish ends of his own.

Far from being of the same religious persuasion as the Swiss, he declares that the people of Holland 'never were and are not of it at all.' Instead of tolerating Calvinistic Christianity alone, like the Swiss, the Dutch tolerate indifferently all the forms of Christianity extant on the face of the earth—Roman Catholics, Calvinists, Lutherans, Arminians, Gomarists, Socinians, Quakers, Anabaptists or Mennonites, Libertines, Independents, Seekers, &c. Nay, they not only suffer Christians of every sort to live in peace among them, but even cherish the Jews, and can farther boast of a sprinkling of Turks and Persians in their towns. How can a people among whom such a state of things prevails, 'be of the same religion as another people, who burned Michael Servetus and Scipio Gentilis alive, for denying the trinity, and who, not forty years ago, put Nicholas Anthony, a minister at Divonne in the Bailiwick of Gex, to death in the same cruel way, upon discovery made that he was secretly a Jew? Not only are the Dutch not Calvinistic Christians, but they are, properly speaking, not Christians at all.'

Stoupe then proceeds to give the correspondent he addresses an account of the tenets of each of the leading sects of Christians resident in the Netherlands. 'But he should not,' he says, 'think he had completed his task did he omit saying a few words on an illustrious and learned man, resident here, who, he is assured, has many followers. This person is by birth a Jew, his name Spinoza, one who has not abjured the religion of the Jews, nor embraced that of the Christians; so that he continues a most wicked Jew [though he has abjured the Jewish religion!] and has not the least tincture of Christianity. Some years ago he put forth a book entitled Tractatus

Theologico-Politicus, wherein his principal design is to introduce Atheism, Libertinism, and the free toleration of all religions, which he thinks were all invented for the advantages the public receive from them, to the end that every one may live honestly, obey the magistrates, and addict himself to virtue, not for the hope of any reward after death, but for the intrinsic excellence of virtue in itself, and the advantages that accrue in this life to those who follow it.'

'This Spinoza,' he proceeds, 'is now living in this country. In his residence at the Hague he is visited by the Virtuosi and such as pretend to more than ordinary curiosity—nay even by some young ladies of quality, who pride themselves on being more ingenious than seems needful in the sex. His book mentioned, has been condemned by a public edict of the States-General and a prohibition put upon the sale of it; and yet is it publicly sold. Amongst all the divines, of whom there are a great many in this country, there has not stood up any one that has presumed to write against the opinions which this author advances. And I am the more surprised thereat for this reason, that the author making a discovery of his great knowledge of the Hebrew tongue as also of all the ceremonies of the Jewish religion, of all the customs of the Jews, and of the heathen philosophy, the divines of the Reformation cannot but say that the book does well deserve that they should take the pains to refute it. For if they still continue silent, men cannot forbear affirming that either they are defective in point of charity in suffering so pernicious a book to be scattered up and down without any answer thereto, or that they approve the sentiments of the author, or that they have not the courage and abilities to oppose them.'

From the large admixture of unwarranted assertion and error in the above extracts, and the way in which we observe some of the views of Spinoza referred to, we see that Stoupe

is not so well informed as he might have been, and surmise that to a man of the world, more especially to one who had laid aside the Geneva bands for the sash and sword, some of the opinions of the 'Renegade Jew,' as he designates Spinoza, were not really regarded so unfavourably as he pretends.

We do not, however, attach much weight to the opinion entertained of our philosopher by Brigadier Stoupe. He is but one of the crowd looking up at the intellectual man of his age, standing alone, and so immeasurably raised above them that they could truly catch none of the mental or moral features that made him notable. To us Stoupe is mainly or perhaps only interesting, from having through his book incited Colerus to enter the field as the biographer of Spinoza. Colerus could not allow the statement to pass unnoticed, that none of all the host of the Reformed Clergymen in the Netherlands had ventured to answer the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. Far from allowing this to be the case he dedicates ten pages of his short biography, as we have seen, to a list of the replies already published. He does not tell us, however, that Spinoza himself never saw any one of these to be of such cogency as to merit a rejoinder, and that none of them all do in fact rebut one of the statements made, or answer on grounds of reason and counter-proof any of the writer's conclusions.

THE CRITICS, FOLLOWERS, AND TRANSLATORS OF SPINOZA,

FRIENDLY, HOSTILE, AND IMPARTIAL.

THE name of these is Legion, and we have no intention to review the series. The earliest apologetic criticism — under the cloak of an adversary however,—is that of Count Boullainvilliers,* who discards the geometrical method from his survey, and so contrives to give an uninterrupted and sufficiently lucid account of Spinozism. The extracts from the work of Father Lami and the letter of the Archbishop of Cambray, which the Editor of Boullainvilliers has appended to the Count's pretended Refutation, seem designed to show, in the case of the simple Priest, the ineffective nature of the battery brought to bear upon the bulwarks in which Spinoza sits entrenched, and in that of the Archbishop, to hint at the identity of view which the excommunicated Jew and the illustrious Christian Hierarch entertained of the nature of Deity.

LOCKE.

The only writer of note among ourselves who lived in the last century, and who must have been well acquainted with the works of Spinoza, though he carefully avoids all mention of his name, was Locke. The account he gives in his preface to the 'Essay on the human understanding' of the way in which his work took its rise, is the first paragraph of Spinoza's

* Refutation des Erreurs de Benoit de Spinoza par M. de Fenelon, le Père Lami et M. le Comte de Boullainvilliers, avec la vie de Spinoza par J. Colerus. 12mo. Brux., 1731.

'De Emendatione Intellectus,' done into English; and the resemblance between the ideas expressed in his 'Epistle to the Reader,' where he says, 'He who sets his own thoughts to work to find and follow truth, will find every moment of his pursuit reward his pains with some delight, and will have reason to think his time not ill spent, even when he cannot boast of any great acquisition,' will not fail to strike the reader as bearing a strong resemblance to the fine passage in Spinoza's Twenty-first Letter to which we have already referred particularly. Locke's suppression of Spinoza's name, however, did not secure him against challenge from opponents of working on a Spinozistic basis and advocating atheism,* whilst the psychological views advocated by the liberally educated physician and physiologist laid him open to bigoted charges of materialism and denial of the most essential doctrines of the Christian Religion.†

J. A. FROUDE.

One of the fairest and still one of the best accounts of the philosophy of Spinoza extant among us we owe to Mr Froude.‡

'It is not often that any man in this world lives a life so well worth writing as Spinoza lived,' says Mr Froude, and this 'not for striking incidents or large events connected with it, but because he was one of the very best men whom these modern times have seen.' * * * 'One lesson there does seem to be in the life of such a man—a lesson he taught equally

* W. Carrol. A dissertation upon Mr Locke's Essay concerning the human understanding, wherein that author's endeavours to establish Spinoza's atheistical hypothesis, &c., are confuted. 8vo. London, 1706.

† By the Bishop of Worcester, especially; to whose attacks Locke's answers afford models of controversial writing.

‡ Vide Westminster Review for July, 1855, and 'Short Studies on Great Subjects,' by J. A. Froude. 2 vols 8vo. London, 1817, vol. ii. p. 1, in which the contribution to the Review is reprinted. This, however, if we be rightly informed, is not the first of the papers on Spinoza for which we are indebted to the distinguished historian. There is another, which appeared in a monthly magazine so long ago as 1845.

by example and in word:—that wherever there is genuine and thorough love for Good and Goodness, no speculative 'superstructure of opinion can be so extravagant as to forfeit those graces which are promised, not to clearness of intellect, but to purity of heart.' * * * 'We may deny his conclusions; we may consider his system of thought preposterous, and even pernicious, but we cannot refuse him the respect which is the right of all sincere and honourable men.' Such is the worthy spirit in which one gifted and liberal mind conceives that of another, his forerunner in the walk of historical criticism and fearlessness in the avowal of his conclusions. 'Spinoza's influence over European thought,' continues Mr Froude, 'is too great to be denied or set aside; and if his doctrines be false in part, or false altogether, we cannot do their work more surely than by calumny and misrepresentation;—a most obvious truism, which in a century or two hence will perhaps begin to produce some effect on the popular judgment.'

It is but a few years since this was penned,—not yet the sixth part of a single century; but all who take an interest in the higher literature devoted to philosophy and theology, know what a change has taken place in the estimate formed of the life of Spinoza and of the character and significance of his writings. Happily the calumny and misrepresentation of which Spinoza, as a man, was so long the subject has now in a great measure passed away, and all fear of the influence of his writings for evil, vanishing like a dream of the night, has given place to an assured conviction of their value as guides to truth and aids to good alone.

Without enlisting under his banner, Mr Froude is therefore as obviously an admirer of the philosopher in the beauty and sanctity of his life as we can see him well pleased to accompany the thinker amid the subtleties of his intellectual speculations. To Mr Froude we owe that fine passage fro-

querily quoted by German writers, in which, drawing a parallel between Leibnitz and Spinoza, and addressing M. de Careil who has been depreciating Spinoza,* he says: 'If M. de Careil desires to know why the influence of Spinoza, whose genius he considers so insignificant, has been so deep and enduring, while Leibnitz has only secured for himself a mere admiration for his talents, it is because Spinoza was not afraid to be consistent even at the price of the world's reprobation, and refused to purchase the applause of his own age at the sacrifice of the singleness of his heart.'

H. G. LEWES.

Mr Lewes is another able writer who, although opposed to all philosophy save that which is 'Positive,' has nevertheless by his occasional papers and more studied writings aided essentially in keeping alive in England an interest in Spinoza. He, too, has a fine sense of the beauty and completeness of the Life of our Philosopher. 'There is an heroic firmness traceable in every act of his life,' says Mr Lewes, 'worthy our meditation, a perpetual sense of man's independence worthy our imitation. Dependent on his own manual labour for his daily bread, limited in his wants, and declining all pecuniary assistance so liberally offered by his friends, he was always at ease, cheerful, and occupied. He refuses, too, to accept the beliefs of another; he will believe for himself; he sees mysteries around him,—awful, inexplicable, but he will accept of no man's explanation. God has given him a soul, and with that he will solve the problem, or remain without a solution.' * * * 'He was a calm, brave man; he could confront disease and death, as he had confronted poverty and persecution. Bravery of the highest kind distinguished him through life, and was not likely to fail him on quitting it;

* Refutation inédite de Spinoza par Leibnitz, precédé d'une Mémoire par M. Foucher de Careil. 8vo. Paris, 1854.

yet beneath that calm, cold stoicism there was a childlike gaiety springing from a warm and sympathizing heart.'—We are pleased to linger with acute and accomplished minds in their expressions of love and respect, where we ourselves feel love and reverence.

Mr Lewes expresses a firm conviction that no believer in metaphysics as a possible science can escape the all-embracing dialectics of Spinoza; and as Lessing said long ago, 'There is no philosophy but the philosophy of Spinoza,' so does Mr Lewes in our own day declare that 'to him who accepts the verdict of the mind as not merely the *relative* truth, but the *perfect*, the *absolute* truth, he sees nothing, humanly speaking, but Spinozism as a refuge.'*

To this conclusion we assent; for if philosophy had its birth for modern times from Descartes, as it had; and exerted its highest influence over European thought through Spinoza, as it has unquestionably done; it may be said to have culminated in Hegel, who though seeming to stand so far apart from Spinoza, is nevertheless a true soul of the Jewish Philosopher. To us Hegelianism, stripped of all that is extravagant and obscure, embraces little or nothing that is not discoverable in plain and easily apprehended terms in the Ethic of Spinoza.

F. DENISON MAURICE.

The theologians ex professo have still shown themselves the most persistent as well as consistent enemies of Spinoza. Arrogating to themselves an indefeasible title to conceive God in their own way, and to interpret His providential government of the world, they have denied the right of all outside their circle to do the same, and have not yet left off denouncing as atheism, and what they call infidelity, all that

* Vide Biographical History of Philosophy, the article Spinoza in the 'Penny Cyclopædia,' and the excellent article on the Philosopher and his philosophy in the 77th No. of the 'Westminster Review.'

transcends the narrow horizon of the dogmatic vision. We are happy, however, to refer to one able and influential theologian, bold enough not only to show his acquaintance with the writings of Spinoza, but to avow his sympathy with the man and his views. 'The foundation of Spinoza's mind,' says the Rev. F. Denison Maurice, 'was laid in the confession of God, which he made the foundation of all his philosophy. "Being" was that in which he believed and rested: God was "Being" in the fullest and most transcendent sense.' Quoting the philosopher from his Cogitata Metaphysica to the following effect: 'How the Essence, the Intellect, and the Will of God are distinguished I set down as among the things which we wait to know. And here I do not forget the word *Personality*, which theologians use to explain this difficulty; but though I am not ignorant of the word, I am ignorant of its meaning, nor can I form a conception of what it is, although I firmly believe that in the blessed vision of God, which is promised to the faithful, God will reveal this to his own;' Mr Maurice adds: 'This honest confession and this earnest hope are among the most touching passages that we remember to have read in any author. They should always be remembered by those who are passing judgment on Spinoza.' *

The only fault we have to find with Mr Maurice's chapter on Spinoza is the apologetic tone he thinks it incumbent on him here to assume. From the discussion of the philosophical views of the pious Malebranche, Priest and Oratorian, however, he can find 'no fitter preparation to enable the reader to think with wisdom, and with the charity that is inseparable from the divine wisdom, of Spinoza. To heap epithets on him is the easiest of all tasks; they lie ready to hand in most of the answers that have been written to him. But his evil and his good must be learnt from himself; and here,

* Modern Philosophy, pp. 377, 381, 388. 8vo. London, 1862.

as in all cases else, some knowledge of the life of the man is essential to a knowledge of the meaning of the writer.' *

Mr Maurice's introduction has, therefore, a deprecatory tone about it which we do not think was at all required in connection with the name of Spinoza. Much rather is his a name never to be mentioned but with honour; charity is altogether out of place as he is concerned, though it is largely required as regards his traducers and persecutors. Did Mr Maurice, indeed, detect evil in speaking the truth, then do Spinoza's writings ask for a great measure of charity; but if, as we firmly believe he does, he sees good only in so doing, then do they demand a still larger measure of applause. If a knowledge of the life of the man, moreover, be needful to a proper appreciation of the writer, where in the short life of the holy Spinoza shall we find a blot or a flaw? where in his writings discover a sentence that is unworthy the purest and noblest among the sons of men?

S. T. COLERIDGE.

S. T. Coleridge in his capacity of lay-ecclesiastic and having no fear of Spinoza, requires a brief notice at our hands. H. C. Robinson in his entertaining Diary † has the following passage highly characteristic of the man: 'Coleridge walked with me to A. Robinson's for my Spinoza, which I lent him. While standing in the room he kissed Spinoza's face in the title-page, and said: "This book is a gospel to me. Spinoza's philosophy, nevertheless, is false, has been demonstrated to be false, but only by that philosophy which demonstrates the falsehood of all other philosophies. Did his philosophy commence with an *It is* instead of an *I am*, Spinoza would be altogether true."'

From Coleridge's marginal notes in Mr Robinson's copy of Spinoza, now to be seen on the shelves of the Library of

* Modern Philosophy, p. 377, et seq. † Vol. I., p. 399.

Manchester New College, London, it appears that he heartily embraced Spinoza's fundamental principle of the Divine Immanence in all things, as distinguished from the usual anthropomorphic conceptions of God. Coleridge, however, thought that 'Spinoza began at the wrong end when he commenced with God as *object*. Had he, though still dogmatizing objectively, begun with the *natura naturans* in its simplest terms he must have proceeded *per intelligentiam* to the subjective, and having reached the other pole, idealism, or the I, he would have reprogressed to the equatorial point or the identity of subject and object, and would thus have finally arrived not only at the clear idea of God as absolute being, the ground of all existents (for so far he did reach, and to charge him with atheism is a gross calumny), but likewise at the faith in a living God who hath the ground of his own existence in himself. That this would have been the result had he lived a few years longer I think his Epistle lxxii. authorizes us to believe; and of so pure a soul, so righteous a spirit as Spinoza, I dare not doubt that this *potential* fact is received by the Eternal as actual.'

There is something that is right and beautiful in this, but something that is not easily to be understood, and something also that is certainly mistaken, so that from the whole we might feel authorized to say that Coleridge did not understand Spinoza. The 'proceeding per intelligentiam to the subjective;' 'reaching the other pole,' and 'reprogressing to the equatorial point or the identity of subject and object,' are phrases to which Coleridge may have attached a meaning, but with which we can connect none. Substantia sive Deus —that which has the ground of its existence in its essence, in itself, *is* the natura naturans = the Efficient Immanent cause of all, in Spinozism. The natura naturata, again, the Universe of things, is the objective manifestation of Deity; and man, gifted with intelligence and volition, as he is part of

nature at large, object and subject at once, is that wherein the existence of God and of all things acquire conscious form or reality. This was probably what Coleridge aimed at but failed fully to express.

Coleridge thought the old Pantheism of Spinoza preferable to modern Deism, which he held to be but 'the hypocrisy of Materialism.'

'His doctrines assume an orthodox air, but to me they are unintelligible,' says the sensible H. C. Robinson.*

DR KUNO FISCHER.

By far the best, the fairest and most exhaustive review of Spinozism of recent times, is that which Dr Kuno Fischer gives in his history of modern philosophy.† Without ranking himself under the flag of Spinoza, this distinguished writer and very able man has yet obviously the very highest admiration for the talent displayed in the Ethics, and entire respect for the brave, self-reliant character, and consistent life of its author; so that he who has read and understood Dr Fischer's survey of the Ethics may be said to be master of Spinozism; as he who follows him in his appreciation of the moral and intellectual nature of the writer of that marvellous book, has made acquaintance with one of the purest and most gifted of mankind.

DR J. VAN VLOTEN.

Another highly appreciative and able review of the life and philosophy of Spinoza is that lately published by Dr Van Vloten, entitled: Baruch Spinoza, his Life and Writings, in

* Op. Cit. vol. ii. p. 298. Et in Arcadia Ego—I, too, have taken tea at Highgate, and listened to the 'Old man Eloquent!' The impression was precisely that which H. C. Robinson notes: After a session of several hours and an uninterrupted flood of mellifluous words, 'it was painful to me to find myself unable to recall any part of what had so much delighted me.'—Ib. p. 297.

† Geschichte der neuern Philosophie. 1ster Band. 2ter Theil. 2te Auflage. Heidelb., 1865.

connection with his own and the present age.* This able writer and advanced thinker is no half-hearted apologist of our philosopher. To a thorough understanding of his works he adds such respect for the talents, and admiration of the character of Spinoza, as makes him not only the faithful exponent of the great thinker's philosophical views, but the graphic painter of his relations to the age in which he lived, to that which followed, and still more to that which is passing.

To Dr Van Vloten we are farther indebted for the publication of a Supplement to the works of Spinoza, containing a Treatise, before unedited, on God and Man, and another on the Rainbow (believed to have been burned by the author shortly before his death), several unpublished letters, and additions to the Life of the Philosopher.† Dr Van Vloten has added a miniature portrait to his work, which, as having been painted by Van der Spijck, Spinoza's host, he believed when he published his supplement to be that of Spinoza. It is so unlike all the other portraits, however, that this conclusion once challenged has been abandoned. The Portrait which accompanies the present publication photographed from the one given by Dr Paulus in his edition of Spinoza, and now in the possession of Dr Van Vloten as he himself informs us, is as pleasant to look on as it is undoubtedly genuine.

The Treatise 'De Deo et Homine' would have been interesting had we not had the Ethics as the author's latest and most complete elaboration of the thoughts of his life. Almost the only chapter we find in this treatise that has nothing corresponding to it in the Ethics is that headed: De Diabolis. As

* Baruch Spinoza, zijn Leven en Schriften in Verband met zijnen en onzen Tijd. p. 8vo. Amst., 1862.

† Ad Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quæ supersunt omnia supplementum. Continens Tractatum hucusque ineditum de Deo et Homine, Tractatulum de Iride, Epistolas nonnullas ineditas et ad eas, Vitamque Philosophi collectanea. 12mo. Amstelodami, 1862.

a *Nonentity, a thing that could not be*, Spinoza, probably, did not think it worth while to discuss the devil in his completed work. But as the principle of evil in a personal form has still an important place in the thoughts of mankind, and Satan is still as foolishly as irreverently and persistently preached from our pulpits as the successful rival of God, we add the short chapter in this place.

OF THE DEVIL.

'If the Devil be an Entity contrary in all respects to God —having nothing of God in his nature, then can he have nothing in common with God.

'Is he assumed to be a thinking Entity, as some will have it, who never wills and never does any good, and who sets himself in opposition to God on all occasions, he would assuredly be a very wretched being, and could prayers do anything for him, his amendment were much to be implored.

'But let us ask whether so miserable an object could exist even for an instant; and the question put, we see at once that it could not; for from the perfection of a thing proceeds its power of continuance: the more of the Essential and Divine a thing possesses, the more enduring it is. But how could the Devil, having no trace of perfection in him, exist at all? Add to this, that the stability or duration of a thinking thing depends entirely on its love of, and union with, God, and that the opposite of this state in every particular being presumed in the Devil, it is obviously impossible that there can be any such being.

'And then there is indeed no necessity to presume the existence of a Devil; for the causes of hate, envy, anger and all such passions, are readily enough to be discovered; and there is no occasion for resort to fiction to account for the evils they engender.'

BERTHOLD AUERBACH.

This well-known popular writer is also author of a complete translation of Spinoza's works into the German language, extremely faithful, and perfectly trustworthy ; * so literal, indeed, that any obscurity in the original is not found cleared up in the translation. Herr Auerbach has prefaced his work by an excellent Life of Spinoza, from which the present writer has derived several useful hints in filling in his canvas. Novelist by profession, Herr Auerbach has even ventured to make the unobtrusive and uneventful life of the philosopher the subject of a tale.† Dr K. Fischer, however, avers that he finds everything there except Spinoza; and certainly the way in which the heroine, Mlle van den Ende, who is called Olympia, is made to treat the hero, had it occurred in fact, would have gone far to console him for having been outbidden by Dietrich Kerkering who, adding apostasy to his presents, carried off the lady as his prize.

M. EMILE SAISSET.

Our neighbours, the French, have been for some years in possession of a neat and available translation into their tongue of the works of Spinoza from the pen of the writer whose name stands above.

Unless he had been engaged by a publisher for the work, however, we are at a loss to conceive the motive that could have induced M. Saisset to undertake the task of translator and editor of Spinoza; for he is not only heart and soul opposed to his philosophy, which he could not have understood, but has the meanest conception of the character of its author, which, in its purity, simplicity, and goodness, he appears to

* B. v. Spinoza's sämmtliche Werke, aus dem Lateinischen, mit dem Leben Spinoza's. 5 vols. 12mo. Stuttgardt, 1841. 2te Aufl. ib. 1866.

† Spinoza, Ein Denker-Leben. 1 vol. 12mo. Stuttgardt, 1854. 4te Aufl. ib. 1860.

have been unfitted to appreciate. Spinoza's understanding (esprit) he admits was vigorous, but his soul (âme), he says, was puny; he speaks of him as a man without a country or a home—an exile (exilé de sa Patrie), dwelling in an obscure corner of Holland (demeurant dans ce coin obscur de la Hollande), and expelled from the Synagogue (chassé de la Synagogue); only anxious to be left at peace in the enjoyment of his own thoughts; unwilling to publish his Ethics lest his quiet should be compromised (ne voulant pas publier de crainte de troubler son repos), and having a much greater dread or dislike than any love of mankind.

But we know from his life that Spinoza was at least as brave and self-reliant as he was unquestionably gifted with the highest intelligence; that he was not an exile and without a country, but a native and a citizen of the United States of the Netherlands, in whose public affairs he always took a particular interest; that he did not hide himself in any obscure corner of the land, but lived openly at The Hague, one of the brightest and best known of the cities of Holland, where he was accessible to all who honoured him with their visits; that he had voluntarily and of himself withdrawn from the congregation of the Jews, and that their excommunication was a piece of poor spite cast after him, which would have been eagerly recalled at a moment's notice on the slightest sign of yielding on his part; that nearly ten years before his death, and without fear of compromising his quiet, he had published the Tractatus Theologico Politicus, of which, though anonymous, he was as well known to be the author as he was ready so to acknowledge himself; and to conclude, that if the Ethics did not see the light in his lifetime, it was through no indisposition on his part, but wholly owing to the opposition of the Cartesians and the clergy, and the calumnious and false reports they spread abroad concerning the character of the work.

M. Saisset is even so blinded by his prejudices that he cannot quote correctly from another when the matter tells in favour of our philosopher, and not against him. Referring to Voltaire's article, *Causes Finales*, in the Dictionnaire Philosophique, for example, M. Saisset proceeds: 'When Spinoza lays about him, at war with Moses and the prophets, Voltaire applauds; but when the study of the Scriptures is quitted for that of Nature, and Spinoza refuses to see in the universe traces of Divine contrivance and intelligent will, Voltaire cries out against him, and apostrophizing him in his curt and familiar style, exclaims: Tu te trompes, Baruch!'

Now, in no passage of his works can Spinoza be shown as at war with Moses and the prophets; and though he criticizes some of the writings that pass under the name of the great Hebrew leader and lawgiver, it is ever with reverence and respect, never with a hostile feeling. Neither in Voltaire's article is there one word about Moses and the prophets, or of any hostility to them on the part of Spinoza. The article *Causes Finales* of Voltaire begins abruptly thus:

'Virgile dit—

> Mens agitat molem, magnoque se corpore miscet,*
> L'Esprit regit le monde—il s'y mêle, il l' anime.

Virgile a bien dit, et Benoit Spinoza, qui n'a pas la clarté de Virgile et qui ne le vaut pas, *est forcé de reconnaitre une intelligence qui preside a tout.* S'il me l'avait niée je lui aurait

* Virgil is nobly paraphrased by Wordsworth, referring to the Spirit of Nature in his Ode on Tintern Abbey, where he speaks of—

> 'A presence that disturbs us with a joy
> Of elevated thoughts, a sense sublime
> Of something interfused
> Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
> And the round ocean, and the living air,
> And the blue sky, and fills the mind of man—
> A motion and a spirit that impels
> All thinking things, all objects of all thought,
> And rolls through all things.'

dit: Benoit, tu es fou!' Voltaire therefore refers to Spinoza in terms the very opposite of those ascribed to him by M. Saisset. So ill qualified, indeed, seems M. Saisset to appreciate the mental constitution of Spinoza, that he thinks there must be a typographical error in the fine passage where the philosopher, speaking of the joy he has in his thoughts and in the contemplation of the Divine perfection, says, that though the fruit he gathers may oft be nought, or even error, yet does he hold himself favoured; for in companionship with such thoughts he passes his days in no sighing and sorrowing, but cheerfully, joyfully, and in peace, and so mounts a step in existence. Instead of *favoured* or *fortunate* (fortunatum) M. Saisset reads *infortunatum*, and translates the word in aggravated terms into '*entièrement malheureux!*'

More than this, M. Saisset, determined opponent of Spinoza on every point of his philosophy, falls himself, like so many others, unconsciously and when he has not the object of his dislike before him, into Spinozism and Pantheism, his *bête noire*. 'Dieu est la condition immediate,' says he, 'de toute existence réelle, de toute pensée distincte. Quiconque pense, pense Dieu; quiconque affirme, affirme Dieu.'* Not hesitating to charge Spinoza with presumption in attempting to interpret God and his attributes, he sees not that he himself falls into the same sin. M. Saisset, in fact, knows more about God's doings than ever Spinoza pretended to do: 'Dieu a donc fait le monde, il l'a fait de rien; en d'autres termes, il l'a fait sans le tirer de soi-même—voilà la Creation.'†

So much we have thought it needful to say of M. Saisset,

* Œuvres de Spinoza, 2nd ed., T. i. p. 44.

† Ib. p. 76. Conf. further an interesting paper by M. Saisset: Sur la Philosophie des Juifs. Maimonide et Spinoza, in Revue des deux Mondes, 2nde periode, T. xxxvii. p. 296. Paris, 1862. It was with much regret that I discovered, on turning to one of the Nos. of the Revue des deux Mondes for 1864, that M. Saisset had died in the prime of his age and powers, in the course of that year. What is written above in the way of criticism was penned long ago and during M. Saisset's lifetime.

whose translation and views of our philosopher, we observe, are often quoted as if they were to be implicitly relied on for their correctness, instead of being what they are, occasionally mistaken, and always conceived with an *arrière pensée* of hostility.

M. Saisset, in a word, would have the world 'fed with the pure marrow of St Augustine (nourri de la moêlle pure de St Augustin), guarded by the discipline of the Church and led by faith on all sides paramount.' But Spinoza was brought up on the equally orthodox fare of the Jewish school of Amsterdam, and had the rigid Rabbi Saul Levi Morteira for master, yet he deserted the Synagogue and wrote the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus; precisely as Réné Descartes, whom M. Saisset so much admires, emancipated himself from the indoctrination of the Jesuits of La Flêche and wrote the 'Meditations.' M. Saisset, as philosopher himself, should have been more tolerant towards Spinoza. If it be not in every man's power to free himself from the superstitions of his childhood, neither is it in every man's power to continue contentedly in these. The great Descartes could, and yet could not. The picture M. Saisset draws of Spinoza is in fact much more true as a portrait of the French than of the Flemish philosopher. Descartes, for instance, was an exile from his country —voluntarily, indeed, but it was to the end that he might live in peace. Instead of freely communicating his thoughts to his younger friends and leaving them at liberty to make use of his ideas, like Spinoza, he charged one of his disciples, Henri Le Roy, with compromising him by publicly defending one of the theses he had received from his master. When he heard of Galileo's impeachment and imprisonment he forthwith stopped the publication of his own book 'on the World.' He cared nothing for politics or public liberty, and he could have had little or no feeling for religion in itself—for the religion of the soul and of the individual mind: 'Je suis de la Re-

ligion de mon Roi ou de ma nourrice,' said he—and his 'Roi' was that pattern of piety and sovereignty combined, Louis the Fourteenth; and his wet-nurse, we must presume, was not much of a theologian. To curry favour with the priesthood he dedicated his 'Meditations' to the doctors of the Sorbonne, and all he uttered was to be received as in purposed conformity with the doctrines and discipline of the Catholic faith. To conclude, he died having submitted himself to all the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, confession—think of Réné Descartes confessing himself to a shaveling priest!—extreme unction, and the rest.

M. Saisset even quarrels with Spinoza's motto 'Caute'—'With caution'—caution so near akin to prudence; and in spite of the adage, Nullum Numen abest si sit Prudentia. Could he possibly have approved Descartes' device, Qui bene latuit, bene vixit; to be freely yet truly translated, He who lives cunningly, lives well? Dr Kuno Fischer, himself the soul of freedom and of toleration, criticizes Malebranche, from whom he differs, in another spirit. 'We reckon not with the man,' says he, 'who by his natural temperament makes himself a priest, and through his life continues a priest of the Oratory.' Descartes, whom M. Saisset opposes to Spinoza at all points, is nevertheless in fact much more closely allied to him than to St Augustine. What could M. Saisset have made of these passages of the Meditations: 'Par la Nature, considerée en général, je n'entends maintenant autre chose que Dieu même, ou bien l'ordre et la disposition que Dieu a établi dans les choses créées; et par ma nature en particulier, je n'entends autre chose que la complexion ou l'assemblage de toutes les choses que Dieu m'a donné.' And again: 'La Nature m'enseigne aussi par ces sentiments de douleur, de faim, de soif, &c., que je ne suis pas seulement logé dans mon corps ainsi qu'un pilote en son navire, mais outre cela que je lui suis conjoint tres étroitement et tellement confondu

et mêlé que je compose comme un seul tout avec lui.' The dualistic proposition, God *and* Nature, was evidently not far remote from that which speaks of God *or* Nature; and the Cartesian dualism, Soul and Body, not far from the Spinozistic: Primum quod actuale mentis humanæ Esse constituit nihil aliud est quam idea rei alicujus singularis actu existentis (i. e. corpus humanum). Eth., Pt II. Pr. xi.

ANTON VAN DER LINDE.

We conclude this section of our work by a brief notice of Dr Van der Linde's monograph, which may be spoken of as a contribution to Anti-Spinozistic literature; not because of any peculiar novelty or talent displayed in the essay, but simply because it is the latest in the class to which it belongs that has fallen in our way; though we may also be influenced in referring to it by the very complete list of Spinozistic and Anti-Spinozistic works and occasional papers which it contains.

Dr Van der Linde has a very poor appréciation both of Spinoza's moral character and intellectual powers—which, to be sure, is something new. 'You could sooner turn the sun from his course than Spinoza from truth,' says one of his editors (Gfroerer). 'He is verily one of the clearest heads that has ever existed,' says the learned historian of Modern Philosophy (K. Fischer); and we have seen the high terms in which the amiable and accomplished Jacobi speaks of our philosopher, though he disliked his system. But Dr Van der Linde sees in Spinoza one of the most perversely illogical and inconsequent among men; shifty withal, and having recourse to artifice to escape the difficulties in his system which he was well enough aware of but had not the candour to acknowledge. Dr Van der Linde appears to have been infected by M. Saisset with his dislike to Spinoza. We can fancy that he translates the French writer occasionally, and he certainly follows him in the motives he assigns for Spinoza's not having published the

Ethics in his lifetime. Dr Van der Linde even ventures to say that Spinoza 'had not the full courage of the philosopher to stand by his convictions. Neither did he truly strive to spread abroad among men the conclusions to which he had come with such mathematical certainty; "What can it matter," argued he, "to truth whether it be made known to-day or to-morrow."' But enough! though there is still so much evidence of ability and scholarly acquirement in his Essay that we can but regret to find an aspirant to the honour of the degree of Doctor in Philosophy, so demeaning himself against what must needs be his better knowledge and his nobler nature as to calumniate a great and pure-minded man, whom he pretends to criticize and interpret in one sentence, and in the next, with a show of misplaced piety, to exclaim, Inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te! *

* Spinoza, Seine Lehre und deren *Nachwirkungen* in Holland. Eine historisch-philosophische Monographie von Antonius van der Linde. Inaug. Dissert. zur Erlangung der philosophischen Doctorwürde. Gr. 8vo. Göttingen, 1862.

CORRESPONDENCE.

LETTER I.

HENRY OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Honoured Sir, Esteemed Friend!

You will judge with what regret I left you on my late visit to you in your retreat at Rhynsburg,* when you see that I am scarcely arrived in England ere I seek, in so far as this may be done by writing, to feel myself in communion with you again. Your scientific attainments, added to the sweetness of disposition and refinement of manners † wherewith nature and self-culture have so amply endowed you, have charms that secure you the love and esteem of all educated and right-minded men. Let us, therefore, most excellent Sir, give each other the right hand of confiding friendship, and sedulously cultivate the same by doing all in our power mutually to aid and oblige each other. All I can give from my slender stores pray consider as your own, and suffer me, I beg in turn, as this may be done without loss to you, to share the intellectual treasures in which you abound.

At Rhynsburg we had a conversation on God, on Infinite Space and Thought, on the agreements and differences of these attributes, on the manner of union between the human body and soul, and on the principles of the Cartesian and Baconian philosophies. But as we only touched hurriedly

* A village near Leyden, where Spinoza lived between 1661 and 1664.

† 'Rerum solidarum scientia conjuncta cum humanitate et morum elegantia.'

and in the most summary manner on subjects of such vast interest, and as my mind has been much occupied by what was then said, I now venture, on the strength of our inchoate friendship, to ask of you kindly to communicate with me more at large on the matters broached, to give me your views of them generally, and in especial to enlighten me on these two points: 1st, Wherein you make the distinction between Thought and Extension to consist; and 2nd, What deficiencies you find in the philosophies of Descartes and Bacon; how you would propose to amend these, or what you would substitute as something better in their stead. The more freely and fully you write to me on these matters the more will you bind me to you; the more pledge me to services of the like sort to you—if, indeed, I have it in my power to render any.

The account of certain physiological experiments by an English nobleman of distinguished parts and learning,* has gone to press here, and will shortly make its appearance. The subjects discussed include Fluidity, Solidity, the constitution and elastic properties of the Air, &c., illustrated by some forty-three experiments. When the work comes out I shall take care to send you a copy by the hands of some one proceeding across seas to the continent.

Meantime, farewell! and think of your friend who with all affectionate esteem is yours,

HENRY OLDENBURG.

London, August 26, 1661.

LETTER II.

B. DE SPINOZA TO H. OLDENBURG.

Honoured Sir,

You might yourself divine how highly your friendship must be prized by me did your modesty permit you to

* The Honourable Robert Boyle.

consider the many accomplishments you possess. When I think of these, I, for my part, am not a little proud to call you friend, especially when I reflect that all things—all spiritual things especially—should be in common among friends. But I feel that I am privileged to do so more through your kindness and good-will than any deserts of mine own. In the excess of your modesty you so abase yourself, and in the plenitude of your good opinion so exalt me, that I do not hesitate to accept the intimacy you so frankly proffer. By desiring a return in the same kind from me you do me much honour, and I do not hesitate to say that I shall do everything in my power to cultivate our friendly relations. In so far as my mental aptitudes are concerned—if, indeed, I possess any—I say they are all most heartily at your disposal, did I even know that this could not be without great detriment to myself. But that I may not seem on any such grounds to deny what you ask on the score of friendship, I shall endeavour to give you my views on the subjects we discussed, although I do not think that what I shall say, without your special indulgence, will prove a means of binding me at all more closely to you.

In the first place, then, I shall speak briefly of God, whom I define as: A Being constituted of an infinity of attributes, each of which is infinite or most perfect in its kind. And here I observe that by an attribute I understand that which is conceived by and in itself, so that the conception of it does not involve the conception of any other thing. For example, Space is conceived by and in itself; but not so Motion, for motion is conceived in something else, its conception involving the idea of space or extension. Now that the above is the true definition of God appears from this: that by God we understand a Being the most perfect and absolutely infinite; and that such a Being exists is readily to be demonstrated from the definition; but as this is not the proper place, I pass by the

demonstration. What I have here to do in order to satisfy my honoured correspondent is as follows: 1st, to show That in the nature of things there cannot exist two Substances which do not differ entirely in their essences; 2nd, That Substance cannot be produced, but that existence is its essence; 3rd, That Substance must be infinite or consummately perfect in its kind. These heads demonstrated, my distinguished correspondent will readily apprehend my drift, provided he but keep my definition of God in view at the same time; so that it does not seem necessary to proceed further in this direction at present. Still, as I desire to give you a clear and connected though brief demonstration of the subject, I can think of nothing better than to send for your consideration and opinion the enclosed slip,* whereon you will find my views set forth in geometrical form.

You wish me, in the second place, to inform you what deficiences I find in the Philosophies of Bacon and Descartes; and here, too, I comply with your wishes, although it is not my wont to dwell upon or to expose the defects of others. The first and foremost seems to me to be this, that they stray so far from a true knowledge of the First Cause and Origin of things the second, that they do not understand the real nature of the human mind; the third, that they do not apprehend the true cause of error. Now, he only who is without all mental culture and discipline can fail to perceive how indispensably necessary it is to have an exact knowledge of these things. But that the philosophers in question have erred in their conceptions of the First Cause and of the human mind is readily to be seen from the truth of three of the Propositions now submitted to you, so that I shall here confine myself to an exposure of the third objection I have stated.—Of Bacon, indeed, I have little to say, he having delivered himself confusedly enough, in the way of narrative only, and proved next to nothing.

* Appended to this Letter.

For he first supposes that the human understanding, besides its liability to deception through the senses, is also deceived by its proper nature, and feigns everything to itself from the analogy of its own constitution, and not from the analogy of the world at large, so that it resembles the face of an uneven mirror, which mingles its own nature with the rays that proceed from the objects it reflects, &c. Secondly, He conceives that the human understanding by reason of its proper nature is determined to abstractions, and imagines as persistent that which is transient only, &c. Thirdly, He thinks that the human understanding is slippery or unstable, and cannot rest or acquiesce in anything. These and the other reasons Bacon gives for his conclusions, are readily reducible to the one error of Descartes in assuming the human will as free, and of wider scope than the understanding; or as Bacon himself has it in a confused way (Nov. Organ., lib. i. Aph. 49), 'because perception is not a pure light, but receives an admixture from the will.' And here it is to be noted that Bacon often uses the word understanding in the same sense as mind (capiat intellectum pro mente), and therein differs from Descartes.

Passing other points by as of less moment, I proceed to show that the cause of error assigned is mistaken; and, indeed, I think that the philosophers named, would themselves have seen it to be so, had they but attended to this, that the Will differs from this or that Volition, even as the quality of whiteness differs from this or that white object, or as humanity differs from this or that human being; so that it is just as impossible to conceive Will as the cause of this or that Volition, as it is to regard humanity as the cause of Peter or of Paul. As Will, therefore, is but a thing of reason (Ens rationis), and can by no means be assigned as cause of this or that volition, and particular volitions, inasmuch as they exist, require particular causes, they cannot be said to be free, but are such necessarily

as they are determined to be by their causes; and as, on Descartes' showing, errors themselves are particular volitions, it follows as matter of necessity that errors, in other words particular volitions, are *not* free, but are determined by external causes and in nowise by the Will; and this is the point I promised to demonstrate.

[Rhynsburg, 1661.]

[The slip sent to Oldenburg seems to meet us exactly in the Appendix to the 'Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch en deszelfs Welstand.' As first draft of the part of the Ethics which treats of God, and Introduction to the Epitome of his views which Spinoza circulated among his particular friends, it is added here for the satisfaction of the reader.]

Axioms.

1. Substance (*zelfstandigheid*, the Self-existent) by its nature is prior to its modifications.
2. Things which differ are distinguished from one another, either really or accidentally (modally).
3. Things which are distinguished really, either have different attributes, such as thought and extension; or are ascribed to different attributes, such as understanding and motion, of which the first belongs to thought, the second to extension.
4. Things which have different attributes, as those also which pertain to different attributes, have nothing in them the one of the other.
5. That which has nothing in it of another thing, cannot be the cause of the essence of that other thing.
6. That which is cause of itself cannot possibly have determined or limited itself.
7. That whereby things are preserved is by its nature prior to such things.

Propositions.

I. No self-existent thing (Substance) really existing can have the same attribute ascribed to it that is ascribed to another Self-existent thing (Substance); in other words, there cannot in Nature be two substances or self-existent things of one and the same nature.

Demonstration. For did two substances exist, they must differ, and so, by Axiom 2, be distinguished either *really* or *accidentally* (modally): not modally, however; for then were mode prior in nature to Substance, in contradiction to Axiom 1: *really*, therefore, in conformity with Axiom 4; consequently, that cannot be said of one which is said of the other. Q. e. d.

II. One Substance cannot be the Cause of the essence of another Substance.

Demonst. Such a cause can have nothing in it of such an effect (Prop. I.), seeing that the difference between them is real; consequently, one cannot produce the other.

III. All Substance or Attribute is by its nature infinite, and consummately perfect in its kind.

Demonst. No Substance is caused by another (Prop. II.); and consequently if it exist, it is either of the same attribute as God, or it has a cause for its existence beyond God. If the former, then is it necessarily infinite and consummately perfect in its kind, as are all the attributes of God; if the latter, still is it necessarily such as it is; inasmuch as it cannot have determined itself (Axiom 6).

IV. Existence belongs so essentially to the nature of Substance, that it is impossible to conceive the idea of the existence of any substance to be present in an infinite understanding which does not really exist in nature.

Demonst. The true essence of the object of an idea is something really different from the idea, either existing in

itself (Axiom 3), or being included in something else which really exists and is distinct from it, not formally or really but modally only. Such are all entities or things which we perceive are neither comprised in extension, nor in motion or rest, and which, when they exist, are distinguished not really, but only modally, from extension. But contradiction would be implied were Substantive entity to be conceived of as comprised in, and not as really distinct from, another thing, by Prop. I.; neither is Substance produced by or from an object which comprehends it, by Prop. II.; finally, Substance being infinite and most perfect in its nature, by Prop. III., *Ergo*, because its essence is included in no other thing, Substance is a thing existing of itself.

Corollary.

Nature is known from itself and through no other thing. It consists of an infinity of attributes, each of which is infinite in itself, and most perfect in its kind, and has essential existence pertaining to it; so that beyond it there is and there can be neither essence nor existence; and thus does it accord most exactly with the essence of the alone supreme and blessed God.

LETTER III.

HENRY OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Honoured Sir, Dear Friend,

I have received and with great pleasure perused your learned letter. Your geometrical method of demonstration has my entire approval; but I must at the same time lament my own dulness which prevents me from so clearly apprehending that which you put with so much neatness and

precision. Permit me, therefore, I pray, to lay before you the evidence of my incapacity by asking the following questions, answers to which I particularly request of you. First: Do you clearly understand from the definition alone which you give of God that such a Being exists? For my own part, when I see that definitions contain nothing but conceptions of our minds, and that our minds may conceive many things that have no existence in fact, and are extremely prolific in multiplying conceptions of things once formed, I do not see how, from the conception I have of God, I can infer that God exists. I can, indeed, by a mental combination of all the perfections I apprehend in men, animals, plants, minerals, &c., form an idea of a single particular substance which shall possess all these attributes united in itself; my mind can even conceive all these attributes infinitely increased and exalted, and so imagine a most perfect and admirable being; but all this does not seem to me to warrant the conclusion that such a being actually exists.

The second question is as follows: Are you quite certain that body may not be limited by thought, and thought by body, inasmuch as it is not yet determined what thought is, whether a corporeal motion, or a spiritual act totally distinct from body?

The third question I propose is this: Do you hold the Axioms you have imparted to me as principles not needing demonstration,—as intuitions requiring no proof? The first axiom is perhaps of this nature; but I do not see that the remaining three can be put on the same footing. The second, for instance, assumes that in the nature of things nothing but substances and accidents exist, whilst many philosophers maintain that space and time fall under neither of these heads. Your third axiom again, viz., that 'Things which have different attributes have nothing in common,' so far from being obvious to me, seems rather to be opposed by

everything we know in the world; for all things known to us whilst they differ in some particulars, do still agree in others. The fourth axiom, further, to the effect that: 'Things which have different attributes cannot be the cause of one another,' is not so clear to my clouded mind as not to require some further light to be thrown upon it. God, indeed, has nothing formally in common with the things of creation, though he is held by almost every one to be their cause.

Since, therefore, these axioms appear not to me to be beyond the reach of question, you will readily understand that I do not find the propositions founded on them to be more assured. The more I consider them, indeed, the more deeply do I seem to fall into doubt in their regard. Looking closely at the *first*, for instance, I say that two men are two substances of the same attribute, inasmuch as each possesses reason; whence I conclude that two substances of the same attribute may and do co-exist. With regard to the *second*, seeing that nothing can be cause of itself, I hold that it scarcely falls within the sphere of our faculties to understand how it should be true that substance cannot be produced, not even by some other substance. For this proposition declares that all substances are causes of themselves, and each and all independent of one another, turns them in short into so many Gods, and in this way denies the first cause of all things. Now, I candidly confess that I do not understand this, and trust you will do me the favour to give me your views on these lofty subjects at greater length and with more ample illustration, informing me particularly as to the origin and production of substances, and the relative inter-dependence and subordination of things in general. I entreat you by our friendship to speak with me freely and confidingly on this occasion; and be fully assured that all you honour me with in the way of communication shall be held most sacred by me: it shall never be laid

to my charge that aught you imparted to me in confidence had turned to your disadvantage by being divulged.

In our philosophical society here we are busily engaged in experimenting and observing, and purpose a history of the mechanical sciences; being minded that the forms and qualities of things can best be interpreted upon mechanical principles, that all natural operations and their various complications can be satisfactorily explained by motion, figure, and structure, and that there is no occasion to have recourse to any inexplicable forms or recondite qualities which are but the refuge of ignorance.

The book I spoke of in my last I shall forward to you as soon as the envoy from the Netherlands sends a messenger with despatches to the Hague, or as soon as another friend with whom I can trust it, travels your way. Excuse my prolixity, and all the liberties I take; and let me entreat in especial that what I lay before you without circumlocution or courtly phrase be received kindly, and in the way of friendship. Meantime believe me to be truly and most sincerely yours,

H. OLDENBURG.

London, Sept. 27, 1661.

LETTER IV.

B. DE SPINOZA TO H. OLDENBURG.

Dear Sir,

On the eve of setting out for Amsterdam, there to spend a week or two, I receive your welcome letter, with your objections to the three propositions I sent you. Pressed for time I shall reply to these only, leaving out of question your other observations for the present.

As regards the first, then, I agree with you in saying that the existence of the thing defined follows in nowise from its

definition; but that this follows only (as I show in the Scholium to the three propositions) from the definition or idea of some one or other of its attributes; that is to say, of something which is conceived in and through itself. This distinction you will find pointedly made in my definition of God; and the grounds of the distinction, unless I deceive myself, I have given clearly enough in the Scholium just referred to—clearly enough, at least, to a philosopher. For I have presumed that the difference between a fancy or fiction and a clear conception is understood, and the validity of the axiom admitted that every definition proper, or clear and distinct conception, is true. After this remark I do not see what further answer need be made to your first query. I therefore proceed to reply to the second.

In this you seem to concede, that as thought belongs not to the nature of space or extension, so thought is not limited by extension; for your doubt only refers to this particular instance. But be good enough to observe that were one to say, space is not limited by space but by thought, he would say that space as space, is not infinite absolutely, but infinite only as respects space; that is, he would not concede to me space as infinite absolutely, but as infinite in its kind only. But you may reply, Thought is, perhaps, a corporeal act. Suppose for the moment that it is so,—though I do not believe that it is,—still, you will not deny that space as space, is not thought; and so much suffices for the illustration of my definition and the demonstration of my third proposition.

You proceed, thirdly, in your objections to say: that axioms are not to be reckoned among the number of common notions. I am not disposed to dispute this point. But then you doubt of their truth; yea, you seem as if you would show their opposites as the more likely to be true. But be good enough to note the definitions I have given of Substance and

Accident, whence all that bears on the matter follows; for, understanding by Substance, as I do, that which is conceived in and by itself, in other words, that the conception of which involves the conception of no other thing; and by mode, modification, or accident, that which is in something else and is conceived by that wherein it is, it clearly appears, first, that substance is prior in nature to its accidents—for these without it can neither exist nor be conceived to exist; and secondly, that besides substances and accidents, there is nothing of reality beyond or outside of the understanding: all that is, is either conceived in itself or in something else, and the conception so formed either includes the conception of another thing or it does not. Thirdly I say, that things having different attributes have nothing in common with one another; for by attribute I understand That the conception of which does not involve the conception of another thing. Fourthly and to conclude, I say, that things which have nothing in common cannot severally be the cause of one another; for, were it otherwise, as between effect and cause there is nothing in common, all that a thing might have in the way of property it would have from nothing! But should you here interpose and say that God has nothing formally in common with created things, &c., I reply that I have maintained the direct contrary in my definition; for I say, God is a Being constituted of infinite attributes, each of which is infinite, or consummately perfect in its kind.

With regard to your objection to my first proposition, I beg you, my dear friend, to consider that men are not created but engendered, and that their bodies, although otherwise constituted, already existed before their generation. But this conclusion is obvious; and I assent to the inference, that were a single particle of matter to be annihilated, all space would at the same moment vanish.

I cannot see how my second proposition makes many

gods; I acknowledge one only, constituted of an infinity of attributes, &c.

LETTER V.

HENRY OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Esteemed Friend,

With this you will receive the book I promised, and I beg you to give me your opinion of its contents, particularly of what is said of nitre, and of fluidity and solidity. I return you my best thanks for your learned second letter which I received but yesterday. I must, however, regret that your journey to Amsterdam prevented you from replying at large to the whole of my doubts. The points you have not referred to, I trust you will yet favour me by considering at your convenience. This second letter has, indeed, brought me much light, yet not so much as to have dissipated all my darkness; which, however, I believe will happily vanish when you have instructed me clearly and distinctly on the true prime or original of things. For so long as I do not clearly see from what cause and how things have begun to be, and by what bond they are connected with the first cause —if such there be—all that I read or hear, meets me but as loose and disjointed discourse. I beg of you, therefore, most learned sir, to be as a torch to me on these matters, and to have the fullest assurance of the good faith and thankfulness of yours, most devotedly,

HENRY OLDENBURG.

London, October 23, 1661.

LETTER VI.

B. DE SPINOZA TO HENRY OLDENBURG.

Honoured Sir,

I have duly received, and, so far as my leisure has allowed, perused the work of the learned and ingenious Mr Boyle. Accept my best thanks for this present. I see that I did not mistake when I presumed on your first promise of the work, that subjects only of the highest importance could engage your attention. You desire me to communicate to you my poor opinion of the book? In so far as my very moderate ability permits I do so willingly, remarking particularly upon certain points, which seem to me either obscure or not sufficiently proven. By reason of my own avocations, I am prevented from discussing the whole of the volume.

[Here follow Spinoza's observations on what is said of nitre, and the states of fluidity and solidity by Mr Boyle. But as in the present advanced state of chemical science, these would only be perused as matters of curiosity, it were loss of time and labour to reproduce them here.]

LETTER VII.

HENRY OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

It is now some weeks, dear Sir, since I received your esteemed letter with your observations on Mr Boyle's book. The writer as well as myself return you our best thanks for your comments. Mr Boyle would himself have signified his obligations had not a press of business, public as well as private, still come in the way.—He hopes, however, by-and-by, to communicate with you, and begs you, meantime, not to misconstrue his silence.

Our philosophical college of which I spoke when I saw you, by the Grace of the King has now become The Royal Society, having its diploma and special privileges, and hopes of adequate funds for the accomplishment of the objects of its institution.

I would recommend you, my dear Sir, no longer to withhold your writings, whether philosophical or theological, the fruits of your ingenuity, from the world of letters, but to publish openly in spite of the opposition of the puny theologians. Your Republic is free enough,—most free in the permission of philosophical speculation. Your own discretion would of course counsel you to present your views and opinions in the most guarded language; for everything else trust to fortune. Go forward, then, most excellent Sir, and cast aside fear of giving offence to the pigmies of our day; the battle with ignorance and frivolity has lasted long enough; let true Science now proceed on her own course, and penetrate more deeply than she has yet done into the innermost sanctuary of nature. Your inquiries, I should imagine, may be freely published in Holland; nor can I conceive that they should contain any matter of offence to the learned; and if you have them as friends and favourers (as I promise you most assuredly that you will), why fear the dislike of the ignorant mobility? I cannot conclude, my honoured friend, without entreating you to take what I have said into your most serious consideration; for my own part, I can never consent to know that the results of your ardent studies should remain buried in eternal silence. You will, indeed, oblige me greatly by informing me, at your earliest convenience, of your decision on this matter.

In these parts there is much going on which you might perhaps think worthy of your notice. Our Society will now pursue its objects with greater zeal than ever, and should peace happily continue uninterrupted, will perchance do not

a little to illustrate the republic of letters. Farewell, dear Sir, and believe me with all devotion and friendship,

Yours,

HENRY OLDENBURG.

London [early in 1662].

LETTER VIII.

HENRY OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Excellent Sir, Dear Friend!

[In the beginning of this letter Oldenburg regrets the pressure of business that has so long prevented his writing, but now hopes that for a while, at least, his engagements may not stand in the way of his regular correspondence. He forwards an abstract of Mr Boyle's remarks on Spinoza's observations on the treatise on Nitre, &c., and then proceeds]: And now I come to the matters that more immediately interest us two; and, in the very first place, permit me to inquire whether you have yet brought that important work of yours to an end of which you spoke, wherein you treat of the origin of things and their dependence on a First Cause, and on the Improvement of the Human Understanding. I believe, my honoured friend, that you could assuredly do nothing that would be more agreeable to the truly learned and philosophic than to send this treatise to the press. This, methinks, to a man of your genius and temper were much more worthy of consideration than anything that might flatter the views of our age and the theologians, who have not so much respect for truth as for their ease. I entreat you, therefore, by our friendly compact, by all the rights of truth to be proclaimed and spread abroad, that you hesitate no longer to communicate your writings to the world. Should, however, and against my hopes and expectations, obstacles greater than any

I can divine stand in the way of your publishing, I earnestly beg of you to have the great kindness to communicate to me an epitome of your work, and for so signal a favour be assured beforehand of my utmost gratitude.

Certain other essays from the pen of the learned Boyle will shortly make their appearance. These I shall not fail to transmit to you by way of return, and shall add to them papers that will inform you of the entire constitution of our Royal Society, whereof, with some twenty others, I am of the council and also one of the secretaries. With all the faith that honest heart can feel, and entire readiness to serve to the extent of my poor ability, believe me to be, dear Sir, yours most truly,

HENRY OLDENBURG.

London, April 3, 1663.

LETTER IX.

B. DE SPINOZA TO HENRY OLDENBURG.

Honoured Sir,

At last I am in receipt of your long-looked-for letter; and now, too, I am fortunate in having the leisure that allows me to reply to it at once. Before doing so, however, I must in few words inform you of the hindrances that have so long stood in the way of my writing to you. Having packed up my baggage in the month of April, I proceeded to Amsterdam. Some of my friends there requested of me a copy of a certain small treatise containing a summary of the second part of the philosophical principles of Descartes demonstrated in geometrical form, and of the chief points handled in his metaphysics. This epitome I had already composed for the use of a young man to whom I was not disposed to communicate my own philosophical views too particularly.

My friends next requested me to give them the first part of the principles in the same form, with as little delay as possible. To gratify them, I set myself forthwith to the task, and had accomplished it within a fortnight. Now, however, nothing would satisfy my friends but that I must publish what I had written; and this also I consented to do upon condition that one of them with me beside him should polish the style a little, and add a short preface by way of hint to the reader that everything in the book was not to be assumed as an expression of my own ideas, inasmuch as I often take totally different views from Descartes, and that this should be pointed out in one or two examples. One of my friends undertook to do everything I required and to play the part of Editor to my little work; yet was all this the cause of a longer stay in Amsterdam than I had intended. Since I returned to this place, where I am now settled, I have scarcely been my own master by reason of the friends who honour me with their visits. But at length, my dear friend, I have so much leisure at command as enables me to tell you all this, and give you my reasons for publishing the treatise in question.

Coming before the public in the way I now do, certain persons holding responsible offices in this country may, perhaps, desire to see what else I have written and acknowledge as my own, and who in this case would secure me, in the event of any further publication, against annoyance or danger. With such countenance, I shall, I doubt not, publish something before long: if I cannot have the support I desire I shall rather keep silent; for I would not obtrude my views upon the world against the wishes of my fellow-countrymen, and so make myself obnoxious to them. I beg you, therefore, my esteemed friend, to have patience with me a little longer, for you shall shortly either have my treatise in print, or an epitome of the same in the way you desire. Meantime, if you would like to have a copy or two of the work that is now

at press,* I shall attend to your wishes as soon as I am myself in possession of it, and an opportunity of forwarding it to you occurs.

Reverting to your letter, I must, as is fitting, return you and worthy Mr Boyle my best thanks for your kind wishes and good offices in my regard. Despite your many and important avocations, you would not overlook your friend; nay, your kindness is such, that you promise me that nothing in future shall stand long in the way of our regular correspondence. To the learned Mr Boyle I am also indebted for his answers to my notes, although they were only by the way, and even on topics apart from the subjects handled. I readily acknowledge that my observations are not of such weight that the learned author of the Treatise on Nitre, &c., should expend on them the time he can employ so much more worthily.

[The sequel of this letter is on the constitution of Nitre, the nature of its spirit, &c., which could not interest the general reader, and would be passed over by the chemist. The conclusion of the letter as characteristic of the writer, and helping to a proper appreciation of his moral nature, follows.]

But I must not detain you longer—I fear, indeed, that I have already been too prolix, though I know I have striven to be brief. Have I, in spite of this, been tiresome to you, pray forgive me, and in especial take the off-hand talk of your friend in good part. For myself I should have felt that I had been guilty of levity or indifference had I not shown

* This refers undoubtedly to the Principia Philosophiæ Cartesianæ. The other work he has ready and would acknowledge as his own must have been the Tractatus de Deo et Homine ejusque felicitate, which, however, was not only never published by himself, but was not even included in his Opera Posthuma, no copy of it having been found among his papers. It has since been reprinted oftener than once, first by Van Vloten, both in Dutch and Latin; and quite recently by Dr C. Schaarschmidt in Dutch, under the title, Benedicti de Spinoza, 'Korte verhandeling van God, de Mensch en deszelfs welstand,' Tractatuli deperditi de Deo et Homine ejusque felicitate, versio Belgica. 8vo. Amsterdam, 1869.

myself earnest in my observations; and it had been mere flattery to have praised that which I did not truly approve. But as, in my way of thinking, there is nothing more unworthy than flattery among friends, I resolved to express my opinions quite openly, in the persuasion that nothing can be more pleasant among persons of sense than such a course. Should it, nevertheless, appear to you better and more advisable to burn what I have written than to show it to Mr Boyle, I leave you at full liberty to do as you list—proceed as you please, only be assured of my hearty attachment to you and to Mr Boyle. I lament that through my want of means I can only give expression to this feeling in words.

B. DE SPINOZA.

Rhynsburg, July $\frac{17}{27}$ 1663.

LETTER IX. (A.)

B. DE SPINOZA TO LOUIS MEYER.

[This letter, which refers to the preface to the Principia Philosophiæ Cartesianæ, first published by M. Victor Cousin, deserves a place here. We give it as we find it in M. Saisset's version of Spinoza's works.]

My Excellent Friend,

I return you the preface by our friend De Vries. I have added a few, very few notes, as you will see on the margin; but I have several others to send which will better reach you by letter. You inform the reader (page 4) of the occasion of my writing the first part of the work; I should like you to add, either here or in some other place, that it was finished in the course of a fortnight, so that no one should look for the very highest degree of clearness and completeness in the work which might fairly be expected. I would also have you

explain to the reader that I demonstrate several things in a manner different from Descartes, not assuredly in the view of correcting him, but only to enable me to keep true to the order I had traced, and not to increase the number of axioms. It is for the same reason, too, that I have felt bound to demonstrate various things which Descartes merely mentions, but does not demonstrate, and, further, to add others which he has passed over altogether.

To conclude, my dear friend, I entreat of you most particularly to suppress all you have said against the personage in question, and to leave no trace of its ever having been written. Among many reasons which induce me to make this request, I shall name but one, and it is this: I would have all the world persuaded that our publication is intended for the general good, and that you are only induced to print this little work by your love of truth and your desire to spread it abroad; that you have therefore been careful to make the thing generally acceptable, and desire to lead men gently and kindly to a love of true philosophy, so that all may conduce in the end to the common good. And this every one will be disposed to believe when he sees that no individual is attacked in the work, and that there is nothing in it that can cause pain to any one whatsoever. Should our gentleman or any other like him venture to show his malevolence in the future, it will be time enough for you then to expose his life and conversation, and the public will applaud.* I beg you, therefore, to hold yourself in patience till then; refuse me not this, I pray, and believe me to be

Yours very heartily and sincerely,

B. DE SPINOZA.

Voorburg, Aug. 3, 1663.

* The personage referred to in this letter was probably Voet, who had attacked Descartes with unjustifiable heat and malignity.

LETTER X.

HENRY OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Honoured Sir, Most Esteemed Friend,

I am greatly pleased by the renewal of our correspondence, and hasten to inform you that yours of the $\frac{17}{27}$th July gave me much pleasure, for two reasons: inasmuch as it assured me of your being well in health, and of your continued friendly feelings towards myself. To crown all, you inform me of your having sent the first and second parts of Descartes' Principia demonstrated geometrically to the press, and most handsomely offer to present me with a couple of copies. These I accept with the greatest pleasure, and beg you to forward me the books when ready through the hands of Mr Peter Serrarius of Amsterdam. I have advised him to expect the packet, and to transmit it to me by the hands of some friend proceeding to England.

Suffer me, nevertheless, to say that I regret you should still suppress the works you would acknowledge as your own, and this the more, because you live in a republic that is so free, where you may entertain what opinions you please, and give the most open expression to your thoughts. I would have your throw off fetters of every sort; and this all the more boldly as by withholding your name you may keep entirely out of danger.

Our noble Boyle lately left us, very much out of health. When he returns to town I shall not fail to communicate to him so much of your letter as refers to his treatise, and inform you of his observations on your ideas. I think I observed his Chymista Scepticum in your hands—a work that was published in Latin some time ago, and has had an extensive circulation abroad. He more recently published another short treatise, containing a defence of the Elasticity of the Air,

against the strictures of a certain Francis Linus, who, without knowledge, and in defiance of reason, would have controverted the phenomena detailed by Mr Boyle in his new physico-mechanical experiments. This little treatise I send you under this cover, and beg your acceptance of it. * * *

I cannot conclude without once and again urging you to give to the world the results of your own meditations. I shall not desist, indeed, in exhorting you to do so until you yield to my prayer. In the mean time, did you consent to impart to me a few chapters of your work, oh, how I should love you, and how I should feel myself beholden to you! Farewell, and love me who am, as ever, yours most affectionately,

H. OLDENBURG.

London, July 31, 1663.

LETTER XI.

[A lengthy communication through Oldenburg from Mr Boyle to Spinoza on the subject of Nitre, Spirit of Nitre, a Vacuum, &c.—The conclusion of the letter is as follows]:

You see, therefore, my dearest friend, that our philosophers are not wanting in their duty in this new realm of experimental science; nor am I less persuaded that you in your province will do all that is expected of you, whatever opposition you encounter from the vulgar, whether among philosophers or theologians. I have already said so much on this head in former letters, that I now refrain from adding more, lest I should be troublesome to you. This last request only I venture to make: that as soon as your commentary on Descartes is published, or aught else that is the fruit of your own ingenuity sees the light, you will, without delay, send it to me by the hands of Mr Serrarius. You will by doing so

bind me ever the more closely to you, and learn with every opportunity that offers how much and how truly I am yours,

H. OLDENBURG.

London, Aug. 4, 1663.

LETTER XII.

HENRY OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

My Dear Friend,

I was much delighted to learn by a letter lately received from Mr Serrarius, that you were alive and well, and not forgetful of your Oldenburg. But I inveighed against fate, if I may use the word, at the same time, for having deprived me for so many months of the pleasant intercourse I was wont to enjoy with you. The turmoil of public business and home calamities are alone to blame for the interruption; for my friendly feelings and regard for you are as great as ever, and will ever so remain. Mr Boyle and I frequently speak of you and of your erudition, and the profound meditations in which you are engaged. We should, however, be delighted to see one of your own bantlings safely born, and in the embrace of the learned; and we do not cease to indulge the hope that you will yet answer our expectations in this particular. Mr Boyle does not wish to have his work on Nitre, &c., reprinted in Holland, inasmuch as it is already extant here in the Latin tongue, and you are only without copies because of difficulties in the way of sending them; pray interpose if you hear of any of your typographers proposing a republication. Mr Boyle has just sent forth another admirable treatise on Colour, Cold, the Thermometer, &c., in which there are many new things of great interest; but this unhappy war* stands in

* The war here alluded to is that waged so ingloriously for England with Holland, between the years 1664 and 1667.

the way of the transmission of books;—would that your booksellers could discover some channel by which I could send you these works of Mr Boyle, as well as another remarkable treatise embracing some sixty microscopical observations with commentaries, very bold yet perfectly philosophical and in conformity with mechanical principles.—I would gladly learn under your own hand what you yourself have lately done, or are still engaged upon.

I am yours most truly,

HENRY OLDENBURG.

London, Apr. 28, 1665.

LETTER XIII.

B. DE SPINOZA TO H. OLDENBURG.

My dear Friend!

A few days ago I received your letter of the 28th of April, and have been greatly pleased again to have the assurance under your own hand that you are well and that your friendly regard for me continues unabated. I, on my my side, have not failed, as often as opportunity presented, to make inquiry after you and your welfare through Mr Serrarius and Christian Huygens, who informs me that he also is acquainted with you. From him I have the further intelligence that the learned Mr Boyle still lives, and had lately published an admirable work on colour in the English language, which he would kindly lend me did I but understand English. I am glad to know through you, however, that this work, besides the one on cold and the thermometer, of which I had not heard, has been published in Latin. Mr Huygens also possesses the book of microscopical observations of which you speak—in English, however, I believe. He has told me of the wonderful things brought to light by the powers

of the microscope, and informed me further of what had been accomplished by the telescope in Italy, with which they have been enabled to observe eclipses of the satellites of Jupiter, and a certain shadow, cast by the ring, apparently, upon the body of Saturn. And this leads me to observe that I much wonder at the hastiness of Descartes, who says that the reason why the satellites of Saturn do not move (for he thought the *ansæ* were satellites, perchance, because he never saw them detached from the body of the planet) may be owing to Saturn's not turning on his axis; for such a conclusion not only does not agree with his principles in general, but from these principles it had been easy to have assigned a reason for the appearance of the *ansæ*, had he not laboured under a certain prejudice.*

Yours as ever,

B. DE SPINOZA.

LETTER XIII. (A.)

H. OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Excellent Sir, Cherished Friend,

From your last of the 4th of September, it would seem that you do not entirely agree with us. But you have vanquished not me only, but our noble Boyle as well, who desires to send you his best thanks for all your pains and expressions of esteem; with occasion given he will respond towards you by every good office in his power. On my part you may be quite sure of the disposition to do the same.

* * * * * *

* At one period in the relative positions of the earth and Saturn the ring of the latter planet appears like two handles attached to his body. The proper satellites of Saturn were discovered in 1655, by C. Huygens, and in 1671, 1672, and 1684, by D. Cassini, by W. Herschell in 1789, and by Lassel and Bond, in 1848.

The Mundus Subterraneus of Ath. Kircher has not yet been seen in our English world, the plague putting a stop to almost every kind of intercourse; and then we have this terrible war upon our hands, which in its horrors seems sometimes to rival that of Ilium, and only does not efface all traces of humanity from among us. Meantime and amid such calamities, although our philosophical society holds no public meetings, yet does one or another of our fellows keep us in mind of what he is doing,—one engaging in hydrostatical experiments, another in anatomical inquiries, others in mechanics, &c., but all privately and in particular.

Mr Boyle, for his part, has been investigating the grounds of the forms and qualities of things as these have been apprehended in the schools and by individual writers, and intends shortly to send to press a treatise on the subject which I doubt not will be interesting. I see that you yourself do not of late so much philosophize as theologize, if I may be allowed to coin such a word, turning your thoughts to such matters as prophecy, miracles, &c. This, however, you probably do in a philosophical spirit; in whatever spirit it be I nevertheless feel that the work in which you are engaged will be worthy of you, as it is anxiously looked for by me. These troubled times do, indeed, throw great difficulties in the way of all kinds of intercourse; but I still hope that you will not fail to inform me in an early letter of the scope and purpose of this new work of yours.

Here we are in daily expectation of news of a second sea-fight, unless, perchance, your fleet have returned to port. The virtue of which you speak as matter of discussion among you, is that of wild beasts rather than of human beings. Were men but guided by their reason they would not tear each other to pieces as they now do everywhere. But what do I say? evil has still abounded in the world; yet neither is it

to be regarded as necessarily perpetual, nor incapable of being replaced by what is good.

Whilst I write I have a letter from that distinguished astronomer of Dantzic, J. Hevelius, who, among other things, informs me that his Cometographia is at press and nearly complete * * * What, I pray, is said with you about the Huygenian pendulum clocks, which are reported to keep such admirable time that it is thought they may serve as means for finding the longitude at sea? What, also, about the Dioptrics of the same philosopher, and his treatise on Motion, both of which we have long looked for here. I am persuaded he is not idle; I would only learn what he is doing. Farewell, and continue to love yours most devotedly,

H. O.

* [London, Sept., 1665.]

A M. M. Benedictus Spinoza, (in de Baggijne Straat ten Huyse van Mr Daniel [Daniel Tydemann] de Schilder in Adam en Eva), a La Haye.'

LETTER XIII. (B.)

B. DE SPINOZA TO H. OLDENBURG.

[Oldenburg writing to the Honourable Mr Boyle on the 10th Oct, 1665, informs him that he had lately heard 'from a certain *odd* philosopher whom you know, it being Signior Spinoza.' He expresses a very great respect for you and 'presents you his most humble service.' Oldenburg then proceeds to give an extract from the letter he had received, to the following effect:] 'I am glad to learn that your philosophers go on their way mindful of themselves and their own republic. I shall hope to hear of what they have lately done, when the men of war, sated with bloodshed, seek repose and recruitment from their toils. Were that celebrated mocker of men's follies alive at this present time he would

surely do no less than die of laughter. I must say, however, that all this pother moves me neither to laughter nor to lamentation, but rather to reflection and closer study of human nature. For I hold it not good to laugh at nature in any of its aspects, and still less to weep over it, when I think that men, like all things else, are but parts thereof, and that I know not how each particular part stands related to and connected with the whole. From such defective knowledge I find that I perceive some natures partially only, not otherwise than maimed, truncated, and in no kind of harmony with our philosophical views. These, consequently, present themselves to me as vain, disorderly, and absurd merely. Yet I say not nay to whosoever wills to have himself slain for what he thinks his good, provided he but suffer me to live for what I hold to be true.

I am now engaged in the composition of my treatise on the Scriptures, moved to undertake the work, 1st, By the prejudices of theologians, which I feel satisfied are the grand obstacles to the general study of philosophy. These prejudices I therefore expose, and do what I can to lessen their influence on the minds of people accessible to reason. 2nd, By my desire to disabuse the world of the false estimate formed of me when I am charged with atheism. 3rd, By the wish I have to assert our title to free philosophical discussion, and to say openly what we think. This I maintain in every possible way, for here it is too much interfered with by the authority and abusiveness of flatterers of the vulgar.

[The above extract, translated from the original as published in the Life of Boyle, by Thomas Birch, appended to Boyle's Works in 6 vols. 4to, is interesting as giving the date when Spinoza was busy with his Tractatus, and explains the allusion Oldenburg makes in the letter that follows to the treatise on the Scriptures. Boyle's Works by Birch being

bulky and not within reach of all the admirers of Spinoza, I add the fragment in the original below.*]

LETTER XIV.

HENRY OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Honoured Sir, Dear Friend,

Like the true man and philosopher you are, you have a natural love for the good, and you need not doubt that they love you in return, as is your due. Mr Boyle and I send you our cordial greetings, and exhort you to go on diligently with your philosophical studies. We both particularly request you, should you in your abstruse inquiries into the nature of things come upon any elucidation of the ways and modes in which the several parts of nature are connected with each other and harmonize as a whole, that you would kindly communicate with us on the subject.

The reasons you assign for writing the treatise on the

* Gaudeo philosophos vestrates vivere, sui suæque reipublicæ memores. Quid nuper fecerint expectabo quando bellatores sanguine fuerint saturi, et ad vires nonnihil instaurandos quieverint. Si celebris ille irrisor hac ætate viveret risu sane perieret. Me tamen hæ turbæ nec ad risum nec etiam ad lachrymandum, sed potius ad philosophandum, et naturam humanam melius observandam incitant. Nam nec naturam irridere mihi fas existimo, multo minus deplorare, dum cogito homines, ut reliqua, partem tantum esse naturæ, meque ignorare quomodo unaquæque pars naturæ cum suo toto conveniat, et quomodo cum reliquis cohæreat; et ex sola hujus defectus cognitione reperio quod quædam naturæ quæ ita ex parte et non nisi mutilatè percipio, et quæ cum nostra mente philosophica minime conveniunt, mihi antehac vana, inordinata, absurda videbantur: jam vero unumquemque ex suo ingenio vivere sino, et qui volunt profecto suo bono moriantur, dummodo mihi pro vero vivere liceat.

Compono jam Tractatum de meo circa Scripturam sensu. Ad id vero faciendum me movent 1mo, Præjudicia *Theologorum*; scio enim ea maxime impedire quò minus homines animum ad philosophiam applicare possint; ea igitur patefacere atque amoliri a mentibus prudentiorum satago. 2do, Opinio quam vulgus de me habet, qui me Atheismi insimulare non cessat; eam quoque averruncare, quoad fieri potest, cogor. 3tio, Libertas philosophandi, dicendique quæ sentimus, quam asserere omnibus modis cupio, quæque hic ob nimiam concionatorum authoritatem et petulantiam utcunque supprimitur.

Scriptures you mention I wholly approve, and do most earnestly wish I could have an opportunity of perusing your commentaries. Mr Serrarius will, perhaps, be sending us a packet before long, and with this you might, did you think fit, forward, for our perusal, something of what you have written, assured that in so doing you will find us equally ready to gratify you in anything that engages us.

I have done little more than turn over the leaves of Kircher's * Mundus Subterraneus, and though his reasonings and his theories give me no evidence of peculiar powers, I still think the experiments described and the observations made proclaim the industry of the writer and his good will to contribute to the progress of philosophical knowledge. You see, therefore, that I give him credit for something more than simple piety; and you will readily distinguish between my commendation and that of those who sprinkle him with that same holy water of theirs.

When you speak of the work of Huygens on Motion you hint that you find all the laws of motion laid down by Descartes to be erroneous. I have not your little book on the Cartesian philosophy at hand, and do not recollect whether you point out this blemish or pass it by, content to follow in the footsteps of the philosopher. I wish heartily that you would favour us with the sight of a child of your own genius, and commit it for nurture and education to the world of philosophy. I remember you somewhere maintain that much which is said by Descartes to exceed the powers of the human mind to comprehend, besides many other more lofty and more subtle things than he ever imagined, are nevertheless completely within the reach and scope of our human capacity. Why, my friend, do you hesitate? What do you fear? Make the trial—set to work, finish your book of high

* Athanasius Kircher, Jesuit, Professor of Philosophy, Mathematics, and Eastern languages at Rome. Born 1602, died 1680.

philosophy, and you will see that the whole brotherhood of true philosophers will welcome you and give you their approval. I venture to pledge my faith on this; which I should not do had I any misgivings or fears of being deceived. But I have none. I do not imagine for a moment that you call the Being and Providence of God in question; and these pillars left untouched, Religion rests on a sure foundation, and philosophical discussion of every complexion can then be defended or excused. Delay no longer then, and so escape further importunity on the subject.

I hope soon to be in possession of the decisions [of astronomers] concerning the new comets, about which a lively controversy has lately arisen between Hevelius, a Dane, and Auzoux, a Frenchman. These I shall not fail to communicate to you. This much I may say at present, that the opinion of the astronomers generally with whom I am acquainted is, that the comet was not one, but two conjoined. No one, so far as I know, has attempted to explain the phenomenon witnessed, by means of the Cartesian hypothesis.

I beg of you, should you hear anything more of the studies and doings of Mr Huygens in connection with the pendulum, or of his travels in France, that you would kindly communicate to me all you may learn at your earliest convenience. I would also gladly know what is said with you about the conclusion of peace; what meaning is attached to the advance of that Swedish army into Germany; and what is said of the position assumed by the Bishop of Munster.* My own impression is that next summer we shall see the whole of Europe involved in war; everything points to trouble and change. We, for our parts, will continue to serve the Supreme with pure hearts, and strive to further true, positive, and useful philosophy. Several members of our Society have gone with the King to Oxford, where they

* In alliance with England, and now at war with the Dutch.

hold frequent meetings and take counsel together for the advancement of natural science. Among other things, they have lately begun to investigate the nature of Sound, and are trying to come to definite conclusions in regard to the particular weights required to bring a vibrating cord from one to another higher note which shall be in harmony with the first. On another occasion I shall probably have more to say on this subject. Meantime farewell, and think often of

Yours very sincerely,

HENRY OLDENBURG.

London, Oct. 12, 1665.

LETTER XV.

B. DE SPINOZA TO HENRY OLDENBURG.

Honoured Sir,

I return you and Mr Boyle my best thanks for the encouragement you give me in my philosophical pursuits. I shall, I assure you, go on according to the measure of my poor abilities, and do not doubt of your countenance and friendly support in what I do.

To that part of your letter where you ask me what I think of the question as to how we ascertain that the several parts of nature are connected, and each harmonizes with the whole? I presume to inquire of you, in turn, on what grounds we conclude or feel assured that the several parts of nature do harmonize as a whole and agree with one another? For in my last letter* I had said that I did not know how this comes to pass. To have such knowledge it were necessary to have a clear understanding of nature as a whole, and of each of its

* Unfortunately lost to us as a whole. But the fragment preserved by Birch, given in Letter xiii. (B.), undoubtedly belonged to it.

individual parts; and I shall proceed to specify the reasons which induce me to say so. As a preliminary, however, I would beg of you to observe that I ascribe to Nature neither order nor disorder, beauty nor deformity; for things, I hold, are orderly or disorderly, beautiful or ugly, in relation to our imagination only, not in themselves.

By connection or colligation of parts, then, I understand nothing more than this: that the nature or laws of one part so accommodate themselves to the nature or laws of another, that they contravene or oppose each other as little as may be. As regards Whole and Part, I consider things in such wise, that parts of any whole, in so far as their several natures are mutually accommodative, in so far and to the extent possible do they harmonize; but in so far as they differ, in so far also do they severally excite ideas in our mind different from each other, whereby each part comes to be considered in itself as a whole, and not as a part. For example: when the motions of the particles of the lymph, chyle, &c., as regards their size, shape, &c., are so accommodated that they completely harmonize with one another, and together compose a single fluid, in so far are the lymph, chyle, &c., considered as parts of the blood; but when we conceive the lymphatic particles in respect of figure, motion, &c., as differing from the chylous particles, then and to this extent do we consider them as constituting a whole in themselves, and not as a part of anything else.

Let us suppose for a moment that there lived an animalcule in the blood, endowed with such visual powers that it could distinguish the several elementary parts of the blood, lymph, &c.; that it was gifted, further, with the capacity to observe how each particle impinging on another either recoiled or imparted a portion of its motion to that, &c.; then would this animalcule live in the blood, as we live in this part of the universe, and view each several particle of the fluid as a

whole, not as a part. It could not know how the several elements of the blood at large are influenced by the general nature of the blood, and how, as required by this, they are severally made to comport themselves in such wise as to harmonize with one another. For if we imagine that beyond the blood itself there were no causes which might impart new motions to it; further, that there was no space beyond the blood, nor any other bodies that could impart their motions to its particles, it is certain the blood would remain permanently fixed in its state, and that its particles would suffer no changes other than those that can be conceived from the motion appropriate to the fluid of which they are constituents. In this case the blood would be considered as a whole, and not as made up of different parts. But as there are very many other causes which influence in determinate ways the laws affecting the nature of the blood, and these in their turn are influenced by the blood itself, it comes to pass that other motions and other variations arise in the blood, which follow not only by reason of the motion of its particles reciprocally, but by reason of the several influences of the motion of the blood and external causes. It is thus that the blood is considered as a part or made up of parts, and not as a whole. So much of Whole and Part.

Now, as all natural bodies must be conceived of in the same manner as we have just considered the blood,—for all bodies are surrounded by others, and are thus influenced in their state of being and action in certain determinate ways, like relations in respect of motion and rest being preserved among them all, or in the universe at large, it follows that each individual body, seeing that it exists modified in a certain definite way, must be viewed as part of the universe at large, agree with the whole of which it is a part, and be in connection with all the other parts of which it is one.* But

* What is this but the Leibnitzian pre-established harmony?—ED.

as it belongs to the nature of the universe, unlike that appertaining to the blood, not to be limited or determined by anything, but to be absolutely infinite, so, and by the nature of this infinite power, are its parts influenced in endless ways, and forced to undergo infinite variations. As regards SUBSTANCE, however, I conceive each of its parts as having a more intimate union with the whole. For, as I have already said in my first letter from Rhynsburg, wherein I endeavoured to demonstrate that it was in the nature of Substance to be infinite, it follows that every individual part is of the nature of corporeal substance, and that without this it can neither be, nor be conceived to be.

You see, therefore, in what manner and on what grounds I say that the human body is a part of nature. And as regards the human soul or mind, I view that also as a part of nature, inasmuch as I hold that in nature there is inherent an infinite power of thought, which, as infinite, comprises the whole of nature subjectively * in itself, and the thoughts of which proceed in harmony with its nature—ideally, to wit.†

Further, I attribute this same power to the human mind, not as percipient of infinite nature, but of nature finite, and as defined by the human body; and on this ground it is that I say the human mind is a certain part of the Infinite Intelligence. But fully to explain and demonstrate these matters and others connected with them would here lead me into too great lengths; nor, indeed, do I imagine that you now expect so much of me. I am even doubtful whether I have rightly understood you, and whether I may not be replying to queries you have never made—I pray you to inform me whether this be so or not.

You write, further, as if I intimated that almost all

* Spinoza has *objectively* here, but *subjectively*, in the modern sense, is meant.—TR.

† 'Cujus cogitationes procedunt eodem modo ac natura ejus, nimirum Idearum.'

Descartes' laws of motion were mistaken. If I recollect rightly, I said it was Huygens who was of this opinion; I only referred to his sixth law as erroneous, a law concerning which I said I thought Huygens himself was mistaken. It was on this occasion that I requested you to communicate to me the experiment you had made in your Royal Society in connection with this subject. But as you do not allude to it, I presume you have thought it would not be proper to do so.

Huygens has been for some time past, as indeed he still is, fully occupied in grinding and polishing Dioptric lenses. In furtherance of this object he has contrived an apparatus wherewith the bowls* can certainly be fashioned in a very satisfactory manner; but I do not see what great advantage he thinks he will derive from his machine, nor, indeed, am I very curious about the matter; for experience has taught me that in spherical bowls the polishing of lenses is better accomplished by the free motions of the hand than by any kind of mechanical apparatus. I can say nothing either of the pendulum experiments or of the journey to France.

LETTER XVI.

HENRY OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Honoured Sir, Much Esteemed Friend,

Your philosophical disquisition on the harmony and connection of the several parts of nature with each other, and with nature as a whole, has given me much pleasure, although I do not clearly see how we are to deny order and symmetry to nature, as you seem to do, particularly when you admit that its several constituent bodies are surrounded or limited by others, and are determined reciprocally to be,

* Patinas—the dishes, bowls, or moulds in which lenses of all kinds are ground and polished.—Tr.

and to act in certain fixed and determinate ways, relations in respect of motion and rest in all being meanwhile maintained. This of itself appears to me to comprise the *formal* reason of all order. But here, perhaps, I do not apprehend you better than I did in regard to what you wrote concerning Descartes and the laws of motion. I beg of you to instruct me wherein you believe that both Descartes and Huygens err as respects the laws of motion. You will in this do me a great favour, and I, for my part, will do all in my power to deserve your kindness.

I was not present when Mr Huygens made his experiments here in confirmation of his hypothesis. I hear, however, that, among other things, he suspended a ball of a pound weight as a pendulum, which in its swing struck another ball similarly suspended but only half a pound in weight, at an angle of 40 degrees, and showed that the effect produced agreed exactly with the result he had ventured to predict on the strength of an algebraical formula. * * * Favour me, I pray, by attending to the request I make above; and be kind enough, also, to keep me informed of Huygens' successes in grinding and polishing telescopic lenses. I hope our Royal Society will soon return to London, and recommence their weekly meetings, for the plague, God be praised, is now greatly abated.

[Here follows an account of a singular disease among cattle, in which the windpipe is stated to have been found full of grass; and a note on the observation of a physician of Oxford, who having bled a young woman in the foot some hours after a hearty breakfast found the serum of the blood milky. Adverting next to social and political subjects, Oldenburg alludes to a current rumour of the return of the Jews to the home of their fathers, after an absence of more than 2000 years.]

Few, says he, in these parts believe it, and many desire it. Should you hear anything of the matter, be sure you communicate it to your friend. I should like much to know how news of so much importance affect the Jews of Amsterdam. Were such a thing to come to pass change in everything else in the world would seem within the reach of possibility.

Explain to me, if you can, what the Swedes and Brandenburghers are about, and believe me, &c.,

HENRY OLDENBURG.

London, Dec. 8, 1665.

LETTER XVII.

HENRY OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

I take the opportunity of Dr Bourgeois' return to Holland to inform you that some weeks ago I sent you my best thanks for the treatise you had forwarded to me; but I have my doubts whether my letter ever reached you. I therein gave you my opinion of the treatise, which, now that I have had time for further study and reflection, I acknowledge to have been precipitate. It struck me at first, and so long as I meted with the measure supplied by the common run of theologians and the current confessional formulæ, that you had been over-free in your strictures on Religion. But since I have reviewed the whole matter I find much to assure me that you had no intention whatever to attack true Religion or damage sound philosophy. On the contrary, I see that you strive zealously to spread abroad and vindicate that which is the genuine purpose of the Christian faith as well as the excellence and sublimity of fruitful philosophy. Believing, as I now do, that such is your purpose, I beg of you earnestly to keep your old and candid friend, who breathes his most ardent vows for the success of so excellent an enterprise,

informed by frequent letters of all you are now doing or intending to do in this direction. I promise you sacredly that if you enjoin silence on me I shall impart to no one a single word of all you say to me on these subjects. I shall only do my best to prepare the minds of good and wise men for the reception of the truths you will by-and-by set in a clearer light, and endeavour gradually to remove such prejudices as may be entertained against your views and meditations. Unless I greatly err, you seem to me clearly to apprehend the nature and powers of the human soul and its union with the body. On this subject I particularly entreat you to give me your further views. Farewell, most excellent Sir, and continue to favour me, who am the zealous admirer both of your doctrines and your virtues,

HENRY OLDENBURG.

London, Dec. 8, 1665.*

LETTER XVIII.

HENRY OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Our literary intercourse thus happily reëstablished, most excellent Sir, I am unwilling to seem backward in the friendly duty of a speedy reply. As I learn by your answer

* The above is the date attached to this letter by the editors of Spinoza's posthumous works. But Bruder in his excellent edition, following De Murr, thinks that the date of June, 1675, would be more correct. The difficulty has arisen from Oldenburg's comments on the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus in 1665, when the book was not published till 1670. Oldenburg in his letter sends his thanks 'pro tractatu tuo mihi transmisso, licet nunquam tradito;' and if this be interpreted in the sense of its never having been delivered, there is no making anything of the commentary on the work that follows. Nor would it help did we read nondum for nunquam—not yet delivered. De Murr's correction of the date seems warranted, and ought probably to be received. Spinoza may nevertheless have yielded to the pressing and repeated entreaties of his correspondent, and sent him an epitome of some of the more important chapters of the Tractatus, which we know by an earlier letter he had promised; in which case the reference to the union between the soul and the body would connect the letter with the 1665 period.

to me of the 5th of July, that you now intend to publish that *Quinque partite* treatise of yours, allow me, I entreat you, relying on the regard you bear me, to beg of you to let nothing appear therein that might in any way be construed into disregard of the religious virtues; and this I ask all the more particularly, because of the present degenerate and wicked age, which would seize on nothing more eagerly than doctrines of a kind that might seem to countenance or abet the prevailing vicious laxities of the times.

For the rest I do not decline to take a few copies of the work in question; but request you to address them to some Dutch merchant resident in London, who on my application to him would deliver them to me. It is not necessary, moreover, to speak of books of this kind being sent to me. So as they but reach me safely I doubt not but I shall find occasion to place them here and there among my friends in London, and in due course to receive the price for you. Farewell, and, leisure permitting, write again to your attached,

HENRY OLDENBURG.

London, July 22nd, 1675.

The date of the above letter shows a gap of some ten years in the correspondence between Oldenburg and Spinoza, and the reader will not fail to observe the difference between the tone of this letter and those written between 1661 and 1665. It is unlikely that the correspondence was dropped so suddenly as here appears. We see, indeed, that Oldenburg must have written to Spinoza some short time at least before the date of the above chilly epistle, for he has an answer from Spinoza of the 5th of July. This letter, however, must have been lost or destroyed, and it is more than probable that several others met with the same fate.

LETTER XIX.

B. DE SPINOZA TO H. OLDENBURG.

Excellent Sir,

At the moment of receiving your letter of the 22nd of July I was setting out for Amsterdam with a view to

putting to press the work about which I wrote to you. Whilst there, however, making my arrangements, a rumour got spread about that a book of mine upon God was soon to appear, in which I endeavoured to prove that there was no God. This report, I regret to add, was by many received as true. Certain theologians (who probably were themselves the authors of the rumour) took occasion upon this to lodge a complaint against me with the prince and the magistracy; and the silly Cartesians, in order to free themselves from every suspicion of favouring my views, set about abusing my writings and conclusions, and bringing me into evil odour, a course, indeed, which they still continue to follow. Having received a hint of this state of things from some trustworthy friends, who assured me, farther, that the theologians were everywhere lying in wait for me, I determined to put off my contemplated publication until such time as I should see what turn affairs might take, and as matters seem every day to go from bad to worse, I am not yet resolved as to what I shall do.

Meantime I would not longer delay my reply to your letter. And let me in the first place thank you for your friendly hints, though I should like to have such farther light from you as would enable me to know what the doctrines are to which you allude, and which in your opinion seem to compromise the religious virtues. For myself I own that what seems to me to harmonize with reason seems to me also most conducive to virtue. I should, therefore, be obliged to you, if this will not give you too much trouble, to point out to me the passages in the Tractatus Theologico-politicus which you say have aroused the scruples of the learned; for I am anxious to supplement the treatise by a few explanatory notes, with a view, if this be possible, to remove any prejudices that may have been conceived against it. Farewell, &c.

End of July or beginning of August, 1675.

LETTER XX.

H. OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

I learn by your last that the publication of the work you have ready is deferred.

I cannot but approve the purpose you announce by notes and comments to illustrate and soften down those things in the Tractatus Theologico-politicus, which have shocked so many readers. The chief of these, I think, may be referred to what you say ambiguously concerning God and Nature, which many are of opinion you confound. Moreover, to many you seem to annul the authority and significance of miracles, by which alone the majority of Christians believe that the truth of divine revelation can be established. Farther, it is said that you do not express yourself openly concerning Jesus Christ, the Saviour of the world, and only mediator between God and man; and that you say nothing of his incarnation and propitiatory death. Your views clearly expressed on these three heads are particularly desired. If, in your communication you satisfy sincere and reasonable Christians, I believe your position with the public at large will be assured. So much I have been anxious to impart to you who am yours, very truly,

H. OLDENBURG.

London, Nov. 15, 1675.

P. S. Let me know, I pray, that these few lines reach you safely.

LETTER XXI.

B. DE SPINOZA TO H. OLDENBURG.

Excellent Sir,

Your very short epistle of the 15th of November

reached me on Saturday last. There you only refer to what you think may shock the reader in the Tractatus Theologico-politicus, and I had expected that you would also have informed me what the opinions are which seem to compromise the practice of the religious virtues, of which you formerly spoke.

To give you my mind concerning the three heads you mention particularly, however, I say, as regards the first, that I take a totally different view of God and Nature from that which the later Christians usually entertain; for I hold that God is the immanent, not the extraneous, cause of all things. I say, All is in God; all lives and moves in God.* And this I maintain, with the Apostle Paul, and perhaps with every one of the philosophers of antiquity, although in a way other than theirs. I might even venture to say that my view is the same as that entertained by the Hebrews of old, if so much may be inferred from certain traditions, greatly altered and falsified though they be. It is, however, a complete mistake on the part of those who say that my purpose in the Tractatus Theologico-politicus is to show that God and Nature, under which last term they understand a certain mass of corporeal matter, are one and the same. I had no such intention.

With regard to miracles, on the contrary, I am most intimately persuaded that the truth of divine revelation can only be assured by the wisdom of the doctrines, and in no-wise by miracles, in other words, by ignorance. This, I think, I have shown at ample length in the sixth chapter of the Tractatus, where I treat of miracles. To what is there set forth I will only add that I make this grand distinction between Religion and Superstition, that the one has wisdom, the other ignorance for its foundation; and this suffices me

* Ἐν τῷ Θεῷ ζῶμεν καὶ κινούμεθα καὶ ἐσμέν, Orat. Pauli ad Athenienses. Acts xvii. 28; 1 Cor. iii. 16; xii. 6; Eph. i. 23.

as ground for my assertion that Christians are not verily distinguished from other men by their faith, their charity, and other fruits of the Holy Spirit, but by certain special beliefs or opinions only, inasmuch as with the mass of mankind of all nations they build on miracles, i. e. on ignorance, the source of everything that is bad in the world, the leaven that turns faith, though true in itself, into superstition. I much doubt, however, whether kings will ever consent to yield a remedy for this evil.

Lastly, and to give you my opinion without reserve on the third head, I say: that it is by no means necessary to know Christ according to the flesh; for, of that eternal Son of God, in other words, of the eternal wisdom of God which manifests itself in all things, in the mind of man especially, and above all in Jesus Christ, we are to hold a totally different opinion. Without this [spiritual] view I hold that no man can attain to the state of true beatitude, inasmuch as this alone informs us as to what is true and false, good and evil, &c. And because, as I have said, this Divine wisdom was most especially manifested in Jesus Christ, so was it preached by his disciples in so far as it was imparted to them by him, and in so far might they vaunt themselves on showing forth this spirit of Christ more clearly than other men. As to what certain Churches add to this, viz., that God assumed our human nature, I have said expressly that I do not understand what they mean; yea, to say truth, they seem to me to speak as irrationally as they would do did they say that the circle had assumed the nature of the square.

So much, I presume, will suffice to show you what I think of the three heads you proposed for my consideration; but you will know better than I whether what I have now said is likely to receive the assent of your Christian friends. Farewell.

November, 1675.

LETTER XXII.

H. OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

As you seem to reproach me for the brevity of my last, I shall make up for it by prolixity in my present letter. You had expected from me, I see, a specification of the views contained in your work which seem to war with the practice of the religious virtues. I proceed, therefore, to inform you that your readers are particularly distressed by finding that you advocate Necessity in all things and in all our actions. Were this admitted, they say, the nerve of all law, of all virtue, and all religion would be severed, and reward and punishment made alike nugatory and indefensible. Whatever is brought about or forced on us by necessity, it is said, is by the same necessity excusable, and no one, consequently, in the sight of God is inexcusable. If we act by fate, and all things proceed under the heavy hand of definite and inevitable necessity, they say farther, they do not see how there can be any guiltiness or any deserved punishment. What wedge can be found to rend this stubborn clump? If you can supply a means of escape from the great difficulty I ardently desire to know it.

With reference to your views on the three heads upon which I sought for information I have farther to ask: First, in what sense you hold miracle and superstition to be terms synonymous and of like import, as you appear to do in your last; seeing that the raising of Lazarus and the resurrection of Christ from the dead surpass all the powers of nature as we understand the expression, and could only have been effected by and through the omnipotence of God. That surely does not argue culpable ignorance which as matter of course exceeds our finite intelligence, limited as it is within such narrow bounds. Do you not rather think that it is consonant with the nature of the created spirit of man and his science,

to acknowledge in the uncreated spirit of the Supreme being such a power as by our poor humanity can neither be conceived nor understood? We are men, and nothing human can we regard as indifferent to us. Wherefore, as you avow you cannot understand how God should put on humanity, I may be permitted to ask how you interpret that passage in the Gospel and that in the Epistle to the Hebrews, the first of which declares that 'the word became flesh,' * the second, that 'the Son of God had assumed the nature not of the angels but of the seed of Abraham'? † The whole tenor of the Gospel [according to John] seems to me to imply that the only-begotten Son of God, the λόγος who both is God and was with God, showed himself with our human nature, and in this capacity gave himself in his passion, death, and burial as an *ἀντίλυτρον*—a cleansing or propitiatory sacrifice,‡ for us sinners. I would gladly be informed by you what interpretation you put on these and other similar passages, the truth of the gospel and the Christian religion—both of which I think you respect—being still maintained entire.

I had intended to write even more at large, but am interrupted by friends to whom I dare not seem inattentive. What I have already said, however, may suffice, and perhaps even prove tedious to you amid your philosophising. Farewell, therefore, and believe me as ever the admirer of your learning and wisdom,

H. OLDENBURG.

London, Dec. 16, 1675.

* Vide Gospel according to St John, i. 1, et seq.
† Epistle to Hebrews, ii. 16, et seq.
‡ 1 Tim. ii. 6; Matt. xx. 28.

LETTER XXIII.

B. DE SPINOZA TO HENRY OLDENBURG.

Honoured Sir,

I see at length what it was you wished me not to divulge. But as this lies at the very foundation of all I proposed to make known in the work I intended to publish,* I shall here explain to you in brief how and on what grounds I maintain the fateful necessity of all things, and of all that happens.

Now, in the first place, I do by no means think that God is subject to Fate, Destiny, or Necessity, but hold that all which happens comes to pass by inevitable necessity from the nature of God; even as it is generally admitted that from the nature of God it follows that God knows himself. No one, I imagine, will deny that such knowledge follows of necessity from the divine nature; yet no one can so understand the proposition as to assume that God is subjected to Fate or Necessity, but on the contrary, that God freely though at the same time necessarily knows himself.

Farther, the inevitable necessity of things for which I contend abrogates neither divine nor human Law or Right. For moral doctrines, whether we assume that they receive or do not receive the form of Law or the stamp of Right from God, are still divine and wholesome; and whether we have the good that accompanies virtue and divine love from God as a legislator and judge, or from the necessity of the divine nature, it is not therefore either the more or the less desirable; as, on the other hand, the evil that follows wicked deeds and base passions, because flowing necessarily from these, is not the less to be deprecated. Lastly, whatever we do, whether we are actuated by necessity or contingency, we still do influenced either by our hopes or our fears.

* The Ethics.—Ed.

Moreover, men are inexcusable in the sight of God on no other ground than because they are in his power even as clay in the hands of the potter, who of the same mass makes one vessel to honour and another to dishonour.* If you will but consider with care the little I have now said, I doubt not but you will be able readily to reply to all the objections that are commonly made to the view taken, as I have myself found to be the case in repeated instances.

Miracle and Ignorance I have assumed as equivalent terms, because they who seek to defend the existence of God and religion by miracles attempt to make good one difficult or obscure thing by another still more obscure, and so introduce us to a new kind of argument, appealing not to the impossible as they say, but to ignorance. But I need not pursue this topic further, as I think I have sufficiently explained my views on the subject of miracles in the Tractatus Theologico-politicus. I shall only ask you to observe, in addition to what is there set forth, that Christ did not appear personally either to the Council, or to Pilate, or to any incredulous or indifferent person, but to believers only; that God has neither right hand nor left, is in no one place more than another, but is of infinite and universal essence; that matter is everywhere matter, that God does not reveal himself in any imaginary sphere evoked by fancy beyond this world; and, as the human body is bounded and maintained in its allotted form by the atmosphere, you will readily conceive that the apparition of Christ after his crucifixion is of the same kind precisely as that in which Abraham thought that God appeared to him when he saw certain men at his door whom he invited in to partake of his meal.

But here, perhaps, you will say: all the apostles believed implicitly that Christ rose from the dead, and verily and indeed ascended into heaven. I do not deny this. Abraham

* Vide Paul's Epist. to Rom. ix. 21.

believed that God had sat at table with him; and the Israelites in general believed that God had come down from heaven on mount Sinai enveloped in fire, and spoken with them immediately in words; whilst these and various others of the same kind were visions or revelations adapted to the capacities and opinions of the men to whom God deigned to make known his will. I, therefore, conclude that the resurrection of Christ from the dead was one of a purely spiritual nature, and revealed to believers according to their capacities only; that is to say, Christ endowed with eternity, rose from the dead—and here I understand the word dead in the sense in which Christ uses it, when he says, Let the dead bury their dead *—even as he in his life and death had given an example of singular holiness to mankind, and, in so far as they followed the example he set them, awakened his disciples from death to eternal life. It were easy, methinks, to explain the whole doctrine of the Evangelists on this hypothesis. I think, indeed, that the 15th chapter of the First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians, and the whole argument of the apostle in other places can only be understood when seen from this point of view; for to me the interpretation according to the common hypothesis appears weak and readily controvertible. I say nothing here of the fact that the Christians interpreted that spiritually which the Jews interpreted carnally.

With you, I acknowledge human infirmity. But allow me on the other hand to ask, whether or no we poor mortals have so much knowledge of the world as enables us to say precisely how far the power of nature extends and to speak positively of aught that transcends this power? Now, as no one could venture without presumption to give an answer here, so may we be permitted, without being held guilty of arrogance, to say that it is legitimate to explain miracles, in so far as this may be done, by natural causes; and as regards those that can

* Vide Matt. viii. 22; Luke ix. 60.

neither be so explained nor shown to be absurd, that it were better to suspend our judgment concerning them, and to assume, as I have said, the excellence of the doctrine as the sole ground of our religious conclusions.

To conclude: you believe that the passages you quote from the Gospel of John and the Epistle to the Hebrews are opposed to what I say. But I answer that this is because you measure phrases in Eastern languages by European modes of speech; and though John wrote his Gospel in Greek, he Hebraizes nevertheless. What, for instance, do you make of those passages of Scripture in which it is said that God manifested himself in a cloud, and that he dwelt in a tabernacle or temple? Do you believe that God put on the nature of a cloud, or of a temple, or a tabernacle? Now, the utmost that Christ said of himself was, that he is the temple of God,* and this, as I have explained, because God manifested himself especially in him. It is to make this truth more impressive that John says, 'The Word became flesh.' But enough on these matters.

[The Hague, Dec., 1675, or Jan., 1676.]

LETTER XXIV.

HENRY OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Ευ πραττειν!—Well done!

You have hit the mark and rightly seen my reasons for desiring the suppression of those views of the fatalistic necessity of all things. I feared that such teaching might interfere with virtuous conduct, and that the hope of rewards and fears of punishment might lose their influence in the world. Nor do I find in your last letter sufficient to meet the difficulty and tranquillize the minds of men. For if, in all our

* John ii. 19; Matt. xxvi. 60; Mark xiv. 58.

doings, moral as well as natural, we human beings are in the hand of God as clay in that of the potter, with what show of justice can any of us have it laid to his charge that he acted in this way or in that, seeing that it was impossible for him to have acted otherwise than he did? Might we not all retort on God and say: Thy inflexible destiny and resistless power compel us so to do, and make it impossible we should do otherwise; wherefore, then, and with what show of justice dost thou subject us to dreadful punishments which we could in nowise avoid, seeing that thou orderest and rulest all things by thy arbitrary will and pleasure, thy law of supreme necessity? If you say that men are inexcusable before God for no other reason than that they are wholly in his power, I turn the argument against you and maintain, with greater show of reason as it seems, that men are excusable precisely because they are in the power of God. For it were competent to every one to say: It is thy irresistible power, O God! and therefore am I excusable for having done no otherwise than I have done.

Farther, when you assume miracle and ignorance as synonymous terms, it seems to me that you prescribe the same limits to the power of God and the capacity, were it even of the most intelligent of men, to know; as if God could do nothing, could call into existence nothing of which man by the application of his best powers could not understand the cause.

Reverting to the history of the passion, death, burial, and resurrection of Christ, I find all depicted in such true and lively colours, that I venture to put it to your conscience and inquire, whether, if you be but persuaded of the truth of the narrative, you think it is to be understood allegorically or literally? The circumstances which the Evangelists have detailed with so much precision seem to me to leave us no choice, but to take the recital in its most literal sense. This

much would I say on these heads, which I ask of you carefully to weigh and answer in a spirit of the most confiding friendship. Mr Boyle greets you cordially again. On another occasion I shall inform you of what we are about in our Royal Society. Meantime farewell, and keep me in your loving remembrance!

HENRY OLDENBURG.

London, Jan. 14th, 1676.

LETTER XXV.

B. DE SPINOZA TO HENRY OLDENBURG.

Honourable Sir,

When I said in my last letter that we are inexcusable because we are in the hands of God like clay in the hands of the potter, I wished this to be taken in the sense that no one has a title to reproach God with having given him a weak body or an impotent mind. For as it would be absurd if the circle complained that God had not given it the properties of the sphere, or the child labouring under stone that God had not endowed him with a healthy frame; even so would it be absurd did a man of feeble soul complain that God had denied him strength of understanding, and true knowledge and love of God Himself, and moreover bestowed upon him so impotent a nature that he could neither control nor get the better of his animal appetites. For the nature of each particular thing agrees with nothing else but that which necessarily follows from its given cause. But that it belongs not to the nature of every man to be of powerful mind, and that it depends even as little on us to have a healthy body as to possess a powerful mind, will be denied by no one save by him who would at once deny both reason and experience. You say, however, that if men sin of natural necessity, so are

they also of natural necessity to be excused; but then you do not explain what you would conclude from this: whether that God could not be rightly angry with them, or that even as they are, they are worthy of being blessed, i. e. worthy of the knowledge and love of God. If you mean the former, I agree with you entirely; for I do not think that God is ever angry, but that all things come to pass in conformity with his decrees. I do not admit, however, that all men must therefore be blessed; for men may be excusable and nevertheless fail of true felicity, and even suffer misery and affliction in many ways. A horse, for instance, is excusable for being a horse and not a man, but in spite of this he must continue in his state. He who is bitten by a mad dog and becomes rabid is certainly excusable, but his fellow men have asserted a right to suffocate him;* and he who cannot subdue his passions nor hold them in check even with the terrors of the law before him, although he may be held excusable on the ground of his infirmity of nature, cannot enjoy true peace of mind or have any knowledge or love of God, but necessarily perishes.

I do not think it needful in this place to do more than direct your attention to this: that when in the Scriptures God is spoken of as being angry with sinners, and their judge; as making inquiry into the affairs of men, or interfering and deciding in these, such language can only be used in a human sense, and in conformity with vulgar opinion. It is not the purpose of the Scriptures to teach philosophy or to make men learned, but to make them obedient.

I do not see, therefore, why, because I speak of Miracles and Ignorance as words of like import, I should be held to

* It was held right and lawful so to do in Spinoza's day. Barbarity of the kind is now out of date. The physician's province is most clearly apprehended at present to do everything to preserve life, in no contingency to do aught to cut it short.

circumscribe the power of God, and man's power to know, within the same bounds.

For the rest, I take the passion, death, and burial of Christ literally, as you do; his resurrection, however, I regard as allegorical. I admit, indeed, that by the Evangelists the resurrection is detailed with such circumstances that it is impossible to deny that they themselves believed in the resurrection from the dead of the body of Christ, and in his assumption into heaven that he might sit at the right hand of God. I admit, also, that what was witnessed by the faithful might have been seen by an indifferent person, had one been present in the places where Christ appeared to the disciples. But I say—and this I do without detriment to the doctrine of the gospel—that herein the witnesses may have been deceived, just as other prophets have been deceived, instances of which I have given in a former letter. Paul, indeed, to whom Christ subsequently appeared, glories in this—that he had known Christ not according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit.

Farewell, and believe that I am yours with all affectionate esteem,

B. De Spinoza.

[Feb. 7th, 1676.]

LETTER XXV. (A.)

HENRY OLDENBURG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

In reply to Spinoza's No. XXV. of Feb. 1676, from Van Vlotens's Supplementum, p. 309.

Dear Sir,

In your last of the 7th of Feb. there are several things on which I feel called to animadvert. Thus you say: Men have no ground for complaint, because God has vouch-

safed them no true knowledge of himself, and has denied them strength enough to resist sin, inasmuch as nothing belongs to the nature of a thing save that which follows necessarily from its cause. Now, I say, as God the creator of man has made him in his own image, which seems to imply wisdom and goodness and power in the conception, it must on every account follow that it is more in the power of man to have a sound mind than a healthy body, seeing that the physical soundness of the body depends on mechanical principles; sanity of mind, on the contrary, on resolution (προαίρεσις) and counsel. You will, perhaps, reply, that men may be excusable, and yet are tried and afflicted in many ways. This at first sight seems hard; and the case you cite in illustration, viz., that one rabid from the bite of a mad dog may well be excused, but may yet rightfully be put to death, does not seem to me to meet the case. The destruction of the mad dog even, would savour of cruelty, were it not required in order that other dogs and animals and men might be saved from being bitten. But if God give man a sound mind, such as he can bestow, there is then no contagion of vice to be feared. And it would certainly appear very ruthless were God to inflict eternal, or even extreme temporal tortures on men by reason of sins they commit, and which they could in nowise avoid. The tenor of all Scripture, however, seems to suppose or to imply that men may abstain from sin; they abound in admonitions and promises,—in promises of reward and denunciations of punishment, all of which seems to militate against any necessity of sinning, and to presume the possibility of escaping the penalties threatened. If this be denied, then were the human mind to be held subject to the like mechanical laws as the human body.

Further, when you assume belief in miracles and ignorance to be equivalent terms, you would, on such grounds, have man the creature, endowed with the infinite power and provi-

dent wisdom of the Creator, propositions which I am most intimately persuaded are altogether inadmissible.

Lastly, when you affirm that the passion, death, and burial of Christ are to be taken literally, but his resurrection from the dead allegorically, you do not appear to me to support your conclusion by any argument. The account of the resurrection is given in the Gospels in the same literal terms as the other accompanying incidents. And this article of the Resurrection underlies the whole of the Christian Religion, and is the voucher for its foundation in truth. This article shaken or demolished, the whole mission and heavenly doctrine of Jesus Christ suffer collapse. It cannot but be known to you how Christ, risen from the dead, laboured in various ways to convince his disciples of the truth of his resurrection properly so called. To propose to turn the whole of this portion of the Scripture narrative into allegory were equivalent to disputing the entire truth of the gospel history.

These few points I have thought well to interpose in vindication of my freedom to philosophise, and I heartily entreat you to ponder them well.

In my next, God granting me life and health, I shall have something to tell you in connection with the doings of our Royal Society. Meantime, &c.

London, Feb. 11, 1676.

The answer which Spinoza doubtless sent to this last letter of Oldenburg's has not been preserved. As Oldenburg's epistle, however, is but a repetition of what he had already advanced, Spinoza's reply could have been little more than a reiteration of the views he had already set forth. The loss of the reply is therefore the less to be regretted.

LETTER XXVI.

SIMON DE VRIES TO B. DE SPINOZA (WITH ADDITIONS FROM VAN VLOTEN'S SUPPLEMENT).

My dear Friend,

I have long desired once more to find myself beside you, but leisure and this bitter wintry weather have not favoured me. I often regret that so great a distance divides us—that we live so far apart. Happy, most happy must that inmate of yours (casuarius) be, living as he does under the same roof with you, and with opportunities whilst dining, supping, and walking with you, of discoursing on high and holy things. Far from each other as we are in body, you are nevertheless often present with me in spirit, especially when I take your writings in hand and study their contents. As everything in these, however, is not so clearly understood by all the members of our society as could be wished (and this is the reason why we have made a fresh start with our meetings), I sit down to write to you, to show you that I am not forgetful of you [as well as to explain our difficulties].

Our society, you must know, is so constituted that one of the members, each taking the duty in turn, reads aloud one of your propositions, explains it in his own way, and then demonstrates it in harmony with the series of which it makes one. Should it happen that one proposition cannot be shown to harmonize with another, we note the difficulty and write to you, so that the matter may, if possible, be cleared up and we may, under your guidance, be enabled to defend the truth against the superstitious among our pious Christians. Backed by you we feel as if we could withstand the arguments of the whole world.

On a first reading we did not find the whole of your definitions alike clear and easy of interpretation. We did not even all agree in opinion as to the nature of definition.

[The writer then goes on to enumerate certain difficulties he had encountered in the definitions with which Spinoza prefaces his Principia Cartesiana. He had sought assistance from Borellus, Clavius, and others, but found little help from them, and so appeals to the master himself. In particular, he does not understand the third Definition of the Principia, and is puzzled by the Scholium to Prop. 10, Pt i. of the Ethics; which we learn must have been already reduced to shape at this early date (1663), and was doubtless imparted in MS. by the author to De Vries, one among the earliest and most ardent admirers of Spinoza, and whom the philosopher in turn appears to have greatly loved. As all the points in De Vries' letter are taken up in succession in Spinoza's reply, it would be mere repetition were De Vries' letter given in extenso. The conclusion of the letter, however, is interesting, and as supplied by Van Vloten is here given.]

Let me return you my best thanks for your writings communicated to me by P. Balling. They have, indeed, given me much pleasure, particularly the Scholium to Prop. 19.* If I can be of any use to you here in anything within my power, I am at your command; you have but to let me know. I have entered the anatomical class and have got half through the course; I shall certainly begin chemistry anon, and so with you as my adviser shall go through the whole medical curriculum. I conclude, and shall look for a reply. Meantime adieu, and believe me to be your most attached,

S. J. D'VRIES.

Amsterdam, Feb., 1663.

To Benedictus Spinoza, Rhynsburg.

* From the demonstration it appears that the existence of God even as his essence is an eternal truth. Eth., Pt i. Prop. 19.—ED.

LETTER XXVII.

B. DE SPINOZA TO S. J. DE VRIES.

[The first paragraph of this letter is from Van Vloten's supplement.]

Dear Friend,

I lately received your welcome letter, for which, and for all your expressions of regard for me, I feel very grateful. Your long absence, I assure you, has been as much matter of regret with me as with yourself. Meantime, I am glad to know that my lucubrations have been of any use to you and our friends. Thus you see, though absent, do I hold converse with you all. Nor need you envy my inmate, for there is no one with whom I have less sympathy than he, none with whom I am more on my guard. I would, therefore, have you and all our more intimate friends advised not to communicate my views to him until he shall have attained to somewhat riper years. He is still too much of a boy; without fixed principles, and eager for novelty rather than truth. These youthful defects, however, I hope will be amended with the lapse of a few years. In so far as I may judge from his parts, indeed, I believe that this will very surely come to pass. The aptness of the youth leads me to take an interest in him.*

* The young man here referred to is certainly Albert Burgh, to whom Spinoza's admirable letter numbered lxxiii. is addressed. The subsequent conduct of the young man in suffering himself to be perverted from the simple faith of his parents, shows us how accurately Spinoza had appreciated his character. Spinoza's reference to his own particular views in this place and his caution to De Vries not to communicate these too freely, would have led us to surmise that his friends of the debating society had more in their hands from the philosopher than his Principia Cartesiana. And there can now be no question that it is to the original draft or epitome of the Ethics, lately rescued from oblivion by the learned bookseller of Amsterdam, Frederick Muller, and edited with a Latin translation by Dr Van Vloten in his supplement to the works of Benedict de Spinoza, 12mo, Amst., 1862, that he alludes. There had already been hints of the existence of such an early work by Spinoza given in various quarters, and even short summaries of its contents (particularly by Dr Ed. Boehmer in his B. de Spinoza Tr. de Deo et

As to the questions discussed in your debating society,—which, by the way, seems to me to be very wisely constituted—and now submitted by you to me, I can see how it has come to pass that you have encountered difficulties in answering them yourselves. It is because you have not distinguished between definitions of different kinds, viz., a definition which serves for the explanation of a thing, the essence of which alone is inquired after and is matter of doubt; and a definition which is proposed for examination only. Now the former, inasmuch as it has a determinate object, ought to be true, whilst the latter needs not to be so. Thus: Does any one require of me a description of Solomon's Temple, I am bound to give him a true account of the structure, unless I mean to talk idly. But do I mentally plan a temple of any kind which I wish to build, and from the extent of which I conclude that I should require such an area, so much stone, so many loads of timber and other material, would any one in his senses say that I had come to a wrong conclusion, because perchance I had made use of a false definition? Or would any one then require me to prove my definition? To do so were to tell me I had not thought of that which had occupied my thoughts, or to ask of me proof of my having conceived that which had been in mind—and this were trifling, indeed!—Definition, therefore, either explains a thing as lying outside of the understanding, in which case it ought to be true and not different from axiom or proposition,—unless indeed the essences or

Homine Lineamenta. Hala, 1852, 4to), but to Fr. Muller and J. van Vloten is due the honour of having first given it to the world entire. Whether it were communicated by Spinoza to his more intimate friends in Latin or in Dutch is doubtful. This much is certain, that the only text (and two copies have already been discovered) of the Treatise now extant is in Dutch. It is entitled: Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch en deszelfs Welstand; translated by Dr van Vloten: Tractatus brevis de Deo et Homine ejusque Valetudine. An elegant and carefully collated edition of the treatise in Dutch has just appeared under the able editorship of Dr Carolus Schaarschmidt (Amst. apud Fr. Muller, 1869, 8vo). Besides the Dutch text, there is an excellent preface, and a disquisition on the sources of Spinoza's Philosophy—De Spinozæ Philosophiæ Fontibus, by the editor.

affections of things be the matters considered, when definition has a wider scope, extending as it then does to eternal verities —or it explains a thing as conceived or as it may be conceived of by us, in which case, again, it differs from axiom and proposition in this, that it requires to be conceived absolutely, and not as an axiom having reference to some simple truth. It is a bad definition, consequently, which is not clearly conceivable. By way of illustration I take the example adduced to you by Borelli: Did any one speak of two straight lines inclosing a space under the name of figure lines, and so designated as straight, lines that are usually called curved, then were the definition admissible, for then were such an indefinite figure as this () to be understood, and neither square nor circle nor any other definite figure. But did he use the word line in its ordinary acceptation, then were the thing unintelligible and the definition meaningless. Now, all this is plainly confounded by Borelli, whose opinion you seem disposed to adopt. I propose another example, that, indeed, which you adduce at the end of your letter. If I say that every substance has one attribute only, this is a simple proposition and requires demonstration. But if I say that by substance I understand that which comprises one attribute only, the definition will be good, provided other entities comprising several attributes are signified by another name than substance. But when you go on to say I have not demonstrated that substance or entity has or may have numerous attributes, it is because you have not properly considered my demonstrations. For I have supplied two, the first of which is in these terms: 'There is nothing more obvious than that every Entity is conceived by us under some attribute, and that the more of reality or being an Entity possesses the greater is the number of attributes ascribable to it. Hence the absolutely infinite Entity or Being [which I designate Substance] is to be defined as constituted by an in-

finity of attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence existing necessarily.*

The second, and, as I think, the more important demonstration is this: 'The greater the number of attributes I connect with any entity or being, the more of real existence am I compelled to conceive it endowed withal;' in other words, the more am I forced to regard it from the point of view of truth or reality; which would plainly be otherwise did I imagine a monster—a chimæra, or anything of the sort.

Farther, when you tell me that you do not conceive thought otherwise than through ideas; because in the absence of ideas all thought ceases, I believe that this happens because you, a thinking entity, set aside or quit yourself of your thoughts and conceptions; and it is not wonderful therefore, that having cast away all thought, nothing remains for you to think about. But the essential of the matter—and I think I have shown it clearly enough,—is this: that understanding, although infinite, belongs to the natura naturata, not to the natura naturans,—to nature influenced, not to nature influencing. But I do not see what this has to do with the comprehension of my third definition, neither do I see what difficulty it throws in the way of understanding that. For the definition as I gave it to you, unless my memory plays me false, ran thus: 'By substance I understand that which is in itself and is conceived by itself, i. e. the conception of which involves the conception of no other thing;' by attribute I understand the same thing, save that attribute, in respect of our understanding, is regarded as attaching a certain specific nature to substance.† This definition, I say, shows with sufficient clearness what I understand both by substance and attribute. You would have me, however, though this seems unnecessary, explain to you how one

*Vide Ethics, Pt i. Prop. 9, 10, 11, and Schol.
† Vide Ethics, Pt i. Def. 3, 4.

and the same thing can properly be designated by two names. Now, that I may not seem niggardly, I shall give you not one but two instances. First, I say, that by *Israel* I understand the third patriarch, and by *Jacob* I mean the same individual, the latter name having been given him because at his birth he grasped the heel of his brother. Second, by *plane* I understand that kind of surface which reflects all the rays of light without change; and by *white* I understand the same thing, save that the term white is referred to the individual who looks on a plane surface, &c.

LETTER XXVIII.

B. DE SPINOZA TO SIMON DE VRIES.

Dear Friend,

You ask me if experience be necessary to know that the definition of an attribute is true? I answer that experience is never required save as regards matters that cannot be concluded on from the definitions of things; such, for example, as the existence of modes; for the existence of a mode cannot be inferred from the definition of anything. But we do not require experience to satisfy us of the reality of those things whose existence is not distinguished from their essence, things whose existence, therefore, is inferred from their definition. Experience, indeed, could never teach us this, for experience teaches nothing of the essences of things; the utmost it can do is to dispose the mind to think of certain determinate essences of things. Wherefore, seeing that the existence of attributes is not different from their essence, we cannot attain to a knowledge of their existence by any experience.

As to your farther question: Whether things, or the affections of things, are eternal verities? I answer: By all

means. Do you now ask: Wherefore, then, I do not call them eternal truths? I reply: In order to distinguish them, as indeed is always done, from those affections that illustrate nothing, or no property of a thing; such, for example, as that Nothing comes of Nothing. This, and similar propositions, I say, enunciate absolute, eternal truths; and in saying so nothing more is meant than that they have no existence outside of the mind or understanding.

LETTER XXIX.

B. DE SPINOZA TO LOUIS MEYER, M. ET PH. D.

Dearest Friend,

I have two letters from you—one of the 11th of January, the other of the 26th of March [1663]. Both were alike welcome to me, especially when I learned that you were well, and often thought of me. I return you my best thanks for all your friendly sentiments and the high consideration in which you hold me, and I beg you to be assured that I am no less affectionately disposed towards you, as I shall seek occasion at all fitting times to show you. I proceed at once in this course to do my best to answer the questions you propose to me in your letters. You would have me give you the results of my meditations on the Infinite, and this I set about with all my heart.

The question of the Infinite has been held to be of all others the most difficult; so difficult, indeed, as even to be insoluble. This, however, has arisen from no distinction having been made between that which is infinite of its own nature and in virtue of its definition, and that which has no limits, not in virtue of its essence, but by reason of its cause; farther, because no distinction has been made between that which is said to be infinite because it is endless, and that

whose parts, although conceived greater or smaller in amount, cannot be determined by any specific number; still further, because no distinction is made between that which we understand merely but do not imagine, and that which we imagine as well as understand. Had these particulars been taken into consideration, I say, philosophers would not have felt themselves overwhelmed by the load of difficulties they now encounter. They would then have clearly understood what the Infinite is that cannot be divided or can have no parts; and what the Infinite that can so consist, that can be so divided. They would, moreover, have understood what Infinite is that which can without implication be greater than another, and what the Infinite that cannot be so conceived; all of which will clearly appear from what follows.

Before going farther, however, I shall in as few words as possible explain what I understand by the terms Substance, Mode, Eternity, and Time. As regards Substance, then, I would observe 1st, that to be or to exist belongs to its nature; that is to say Being or Existence follows from its essence and definition alone; a truth which, if I rightly remember, I formerly demonstrated to you *vivâ voce*, without the aid of any other proposition. 2ndly, The second point, which indeed follows from the first, is this: substance is not manifold or multiple, but exists singly and is ever of one and the same nature. 3rd, All substance can only be understood as infinite.

The affections of Substance I entitle Modes; the definition of which, as it is not that of Substance itself, does not involve existence; wherefore although modes exist, they may yet be conceived as non-existent; whence it follows, farther, that when the essence only of modes is considered, and not the order of nature at large, we cannot conclude either that they already exist, that they will or will not exist in the future, or that they existed in the past. From this it clearly

appears that we conceive the existence of Substance in a totally different manner from that of Mode; and it is from this that the distinction between eternity and time or duration arises, for whilst we express the existence of Modes in connection with the idea of time, we connect the existence of Substance with that of Eternity, i. e. the endless enjoyment of being or existence.

From what has now been said, it follows that we can at will determine the existence and duration of modes, when, as usually happens, we have regard to their essential nature only, and not to the order of nature at large, because to this extent we do not compromise the conception we have of them, —can conceive them as greater or smaller, and as divisible into parts; Eternity and Substance, on the contrary, as they can only be conceived of as Infinite, can suffer nothing of this kind without the conception we form of them being at the same moment destroyed. Wherefore they talk idly, I will not say insanely, who speak of extended Substance as consisting of parts, or as made up of bodies truly distinct from one another. This were as if by adding or accumulating a multitude of circles, it were thought possible to compose a square, a triangle, or some other figure totally different from a circle. The whole farrago of arguments whereby philosophers commonly pretend to show that extended Substance is finite or bounded, therefore, amounts to nothing; for all proceed on the assumption that corporeal substance is constituted of parts. In precisely the same way would they who hold that a line is made up of points find many arguments to show that it is not divisible to infinity.* Did you now ask me how it comes that we are naturally so much disposed to think of extended Substance as divisible, I answer, Because we conceive quantity in two ways, abstractly, to wit, and superficially;— superficially in so far as we imagine quantity through the

* Ethics, Pt i. Pr. 13, Schol.

senses; abstractly when the conception is in the understanding only. Now, if we consider quantity as it is in the senses and the imagination—and this indeed very readily and most commonly happens—we then find it divisible, made up of parts and multiple; but when we consider it abstractedly, as it is in the intellect and a thing *per se*, which it is extremely difficult to do, then do we perceive it to be, as already said, Infinite, Indivisible and One.

Farther, it is because we can at will set limits to duration and quantity, viz.: when we conceive the first abstracted from Substance, the second distinct from mode flowing from things eternal, that [ideas of] *time* and *measure* arise—of time to aid imagination in limiting duration, of measure to aid imagination in determining quantity.

Still farther, it is because we separate the affections of Substance from Substance itself, and reduce these to classes, in order that we may more easily imagine them, that [the idea of] *number* arises—number by which we determine or limit the affections of Substance.

From this it is clear that measure, time, and number, are nothing but modes of thinking, or rather of imagining. Wherefore it is not wonderful that all who with such notions,—ill-defined besides,—have sought to comprehend the course and procedure of nature, have got so thoroughly entangled in difficulties of their own making, that they have been at length unable to extricate themselves otherwise than by violating all reason and admitting absurdities of every sort. For, as there is much that can in no wise be apprehended by the imagination but by the understanding only, such as Substance, eternity, and the like, if any one attempts to explain things of this kind by notions that belong to the domain of imagination, he proceeds as though he had set himself the task of imagining foolishness. Neither can the modes of Substance be understood if they be confounded with the entities of rea-

son, or the auxiliaries of imagination. For, if we do so, we sever them from Substance and mode, by or through which they flow from Eternity, without which, however, they cannot be rightly known.

That you may have the clearer view of this, take the following example: should any one conceive duration abstractedly, and begin, confounding it with time, to divide it into parts, he could never know in what way an hour passed by. For, in order that an hour should elapse, or that the conception of the lapse of an hour should take place in the mind, it would be necessary first that half of the interval should pass, then half of the remaining half, half of this again, and again, and again to eternity, so that no end of the hour could ever be attained to. It is for this reason that many who are not used to distinguish the entities of reason from real things have gone so far as to maintain that duration is made up of distinct moments, and so, striving to escape Scylla, have fallen into Charybdis; for, to compose duration out of moments were the same as pretending to constitute a given number by a series of noughts.

Since it sufficiently appears from what has now been said that neither number, measure, nor time can be infinite, seeing that they are nothing more than aids to the imagination —for otherwise number would not be number, nor measure measure, nor time time—it is obvious why many who confound these three [images] with things themselves, because ignorant of the true nature of things, do in fact deny the Infinite. But the mathematician sees how wretchedly such persons reason; for he is never stayed by arguments of such a complexion in the matters he clearly and distinctly apprehends. For, besides finding many things that are inexplicable by any number (and this sufficiently shows the inadequacy of number to determine everything), he discovers others that exceed all assignable numbers. Yet does he not conclude that

such things exceed all numbers through the multitude of their parts, but from this: that by the nature of the thing it cannot without manifest absurdity be numbered. All the inequalities, for instance, of the space interposed between A B and C D, and all the varieties of movement which matter in motion within the included space might undergo, can never be made the subject of numerical computation. And this happens not from the magnitude of the included space; for however



small this part is assumed to be, the inequalities of the small part will still exceed all power of enumeration. Neither is this conclusion come to as in other cases, because we have not the maximum and the minimum of the part,—for in our diagram we have both—the maximum to wit in A B, the minimum in C D. It is because the nature of the space comprised between two non-concentric circles is such that it admits of nothing of the kind. He who would attempt to express all the inequalities of such a space by numbers must begin by making the circle something else than it is.

To return to our proposition: any one who should seek to determine all the motions of matter that have ever occurred by reducing them and their durations to fixed numbers and definite times, would do no less than essay to deprive corporeal substance, which we cannot conceive otherwise than as existing, of its affections, and so efface its proper nature. I

should find no difficulty in demonstrating so much, besides various other points touched on in this letter, did I not deem it superfluous to do so.

From what is said you will see that there are some things which by their nature are infinite and can by no means be conceived as finite; that there are others which, in respect of the cause on which they depend and when viewed abstractedly, can be divided into parts and regarded as finite; lastly, that there are some which may be called infinite—or rather, if you will—indefinite, which may be conceived as greater or smaller, and which nevertheless are unassimilable with any number—as is manifest enough from the example adduced as well as from many others.

I think I have now laid before you the main causes of the error and confusion that have arisen in connection with the question of the infinite, and have so explained matters that, unless I deceive myself, there remains no point not touched on which may not be cleared up by what has been said. I need not, therefore, detain you longer here.

This much, however, I would add by the way, that in my opinion some of the modern peripatetics have understood amiss the old Aristotelian demonstration of the existence of God. This, as I find it given by a certain Jew, Rabbi Ghashdi by name, runs as follows: 'Assume a progress or sequence of causes to infinity, all things that be must then be caused; but nothing that is caused can exist in virtue of its proper nature; therefore is there nothing existing to the essence of which belongs necessary existence. But this is absurd, therefore is the assumption absurd also.'—The pith of the argument as thus put does not lie in the impossibility of an infinity in act, or of a sequence of causes in infinitum, but in this only that things are assumed which do not by their proper nature exist necessarily, which are not determined to existence by a Being whose nature it is necessarily to exist.

I should now go on to your second letter, but am pressed for time; I could, indeed, reply to all it contains more conveniently could you favour me with an interview. Let me beg of you, therefore, to come to me at your first convenience —the season for moving about now approaches. So no more at present but farewell! and be mindful of me, who am yours, &c.

B. D'ESPINOZA.

Rhynsburg, April 2nd, 1663.

Note. A copy of this letter must have been given to Von Tschirnhaus, who refers to it in his letter of May, 1676, No. lxix., almost as if it had been addressed to him.—ED.

LETTER XXX.

B. DE SPINOZA TO PETER BALLING.

My Dear Friend,

Your last letter, if I recollect rightly, of the 26th of last month came duly to hand, and filled my mind with grief and anxiety, although the admirable calm and strength of soul you display went far to console me. I see that you know how to meet the contrarieties of fate, or rather the world's interpretation of untoward events, with the best weapons. My solicitude for you, however, rather increases than gets less of late, and I entreat you by our friendship again to let me hear very fully about yourself, unless, indeed, writing at this time be found distressing to you.

As to the omen of which you speak, when you thought you heard your child sobbing and groaning whilst he was still in good health, in the same way as he did when seriously indisposed and shortly before he died, I am of opinion that the sounds you heard were no actual sobs or groans, but were

the mere product of your imagination; for you tell me that when you roused yourself to listen, you no longer heard them so plainly as you had done before, and as you did again when you were dropping off to sleep. This of itself proves that the sobs and groans you heard were entirely of the imagination. And I can confirm this view by that which happened to myself last winter in Rhynsburg: On awaking one morning out of a distressing dream, just as day was breaking, the images I had had present to me in my dream floated before my eyes as distinctly as if they had been actual objects. One form in particular, that of a leprous negro, whom I had never seen in my life, presented itself to me with singular distinctness, but faded and in a great measure disappeared when, to turn my thoughts to something else, I fixed my eyes on a book; as soon, however, as I allowed my eyes to wander from the page the vision of the blackamoor presented itself with the same vividness as before. By-and-by it began to fade, and anon it disappeared entirely. Now, I say, that what happened to me internally as an apparition or visible form, occurred to you through your sense of hearing; but, as the circumstances in the two cases were different, that which befell you was called an omen or warning, whilst my vision received no such designation.

From what I have now said I think it plainly appears that the creations of the fancy or imagination are the effects of our bodily or mental states. And this much at present, and to avoid prolixity, I say on the ground of experience only; by experience, indeed, we know that fever and other bodily derangements are causes of delirium, and that they whose blood is distempered think or dream of strife and disaster and death. The imagination, moreover, is entirely governed by the state of the mind [as this is by the state of the body], and every day experience assures us that it waits upon sensuous impressions, and arranges and links its creations

with each other, precisely as the understanding does its reasonings and conclusions. We, in fact, perceive almost nothing of which imagination does not fashion an image or counterfeit; and this being so, I maintain that the acts or operations of imagination which proceed from corporeal causes can never be regarded as omens or prognostics of things or events to come, inasmuch as their causes involve no future thing or contingency. Those acts of the imagination, however, or the images which have their cause in particular mental states, may be omens or prognostics of future events; because the mind may have a presentiment, although it be obscure and confused, of things about to happen. The mind, indeed, can imagine things as vividly and fixedly as if they were actually present. A father, for example, and to refer to your own case, feels such love and affection for his son, that he and the beloved object seem as one and the same. And as there must necessarily arise in the mind of the father an idea in harmony with the affection he bears his child, and because of the intimate part he has in him, so must the mind of the father necessarily partake of the ideal being of the son, and of his affections, and all that follows from these. And now, as the mind of the father participates ideally in that which belongs to the nature of the son, so can he, as said, imagine something of this nature so vividly, that he seems to have the object he ideally conceives, actually before him, provided the following conditions be fulfilled, viz.: (*a*) that the event which befalls the son in the course of his life be important; (*b*) that it be such as can be readily imagined; (*c*) that the time when the event happened be not distant; (*d*) lastly, that the body be in good and sound condition, not as regards health only, but, further, as respects freedom from care, anxieties of business, and other things that disturb the senses from without. The matter may be further aided by the thoughts running much upon things that usually excite

similar ideas. For example, if whilst engaged in speaking with any one we hear groans, it mostly happens that when we think of the same person again the groans we heard with our ears when conversing with him on the former occasion recur to the memory.

Such, my dear friend, are my views of the subject on which you consult me; conveyed in brief terms, I own, but I think supplying you with matter which will induce you, on the first favourable opportunity, to write to me again.

Meantime I am, &c.,

B. D'ESPINOZA.

Vorburg, July 20, 1664.

LETTER XXXI.

W. VAN BLEYENBERG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Sir and unknown Friend,

I have already, and oftener than once, carefully read through your lately published work and its Appendix.* To another rather than yourself should I speak of the consummate ability of which I find evidence there, and of the pleasure I have derived from the perusal. The oftener and the more attentively I read the work, indeed, the more am I delighted, and ever still do I find something in its pages I had not observed before. But I must not in expressing too much admiration of the author show myself in the light of his flatterer. I know that the Gods only sell to man at the price of great labour. But not to detain you longer with expressions of my admiration, I crave permission to inform you who your unknown correspondent is who takes the liberty of writing to you. He is one who, impelled by the longing for

* The Principia Philosophiæ Cartesianæ and appended Cogitata Metaphysica, 1663, are here referred to.

pure and simple truth, strives with all his might, and to the extent permitted in this short and fleeting life, to gain a firm footing on the grounds of science, who proposes no object but the attainment of truth, and would make science the stepping-stone neither to distinction nor wealth, but by its means attain to that peace of mind which truth alone can give. Now, of all my studies, none gives me such delight as metaphysics, and if I am superficially rather than profoundly acquainted with the subject, this does not hinder me from giving my leisure to its cultivation. No one, to my mind, has so happily or successfully devoted himself to metaphysical science as yourself, and my great desire now is that you should be more intimately acquainted with me, and kindly consent to assist me in the doubts and difficulties I encounter on my way.

To return to your treatise, much as I find to my taste therein, I must admit that I also meet with matters difficult of digestion; and in doubt whether it were becoming in me, or will prove agreeable to you, if I lay some of these before you, I send this letter as a preliminary, and ask: whether I may take it on me to do so; and, leisure permitting on your part and nothing pressing more for consideration in the course of these long winter evenings, whether I may venture to hope that you will favour me with some further development of your views and opinions? * * *

That my letter may not seem empty in every other respect, I take occasion to mention a single subject on which I would very gladly be better informed. Here and there, both in the Principia and the Cogitata, you maintain, either as your own opinion or the opinion of Descartes whose philosophy you are teaching, that to create and to preserve are one and the same thing, and that God not only created substances, but their motions also; that is, God not only gave substances their state of being by his creative power, but preserves them

continuously by the same in their motions and strivings also. God, for example, not only acts on the soul by his immediate will and power in suchwise that it exists and preserves its state of being, but is also the immediate cause that the actions and motions of the soul are such as they are. In the same way as the ceaseless influence of God is cause of the continued existence of things, so are the strivings or motions of things due to the same cause working in them, inasmuch as there is no cause of motion out of or beyond God. It follows, therefore, that God is not only the cause of the substance of the soul, but, further, of every one of its motions, emotions, or aspirations, designated by the name of Will,—a proposition, indeed, which you advance in various places. By this proposition, however, it would seem necessarily to follow that neither in the motions of the soul, nor in the will as inherent in the soul, can there be aught either of good or evil; or otherwise, that God himself is the immediate agent in both the good and evil that exists; for that which we entitle evil proceeds from the soul, and consequently under the immediate influence and with the concurrence of God. Thus, the soul of Adam disposes him to eat of the forbidden fruit; from what precedes, however, it must not only follow that the soul of Adam wills this through the influence of God, but also that the influence of God wills the soul of Adam to be in the state in which it is. The act of Adam, therefore, inasmuch as God not only moved his will, but moved it in a certain determinate way, is either not evil in itself, or God is himself the immediate cause of what we call evil.

Neither Descartes nor you appears to me to untie this difficult knot in saying that evil is nothing positive, is a non-entity wherein there is no concurrence of God. But whence came the will or desire of Adam to eat? Whence the will of the devils to their pride and presumption? For as the will, as you truly observe, is nothing different from the soul, but

the expression of one or other of its emotions, still is the co-operation of God essential to the motion, whatever it may be. Now, by your writings I see that the co-operation of God is nothing else than the determination of a thing by his will in this or that direction; whence it follows that God co-operates in the evil disposition in so far as it is evil, even as he does in the good in so far as it is good—in other words, God himself is the determining cause of the good and the evil that happens in the world. * * * Further, no determination can take place in our will which was not known to God from eternity; for did we imagine that God knew not what his creatures would do on any and every occasion, we should conceive an imperfection in the Supreme. But how could God know what was to happen otherwise than by his purpose and resolve? The purposes and resolves of God, consequently, are the causes of our determinations; and so and on yet other grounds it follows either that the evil will is not really bad, or that God is the immediate cause and agent of the evil. Nor can the distinction made by theologians between the act and the evil inseparable from the act, be held as being here in place; for God had resolved the act as well as the manner of the act and its consequence: God had not only determined that Adam should eat, but, further, that he, in defiance of the special commandment given him, must necessarily eat. From all of which it follows yet again either that the act of Adam's eating was not evil, or that God himself caused him to sin.

This, honoured sir, is what, for the present, I say I cannot comprehend in your treatise. I find it difficult to adopt either extreme conclusion, and venture to anticipate a satisfactory solution of my dilemma from your knowledge and critical acumen. In my next I hope I shall be able to assure you how much I am indebted to you for your guidance. Meantime be assured that my sole motive in writing to you is love of truth. I am a free man, bound to no profession,

but live by honest merchandise, and spend the leisure I can call my own upon such studies as these. If you do me the favour to reply to me, as I most anxiously desire you should, please to address me as below, and believe me to be yours, most sincerely.

WM. VAN BLEYENBERG.

Dordrecht, Dec. 12, 1664.

LETTER XXXII.

B. DE SPINOZA TO W. VAN BLEYENBERG.

My unknown Friend!

Your letter of the 12th Dec., enclosed in another of the 24th of the same month, reached me on the 26th at Schiedam. I am thereby informed of your eager love of truth, and that truth is the end and aim of all your studies. In the persuasion that this is so, I, whose mind is also directed to nothing else, gladly assure you that I shall not only comply with your present request, but to the extent of my ability reply to any questions you may propose at other times, adding whatever may strike me as likely to further our friendship and good understanding. Of all that lies not immediately within our own power, indeed, I value nothing more highly than to have friendly relations with lovers of truth, there being nothing in the world, not in our power, on which we can repose with more calm assurance than the friendship of such men; for it is even as impossible to renounce the love they feel for one another, this having its foundation in the reverence they reciprocally entertain for truth, as it is impossible to abandon a truth once apprehended. The love of truth for its own sake, indeed, is the highest and sweetest of all things not under our control; for nothing but love of truth has power to knit diversity of view and disposition in bonds of harmony.—I

say nothing of the great and manifold advantages that accrue from the same delightful spirit, that I may not delay you longer with reflections which have of course occurred to yourself; I only say so much as I do, indeed, to show you how agreeable it will be to me to find occasion in times to come to give you pleasure.

Seizing the present opportunity, then, I proceed to discuss the problem you propose, which may be stated in these words: It seems clearly to follow as well from God's providence, which is not distinct from his will, as from God's concurrence and continuous creation of things, that there is either no evil and no sin, or that God is the cause of the evil and the sin that exist. But you do not explain what you understand by evil; and so far as appears from the instance you adduce of the definite will of Adam, you appear to regard the will itself as evil,—the will of man conceived as determined in such and such a way or as contravening the will of God. It is on this ground you say (as I should also were the thing actually as you put it) that it is absurd to assert either that God himself does the thing opposed to his will, or that an act, though opposed to his will, can be good. For my own part, I cannot admit that sin and evil are aught positive, still less that aught can be or can happen in opposition to the will of God. On the contrary, I not only say that sin is nothing positive, but that we cannot otherwise than improperly, and speaking humanly only, say that we offend or sin against God.

As regards the first point—the nonentity of sin—we know that whatever is considered in itself without respect to anything else includes an amount of perfection as great as the essence of the thing itself; for the essence of a thing is nothing more than the perfection that belongs to it. I take, for example's sake, the purpose or will of Adam to eat of the forbidden fruit. This purpose, this will, considered in itself,

involves as much of perfection as it has of reality; and viewed in this light, we see that we conceive imperfection in things only when we contrast them with other things having more perfection or reality than they. In the resolve of Adam consequently, when we consider it in itself, when we do not contrast it with something more perfect—and it were easy to contrast it with an infinity of natural objects, such as trees, rocks, &c., each in its own respect more perfect—we fail to discover any imperfection. That this conclusion is commonly assented to appears from the fact, that what is regarded with indifference or more positive dislike in mankind is often contemplated with pleasure or admiration when seen among the lower animals, such, for instance, as the contests of bees, the jealousy of doves, &c.—acts condemned in man are approved and held as evidence of excellence or perfection when witnessed in animals. Such being the case, sins, inasmuch as they indicate imperfections only, consist in nothing expressive of reality; and of this nature were the determination of Adam to eat of the fruit and his act of eating.

Neither, moreover, ought we to say that the will of Adam militated against the law of God, and that it was evil because it was displeasing to God. For, besides that it would imply great imperfection in God could anything be done contrary to his will; if he desired anything he had not the power to effect, or if his nature were such and so determined that like creatures he felt sympathy with this, antipathy to that—all this, I say, were wholly at variance with the divine will; for, inasmuch as the divine will is not different from the divine intelligence, it is alike impossible that anything can come to pass against the will as against the intelligence of God. In other words, that which should happen against the will of God would be of a nature opposed to his understanding also; and this were tantamount to speaking of a square circle.

Since the will or resolution of Adam, then, considered in

itself, was neither evil, nor, properly speaking, against the will of God, it follows that God may have been its cause, yea, and on the grounds you mention, must have been its cause; not, however, as it was Evil, for the evil that was in it was nothing other than a state of privation into which Adam must fall by reason of his act, and it is certain that privation is nothing positive, and that it is entitled evil in reference to our human understanding only, not to the understanding of God. Now, this comes of our habit of including all the individuals of a genus—all, for example, having the outward lineaments of humanity—under one and the same definition, and therefrom concluding that all alike are susceptible of the highest perfection deducible from the definition. When, however, we find one whose actions are in contradiction with this perfection, we infer that he is void of the perfection in question, and that he departs from his proper nature, which we should not do had we not referred him to our definition and deemed him endowed with a certain nature. But as God neither knows things abstractedly nor fashions definitions, and as things have no more reality than that wherewith the divine intelligence and power has endowed them, it follows definitively that we can only speak of the privation in question with reference to, or as it bears upon, our intelligence, and in nowise as concerns the intelligence of God.

In this way, I apprehend, the question is satisfactorily met and answered. But still further to smooth the way and be rid of every scruple, I hold it necessary to reply to the two following questions, viz.: First, why do the Scriptures say that God punishes the wicked in order to lead them to repentance, and also why did God forbid Adam to eat of the fruit of the tree of knowledge, though he had determined that Adam should not obey the order? Secondly, why does it appear to follow from my writings that the Wicked by their pride, avarice, &c., honour God as much as the Good by their love,

integrity, charity, &c., seeing that both alike accomplish the will of God?

In reply to the first, I say, that the Scriptures, as more especially adapted to the comprehension of the many, and destined to be profitable to them, always speak in a popular or merely human manner. For the people are unable to apprehend sublime things. And this is the reason, I feel persuaded, why all that God revealed to the prophets as necessary to salvation is set down by them in the shape of law. This is why they have invented whole scenes and parables which reveal God, the author and arbiter of salvation and perdition, as a king and lawgiver, have designated and set down as laws certain means which are nothing but causes, and declared salvation and perdition, which are but effects flowing necessarily from these means, as rewards and punishments. Making use of tropes and figures rather than adhering to simple statements of truth, they have often made God speak after the manner of a man; described him as merciful or angry, as now desiring something in the future, as now possessed by jealousy and suspicion, and even as deceived by the devil! Philosophers, therefore, and all who are above the law, or are a law to themselves, i. e. who follow virtue not because it is prescribed as law, but from love and because of its own excellence, ought not to find offence in such language.

The commandment given to Adam, therefore, consisted in this only: that the eating of the fruit of the forbidden tree would cause death, in the same way as it is revealed to us by our natural understanding that poison is deadly. If you now ask to what end this was revealed? I answer, that Adam by knowledge should be made more perfect. To ask of God, however, why he did not give Adam a more perfect will, were as absurd as to inquire why a circle had not been endowed with the properties of a sphere, as plainly appears

from what is said above, and as I have demonstrated in the Scholium to the 15th Proposition of the Principia.

With regard to the second difficulty, I admit as true that the wicked do in their way express the will of God; but they are in nowise, because of this, to be compared with the good. For the more perfection anything has, the greater the portion it has also in the Divinity, and by so much the more does it express the perfection of the Godhead. As the good, then, have immeasurably more perfection than the bad, their virtue cannot be compared with the power of the bad, because the bad are without the divine love which flows from the knowledge of God, through which alone do we after our human fashion call ourselves servants of the Most High. Yea, because the wicked know not God, they are nothing but as a tool in the hand of the workman, which serves unconsciously, and in serving is wasted and worn out. The good, on the contrary, serve with consciousness, and in serving are made ever more perfect.

Voorburg, Jan., 1664.

LETTER XXXIII.

W. VAN BLEYENBERG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Dear Sir, dear Friend!

On a first hasty perusal of your letter I was much disposed not only to reply to it at once but to take exception to many of the things it contains. But the oftener I read it over, the less I seem to find for objection. Before asking your aid in solving some of the difficulties I nevertheless encounter, I should like you to know that I have two general rules, in accordance with which I proceed in my philosophical inquiries. The first is to have clear and definite intellectual conceptions; the second, to keep the revealed

word or will of God in view. With the first I advance as a lover of truth, with the two as a Christian philosopher; and if it happens that after long deliberation I find my natural understanding either opposed to the Scriptures or little in accordance with them, such is their authority with me that I rather abandon the ideas I had formed, than presume to set them up in opposition to the truths I find prescribed to me in the Book. And how should this be otherwise? for I desire firmly to believe that the Scriptures are the word of God; that is, that they came from the great and most perfect God, endowed as He is with an infinitely greater number of perfections than I can comprehend, and I imagine that were I more perfect than I am, I might perchance be able to co-ordinate the sounder conceptions I should then form with everything taught in the sacred volume. You say yourself (Princip. Philos. Cartes., Pt. i. Prop. 15) that our conceptions, be they ever so clear, still involve imperfection; and so, and for this reason, am I rather disposed, were it even against reason, to lean on Scripture, on the ground that it has come to me from the Most High (and this I assume for the present), and therefore ought to receive my assent and belief. Taking my first rule of philosophizing for my guide, then, I admit that there are many things in your letter which I must concede, though I add that some of your subtle reasonings arouse my suspicions; but my second rule compels me to differ from you entirely.

In connection with the question of good and evil you say that you abide by your opinion, viz., that nothing happens or can happen against the will of God. And as the difficulty in regard to the evil that happens required an explanation, you supply it by denying that 'Sin is anything positive,' and add, 'It cannot without impropriety be said that we sin against God.' In the Principia you have further; 'There is no absolute evil, as plainly appears of itself; for everything

that exists, considered in itself and irrespectively of everything else, includes a perfection commensurate with its nature; and from this it follows obviously that sin, as mere evidence of imperfection, can consist in nothing expressive of entity or existence.' But if sin, error, evil, however designated, be or consist in nothing but the absence of perfection, then does it seem inevitably to follow that a perfect thing—and everything is as perfect as its nature—cannot include any imperfection, in other words, that evil cannot arise in any existing thing; for the perfect can in nowise be robbed of its perfection, and if nothing happens against the will of God, and only so much happens as belongs to the essential nature of things, how and in what way can evil, which you say is the absence of good, be conceived? I am persuaded, honoured sir, that you must here admit one of two things, either that there is positive evil, or that good may suffer deprivation of its good or better condition. But to me it seems a contradiction in terms to say that there is no evil, and yet that a good or a better estate may be lost. And suppose you still maintained that evil is nothing positive, and that evil can only be called evil in respect of our intelligence but not in respect of the intelligence of God, and that, in so far as we are concerned, there is deprivation, whilst, as regards God, there is negation only, I would gladly know how the admitted evil as respects God can be merely negative. To me, I own, it seems impossible that evil or the deprivation of goodness can be mere negation in respect of the Supreme. [The remainder of this letter, as it can be read through Spinoza's reply, which takes up each point in its order, is here omitted—all its arguments are met and discussed in the answer.—Ed.]

Dordrecht, Jan. 16th, 1664.

LETTER XXXIV.

B. DE SPINOZA TO W. VAN BLEYENBERG.

Sir and Friend!

When I read your first letter I believed that our opinions nearly agreed; but from your second I see that this is far from being the case; and that we not only are not of one mind in regard to the consequences flowing from first principles, but that we differ in regard to these principles themselves. I scarcely believe, therefore, that any amount of letter-writing will enable us to come to an understanding; for I see that you will accept no conclusion, were it even the most irrefragable by the laws of demonstration, which you yourself or the theologians of your acquaintance find not to accord with your interpretation of the text of Scripture. If, however, you assume that God speaks to us more clearly and potentially through the Scriptures than through the natural understanding with which he has also endowed us, and which his divine wisdom preserves to us assured and uncorrupted, then I say you have good grounds for bringing your understanding to the level of the views you attribute to holy writ, for I myself in such a case could do no otherwise. But as regards myself I candidly and without reserve avow that, although I spent many years in their study, I do not understand the sacred Scriptures; and as it has never happened to me, when I had attained to a firm and definite conclusion, to fall into such a train of thought as led me to doubt of its truth, so do I comfort myself and rest satisfied with what my understanding shows me. I feel no anxiety lest I should have deceived myself in the matter, and never imagine that the sacred writings—though I may not have questioned them in regard to the particular matter in hand—can contravene my conclusion; for truth is never in opposition to truth, as I have shown in my

Appendix (I cannot refer to the chapter, for I have not the book here in the country with me). And though I were at times to find the fruit unreal which I gather by my natural understanding, yet would not this make me otherwise than content, because in the gathering I enjoy, and pass my days not in sighing and sorrow, but in peace, serenity, and joy, and so mount a step higher in existence. I acknowledge, meanwhile, —and this, indeed, affords me the greatest satisfaction and peace of mind—that all which comes to pass does so by the power of the most perfect of beings and in conformity with his immutable decrees.

But to return to your letter. I have to thank you sincerely for having shown me your system of philosophical inquiry; I can, however, by no means thank you when in your remarks on my reply I find you fastening such and such views and opinions upon me. What ground, I pray, has my letter afforded you for ascribing to me such sentiments as these: that men are like the beasts of the field; that like the lower animals men die and perish for ever; that our deeds are displeasing to God, &c.? I have, on the contrary, emphatically declared that the good reverence God, and by this reverence are made more perfect, because more fit to love God truly. Is this reducing man to the level of the beasts? Is this saying that men perish like the beasts of the field, and that their works are displeasing to God? Had you read my letter more carefully you would have seen that our diversity of view lies in this: Whether God as God, i. e. absolutely and without having human attributes ascribed to him, communicates to the good the perfection that belongs to them, as I maintain he does; or, stands towards them as a ruler—which is your opinion, and serves for your ground when you challenge me with saying that the wicked, because they act according to God's decrees, serve God in their way, even as the good serve him in theirs. Such a conclusion, however, can in no way be

wrested from my words; for I never speak of God as a Judge or Ruler; and therefore estimate works according to their character and quality, not according to the power of the agent; and hold that recompense follows deed as necessarily as from the nature of a triangle it follows that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles. Every one will see this at once who observes that our greatest happiness consists in the love of God, and that this love flows of necessity from the knowledge of God, which is consequently so strongly, so earnestly pressed upon us. The principle, however, may be most effectively demonstrated generally, if attention be only given to the nature of a Divine decree, as I have explained it in my Appendix to the Principia. But I own that they who confound the nature of the Deity with the nature of man are little fitted to comprehend or to arrive at right conclusions on such subjects.

I was much disposed to bring this letter to a conclusion here, and not to trouble you further with a discussion of matters which, to judge from the excessively pious passage towards the end of your letter, might serve for entertainment, but could lead to no useful conclusion. But not to overlook your request entirely, I shall go on to explain the words Negation and Deprivation, and briefly touch on what seems most requisite to elucidate the import of my former letter.

First, then, I say that by *deprivation* I understand not the act of depriving or taking away, but simple absence or deficiency only, which in itself is nothing, but is an object of the understanding or a mode of the thinking principle within us of which we become aware when we compare things with one another. We speak for example of the blind being deprived of sight, because we readily imagine them possessed of vision; or the idea of deprivation arises from our contrasting the blind with other persons who see, or because we compare

their present state with a former state when they may have had the use of their eyes. When we consider the blind in this way, contrasting their nature with the nature of other men or with their state in former times, we say that sight belongs to their nature as men, and consequently that being without it they are without, or have been deprived of, the power of vision. When we consider a decree of God, however, and its nature, we can with as little propriety speak of a blind man as of a stone being deprived of sight, for sight at the moment belongs as little to the man as it does to the stone—nothing more appertains to the blind man or is his than that which the divine intelligence has given him. And it is for this reason that God is no more the cause of the absence of sight in the blind man, than of the absence of sight in a stone; which therefore amounts to a pure negation.

In the same way, when we regard the nature of a man carried away by the lust of sensual pleasure, and contrast his appetites with those the good experience, or with the desires the same man may have had at a former period, we say of him that he is deprived of the better aspirations or desires of humanity; for we then judge that virtuous aspiration properly belongs to his nature. But this we could not do did we view the matter as having respect only to the nature of a divine decree, and the divine intelligence; for in this particular, better aspiration belongs as little to the nature of the sensual man at the moment, as it does to the nature of a devil or a stone. On this ground the want of better aspiration is no deprivation, but is negation. Deprivation therefore is nothing more than the abstraction of some faculty or quality from a thing which we conceive properly belongs to its nature. With this explanation we find no difficulty in understanding why the desire of Adam for earthly things should be evil in respect of our understanding, but not in respect of the intelligence of God. For although God was aware of

Adam's past as well as present state, he did not therefore understand him as deprived of his former condition, i. e. God did not understand that the past belonged to Adam's nature; for then had God understood something contrary to his will, i. e. to his intelligence.

If you rightly apprehend what I have now said, and further bear in mind that I do not admit the freedom which Descartes ascribes to the mind, as L. M. has declared in my name in his preface to the Principia, you will not find the slightest contradiction in what I say here. But I now see that I should have done better had I answered in my first letter with Descartes, 'That we cannot know how our freedom, and what depends on it, agrees or can be reconciled with the freedom and providence of God;' so that from God's creation we can discover no contradiction in our freedom, for we cannot conceive how God created the world, and (which indeed is the same thing) how he preserves it. But I imagined you had read the preface; and I felt that I should sin against the friendship to which I so cordially responded did I not answer you according to my most intimate persuasions. But this is beside the matter. As I see, however, that you have not thus far rightly understood Descartes, I beg your attention to the two following points:

First, that neither Descartes nor I have ever said that it belonged to our nature to restrain our will within the limits of our understanding; but only that God had given us a definite understanding, and an indefinite will, in such wise, however, that we do not know to what end he may have created us. Further, that the will, thus indeterminate, makes us not only more perfect, but is also, as I shall immediately show you, extremely necessary to us. Second, that our freedom neither resides in contingency nor indifference, but in the mode of affirming or denying; so that we are the more free the less indifferently we affirm or deny anything.

For instance: If the nature of God is known to us, then from our proper nature affirmation of the being of God follows as matter of necessity, even as it follows from the nature of the triangle that its three angles are equal to two right angles; and yet we are never so free as when we affirm a thing in this manner. But as necessity here is nothing but the decree of God, we may from it understand in a certain way under what conditions we do a thing freely and are its cause, notwithstanding the fact that we do the thing necessarily and by the decree of God. This, I say, we can in some measure understand when we affirm a thing which we clearly and distinctly perceive or apprehend; but when we assert anything which we do not clearly and distinctly apprehend, that is, when we suffer our will to transcend the limits of our understanding, we cannot then apprehend that necessity and those decrees of God, but our own liberty, which is always included in our will, in respect of which our actions are alone entitled good or evil. And if we then seek to reconcile our freedom with the decree and ceaseless creative power of God, we confound that which we clearly and distinctly understand with that which we do not so understand, and thus engage in a vain attempt. It is enough for us therefore to know that we are free, that we can be so the decree of God not opposing, and that we ourselves are the cause of evil, inasmuch as no act save as respects our freedom alone can be called evil. So much as regards Descartes, and to show you that his words, considered in the way I have done, involve no contradiction.

And now I come to that which more immediately concerns myself; and I shall first show the advantages that accrue from my opinion, which mainly consists in this: that as intelligent beings we can submit ourselves, mind and body, without a show of superstition to God, and without denying that prayer may be extremely useful to us; for my under-

standing is too limited to take in all the means that God has provided whereby men may be brought to the love of him, in other words, to salvation. My opinions therefore are as remote as possible from everything pernicious; on the contrary, they indicate most clearly the only means by which they who are not possessed by prejudice and childish superstition may attain to the highest degree of blessedness.

What you say about my making man so entirely dependent on God as to reduce him to the level of the elements, plants and minerals, shows clearly that you have most perversely misunderstood me, and that you confound things of the understanding with things of the imagination. Had you truly understood the meaning of the words, Dependence on God, you would not assuredly have thought that things, in this their dependence, are either dead, or material merely, and imperfect. Who has ever dared to speak so unworthily of the most Perfect of Beings! You would, on the contrary, have seen that it is really and truly as things depend on God that they are perfect; so that we best comprehend this dependence, this necessary course of all in conformity with the eternal decrees of God, by giving our minds to the contemplation of the most comprehensible and perfect of created things, to the highest conceptions of the understanding, and not to the consideration of stocks and stones.

I cannot refrain from expressing my especial surprise that you should ask, 'If God punish not the sins of men, what should hinder me from committing all sorts of iniquities?' Here you speak of God as a judge, who inflicts punishment, and not of that which the sin or crime committed carries with it of itself. But the distinction here is the entire question at issue between us. Certainly, he who abstains from wickedness through fear of punishment only—and I will not think of you in this wise—acts not from any feeling of love or sense of duty, and is anything but truly virtuous. For my

own part I repudiate such morality; I live, or strive to live, free of offence; to do otherwise were repugnant to my nature and would make me feel estranged from the knowledge and love of God.

Further, had you but given a little attention to the nature of man, and to the nature of the decrees of God, as I have explained these in my Appendix to the Principia, you would have seen and clearly understood how deductive reasoning was to be proceeded with before conclusions were come to, and would never have said so recklessly that my opinions assimilated us to stocks and stones, and never connected my name with the many absurdities you have yourself imagined.

With regard to the two positions of mine, which, before proceeding to your second rule, you say you do not understand, I reply that Descartes suffices for coming to a conclusion as respects the first; for if you question your own nature you will find that you can verily suspend your judgment. But should you say that you do not feel in yourself such command of your reason at one particular moment as might assure you of power over it at all times; this would be as if Descartes were made to say that we cannot at this present moment know we shall continue to be reasonable beings, or retain our thinking nature so long as we remain in health—which surely involves a contradiction.

With respect to the second of my positions, I say with Descartes that did our will not transcend the limits of our very restricted understanding, we should be miserable indeed, for then should we be powerless to eat even a crust of bread, to take a step in advance, or to stand still—for all around us is uncertain and full of danger.

And now I come to your second rule, and declare that I believe I ascribe as high a value and authority as you do, or even a higher value and authority than you do, to the truths which you believe you find, and which you fancy I do not

find, in the Scriptures. And this I say, because I know that I have taken much greater pains than most men in their study, and have been especially scrupulous not to ascribe to them any puerile or absurd opinions; an error which he only can escape who is either guided by the spirit of true philosophy, or is favoured with a divine revelation. The interpretations of Scripture by the common run of theologians, therefore, move or interest me little; particularly when they are of the sort that interpret the text by the letter, and outward sense. I have never yet met with any theologian, however, save among the Socinians, so obtuse as not to see that in the Scriptures God is frequently spoken of in an entirely human manner, and that their meaning is often expressed in parables. With regard to the contradiction which, in my opinion at least, you vainly strive to show in what I advance, I must presume that you understand by a parable [or allegory] something entirely different from that which is commonly understood by the term; for who ever heard it said that he who expressed himself allegorically, spoke falsely or without a meaning? When Micah, for instance, informed king Achab that he had seen God seated on his throne with the host of heaven ranged to the right hand and the left, and heard God ask who had so deceived the king; this assuredly was an allegory by which the prophet took occasion to impart what he had to make known in the name of God to the king. His purpose here was plainly enough not to teach any abstruse theological dogma; and in speaking figuratively he can in no wise be held to have lost sight of his meaning. So also the other prophets made known the word of God to the people in the way they did, as seeming to them the best way; but not as that whereby God desired to lead the people to a knowledge of the primary scope and purpose of Scripture, which, according to the saying of Christ himself, consists in this: that we are to love God above all things, and our neigh-

bour as ourselves. Abstruse speculation I believe to have nothing to do with Scripture. As regards myself, I say that I have not learned, and have never been able to learn, anything of the eternal attributes of God from the Scriptures.

With regard to your fifth argument, viz.: that the prophets imparted God's word in the way they have done, because one truth cannot be opposed to another, I have nothing to say but that I demonstrate—as every one who understands what demonstration means will conclude—that the Scriptures, even as they are, are the true revealed word of God. Of this I could, indeed, only have mathematical proof through divine revelation; and I have therefore said: I *believe*, but do not mathematically *know*, that all that was revealed by God to the prophets, [is truth]; and this I do because I firmly believe, but do not mathematically know, that the prophets were the most trusted interpreters and faithful messengers of God; so that I find no contradiction in anything I have said, whilst not a few are involved if contrary views be taken.

The rest of your letter, as having no bearing on the question immediately before us, I pass by without comment; but only add that I am, &c.

Voorburg, Feb., 1665.

LETTER XXXV.

W. VAN BLEYENBERG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

[Bleyenberg complains of having been rather sharply handled by Spinoza in his last, which was less friendly in its tone than he had expected. Bleyenberg's letter is in very good taste, but in great part a repetition of what he had already written with intermingled comments on various passages of Spinoza's last epistle. There is a good deal, besides, of a suppositious, and as concerns himself a personal, nature.

He is fettered by foregone conclusions, and cannot, although evidently a man of superior talents, attain to the heights of pure reason on which Spinoza sits secure.]

LETTER XXXVI.

B. DE SPINOZA TO W. VAN BLEYENBERG.

Sir and Friend!

In the course of this week I have received two letters from you, which were delivered to me at Scheidam. In your first you complain, as I see, of my having said, 'that you acknowledged no demonstration, &c.,' as if I had been referring to my conclusions as unsatisfactory to you; this, however, was by no means my intention, for when I wrote in this way I had your own words in my eye where you say, 'and if it happens that after long deliberation I find my natural understanding either opposed to the Scriptures or little in accordance with them, such is their authority with me that I rather abandon the ideas I had formed, than presume to set them up in opposition to the truths I find prescribed to me,' I have consequently but repeated your own words to show the great diversity in our views, and so give you no real ground of offence.

As towards the end of your second letter you express a wish and a hope that you may continue steadfast in your faith, and say that all we comprehend by our natural understanding is indifferent to you, I thought with myself, and still continue in the mind, that my views and opinions could be of no use to you, and that, therefore, I should do better no further to forsake my studies—too long interrupted already—for a discussion that can yield no fruits. And this conclusion is not opposed to what I said in my first letter; for there I treated you as a pure philosopher who (as indeed many call-

ing themselves Christians also declare) had no touchstone for truth but natural understanding, and not theology. Herein, however, you have informed me of my mistake, and thus shown me that the foundation on which I thought to have built our friendship was not laid as I had imagined.

What you say, further, in your second letter as well as in this last, that we should not, as so commonly happens in controversy, overpass the bounds of civility, I pass by as if it had not been said. I only advert to the subject, indeed, that I may find occasion to declare that I have given you no cause of offence, and still less to suppose that I cannot bear contradiction. I now proceed to your objections.

First and foremost, I pointedly maintain that God is truly and absolutely the Cause of all that is—of all essential being whatsoever. If, therefore, you can show that evil, error, sin, crime, &c., are anything that expresses essence, I will forthwith admit that God is the cause of evil, error, sin, &c. I think I have sufficiently shown that whatever assumes the form of evil, sin, &c., consists in nothing expressive of essence, and that God, therefore, cannot be said to be its cause. The crime committed by Nero in the murder of his mother, for instance, in so far as it involved anything positive, lay not in the outward act; this was but the accomplishment of a purpose; Orestes had a like intention to slay his mother, and yet is he not held guilty in the same sense as Nero. Wherein therefore consisted the guilt of Nero? In no other than that in his foul deed he showed himself cruel, ungrateful, and disobedient. But it is certain that none of these terms expresses any essential thing, and therefore God was not their cause, although they were the cause of the purpose and act of Nero.

I would here observe, by the way, that when we speak philosophically with one another, it were well if we made no use of theological phraseology; for as God by theologians is

always spoken of, and this not unadvisedly, as if he were a more perfect man, it is therefore competent to them to say that God desires this or that, that he is angry with the wicked, delights in the good, &c. In philosophy, however, we see clearly that such attributes as make a man perfect can with no more propriety be ascribed to God, than can those qualities that render the elephant or the ass perfect in its kind be ascribed to man. Such language has no significance here, neither can it be used without causing utter confusion in our conceptions. Speaking philosophically we cannot say that God requires aught of any man, or that anything is either displeasing or pleasing to him; for all such affections imply merely human states that have no significance when the nature of God is considered.

I would here have it notified, however, that although the works of the good (or those who have a clear conception of God, in conformity with which all their deeds and all their thoughts also are determined), and the doings of the wicked (or those who have no such idea of God, but ideas of earthly things only whereby alone their acts and thoughts are determined), and, indeed, all things that be, flow of necessity from the eternal laws and decrees of God, and ceaselessly depend on God, yet do these all differ not only in degree, but in essence, from each other. For, although a mouse and an angel, and joy and sorrow, alike depend on God, the animal is not of the nature of the angel, nor is joy of the species of sorrow.

With these remarks I think I have answered your objections, supposing always that I have rightly apprehended them; for I am sometimes in doubt whether the conclusions you draw from them do not differ from the proposition itself you wished to demonstrate. But this will the more clearly appear if I reply to your questions on these grounds: 1st, Whether to commit murder be as agreeable to God as to give

alms? 2nd, Whether to steal, as regards God, is as good as to do justly? 3rd, Suppose a mind so singularly constituted as not only to feel no repugnance to libertinage and crime, but to delight in evil courses of every kind, are there any elements of virtue in such a mind which might induce its owner to cease from evil, and begin to do well?

To the first question I answer,—speaking philosophically remember,—that I do not know what you mean by the phrase, *agreeable to God.* If you ask me whether God hates one or delights in another? whether one has offended God, another done that which was pleasing to him? in either case I answer, No. And if your question be, Whether I think that they who commit murder and they who give alms are alike good and perfect? again I say, No.

To your second query, Whether good as respects God implies that the just can do any service, the thief any disservice to God? I reply that neither the honest man nor the thief can do aught to cause pleasure or displeasure to God. If the question, however, be, Whether the deeds of these, in so far as they include anything real and are caused by God, are alike perfect? I answer, If we regard the deeds only, it may be that both are equally perfect. Do you now ask, Whether the thief and the just man are alike perfect and alike blessed? I say, no. For by *just* I mean a man who desires that every one should securely hold what is his own, a desire or disposition which I demonstrate in my Ethics—a work not yet published—to have its necessary origin in the good and pious from the clear knowledge they have of themselves and of God. Now, inasmuch as a thief or dishonest person has no desire of this kind, he is destitute of this necessary cognition of God and himself, which is the first condition to the beatitude of mankind. If, finally, you ask what should move you to aspire to or to do that which I characterize as virtuous rather than

anything else? I say, I cannot know which of the infinite motives God has at his disposal he may employ to determine you to such a course. It may be that God impresses you with a clear conception of himself, inclines you to renounce the world through love of him, and to love the rest of mankind as yourself; and it is plain that such a constitution of mind wars with everything that is called evil, and cannot, therefore, be expected to be met with in a single subject. But this is not the place for the discussion of the ground of Ethics at large, any more than for giving an explanation of everything I have advanced in my writings; I restrict myself to giving answers to your questions, and defending myself from the conclusions you would put upon me.

With reference to your third query, therefore, I answer: that it appears to me to involve a contradiction; it is as if some one had asked, whether it accorded more with the nature of a certain person that he hanged himself, or whether reasons could be given why he should not hang himself? Admitting the possibility of such a nature, I then declare (and this whether conceding or not conceding free will to man) that he who should see he would be more commodiously placed nailed to a cross than reclining at his table, would act most foolishly did he not have himself suspended forthwith; even as he who clearly saw that by perpetrating wickednesses he could attain to a higher state of perfection, and lead a better life, than by walking in the ways of virtue, were foolish did he not take to the evil courses; for wickedness in respect of such a perverted sample of humanity would be virtue.

The question you append to your letter, as you do not press for a reply, I pass by unnoticed, for in an hour I could concoct a hundred of the same sort and yet never arrive at a

conclusion in regard to any one of them.* At present I only say that I am, &c.

[Voorburg, March 13th, 1665.]

LETTER XXXVII.

W. VAN BLEYENBERG TO B. DE SPINOZA.

[Bleyenberg has paid Spinoza a visit and had a long conversation with him. In despair of being able to remember all that was said, he has gone immediately to a convenient place and set down as much as remained with him; he laments, however, that it does not amount to a fourth of what he would so gladly have carried away. In spite of Spinoza's wish, so plainly expressed in his last letter, and the time he must have given Bleyenberg at their interview, his correspondent goes on pressing him heavily with questions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, referring either to points discussed at the interview or opening new ground, that would have required whole pages of explanation. Besides this, he makes a pitiless request to be furnished with 'the principal Definitions, Postulates, and Axioms whereon the Ethics is founded.' 'You may, perhaps,' he proceeds, 'excuse yourself, alarmed by the amount of trouble implied; but I entreat you for this once to comply with my request; for unless you do so I shall never be able rightly to seize your meaning.']

Dordrecht, March 27th, 1665.

LETTER XXXVIII.

B. DE SPINOZA TO W. VAN BLEYENBERG.

[Spinoza courteously declines returning to the subjects of

* The question is this: Whether by our sagacity we could escape such things as will otherwise happen to us?—ED.

discussion that have already engaged them, and cannot enter on the vast field of the Ethical philosophy to gratify the curiosity of his correspondent. Before finding leisure to reply to his letter of the 27th of March, he has received another complaining of delay on his part in replying to the letter of the date given. The philosopher will, however, be happy, should the opportunity occur, to converse again with Mynheer van Bleyenberg on the subjects that interest him so much. Meantime he hopes his correspondent will not press him further, but continue to think of him as a friend disposed to the extent of his power to do him service.]

[Voorburg, June 3rd, 1665.]

LETTER XXXIX.

B. DE SPINOZA TO * * * [QY CHR. HUYGENS.]

A new argument for the Oneness of God.

Honoured Sir,

I had not forgotten your request to have a demonstration of the Unity of God on the ground of his nature involving necessary existence, but of late have had no opportunity, business keeping me otherwise engaged. Now, however, I have leisure and set out with the following postulates:

1st, The true definition of a particular thing includes nothing but the simple nature of the thing defined. Whence it follows:

2nd, That no definition proper includes or expresses multiplicity or any particular number of individuals, such definition including or expressing nothing but the nature as it is in itself of the individual thing defined. The definition of a triangle, for instance, comprises nothing but the nature of the triangle, simply and by itself, not of a multiplicity or of any particular number of triangles. The definition of

mind as a thinking entity, and that of God as a perfect being, include nothing but the nature of the mind and the nature of God, not any number of minds or of Gods.

3rd, That for every existing thing there must necessarily be a positive cause whereby it exists.

4th, That this cause must reside either in the nature and definition of a thing itself (because existence belongs to or is necessarily included in the nature of a thing), or must exist without or beyond the thing defined.

From these premisses it follows that if there exist in nature a certain number of individuals, there must also exist a cause or a number of causes whereby precisely this and no greater or smaller number of individuals exist. If, for instance, there exist 20 men in the world (and to avoid all confusion, let us suppose them the first 20 men that ever existed in the world), it is not enough for us to investigate the causes of human nature in general in order to find a reason for the existence of these 20 men; it is imperative on us further to assign a reason why neither more nor fewer than 20 men exist. For by the third premiss above, the reason and cause for the existence of each individual man has to be given. Now, this reason by the first and second of our premisses cannot be included in the nature of man himself, for the true definition of a man does not include the number of 20. By the fourth premiss, consequently, we see that there must be a reason beyond themselves for the existence of the 20 men, and therefore of each individual man among them.

From the above we conclude absolutely that all manifold existence is necessarily owing to causes external to itself, and not to any power inherent in its own nature. But as we say hypothetically that necessary existence belongs to the nature of God, a true definition of God must needs include necessary existence in its terms; and so from a true definition of God must the necessary existence of God be inferred. For the

true definition of God, however, as appears by the second and third premisses, the necessary existence of a multiplicity of Gods cannot be concluded; whence definitively we infer the existence of One God: q. e. d.

Such, honoured Sir, appears to me at the moment the best mode of replying to your proposition. I have already, indeed, and in another place, given a different demonstration of the same thing, by applying the distinction I make between essence and existence; but I have thought that I should best meet your request to me by what precedes, and so I send you this new demonstration, and hope it will prove satisfactory to you. Waiting your opinion, I meantime remain, &c.

Voorburg, Jan. 7th, 1666.

LETTER XL.

B. DE SPINOZA TO * * * [QY CHR. HUYGENS.]

Further arguments for the Unity of God.

Honoured Sir,

By your last letter of the 30th of March you have satisfactorily explained certain matters which appeared to me obscure in that of the 10th of February. Properly informed of your meaning, I now state the question as I conceive you put it: Is there one and only one Entity existing of its own sufficiency and power? That there is I not only affirm, but undertake to demonstrate on the ground that the nature of this entity involves necessary existence; although the same conclusion is most readily arrived at from the intelligence and other attributes of God, as I have shown in the earlier propositions of the first part of the Principia Cartesiana. But in approaching the subject here, I shall, by way of preliminary,

speak of the properties which Being that comprises necessary existence must possess.

1. It must be eternal. For were any determinate duration ascribed to it, it would, beyond the term assigned to it, have to be conceived as non-existent, therefore as not involving necessary existence, which were in contradiction with its definition.

2. It must be simple—not composed of parts; for component parts must in nature and understanding be anterior in time to the compound they form; but this is impossible in respect of that which by its nature is eternal.

3. It cannot be finite or limited; but can only be conceived as infinite. For were its nature determinate, and also conceivable as determinate, then must it by its nature be conceivable as non-existent beyond certain limits, which were in contradiction with its definition.

4. It must be indivisible. For were it divisible it might be divided into parts, either of like or of unlike nature. In the latter case it might be destroyed and so cease to exist, which were opposed to the definition; in the former, each part would include a necessary existence in itself, and so one might exist without another; each consequently might be conceived individually, and so apprehended as finite in its nature, which were also in contradiction to the definition. From all of which it is obvious that when we ascribe imperfection of the kind in question to Entity we forthwith fall into contradiction. For be the imperfection we attach to such a nature what it may, whether it is conceived as consisting in some defect, in some delimitation, in some change suffered from without through deficiency of inherent power to resist it, we are still forced on the conclusion that the nature which by the predicate involves necessary existence does not exist, or does not necessarily exist. Wherefore I conclude—

5. That all which involves necessary existence can have no imperfection in itself, but must express simple perfection.

6. Since then it can only proceed from its perfection that a being exists of its own sufficiency and power, it follows that if we suppose a being which does not express every perfection to exist by its proper nature, we must needs suppose that the being which includes all perfection in itself exists also. For if aught endowed with inferior power exists of its own sufficient force, by how much more must we suppose an entity possessed of greater power to exist of itself.

And now to come to the point: I affirm that the Being whereunto existence belongs by its nature,—the Being which alone includes every perfection in itself, and which I entitle God, can only be One. For if an Entity be assumed to whose nature existence belongs, this entity must not only be without all imperfection, but must include all perfection within itself (by No. 5); and so must the nature of this entity belong to God (who by No. 6 we have also shown to exist); because God includes all perfection, excludes all imperfection. Nor can such an entity exist out of or beyond God; for did it so exist, one and the same nature, involving necessary being, would have a two-fold existence, and this by the preceding demonstration is absurd. Consequently, nothing is that is out of God; but God alone is that which involves necessary existence: q. e. d.

This, excellent Sir, is what I think of at the moment, as demonstrating the Oneness of God. I trust I may at least prove to you that I am, &c.

Voorburg, April 10, 1666.

LETTER XLI.

B. DE SPINOZA TO * * * [QY CHR. HUYGENS.]

Farther considerations on the Unity of God.

Excellent Sir,

I have been prevented by various hindrances from sooner replying to your letter of the 19th of May. As I see that you suspend your judgment concerning the chief part of the demonstration lately sent you (because of the obscurity you find in it, I presume), I shall here endeavour to explain myself more clearly.

I began by enumerating the four properties which a self-existent Being must possess; and these four and others of the same kind I brought together and comprised in one, in my fifth premiss. I had then before me all that was necessary for my inference on the ground assumed. In my sixth premiss I approached the demonstration of the existence of God on the hypothesis assumed, and thence, finally, and without presuming anything more than the sense usually attached to the words employed, I arrived at the conclusion required.

Such in brief was my theme, such the end I proposed. I shall now proceed to explain each head of my demonstration seriatim, beginning with the premised specialties of the self-existing being.

As regards the first, you tell me you find no difficulty, nor indeed is either the first or the second anything more than an axiom. For, by simple I understand that only which is not compound, whether this be as regards parts dissimilar or identical in their nature. The demonstration, therefore, is quite general.

The meaning of my third preliminary position, to the

effect, That if the entity considered be Thought, it is as thought; if it be Space, it is as space that it is indeterminate, and in either case can only be conceived as indeterminate—this premiss, I say, I see you have perfectly apprehended, although you remark that you do not perceive how the conclusion follows. It is simply because there were contradiction in conceiving anything under the form of a negation in whose definition existence is affirmed. And inasmuch as determination or limitation is nothing positive, but only implies privation of existence of the same nature, it follows that that in whose definition existence is affirmed cannot be conceived as determined or limited. If, for example, the term Space implies or comprises necessary existence, we can as little conceive space non-existent as space non-extended; and if this be conceded, it then becomes impossible to conceive space as determined or finite; for, imagined as limited, it must be bounded by its proper nature, namely, space; and the space by which it was bounded would have to be conceived under a negation of existence, which, by the hypothesis, is a manifest contradiction.

In the fourth premiss I desired to show nothing more than that a self-existent entity can neither be divided into parts of like nor of unlike nature, and this, whether the parts of dissimilar nature involve necessary existence or not. For, in the latter case, I said that the entity might be annihilated,—annihilation of a thing being equivalent to resolution into parts, and of parts no one part expresses the nature of the whole. Division, in the first sense, would be in contradiction to the three properties already declared.

In my fifth premiss I have only supposed perfection to consist in Existence absolute (-τῷ Esse), and imperfection in the absence of such existence (-τοῦ Esse). I say absence; for although extension *per se*, for example, negatives thought,

this of itself implies no imperfection in extension, as it would were it limited; in the same way as if it were without duration, place, &c.

My sixth premiss you concede absolutely; and yet you say your difficulty here continues unremoved. Why, you ask, cannot there be several self-existent entities of different natures, seeing that thought and extension are different and yet subsist of their own sufficiency? Here I can discover no difficulty save that you apprehend the question in a totally different way from me. I think I see the sense in which you understand it; but not to waste words, I shall only enter on the sense in which I myself conceive it. I say then: If we assume something which in its kind is infinite and perfect, and exists of its own sufficiency, such existence will then have to be conceded to the absolutely perfect and infinite entity which I call God. If, for example, we should declare that extension and thought (each of which in its kind—that is, in a certain kind of being, must be perfect) exist of their self-sufficiency, then must the existence of God, who is absolute perfection, who is, in other words, a Being absolutely indeterminate or infinite, be also conceded.

And this were fit place for me to remark on the meaning I attach to the word *Imperfect*. By imperfect, then, I understand that something is wanting to a thing which nevertheless properly belongs to its nature. Space, for example, can only be spoken of as imperfect in respect of duration, situation, quantity,—i. e. did it not continue, did it not keep its place, &c., but never because it does not think; inasmuch as nothing of thought is implied in its nature, this consisting in extension alone, consisting, that is to say, in a certain kind of being, in respect of which only it is determinate or indeterminate, imperfect or perfect. Now, inasmuch as the nature of God does not consist in any certain kind of being, but in Being absolutely indeterminate, so does His being require all that

perfectly expresses Existence. Were it otherwise, the nature of God would be finite and defective. Such being the case, it follows that there can be but one Being, God to wit, who exists of His own proper power, or is self-existent. For if, by way of illustration, we assume that space involves existence, it were necessary to show that it is eternal and indeterminate, and expresses no imperfection, nothing but absolute perfection. In this case extension will belong to God, or there will be something which, in a certain manner, expresses the nature of God; inasmuch as God is an entity which, in no particular respect only but absolutely and essentially is infinite and all-powerful.

What has now for your satisfaction been said of space may also be affirmed of any other attribute. I therefore conclude, as in my last letter, that nothing exists out of or beyond God, but that God alone exists of his self-sufficiency. What I have now laid before you will, I trust, suffice to show my meaning in my former letter, and so enable you better to form an opinion of its conclusions.

As I am about to have some new platters for polishing lenses made, I would gladly have your opinion on the subject. I do not myself see what advantage we gain by grinding lenses in the convex-concave fashion. If my calculations are correct, I should say that the plano-convex was the better form. For if we assume the ratio of the refractive power to be as three to two, &c. * * * But as you have doubtless already thought over this question, and made your calculations with entire accuracy, I request your opinion and advice in the matter.

Voorburg, May, 1666.

LETTER XLII.

B. DE SPINOZA TO J. B. [JOHN BRESSER, M.D.]

On the best method of proceeding to the investigation of things.

Learned Sir, dear Friend!

The moment I find leisure to collect my thoughts, for I have of late been much distracted by business and anxieties, I discharge my duty and reply to your letter. But first of all let me return you my hearty thanks for the love you bear me, the good offices you have already so often done me, and the expressions of friendly interest you reiterate in your letter.

I pass on to the question you propose in the following terms: Is there or may there be devised a method whereby we may advance easily and assuredly in a knowledge of the highest and most excellent things; or are our minds, like our bodies, liable to contingencies, and our thoughts governed by accident rather than by certain and definite rules?

I think I shall best reply to you if I show that there must necessarily be a method whereby we may conduct our understanding and concatenate our clear and definite conceptions; and that the understanding is not, like the body, exposed to contingency. That this is so seems obvious from the fact alone, that a single clear and definite conception, or several clear and definite conceptions associated, may be absolutely the cause of another clear and definite conception. All the clear and definite conceptions we form, indeed, can only arise from other clear and definite conceptions springing within us and acknowledging no cause beyond ourselves. Hence it follows that the clear and definite conceptions we form depend entirely on our proper nature and the fixed and changeless laws that belong to or inhere in it; in other words, on our own absolute power, not on accident, i. e.

on any external cause or causes which, although acting in virtue of fixed and determinate laws, are yet unknown to us and foreign to our nature and faculties. As regards perceptions of a different kind, I admit that they depend in a great measure on accident.

From what I have now said it clearly appears what the true method must be, and wherein it chiefly consists, viz., in a knowledge of pure intellect alone, its nature and its laws. And that this may be acquired it is essential above all things to distinguish between understanding and imagination, and between true ideas and such as are false, feigned, or doubtful, and especially to discard all that depend on memory merely. To do this it is not necessary, in so far at least as the method in question is concerned, to know the nature of mind through its first cause; it is enough to arrange a short history or summary of the mind or its perceptions in the manner taught by Bacon.

In these few words I think I have explained the true method and chief means of attaining to intellectual certainty, and at the same time shown the spirit in which the subject is to be approached. I must warn you, however, that it will require your most serious meditation, and great perseverance and resolution on your part, to enable you to make any way in such inquiries. It will further be requisite that you prescribe to yourself a certain mode of life, and fix on some definite end to be attained. But of this enough for the present, &c.

Voorburg, June 10th, 1661.

LETTER XLII. (A.)

B. DE SPINOZA TO J. BRESSER, M.D.

From Van Vloten's Supplementum, p. 303.

Dear Friend,

I scarcely know whether you may have truly and entirely forgotten me or not, though many things concur to make me surmise that you have. First, when I would have bidden you good-bye before leaving [Amsterdam] and expected to fall in with you at your own house, the invitation thither having come from yourself, I found you had left home for the Hague. I next proceed to Voorburg, nothing doubting but that there we should encounter in transitu; but, no —dis aliter visum—it pleased the gods to send you straight home, and without shaking hands with your friend. Finally, I wait patiently in this place for three weeks; yet not once in all that time has a single line reached me from you! Would you, therefore, end my suspicions of your constancy, it may be readily done by a letter, wherein you may also point out the channel through which we may best carry on that epistolary correspondence of which there was once a talk in your house. Meantime, I take occasion to ask of you particularly—indeed, I do now pray and beseech you by our friendship, to enter on the important work you spoke of, with your best endeavours, and to dedicate the better part of your life to the cultivation of your heart and understanding—now, I say, whilst there is yet time, before you have to mourn over opportunity neglected, and your own short life past and gone.

As regards our intercourse by letter, I would here say a few words with a view to induce you to write to me with the most entire freedom; for, do you know that I have sometimes suspected, nay, I have even felt assured, that you mistrusted your abilities more than enough, and were ap-

prehensive lest you might ask or propose that which it became not a man of parts and learning to do. To praise you to your face, and to say how highly I esteem your talents, were not seemly in me; but, lest you might fear that I should show your letters to any one who might turn to your disadvantage phrases written in the confidence of friendship, I pledge you my word that I shall keep all you write to me most religiously to myself, and without your consent and approval impart no syllable of all you may say to another. Under this guarantee I think you may engage freely in writing, unless, indeed, you question my truth, which I should be loth to believe you did. In your first letter, therefore, I shall expect to hear what you have to say to these my overtures; and, further, I shall look for a little of that same conserve of roses* you promised me, although I am now much better than I was. I was let blood after my arrival here; still the fever did not leave me (I had felt lighter and better, indeed, before the blood-letting,—the good effect of change of air, I apprehend); I had yet to suffer two or three attacks of my tertian ague; but with care and good living I have at length succeeded in putting the enemy to flight—whither it has gone I know not; I shall only take especial care that it do not find me again.

As to the third part of my philosophy, I shall shortly send a portion of it either to you, if you say you would like to translate it, or to friend De Vries; and although I had made up my mind that I should let none of it from under my hand until completed, nevertheless, and because the work has run out to a greater length than I had contemplated, I am indisposed to keep you waiting longer, and I, therefore, now send you the MS. to about the 80th Proposition.

I hear much of English affairs, but nothing definite.

* A popular remedy in former days, especially for pectoral affections.—ED.

The people do not cease from their suspicions of evil intentions of every sort, and cannot imagine the reason why the fleet does not put to sea. Affairs undoubtedly do still seem very unsettled. I only fear our chiefs are over-anxious for accurate information and too cautious perhaps; but time will show what course they mean to pursue, and what attempt—may the gods direct everything for the best! I would gladly know what is thought and what is known for certain with you; but, above all, I would have you believe that I am ever yours, &c.

May or June, 1665.

LETTER XLIII.

B. DE SPINOZA TO J. V. M.

[This letter is in reply to an arithmetical question on the doctrine of chances, and has no connection with the Ethics.]

LETTER XLIV.

B. DE SPINOZA TO J. J. [QY JARIG JELLIS.]

[On the Dioptrics of Descartes; without interest to the student of the philosophy of Spinoza or the character of its author.]

LETTER XLV.

B. DE SPINOZA TO J. J. [QY JARIG JELLIS] ON GOLD-MAKING.

Dear Friend!

I have spoken with Vossius on that business of Helvetius; he laughed heartily over it, and wondered that

'I should mention such absurdities.* Making light of what he said, however, I went on to the goldsmith Brechtelt, who had tested the gold, and he spoke in very different terms from Vossius, affirming that between the melting and separating, the gold had gained in weight, and that it gained by so much the more as the weight of silver thrown into the crucible to effect the separation was greater, so that he firmly believed the particular gold in question which transmuted his silver into gold had something peculiar in its nature. After this I proceeded to Helvetius, who showed me both gold, and the interior of his crucible covered with gold, and informed me that he had not thrown more of that metal than might be represented by the fourth part of a barley-corn or a mustard-seed into the melted lead. * * * So much have I been able to learn of this matter.

The writer you speak of, who you say plumes himself on having demonstrated that the arguments for the existence of God which Descartes adduces in his 3rd and 4th Meditations are false, assuredly fights with his own shadow, and will hurt himself more than others. I confess, nevertheless, that Descartes' axiom is in a certain sense obscure, as I have already said, and might have been more clearly and truly stated in the following manner: 'That the power of thought to think is not greater than the power of nature to exist and to act.' This is a clear and true axiom, whence and from the idea of which the existence of God follows most clearly and effectively. As to the argument of the recent writer you mention, it is obvious that he has not understood the subject. It is true enough, indeed, that we may go on to infinity if a question is to be solved on such a footing as he proposes, otherwise it is mere foolishness. If, for example, it be asked, By what

* J. F. Helvetius—not the French writer—had published a book under the title of *Vitulus aureus*, containing disquisitions on the philosopher's stone, on gold-making, and the like.

cause is such and such a body moved in such and such a way? we may answer, the motion is determined by another body, this by another, and so on to infinity, proceeding from cause to cause: this, I say, were a legitimate answer, because the question concerns the motion only, and by referring from one body in succession to another we assign a sufficient and eternal cause for the motion in each. But if I see a book filled with the most sublime meditations, and carefully written, in the hands of one of the people, and ask him whence he had the book? and he answers me, saying, that he had written it out from another book of another person, who also could write neatly, he from another, and so on, I should not feel that I had received a satisfactory answer; for I had not inquired concerning the mere fashion and sequence of the letters, but concerning the thoughts which their co-ordination conveyed. To refer back to infinity in such a case were no reply to my question. The application of this view to ideas is readily to be understood from what I have said in my principles of the Cartesian Philosophy, Pt i., Axiom 9.*

[Hereafter follow some further remarks on the subject of optics. As a manufacturer of lenses Spinoza was well aware of the impossibility of the whole of the luminous rays being made to converge to an absolute focal point after refraction by a simple lens of any form. The reason of this he ascribed to the different distances whence rays of light proceeded from the luminous object, to fall upon the convex surface as well of the lens as of the eye; and is decided in maintaining the spherical form of the lens as very superior to either the parabolic or elliptical forms that had been proposed. The compound nature of light and the different refrangibility of its several rays, in which consists the main difficulty of obtaining ac-

* To this effect: The objective reality of our ideas requires a cause in which this same reality resides not only objectively but formally or immanently.—ED.

curate definition of objects by the telescope, were facts not known to Spinoza.]—Ed.

LETTER XLVI.

B. DE SPINOZA TO J[ARIG] J[ELLIS].

[This letter, written from the Hague, Sept. 5th, 1669, contains an account of some experiments in hydrostatics, which in themselves are of no interest in the present day, interesting though they be in showing us Spinoza, not always immersed in metaphysical meditation, but occupied with physical science as well. Natural history and physiology had as yet made so little progress, that grave philosophers seem not to have questioned the possibility of geese being produced from barnacles.]

LETTER XLVII.

B. DE SPINOZA TO J[ARIG] J[ELLIS].

Dear Friend,

During a visit which Prof. N. N. [Neostadius or Neustadt] paid me lately, he told me among other things that he had heard my Theologico-political treatise had been translated into Dutch, and was about be sent to press for publication. I beg of you to use every means in your power to prevent this. It is not only my own wish that the thing should not be done, but that of many of my friends, who would not willingly see my work interdicted, as it inevitably would be were it to appear in a Dutch translation. I doubt not but you will use your best endeavours here for my sake as well as that of the cause.

One of my friends sent me some short time back a treatise entitled, Homo Politicus, of which I had already heard much. I ran it through, and found it one of the most pernicious books that can possibly be conceived. Worldly distinction and wealth are the summum bonum of the writer; the whole of his views are squared to the attainment of these; the surest means to success in their pursuit are enlarged on, and consist according to him in inwardly discarding all sense of religion, but outwardly conforming to what we think will best serve our ends; we are further to keep faith with others so far only as our own interests will thereby be served. He would have us, moreover, flatter men to the top of their bent; promise largely, but by no means hold it needful to keep the promises made; lie upon occasion; swear falsely, &c., &c. When I had read the book, I thought with myself that I should indite a treatise indirectly against its author, in which I should treat of the true happiness of man, show forth the unquiet and miserable lives of those who think of nothing but wealth and distinction, and, on the most obvious grounds of reason backed by numerous instances from history, exhibit the insatiable nature of the lust for wealth and distinction, and the danger to States inseparable from the over-eager pursuit of these.

How much better and nobler the meditations of Thales of Miletus than the conclusions of this poor writer! All, says Thales, is in common among friends; the wise are the friends of the Gods, and all things are of the Gods; therefore to the wise are all things. Thus in a word did this wisest of men make himself one of the richest also, nobly despising wealth rather than sordidly pursuing it. He shows, however, in various ways, that the wise are without wealth, not through necessity, but by choice; for once, when certain friends reproached him with his poverty, he replied: would you have me show you I could compass that which you pursue so eagerly,

but which I think it not worth my while to win? They assenting, he sent out and hired all the oil presses in the country, his skill as an astronomer enabling him to foresee that the ensuing olive harvest, which had failed for several years before, would in the current year be abundant. Engaging the presses at moderate rates, he in a single season made an immense fortune, which he distributed with as great liberality as he had shown skill in its acquisition.*

The Hague, Feb. 17, 1671.

LETTER XLVIII.

LAMBERT VAN VELDHUYSEN TO ISAAC OROBIO, M.D.

Criticizing the Tract. Theol. Polit. in a hostile spirit.

Utrecht, Jan. 24th, 1671.

Learned Sir,

Having at length a little leisure at command, I make use of it to satisfy your desire that I should give you my opinion of the book entitled Discursus Theologico-politicus. This I shall now proceed to do in so far as time and my power permit, not discussing each individual head of the work, however, but confining myself to a summary exposition of the views and sentiments of the author on the subject of religion.

It has escaped me as to what people the writer belongs, and what manner of life he leads; but it is of no moment to be thus informed. That he is not without talent, and has neither treated superficially nor contemplated with indifference the religious controversies that are now agitating Christendom, appears sufficiently from the argument of his book. The writer seems to think that he will be in fitter case to examine the views and opinions which cause mankind to split into factions

* Vide Diogenes Laert. I. 1, 5, and Cicero de Divinatione, I. 49.

and parties, if he himself is free from all prejudice. Hence he has laboured more than enough to divest himself of superstition of every sort, whereby it has come to pass that in striving to show himself wholly free, he has swerved too much in the opposite extreme. To escape the charge of superstition he seems to me to have discarded religion altogether. He certainly does not rise above the religious views of the deists, of whom there are everywhere a sufficient number, especially in France, and against whom Mersenne wrote a treatise which I remember formerly to have read. But I scarcely think that any of the deists have raised their voices with so fell a purpose, or have so powerfully and skilfully advocated their most pernicious cause, as the writer of the dissertation in question. Besides, unless I am mistaken, this writer has no notion of confining himself within the limits of the deists, but would permit mankind entirely to neglect the subordinate parts of religious worship.

He acknowledges God, then, and professes his belief in him as author and fashioner of the universe. But he plainly maintains that the form, species, and order of the world are necessary throughout, as is the nature even of God himself, and the eternal truths, which, as he will have it, have been established independently of the will of God. Therefore does he pointedly declare that all things happen by uncontrollable necessity, by inevitable fatality; and maintains that when things are rightly seen there is no room for precepts or commandments, the ignorance of mankind as he thinks having introduced these words—the inexperience of the vulgar leading them to forms of speech which ascribe affections to the Deity. God, therefore, he says, accommodates himself equally to the capacity of mankind when he makes known eternal truths and conduct that must necessarily be observed, in the shape of commandments. He teaches, moreover, that those things which are imposed as laws, and are thought to be subject to

the will of man, are as much matters of necessity as is the nature of the triangle; and consequently, that those things which are commanded in laws and are held to be abstracted from the will of man, come to pass and are as necessary as is the nature of the triangle. All that is comprised in commandments, therefore, depends no more on the will of man, and avails him as little for good or evil by their observance or neglect, as the will and the absolute and eternal decrees of God can be changed by prayers. Precepts and commandments, consequently, are put on the same footing; and agree in this, that the inexperience and ignorance of man have moved God to make them known, to the end that they might be of some service to those who could form no better notions of God, and who required such wretched aids to arouse in them respect for virtue and hatred of vice. We therefore find that the author makes no mention in his book of the use of prayer; neither does he speak of life or death, neither of any sort of reward or punishment, whereby according to common consent men are influenced in their lives and conduct.

And all this he does consistently with his principles. For what room can there be for any final judgment and award, or what hope of reward or fear of punishment, where all things are ascribed to destiny and inevitable necessity, where all is held to proceed from God, or rather where, as he maintains, the universe is God? For I much fear that our author is not far from the opinions of those who maintain that all things necessarily proceed from the nature of God, and that the universe is God—his views, at least, do not greatly differ from theirs who so conclude. He, however, places the highest enjoyment of man in the practice of virtue, which is, he says, its own great and best reward. He would, therefore, have man rightly informed of the nature of things, and dedicate himself to virtue, not because of any precept or law of God, not from any hope of reward or fear of punishment, but

led to do so solely by the beauty of virtue, the peace of mind and the exceeding joy which are felt in its practice.

He therefore maintains that God has only in a certain way exhorted man to virtue through the prophets and revelation, by promises of reward and threats of punishment, the two conditions that are always attached to laws, because the minds of common men are so constituted, and so ill informed, that they can only be driven to virtuous courses by arguments derived from the nature of laws, by fear of penalties or hopes of reward; whilst they who understand things truly find no force in any considerations of the kind.

Neither does he think that the prophets and teachers of sacred things, and, by implication, God himself—inasmuch as He made use of their mouths for the instruction of mankind—ever recur to arguments, false in themselves, if their nature be but properly understood. His reasoning, however, would lead to a different conclusion; for openly and everywhere, as occasion serves, does he declare that the sacred Scriptures were not written for the purpose of inculcating truth, and teaching the nature of the things of which they speak, and which, in their application, serve as incitements to virtue. He, indeed, denies that the prophets were altogether well informed or quite free from vulgar errors in the reasons they adduce and the arguments they employ as means of inciting mankind to virtuous lives, although the nature of the moral virtues and vices was assuredly perfectly well-known to them.

The author, therefore, teaches that the prophets, when instructing those in their duties to whom they were sent, did not always escape errors of judgment; but that their sanctity and piety of purpose, nevertheless, were not diminished thereby, not even when they made use of false and unfounded arguments and assertions accommodated to the preconceived opinions of those they addressed, and by such means inclined

their hearers to virtues which were never made subject of controversy among men. The object of the prophets' mission to man, he says, was the promotion of virtuous conduct, not the inculcation of doctrinal truth; and he is therefore of opinion that the mistakes and ignorance of the prophets so long as they moved men to virtue were not really noxious; for he thinks that it is of little moment by what arguments virtuous or moral conduct is furthered. Piety, he opines, is not influenced by the truth of other things mentally perceived, when the sanctity of morals is not comprised in such perceptions; and he thinks that the knowledge of all truth, and even of all mystery, is more or less useful and necessary only as it conduces more or less to piety.

I believe that the writer here refers to that axiom of theologians which distinguishes between the dogmatic teaching of a prophet and the simple narrative of a thing; a distinction which, unless I am deceived, is acknowledged by all theologians, who hold that sound doctrine is still compatible with a large amount of error. He, therefore, thinks that all must assent to his views who deny that reason and philosophy are the true interpreters of Scripture. For, when all are agreed that in Scripture many things are predicated of God which do not accord with the divine nature, but are accommodated to the capacities of men, in order that they may be influenced by what is said and the love of virtue aroused in their minds, it may be maintained, he thinks, that the sacred teacher desired by those false arguments to bring men to the observance of virtue, or that the reader of the sacred Scriptures might have the liberty allowed him of judging from the principles of his own understanding of the sense and scope of the doctrine set forth. But this view the writer totally condemns and repudiates, as well as that of those who, with the paradoxical theologian, teach that reason is to be the interpreter of Scripture; for he is of opinion that Scripture is

to be understood according to its literal sense :—men are not to be allowed the liberty of interpreting of their own free will, and according to the rules of right reason, what is to be understood by the words of the prophets, in order that conclusions may be formed in regard to their reasons and the knowledge they had acquired of things in general; neither are men to be permitted to say when it is that the prophets speak literally and when figuratively. But it will be more in place to speak particularly of these matters by-and-by.

Returning to points from which I have somewhat strayed, the author, sticking to his principle of the fatal necessity of all things, denies that any miracle opposed to the laws of nature ever occurred; for he maintains, as we have said above, that the nature of things and their kind and arrangement are not less matters of necessity, than are the nature of God and the eternal truths he has ordained; he, therefore, teaches that it is as impossible anything should depart from the laws of nature as that in a triangle the sum of the three angles should not be equal to two rectangles. God, he says, cannot make a less weight raise a greater, or a body moving with a force or a rate as of two, overtake a body moving with a force or a rate as of four. He, therefore, declares that miracles must be incidents in conformity with or subject to the common laws of nature, which, as he teaches, are unchangeable, even as the nature of things is unchangeable, inasmuch as the nature of all law is involved in nature itself; neither does he recognize any other power of God beyond the ordinary power which is exerted in harmony with the laws of nature; he even thinks that no other power of God can be imagined, because it would compromise the nature of things, and set nature at war with itself.

A miracle, consequently, according to our author, is an incident or event happening unexpectedly and of whose cause the vulgar are ignorant. In the same way the vulgar ascribe

to prayers duly offered, and the particular interference of God, their escape from any threatened danger or the attainment of any wished-for good, whilst in the writer's view God has already decreed from eternity that that should happen which the vulgar suppose has come to pass through His special influence and intervention, prayers not being the cause of the decree, but the decree the cause of the prayers.

The whole of this on destiny and the inevitable necessity of things, both as regards the nature of things and the events which happen daily, he places in the nature of God; or, to speak more plainly, in the nature of the will and intelligence of God, which, different in name, indeed, do in fact meet and form one in God. He therefore maintains that God as necessarily wills the universe to be as it is and all that happens within it, as he necessarily knows the universe to be such as it is. But if God necessarily knows the universe and its laws, he concludes that God could no more have made another universe than he could now subvert the nature of things, and cause twice three to be seven. Wherefore we cannot conceive anything in the universe, or the laws by which the beginnings and ends of things are controlled, to be different from what they are; or did we imagine aught different from that which is it would be subversive of itself. He therefore teaches that the nature of the Divine Intelligence, of the whole universe and of the laws whereby it is governed, is such, is so arranged and ordered, that God by his will and understanding could no more conceive things other than they are than he could will to make it come to pass that things should be other than they are. Hence he concludes, that inasmuch as God could not now act in a way subversive of his primary acts (that God could not now do acts subversive of themselves), so God can neither imagine nor know natural things otherwise than as they are; the conception and understanding of the nature of things other than as they are, being as impossible

as is the production of things other than they are, inasmuch as all those natures if conceived to be different from, would then necessarily be in opposition to, those that exist; for the nature of things comprised in the universe being (in the author's opinion) necessary, they cannot have this necessity of themselves, but derive it from the nature of God, from whom they necessarily emanate. For he will not have it, with Descartes, whose other doctrines he nevertheless appears disposed to adopt, that the natures of all things, inasmuch as they differ from the nature and essence of God, so must ideas of them have been freely present in the divine mind.

With such views the author prepares the way for what he delivers in the latter parts of his book, in which all that has been taught in preceding chapters is found to culminate. He would have the mind of the magistracy, and, indeed, of men in general, imbued with this axiom: that to the ruling power belongs the right to determine the form of religious worship which is to be publicly followed in the state. Still it would be lawful, as he thinks, for the authorities to suffer the citizens to think of religion as they feel disposed, and to speak of it as by their mental and moral constitution they incline to do, and even to grant them perfect liberty of public worship.

As to what concerns the moral virtues, as there is no difference of opinion here, and so long as piety is not attacked, and other studies and usages do not touch morals, he concludes that it cannot be displeasing to God that men should espouse as pious or sacred whatever they choose. Here, however, the author must be understood to be speaking of matters as sacred which do not constitute moral virtue, which do not shock propriety, and which are neither opposed nor foreign to it. He refers to matters that men may espouse with profit to themselves and others, and as helps to a truly virtuous life; to matters by observance of which

they may hope to render themselves acceptable to God; for God can never be offended by acts that are indifferent in themselves and have no bearing either on virtue or on vice, though men may refer them to pious purposes, and use them as guides and safeguards to virtuous conduct.

The writer, however, in order, as it seems, to lead mankind to adopt these paradoxical views, maintains first that the whole of the religious worship instituted by God and delivered to the Jews, was solely arranged with a view to their leading a prosperous life within the confines of their own state; further, that the Jews were not more agreeable to God, not more cherished of him, than other nations, a fact which he says God everywhere proclaims by his prophets to the Jewish people when he reproves them for the sins and backslidings they were guilty of in the practice of the very worship which was instituted and ordered by God for their advantage, and which consisted entirely in observance of the moral virtues, in other words, in love of God and neighbourly charity.

Further, inasmuch as God has imbued the minds of men of every nation with moral principles, and sown as it were the seeds of virtue in their souls, so that they can judge of themselves, and without positive instructions, between good and evil, so does he conclude that God has not left other nations uninformed of those things whereby true happiness may be obtained, but, on the contrary, has imparted these to all men alike for their advantage. He declares, indeed, that in all things which serve for the attainment of true happiness other nations are on the same footing as the Jews, and he shows that the Gentile nations did not lack for true prophets, a fact of which he furnishes several instances. He even insinuates that God governed other nations by means of good angels, whom, in conformity with the language of the Old Testament, he calls Gods; consequently, that the sacred rites of other nations were not displeasing to God, so long as

they were not so corrupted by superstition as to divert men from true piety, and did not lead them to perpetrate deeds incongruous with morality under the name of religion. God forbade the Jews for peculiar reasons,—for reasons appropriate to them alone,—to worship the Gods of other peoples, though these Gods were worshipped in virtue of the institution and procuration of God with the same propriety by these nations, as the angels, held to be the guardians of the Hebrew republic, were esteemed by the Jews in their way as among the number of the Gods, and treated by them with divine honours.

But when we find the author admitting that no kind of outward worship can in itself be grateful to God, he of course thinks it of little moment with what ceremonies or rites such worship is conducted, provided only it be of such a nature, be so accordant with the conception formed of God, as to arouse reverential feelings in the minds of men, and incite them to the study and practice of moral virtue.

Finally, inasmuch as he holds that the substance of all religion is comprised in virtuous conduct, and that any knowledge of mysteries is superfluous and not calculated to favour a virtuous life, and that everything which tends to incite and lead men to virtue is better in itself and of more moment to the world, he concludes that all precepts concerning God and his worship,—all matters pertaining to religion in general, which are believed to be true by those who entertain them, and tend to make goodness and probity flourish and abound, are to be respectfully considered, or at all events in no case to be summarily rejected. To confirm these views he cites the prophets themselves as authors and evidences of the opinions he inculcates, for they declare that God takes no account of the ideas men entertain of religion, but that that worship and those sentiments which proceed from respect for virtue and reverence for the Deity are the things

that are agreeable to God. This notion he pushes so far as to say that arguments even which are not well-founded, but which accord with the sentiments of the people addressed, provided only that they act as spurs to virtuous conduct, are to be accounted good arguments. He therefore declares that God permitted a certain range or freedom of argument and illustration to the prophets, whereby they were enabled to accommodate themselves to the times in which they lived and the persons to whom they addressed their exhortations, and that these were good and allowable amid the circumstances in which they were used.

From this the writer thinks has arisen the fact that different teachers have made use of different and often mutually opposed arguments; Paul, for example, declaring that men are not justified by works, James insisting, on the contrary, that they are; the Apostle James, in the opinion of our author, thinking that Christians might be led astray by the doctrine of justification by faith, and therefore laying the greater stress on his own doctrine of justification by faith and works combined. James doubtless perceived that it was not good for the Christians of his day to have this doctrine of justification by faith alone propounded to them; men being apt to be led thereby listlessly to rely on the mercy of God and pay no regard to good works. But Paul's discourse was to the Jews, who erroneously placed justification in observance of the law as it was especially delivered to them by Moses, by which they thought that they were raised above other nations, and the way of salvation prepared for them alone, and so rejected the means of salvation by faith, whereby they were put on a level with other peoples, and left naked and bare of any peculiar privilege. Since, therefore, both propositions, this of Paul, that of James, delivered in different times, to different communities, and under different circumstances, nevertheless agreed in their purpose of leading men to piety and virtue,

the author thinks that prudential motives alone led the Apostles to pursue now this course of instruction, now that.

And this is one reason, among many others, why the writer thinks that it is as far from truth to pretend to explain the text of Holy Writ by means of reason, and to constitute this the interpreter of its language, or to interpret one sacred writer by another,—since they are of equal authority, and the language they employ is to be explained by the forms of speech and the peculiarities of address made use of by each of them severally; we are never, he says, when engaged in investigating the true sense of the Scriptures, to attend to the nature of the matter, but always to the literal meaning of the words only.

When Christ, therefore, and the other teachers divinely sent, declared after his example and commands that men only attained to beatitude by the study of the virtues, and that everything else was of no moment, the author would thence infer that the ruling power in a state should only be careful that justice and probity flourish in the commonwealth, and should deem it no part of their duty to consider and to declare what form of worship and what variety of doctrine is most in accordance with truth: they are only to take heed that nought in this kind be adopted by the professors which may prove a bar to virtue.

The magistracy of a state, consequently, may properly, and without offence to the Deity, tolerate various religions within their jurisdiction. To persuade us of this, however, he insists that the excellence of the moral virtues, in so far as they are useful in associations of men, and are displayed in outward act, lies in this, that they are not practised on the ground of private judgment and inclination, but on the authority and command of the supreme power in the state: outward acts of virtue, he says, change in their nature by circumstances, and the duty of men to do deeds of the sort, is to

be estimated by the advantage or disadvantage which accrues from them; so that certain acts virtuous in themselves done out of season may lack the true nature of virtues, and may even be placed in the opposite scale of the vices. The author thinks, however, that there is another mode of appreciating the virtues; for inasmuch as they have their seat and being in the mind, they do in reality always preserve their proper nature, and are never dependent on variety of circumstance.

The writer would not permit cruelty and vindictiveness; he would have nothing but love of our neighbours, and love of truth under any circumstances. But there may be times when it may be right or proper, not, indeed, to ignore and cast off respect for virtue and good resolutions, but either to abstain from such of these as are shown in outward act, and sometimes even to proceed in such a way as apparently to contravene them; and this because, as he says, it is no duty of a virtuous man to expose truth to the light, and to inform his fellow-citizens of this truth by word of mouth, and by writing, if he thinks that disadvantage rather than advantage will accrue to them from its promulgation. And although all men should be included in one common bond of love, and this feeling is never to be discarded, still it frequently happens that certain persons may be severely treated by us without our being chargeable with cruelty, when it is obvious that great damage would accrue from the clemency we might be disposed to practise towards them. So, also, he opines that all things, even all truths, whether they refer to religion or to civil life, are not opportunely proposed at all times. He, therefore, who teaches that pearls are not to be cast before swine; and is also of opinion that it is no duty of good men to enlighten the people on certain heads of religion which, paraded and scattered about among the vulgar, might prove a cause of disturbance to the commonwealth or the church, whereby more harm than good would ensue to orderly and pious citizens.

But when, besides these and other things belonging to civil society, such as the power to make and the authority to enforce laws, which cannot be disjoined, and the several wills of the individuals associated into the body politic cannot be suffered to prevail but must be given up to the supreme head of the state, the author argues that this authority has the right to determine what things and what dogmas are to be publicly taught within the commonwealth, and that it is the duty of citizens or subjects—in so far, at least, as outward manifestation goes—to abstain from teaching and making profit of topics on which the laws of the magistracy have ordered silence to be kept; for God has no more permitted private judgment on such matters to be entertained than he has allowed acts to be done against the will and commands of the ruler or the sentence of the judge, whereby the law would lose its force, and the end and object of all authority be frustrated. For the author thinks that, by conformity and outward profession of religion, men may be kept quiet, and that the regulation of external acts of divine worship may be properly intrusted to the judgment of the magistracy; in the same way as the right of estimating injuries done to the state and the power of enforcing reparation are accorded to the authorities. For inasmuch as a private person is not held bound to accommodate his own judgment on an injury done to the state to the judgment of the magistracy, but may privily entertain his own opinion, although, if the matter came to such a pass, he would be bound to give his assistance in carrying out the decision of the magistracy, so the author thinks that private persons may be allowed to judge for themselves of the truth or falsehood as well as of the necessity of any religious dogma. Neither is it possible, as he thinks, to compel private persons by any state law to think of religion in the same precise way, although it depends on the decision of the ruling power to say what dogmas are

to be publicly propounded; the right or duty of private persons is only privily to make known their views of religion when they differ from those of the magistracy; but they are to take no steps without their sanction whereby the rules of religious worship laid down by them might be compromised.

And as it may very well happen that the magistracy, differing on many points of religion from the people, may desire certain things to be taught publicly which the people do not approve, but which the magistracy think concern the divine honour, the author sees that to make open profession of such dogmas in his republic might bring much detriment to the common weal, by reason of diversity of opinion between peoples and their rulers; therefore to his former does the author add this second reason by way of tranquillizing the minds of both rulers and subjects, and of keeping religious liberty intact, viz.: that the magistracy are not to fear the anger of God, although they permit objectionable sacred rites to be performed in his model republic, provided always that they are not at variance with the moral virtues. The meaning of this opinion, I apprehend, will not have escaped you, seeing that I have exposed it at sufficient length in what has gone before.] [The author, in fact, maintains that God does not concern himself about men's religious opinions, neither does he care how they are mentally disposed, or what religious rites they practise, all such matters in the writer's opinion having no connection and nothing in common with virtue or vice, inasmuch as the duty of every one is so to comport himself that he may follow those maxims and adopt that form of worship by which he conceives he will be best maintained in a course of virtuous action.

Thus, most accomplished Sir, you have a compendious survey of the doctrines comprised in the Tractatus Theologico-politicus, which in my opinion goes the length of destroying all worship, all religion, of openly propounding atheism, or

at all events of presenting God in such a way that mankind can never be touched by reverence for his Divinity, God himself in the system of our author being subject to destiny, no place being left for his superintendence and divine providence, and all idea of reward or punishment taken away.

This much, at all events, is clearly to be seen from the work, that the whole authority of the sacred Scriptures is called in question by its statements and reasonings—and that their Cause is only alluded to by the writer; so that it follows from his positions that the Alcoran is also to be accounted or held equivalent to the word of God. Nor has the writer a single argument to show that Mahomet was not a true prophet; for the Turks also hold in respect those moral virtues which are prescribed by their prophet and about which there is no dispute among mankind at large. According to the author, God is still nigh to the peoples whom he has not thought fit to lead into the pale of reason and obedience by such special revelations as he has delivered to Jews and Christians.

I believe, then, that I do not swerve much from the truth, nor do the author any injustice, when I denounce him as teaching mere atheism by colourable and crafty arguments.

LETTER XLIX.

B. DE SPINOZA TO ISAAC OROBIO, M.D.

In reply to Dr Veldhuysen's criticism of the Tractatus Theologico-politicus.

Learned Sir,

You are doubtless surprised that I have made you wait so long for an acknowledgment of your letter, but, in truth, it is with difficulty I have brought myself to notice the libellous epistle you enclosed, and, indeed, I only write now to make good my promise to answer it. That I may do as little violence as possible to my proper sentiments, I shall be

brief, contenting myself with showing how your correspondent falsifies both my views and my intentions,—whether of set purpose and from malevolence, or through ignorance, I cannot so readily tell. But to the matter.

Your correspondent first says, 'That it is of little moment to know to what people I belong, or what manner of life I lead.' Had he been duly informed on both of these heads he would not so easily have persuaded himself that I inculcate atheism. Atheists, for the most part, are wordlings, and seek eagerly after wealth and distinction; but these, all who know me are aware, I have ever held in the very slenderest estimation. He is then pleased to say that 'I must be a man of no mediocre ability,' for the purpose, apparently, of giving point to his next assertion, that 'I have at best skilfully, craftily, and with the worst intentions, advocated the radically bad and pernicious cause of the Deists.' This of itself were enough to show that the writer has not understood my arguments; for who could possibly be of so crafty and hypocritical a temper as to array a host of the most cogent and convincing reasons in favour of a conclusion which he himself believed to be false? Of whom would your correspondent believe that truth and sincerity guided the pen, if he thought that falsehood in disguise could be enforced with the same straightforwardness of purpose as truth itself? But, indeed, I ought not to express surprise here, for even thus was Descartes traduced by Voet; even thus are the best men in the world wont to be met by their opponents.

The writer next proceeds to say, 'It seems as though, to escape suspicion of superstition, I had thought it requisite to divest myself of all religion.' I do not pretend to divine what he understands by religion and what by superstition; but I ask, Does he cast off religion who rests all he has to say on the subject, on the ground that God is to be acknowledged as the Supreme Good; that He is with entire single-

ness of soul to be loved as such; and that in loving God consists our highest bliss, our best privilege, our most perfect freedom? Further, that the reward of virtue is virtue, and the penalty of incapacity and baseness is ignorance and abjectness of spirit? Still further, that every one is bound to love his neighbour as himself, and to obey the laws of the land in which, and the authority under which, he lives? Now, all this I have not only insisted on as impressively as I could in words, but I have further adduced the most cogent reasons that presented themselves to me in support of my conclusions.

But I think I can see whence the hostility of my critic arises. This person finds nothing in virtuous life and right reason in themselves which satisfy or delight him; it seems as though he would rather live under the empire of his passions, yield to his appetites and lusts, were it not that this one consideration withheld him—the fear of punishment. He must keep himself from doing amiss as a slave; he cannot observe the divine commandments of his own free-will, but crouches before them with a perplexed and unsatisfied soul; he strikes a bargain with the Almighty, and for good conduct looks for much more ample reward, and of a much more sensible kind, than he expects to find in the divine love,—aye, recompense ever the greater as inwardly he feels more averse to good, as he, reluctantly and perforce, compels himself to effect the good he does. This is the ground of his belief that all who are not restrained by fear of the kind he feels himself, must live without a curb upon their lusts, and cast out religion from their souls. But I quit this ungrateful topic, and proceed to the inferences of my censor, and to this one in especial, that 'I with glozing and crafty arguments inculcate Atheism.'

The grounds of this conclusion appear to be that he thinks I take from God all freedom, that I subject the Supreme to

fate. This is utterly false: I do nothing of the sort; on the contrary, I maintain that everything follows by inevitable necessity from the very nature of God. It is universally admitted that God by his nature knows himself, and that this knowledge follows necessarily from the Divine nature; but I presume no one thinks that God is therefore controlled by fate. On the contrary, all reasonable men believe that God knows himself freely and necessarily at once; that freedom and necessity, in fact, are terms synonymous when the nature of Deity is in question: God, as author of all, is himself fate, freedom, and necessity. In this I can see nothing which every one may not understand, nothing which any one can find fault with; but if my critic nevertheless believes that what I say is said with an evil intention, what, I would ask, must he think of his Descartes, who maintains that nothing happens through our agency which God has not already pre-ordained; yea, that in every moment of our lives we are as it were created anew by God, but that we do not the less act freely according to the power that is given us? a state of things which, as Descartes himself admits, is altogether incomprehensible.

The necessity of things which I contend for abrogates neither divine nor human laws; the moral precepts, whether they have or have not the shape of commandments from God, are still divine and salutary; and the good that flows from virtue and godly love, whether it be derived from God as a ruler and lawgiver, or proceed from the constitution, that is, the necessity, of the Divine nature, is not on this account the less desirable. On the other hand, the evils that arise from wickedness are not the less to be dreaded and deplored because they necessarily follow the actions done; and, finally, whether we act with freedom or from necessity we are still accompanied in all we do by hope or fear. My censor, therefore, says falsely that I put the question of morals and religion on such a foot-

ing that neither command nor prescription are any longer to be recognized, or, as he has it, 'That there can be no expectation of reward, no fear of punishment, if everything be held subject to fate, or follow of necessity from the nature of God.'

Here I will not pause to ask whether it be one and the same, or a very different thing, to maintain that all happens necessarily from the nature of God, and to hold that the universe is God? but I beg you to observe how the critic odiously and unjustifiably adds that 'I am minded men should lead virtuous lives, not because of the precepts and commands of God, or moved by the hope of reward or fear of punishment, but,' &c. In the whole of my Tractate I aver that you will find no word to this effect. On the contrary, I declare expressly (vide chap. iv.) that the sum of the Divine law, the law that is written on our hearts and minds by the hand of God (vide chap ii.), consists in this especially,—that we love God as our supreme good, not through fear of punishment, for love knows nothing of fear and cannot flow from fear, not even from love of aught else that we might wish to enjoy, but wholly and solely from devotion to the Supreme; for were this not the rule, we should then love God less than the thing desired. I have further shown in the same place that this is the very law which God revealed to the prophets; and if I now maintain that this law receives its character of commandment from God, or if I comprehend it in the way I comprehend the other decrees of God as involving an eternal truth, an eternal necessity in itself, it still remains an ordinance of God, and is doctrine wholesome to mankind. Even so, whether I love God of my own free will or by the necessity of the Divine decree, I shall still love God and be blessed. I might therefore with reason maintain that this person belongs to that class of men of whom I speak at the end of my preface, and say, that I would much rather they left my book

unread, than by perverse interpretations of its views, whilst deriving no benefit from its perusal themselves, prove hindrances in the way of others who might profit by its contents.

Although I believe that I have already said enough in the way of explanation of my views, and in answer to my censor, I still think it worth while to make a few further observations. I say, then, that he is mistaken when he imagines that I had in my eye that axiom of theological writers, which draws a distinction between the dogmatic doctrine and the simple narrative discourse of a prophet. If he really understands what I say in my 15th chapter, when quoting the Rabbi Judah Alpakhar, how could he believe that I agreed with the Rabbi, when I was all the while engaged in pointing out the erroneousness of his conclusions? If my critic intended any other axiom than the one I refer to, then I avow that I am not myself acquainted with it, and could not therefore in any way have had it in my eye.

Further, I cannot see how my censor should say I believed that 'all would agree with me in my views who deny that reason and philosophy are the proper interpreters of Scripture,' seeing that I have pointedly rejected the conclusions as well of those who scout reason, as of Maimonides [who would reconcile Scripture with reason by arbitrarily torturing its text into the shape he desires].

It were long to recite everything advanced by my critic in which I can see that he does not come to his task of censor with an entirely assured spirit; I therefore proceed at once to the passage where he says, that 'I have no grounds for my opinion that Mahomet was not a true prophet.' This singular conclusion of his he as strangely seeks to make good from the general statement and opinions I propound, in spite of the fact that from all I say of Mahomet I plainly show that I regard him as an impostor, inasmuch as he denies throughout the Koran that liberty which the universal re-

ligion, the religion which is revealed by natural as well as by prophetic light, allows—the right to worship God in spirit and in truth, a right which I have maintained must under all circumstances be conceded to mankind. And had I happened not to have done so, I should ask whether I were really bound to show that every one who has spoken oracularly was a false prophet? The prophets of the Old Testament were held on their parts, to prove that they were true prophets. If after all I am met by the reply that Mahomet taught divine precepts and gave sure signs of his mission, then would my critic himself have no grounds for refusing to Mahomet the character of a true prophet.

As regards the Turks and other peoples not included in the pale of Christianity, I am free to confess that I believe if they worship God in love and truth and do justly by their neighbour they have within them that which is equivalent to the Spirit of Christ, and that their salvation is assured, whatever notions they in their ignorance may entertain of Mahomet and his revelations.

You see, therefore, my dear friend, that my critic fails greatly of the truth; but I do not the less perceive that he does me far less injustice than he does himself, when he ventures to assert that 'by colourable and crafty arguments I inculcate Atheism.'

In conclusion, I venture to hope that in what precedes you will not find anything said too severely, and that is not well deserved by my censor. Should you however meet with anything of the sort, I beg you to strike it out, or to soften and amend it as may seem best to you. It is not my wish to vex or irritate him, whoever he may be; neither is it my purpose, in my desire to stand well with you, to make myself a single enemy abroad; indeed, as such adverse criticisms are common enough, I should scarcely have brought myself to reply to this particular one, as I say at the beginning of

my letter, had I not pledged you my word that I should do so. Farewell! I commit this letter to your prudence, and beg you to believe that I am yours, &c.,

B. DE SPINOZA.

LETTER XLIX. (A.)

[LXXV. in Original Op. Post. B. de S.]

B. DE SPINOZA TO LAMBERT VAN VELDHUYSEN, M.D.

Excellent Sir,

I am surprised that our friend Neostadius (Neustadt) should have said I had thoughts of replying to the various publications that have lately appeared against my Theologico-political Treatise, and among others, of refuting the strictures contained in your manuscript. It has never come into my head to answer any one of my public opponents, so unworthy have they all appeared to me of notice; and I have no recollection of having said more to Neostadius than that I thought of illustrating some of the obscurer passages of the Tractatus by notes, and of appending to these notes your letter and my reply to it—if I might have your consent to do so. I requested Neostadius, indeed, to ask your consent to this, adding, that if perchance you were indisposed to grant me the favour I desired, because in my reply there are certain expressions that savoured of harshness, you were to feel yourself at perfect liberty either to expunge or to alter them. Meantime I cannot suppose that our friend will be offended by my informing you of the matter as it is in fact; for if I do not obtain the permission I crave, I can at least show that I shall not publish your letter without your consent. And although I believe your letter might be made public without detriment to you (your name might even be withheld), be assured that I shall not move in the matter without your

permission. But, to give you my whole mind, you would do me a still greater favour did you communicate to me those fresh arguments with which you believe you can confute my Tractatus,—or you might add them to your manuscript. I even beg of you very earnestly to do this; for there is no one whose arguments I am more disposed carefully to consider than your own, aware as I am of the singular candour of your disposition, and satisfied that you are led in all you say or do by the love of truth alone. Again, and yet again, I entreat you to make light of the labour I would thus impose on you, and beg of you to believe that I am yours with the greatest respect,

B. DE SPINOZA.

[The Hague, 1674 or 1675.]

LETTER L.

B. DE SPINOZA TO * * * *

The difference between the political views of Hobbes and myself, about which you ask, lies in this: that I advocate natural right as the paramount principle, and maintain that the ruler has no more authority over subjects than may be measured by the liberties belonging to the natural state which subjects cede to him for their mutual advantage and security.*

When I say, as I do in my metaphysical reflections, that God cannot be spoken of otherwise than improperly as *one* or *single*, I mean that an entity can only be called one or single in respect of its existence, not of its essence; for we do not conceive things under the category of number until they have been reduced to common genera or kinds. He, for instance,

* Hobbes, on the contrary, gives unlimited power to the ruler. Vide Tract. Theol. Polit., chapter XVI. p. 270, where the author's views are developed at length.—ED.

who holds in his hand a penny and a shilling will not think of the number two unless he regards them merely as pieces of money, when he may say that he has two coins in his hand, for the penny is a coin as well as the shilling. A thing is, therefore, only called one or single after some other thing that agrees with it has been conceived. But as the existence of God is also his essence, and we can form no universal idea of the essence of God, it is certain that he who conceives God as one or single has either no true idea of God, or speaks of him improperly.*

With regard to what I say of figure as negation, not as anything positive, it is obvious that matter indefinitely considered can have no shape, but that shape can only occur in connection with finite and determinate bodies. For he who says that he sees a figure, means nothing more than that he conceives a definite thing, and the manner in which it is limited or determined. The determination, therefore, does not belong to the thing as its existence, but rather as to its non-existence. Now, as figure is nothing but determination, and determination is negation, figure, as said, can only be negation.

I noticed the book which the Utrecht Professor wrote against me (though it was only published after his death) in

* In the Cogitata Metaphysica, Pt i. cap. 7, § 2, we have this: 'Unity is opposed to multiplicity, and is nothing more than a mode of thought. * * * God, in so far as we detach him from other beings, may be said to be one, but as we cannot conceive that there are other beings of the same nature as God, we say that he is singular and alone. Did we, however, examine the matter more closely it might perhaps be shown that God cannot, without impropriety, be spoken of as one or single; but this is really of little or of no moment to those who are anxious about things, not names.' Lessing seems to have been impressed with the subtle conception here involved; and the curious reader will find reward for his pains by turning to § 73 of the admirable English translation of the Erziehung des Menschengeschlects—The Education of the Human Race, published by Smith and Elder, 12mo, 1856. The meaning of Spinoza is simply this: that *one* referred to number implies the existence of *two*, or more than one; God is God, as the universe is the universe; and we ought no more to speak of one God than of one universe. May not Lessing have mistaken Spinoza's meaning when he proceeded to evolve *The Trinity* out of what is said?—ED.

the window of a bookseller's shop lately. From the little I then read of it, I do not think it worthy of a more attentive perusal, much less of a serious reply. Mentally smiling, I thought with myself that the most ignorant are everywhere the most presumptuous and the most eager to appear in print. It strikes me that * * * * must be showing his wares as the hawkers do theirs—bringing out the most worthless first. The Devil, they say, is extremely crafty, but these folks, methinks, far surpass the Devil in cunning. Farewell.

The Hague, June 2, 1674.

LETTER LI.

GOTTFRIED LEIBNITZ TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Frankfort, Oct. 5th, 1671.

Honoured Sir,

Among your other titles to consideration the fame of which has spread abroad, I learn that you are especially skilled in the science of optics. This induces me to send you a copy of an essay of mine on the subject, assured that I can submit it to no more competent judge than yourself. My pamphlet is entitled *Notitia Opticæ promotæ*, and has been sent to press that I might the more conveniently communicate with my friends and the curious in such matters. I also hear that the excellent Mr Diemerbroeck, with whom I presume you are acquainted, excels in this branch of science; and you would signally oblige me could you obtain for me his judgment and favourable opinion of my tract, to which I beg to refer you for my views.

I presume you must have seen the *Prodromo* of Fr. Lana, Jesuit, written in Italian, in which he advances much that is interesting in Dioptrics, as well as the work of J. Oltius, the Swiss, a young man, very learned in the same subject, entitled

Cogitationes physico-mechanicæ de Visione, in which, among other things, he speaks of having invented a very simple machine for grinding and polishing lenses of every description, and further avers that he has discovered a means of collecting all the rays proceeding from every point of an object [after refraction] into so many precisely corresponding points, the object being at a certain distance only and of a given figure.

My proposal comes to this: Not that the rays proceeding from every point of an object should be precisely reunited (for this, whatever the distance or figure of the object, is impossible in the present state of our knowledge), but to have the rays of the points without as well as of those within the optic axis equally reunited. If this can be done we should then be able to have the apertures of our telescopes as large as we pleased without detriment to clear definition. But I leave the matter to your very competent judgment. Farewell, honoured Sir, and favour your sincere admirer,

GOTTFRIED LEIBNITZ, J. U. D.,
Councillor to his Highness the Palatine, Mayence.

P. S. [Added from Van Vloten's Supplement.] Should you honour me with a reply the most noble Councillor Diemerbroeck will, I hope, be found ready to take charge of it for me. I suppose you must have seen my new Hypothesis Physica; but if you have not, I shall send it to you.

LETTER LII.

B. DE SPINOZA TO THE LEARNED AND MOST NOBLE GOTTFRIED LEIBNITZ, JURIS UTRIUSQUE DOCTOR ET CONCILIARIUS MOGUNTINUS.

Most learned and noble Sir,

I have perused the Essay you were good enough to send me, and return you my best thanks for making me ac-

quainted with it. I only regret that I do not entirely understand your views, although I believe you express yourself clearly enough. But I am at a loss to know whether you believe there is any reason why we cannot have the aperture of a telescope of any size we wish other than this, viz.: that the rays issuing from one *point* do not [after refraction] accurately reunite in another point, but only converge within a certain *space*, which we are wont to call the mechanical spot or space, and which is larger or smaller as the aperture of the glass is large or small.

I would gladly know if the lenses you speak of under the title of *Pandochmic** obviate this defect in such a way, that the mechanical spot within which the rays from the same point of an object collect after refraction remains precisely of the same size whether the aperture of the telescope be large or small? Did your lenses accomplish this they would be vastly superior to those of any other figure with which I am acquainted; for with them we should be able to increase the apertures of our telescopes at pleasure without detriment to their defining power. Did they possess no such property, however, I do not see why you should speak so much more highly of them than of lenses of the usual configuration. Lenses that are segments of spheres have everywhere the same axis, and every point of the surface of an object viewed through them may be regarded as seated within the axis of vision; for although every point of the surface of an object is not really equi-distant, still the difference in their several distances is not appreciable when the object is somewhat remote, and all the rays proceeding from it may be considered as virtually parallel when they enter the lens. I believe your lenses might prove serviceable when we would include many objects in the field—in those cases, in short, in which we commonly employ unusually large convex glasses with spherical

* From πᾶν, all, and δοχμόω, to bend.

surfaces. But I suspend my judgment upon all these points until I have further information of your views from yourself, with which I particularly request you to favour me.

I have not seen either the Prodromus of Fr. Lana or the observations of Oltius; and, what I regret much more, I have still been unable to get a sight of your *Hypothesis Physica*, which is not to be purchased at the Hague. Your proffered present will therefore be extremely acceptable to me, and if I, in return, can be of any service to you, pray command me. I trust you will not find it troublesome to yourself to reply to me in the direction indicated.

Yours, most noble Sir, very sincerely,

B. DE SPINOZA.

The Hague, Nov. 9, 1671.

P. S. Mr Diemerbroeck does not live here; and I am therefore obliged to send this in the ordinary way, by post. I do not doubt but you are acquainted with some one else here whom I too might know, who would take charge of our letters, and pass them safely between us. If you do not possess the Tractatus Theologico-politicus, I will, if you make no objections, send you a copy.

LETTER LIII.

J. L. FABRITIUS TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Heidelberg, Feb. 16th, 1673.

Distinguished Sir,

I am commanded by my gracious master, the Prince Palatine,* in whose esteem you stand very high, though you are as yet unknown to me, to write to you, and ask if you might feel disposed to accept the chair of Professor of Philo-

* Charles Louis, Elect. Palatin, 1632—1680.

sophy in ordinary in the University here? The salary would be the same as that of the other professors in ordinary.

Nowhere, dear Sir, could you find a prince more favourably disposed than our Elector to men of distinguished abilities, among the number of whom he reckons you. You would enjoy the most perfect freedom in philosophizing, which his Highness feels assured you would not abuse by calling in question the established religion of the state. For my own part, I cannot do otherwise than second the wishes of our excellent prince. I therefore request you to reply to me at the earliest possible moment, either addressing your letter directly to me here, or sending it through one of the electoral residents at the Hague, Herr Grotius, or Herr Gilles van der Hek, or in any other way that seems best to you. I only add that, should you make up your mind to come among us, you may feel assured that you will lead a pleasant life becoming a philosopher, unless all we hope and anticipate falls out much otherwise than we believe. Farewell, honoured Sir!

From yours very obediently,

J. Ludovicus Fabritius,

Prof. Acad. Heidelb. et Elect. Palatin. Consiliar.

LETTER LIV.

B. DE SPINOZA TO J. LOUIS FABRITIUS.

The Hague, March 30, 1673.

Honoured Sir,

Had it ever been my wish to undertake the duties of a Professor in any Faculty, my desires would have been amply gratified in accepting the position which his Serene Highness the Prince Palatine does me the honour to offer me through you. The proposal, too, is much enhanced in value

in my eyes by the freedom of philosophizing attached to it, to say nothing of the pleasure I should feel in living under the sway of a Prince so universally admired for his parts and accomplishments. But as I have never thought of assuming the duties of a public teacher, I cannot now, although I have long pondered over the matter, make up my mind to avail myself of the distinguished opportunity held out to me. I think, in the first place, that I should be losing sight of my own further philosophical culture, were I to devote myself henceforth to the instruction of youth; and in the second, I do not know within what precise limits that same liberty of philosophizing would have to be restrained, so that I should not seem to interfere with the established religion of the principality; for schism does not arise so much from the zealous study of religion in itself, as from diversity in the affections of mankind, or from that spirit of contradiction which leads men to differ from and to condemn everything, however well and wisely said. I have already had much experience of misconstruction in my hitherto secluded and solitary way of life; how much more, then, should I not have to fear were I advanced to an office of the dignity proposed?

You see, therefore, honoured Sir, that I do not look for any higher worldly position than that which I now enjoy; and that for love of the quiet which I think I can otherwise secure, I must abstain from entering on the career of a public teacher. I therefore beg of you very earnestly to obtain for me from his Serene Highness the favour of some further time for deliberation; and, meantime, to do what you can to keep me in his good opinion, whereby you will confer an additional obligation on,

Most honoured Sir,

Your very obedient servant,

B. DE SPINOZA.

LETTER LV.

* * * TO B. DE SPINOZA.

[This letter, from a correspondent unnamed, consists of nothing but inquiries concerning ghosts and hobgoblins; Spinoza's answer which follows makes a version of the original unnecessary.]

LETTER LVI.

B. DE SPINOZA TO * * *

Honoured Sir,

Your letter which came to hand yesterday gave me much pleasure, both by reason of the news it brought me of yourself, and the assurance it conveyed that you had not quite forgotten me. Some might perchance have thought it an ill omen that ghosts and hobgoblins form the chief topic of your letter; but for my part, I find something more therein, and see that not only truth, but trifles and imaginations, may be turned to account.

As to your question, whether spectres are phantasms and imaginations, let us, I pray you, reserve it for the moment, as I see that to you it would seem almost as extraordinary simply to question or absolutely to deny the reality of such things, as it would to him who is already convinced of their existence by the numerous ghost stories that are told both by ancient and modern writers. The great esteem and honour in which I have always held and still hold you do not permit me to contradict, but much less will they allow me to flatter you. What, therefore, I would propose were this, that you choose for discussion one or another from among the many ghost stories you have read, which seems to you to afford the least room for doubt, or goes furthest to prove the existence of spectres.

To say truth, I have never myself perused any author worthy of credit, who, to my mind, clearly demonstrated the reality of spectres; so that to the present moment I am utterly ignorant of what they are, and so far have met with no one who could inform me. This much, however, seems certain, that we ought to know precisely what the thing is of which we have a clear intimation through experience; for, without such knowledge we shall scarcely gather from any narrative that spectres are actual existences. We should at best conclude for the existence of a certain something, but what this might be would be known to none. Did philosophers incline to call by the name of spectres things of which we are ignorant, I should not then deny them; for there are numberless things unknown to me.

Before proceeding to explain myself more fully on this subject, then, I beg of you, honoured Sir, to tell me what you yourself think these spirits and spectres are? Are they childish, foolish, or mad? All I have ever heard of them seems to me applicable to ignorance rather than to science, and, putting the best possible face on the matter, to partake more of puerility or folly than anything else. Ere I conclude I would submit to you that in the tales we have of hobgoblins and spectres, we more certainly discover than from almost any other quarter that disposition or desire which the majority of mankind experience to narrate events not as they are in fact, but as they would have them to be. The principal reason of this I believe to consist in the fact, that these tales have never any other witness than their relators—inventors also for the nonce, and having no fear of contradiction in regard to the circumstances adduced to substantiate the truth of what is said; the line taken in this view being such as seems best calculated either to justify the terror they have of dreams and omens, to proclaim their courage, or to confirm the faith and opinions they entertain. Besides these I could ad-

duce other reasons which move me to doubt if not of the narratives, yet of the circumstances connected with them, which for the most part confirm me in the conclusion I should draw from the narratives themselves. Here I end, until I shall have heard from you what the particular histories are which have brought such conviction to your mind that to you it seems absurd to make the reality of spectres matter of doubt, &c.

LETTER LVII.

* * * TO B. DE SPINOZA.

[This letter is from the same correspondent on the same subject. He thinks that spirits must exist in order to complete the symmetry and perfection of the universe, and that the Creator may have made them to bear a greater resemblance to himself than material bodies; because, as there are bodies without souls, so may there be souls without bodies; because in the upper air there is no place for opaque bodies, and the measureless space between us and the stars cannot be empty, but must be peopled by spiritual beings of such subtle and rare substance as to be invisible. As to the histories which have convinced him of the existence of spirits they may be found in Plutarch (Illust. Viror. Hist.), in Suetonius (Vitæ Cæsarum), in Jo. Wier (De Præstigiis, &c., and in Op. Om. Amst. 1660), in Lud. Lavater (De Spectris et Lemuribus) and in Cardanus (De Subtilitate, &c.). Melancthon, further, a sage personage [he might have added Luther, a bold man, who threw his ink bottle at the head of the devil upon a certain occasion], believed in the existence of spirits. 'A certain Consul,' he goes on to say, 'a wise and learned man, who is still alive, told me that he had often heard work going busily forward during the night in his mother's brew-house, precisely as when brewing was going on in the day-

time. Something of the same kind,' he adds, 'has also occurred to myself, and can never be forgotten by me, so that on the grounds of personal experience as well as report I am convinced of the existence of Spectres.'

As to what is said about evil spirits, which plague and torment miserable man in this life and in the life to come, and of magic, he says, 'I believe such tales to be fables,' &c. &c.]

LETTER LVIII.

B. DE SPINOZA TO * * *

Honoured Sir,

Reassured by what you say in your last letter, that friends may have opposite opinions upon indifferent subjects without detriment to their friendship, I shall now give you frankly my opinion of the grounds and narratives from which you conclude that there exist spirits of different kinds, but perhaps none of the feminine gender. One principal reason for my not replying to you sooner was that I had not all the books you quote at hand for reference. I had Pliny and Suetonius, however, and having these I now think I may dispense with the others; for I am persuaded they would all be found speaking in the same senseless style, and showing the same love of the uncommon that is wont to arrest the attention and excite the admiration of the vulgar. I own that I have been even less astonished by the character of the stories I find related, than by the position of those who narrate them; I am indeed confounded to discover men of parts and ingenuity misusing their powers in attempts to persuade mankind of the truth of such absurdities.

Let us leave the writers, however, and proceed to discuss the things themselves; and the subject of my first argument

will be, the relevancy of your conclusions; making sure at the outset that I, who deny the existence of spectres and spirits, sufficiently understand the authors who have written on the subject, and that you, who admit the existence of hobgoblins, do not estimate the writers you refer to at more than their proper worth.

Your firm belief in the existence of male and no less pointed denial of that of female spirits seems to me more like a fancy or imagination than anything else; or may it be a consequence of the popular belief which still pictures God as of the male, not of the female sex?* I am surprised that you, who have seen spirits naked, should not have paid more particular attention to the parts which distinguish the sexes,—perhaps it was terror that prevented you from observing accurately; or was it that there was nothing to distinguish male from female? You will perhaps reproach me here with turning the question into ridicule rather than meeting it with a serious reply; were you to do so, however, I should only the more clearly perceive that you hold to your faith so firmly that no one, in your opinion at least, could shake it, unless perchance he maintained the perverse and absurd opinion that the world arose by chance. And these words lead me, before entering on the subject more immediately before us, to give you in brief my views of the origin of things.

Has the world arisen by chance? As certain as it is that chance and necessity are two opposites, even so certain is it that he who maintains the world to have been formed by the Divine Nature denies that it is the effect of chance; whilst

* In the ancient Indian mythology Brahm was at once Potential and Passive—male and female in himself. Vide Creuzer and Guigniaut, Religions d'Antiquité. The only modern writer of parts and learning who has spoken of the Deity as male and female is Theodore Parker. He frequently in his later writings refers to God as 'The Father and Mother of mankind.'—ED.

he, again, who holds that God might have left the creation of the world uneffected declares, although in other words, that the world was produced by accident; for it were then the effect of a will that might not have been. But as such an opinion and such a conclusion are alike and in every respect absurd, it is now we may say universally admitted that the will of God is from eternity and has never been indifferent or inefficient. On this account, for this reason must we of necessity acknowledge—observe this well—that the world is a necessary effect of the Divine Nature. And whether this be spoken of under the title of will, intelligence, or be attempted to be expressed by any other word, it still comes to this that one and the same thing is called by different names.

If it be now asked whether the Divine will differs or does not differ from the will of man, the answer must be: that the former has nothing in common with the latter but the word will. Besides this, it is mostly admitted that the will, intelligence, nature, and essence of God are one and the same thing; to which I add, not to confound the Divine with human nature, that I do not ascribe to God the mere human attributes of will, understanding, attention, hearing, and the like. Repeating my position: that the world is a necessary effect of the Divine Nature, and no product of chance, will I hope satisfy you that they who maintain the world to be the effect of chance and I are opposed in our views at every point.

Firmly established on this basis as a preliminary, I now go on to examine the grounds on which you infer the existence of ghosts and apparitions of every description. In general and at once I say that you seem to me to proceed on conjectures rather than on solid grounds, and I persuade myself with difficulty that you can accept conjecture as demonstration. But, conjecture or reason, let us see if we may venture to accept either as well-founded.

Your first argument is that spirits must exist in order that the beauty and symmetry of the universe may be completed. Beauty, honoured Sir, is not so much a quality in the object regarded as it is an effect in him who regards. Were our sight longer or shorter, or our temperament other than it is, the things that now appear beautiful to us might present themselves as hideous, and those that now seem ugly look beautiful. The fairest hand seen under the microscope is a coarse and frightful object. Many things which look beautiful at a distance are hideous seen close at hand, and vice versâ; so that things considered in themselves or in reference to God are neither beautiful nor ill-favoured. He therefore who should maintain that God made the world so and in such wise that it might be beautiful, must necessarily conclude in one of two ways, either that God created the world with reference to the appetites and eye of man, or the appetites and eye of man with reference to the world. Now, whether we assume the former or the latter of these conclusions, I do not see wherefore on either assumption it should follow that God had created spectres and spirits also. Perfection and imperfection are words that do not differ much in meaning from beauty and deformity. But not to be too prolix, I would only ask, which of the two contributes most to the embellishment and perfection of the world; the existence of spirits [whom you presume to be beautiful], or the variety of monstrous shapes, such as Centaurs, Hydras, Harpies, Satyrs, Griffins, Arguses, and the like, that have been imagined? The world would certainly have been prettily furnished had God contrived and ornamented it with such creatures of the fancy as may be feigned or fashioned in our dreams, but of the nature and purpose of which it is impossible to form a conception.

Your second reason for believing in the existence of spirits is, that God has made them more truly in his own

image or likeness than any other created thing. But I must confess that I do not understand how or why spirits should be held to have a higher stamp of God upon them than other created things. This much, however, I do understand: that between the finite and the infinite there is no kind of proportion whatever; so that the distinction between the highest and most perfect creature and God, is no other than that between God and the lowest and vilest of things. But this is really beside the question. Had I only as clear a conception of a spectre as I have of a triangle or a circle, I should not hesitate to acknowledge that it was created by God; but inasmuch as the ideas I form of spectres agree completely with those I form of hydras, harpies, griffins, and the like, I cannot regard them save as dreams, which differ as much from God as being differs from non-existence.

Your third reason: 'that inasmuch as there are bodies without souls, so there must be souls without bodies,' seems to me equally absurd. Tell me, I pray you, whether it is not also likely that there are hearing, sight, memory, &c., without bodies, inasmuch as there are bodies which do not see, hear, remember, &c.; or may there be a sphere without comprising a circle, because circles exist without spheres?

Your fourth and last reason is the same as the first, to my answer to which I therefore refer you. I shall only observe here that the *above* and *below* which you conceive in infinite space, is unknown to me, unless indeed you assume the earth to be centre of the universe; for were the sun or Saturn the centre, that which you speak of as above and below would then be referred to one or other of these and not to the earth. I conclude, therefore, setting other considerations aside, that the reasons assigned, and any number more of the like sort that might be adduced, would convince no one of the existence of spectres or hobgoblins, unless indeed he were of the number of those who, shutting the ears of their understanding, suffer

themselves to be carried away by superstition, and are so much opposed to right reason that to discredit philosophy they prefer putting faith in old women's tales.

As to the narratives to which you refer, I have already said in my first letter that I by no means denied them, but only the inferences from them. I do not indeed hold them so absolutely truthful as not to question many of the circumstances added to them in the way of ornament as it seems, rather than as means of supporting the truth of the narratives or strengthening the conclusions drawn from them. I had hoped that you would have given one or another from the multitude of stories extant, that should either have left less doubt on the mind, or supplied irrefragable testimony to the reality of spirits and apparitions. That the Consul you mention should infer the existence of spirits from hearing such noises during the night in his mother's brew-house as are usually heard in the day-time only, appears to me simply laughable. But I cannot undertake to criticize the piles that have been written on such follies. To be brief, I refer to Julius Cæsar alone, who, as Suetonius testifies, ridiculed such things and yet was fortunate (Vide Sueton. cap. 59). Even so ought every one who properly considers the passions and imaginations of mankind, to laugh such stuff to scorn, in spite of all that Lavater, Wier, and the rest, who have gone dreaming on the subject, may say to the contrary.

LETTER LIX.

* * * TO B. DE SPINOZA.

[The same correspondent writes in reply to Spinoza's last. There are no female spirits, he thinks, because he does not think spirits engender. Free and necessary he thinks are opposed; not so fortuitous and necessary. He denies that the

will of God has never been indifferent, or is always and necessarily efficient, and so on, in dissent from what our philosopher has said. He excuses himself from attempting a demonstration of the existence of spirits or of souls without bodies—here, he opines, we must be content with conjecture and probability. Beauty, he says, consists in consonance or harmony of parts, and a thing is beautiful as it is perfect, perfect as it is beautiful. Centaurs, harpies, and hydras are out of place here, the question being of the eternal and temporal, infinite and finite, substance and accident, corporeal and spiritual. Spirits, he says, resemble God, because God is a Spirit; to give as clear an idea of a spirit as of a triangle is impossible.] 'Tell me, I entreat you,' he proceeds, 'whether you have as clear an idea of God—an idea as distinct to your understanding—as the idea you have of a triangle?' All the philosophers of ancient times believed in the existence of spirits, and 'among the moderns no one denies it.' * * * 'Cæsar, Cicero, and Cato did not laugh at spectres, but derided omens and predictions; and yet, had Julius paid more respect to Spurina's warning on the day he fell, his enemies would have found no opportunity to pierce his body with so many wounds.'

LETTER LX.

B. DE SPINOZA TO * * *

Honoured Sir,

I hasten to reply to your last letter which reached me yesterday. The news of your indisposition would have caused me more uneasiness than it did had I not at the same time heard of your improvement; I hope that now you are completely recovered.

How difficult it is for two men who start from different

principles in matters depending on many other things to agree and think alike, would appear very plainly from this correspondence of ours, did no other reason show that such must needs be the case. Tell me, I pray you, if you have ever either personally known, or in the course of your reading met with any account of a philosopher who maintained that the world had arisen by accident in the sense in which you understand the words, viz.: that God in fashioning the world had a predetermined aim in view and yet failed to accomplish it? I cannot myself conceive how it could ever have come into the mind of man to imagine such a thing. And I must add that I experience very much of the same difficulty when I see you would have me believe that the fortuitous and the necessary are not opposed to one another. So soon as I apprehend that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, I deny that chance has had anything to do with this truth; even so, when I see that heat is a necessary effect of combustion, do I put accident out of the question. To me it seems equally unreasonable to speak of necessary and free as opposites; for no one can deny that God knows himself and everything else *freely*, yet all by common consent admit that God knows himself *necessarily* also. You, therefore, seem to me to recognize no distinction between compulsion or force and [philosophical] necessity. That man wills to live, to love, &c., is not compulsory, but is necessary—and much more is it that God wills to be, to know and to act. If, in addition to what has now been said, you will further reflect that Indifference is nothing but ignorance or doubt, and that Will is a constant definite power, and a necessary property of intelligence, you will see that my words express and in every particular agree with truth. Did we affirm that God could will not to will a thing, and was competent not to understand it, we should ascribe different kinds of liberty to God—one necessary, another indifferent;

and should then conceive the will of God as distinct from his essence and understanding, and so fall from one absurdity into another and another.

The attention I requested of you in my last does not seem to have appeared necessary to you; and this is the reason why, not having fixed your thoughts on the main question, you have passed by unnoticed that which is in fact most essential to the whole matter.

When you observe that if I deny to God vital activity, hearing, seeing, attention, &c., and refuse to concede these as eminently extant in God, you do not then understand God as I conceive him, and this leads me to surmise that you do not believe there are any higher perfections than those implied in the attributes you mention. I do not wonder at this; for I believe that were a triangle gifted with powers of thought and speech it would in like manner maintain that God is eminently triangular, as would a circle that the Divine nature was eminently circular. On the same ground would each individual thing ascribe its own qualities or attributes to God, constitute itself in the image of God, and hold everything else less favoured or misshapen.

The limits of a letter and want of time do not allow me to enter at length on my views of the Divine Nature, or fully to discuss the questions you put to me—to say nothing of the fact that to start difficulties is to give no good reasons. That we do much in the world on conjecture is very true, but that we have our meditations from conjecture is false. In common life we follow verisimilitudes, but in our speculations we proceed under the constraint of truth. A man might die of hunger and thirst, did he resolve neither to eat nor drink until he had obtained complete demonstration that meat and drink would do him good. But this is not so with thought and reflection. On the contrary, we have to be on our guard against admitting anything as true which is only likely or

probable; for when we have accepted one falsehood, an infinite number of others may follow in its train. We are not to conclude, however, because human and divine science are greatly open to diversity of view and to controversy, that all the subjects comprised in them are uncertain. Some men are so possessed by the spirit of contradiction, that they even scout geometrical demonstrations. Sextus Empiricus and other sceptics whom you quote declare it false that a whole is greater than a part, and treat all the other accredited axioms in the same way.

But granting that from defect of demonstration we have to content ourselves with probabilities, I say that the reasoning should in every case have such verisimilitude that, although we might feel authorized to question, yet we ought not to feel justified in denying its cogency; for whatever can be definitively contradicted or denied is nearer akin to the false than the true. If, for example, I say that Peter is alive because I saw him alive and well yesterday, this is likely to be true, and no one will contradict me; but if another says that he saw Peter in a fainting fit yesterday, and that he died in consequence of the seizure, this will have the effect of making my statement appear untrue and laying me open to contradiction. Having already shown your conjectures about spirits and hobgoblins to be false, to have nothing of likelihood about them, I find nothing worthy of comment in your reply to what I have said.

To your question whether I have as clear an idea of God as I have of a triangle, I answer affirmatively—Yes; but if you ask whether I can form an image or picture of God as clear as that I form of a triangle, I answer No. For we cannot picture God to ourselves, but we can verily understand him.* I have here to observe, however, that I do not say I entirely know God, but that I apprehend some of his attributes,—some I

* 'Deum enim non imaginari, sed quidem intelligere possumus.'

say, not all, nor even the greater number of these; and it is certain that ignorance even of the greater number does not prevent me from having a knowledge of some. When I first studied Euclid's elements, I soon understood that the three angles of any triangle were equal to two right angles, and I clearly apprehended this property of the triangle, although ignorant of many other propositions.

As regards ghosts and hobgoblins, I have never yet heard of any intelligible property belonging to them, but much that was fanciful and that no one could understand. When you say that spectres or apparitions in this lower region (I follow your expressions, although I am ignorant that the matter of this lower sphere is less excellent than that of any superior region) are composed of most rare, subtle, and attenuated substance, you seem to me only to be speaking of gossamer, vapours, or the air. To tell me they are invisible gives me no more information than if you spoke of what they are not, not of what they are—unless perchance you mean that they make themselves visible or invisible at their pleasure, and that imagination here, as in all other impossible instances, meets with difficulties.

I do not attach great value to the authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates in such matters. I should, however, have been astonished had you quoted Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius, or any of the atomists. It is not to be wondered at that they who contended for occult qualities, intentional species, substantive forms, and a thousand other vanities, believed in spectres and apparitions, demons and hobgoblins, and gave credence to old women's tales, that they might weaken the authority of Democritus, of whose good name and fame they were so envious that they burned all the writings he had divulged with so much reputation. If you are determined to pin your faith on them, what reason have you for refusing assent to the miracles of the holy virgin and all

the saints, narrated so circumstantially by many celebrated philosophers, theologians, and historians, and of which a hundred may be quoted for every one related by the older writers? But, most excellent Sir, I have proceeded to greater lengths than I had intended; and trouble you no further with views and conclusions which I know you will not assent to, because I see you adopt principles totally different from those I make my guides.

LETTER LXI.

* * * [G. H. SCHALLER] TO B. DE SPINOZA.

[In this letter the writer expresses his belief that much of the difference apparent between philosophers is verbal—is about terms more than things. The principal subject on which he asks for information is that of free-will. He is evidently a careful student of Descartes.]

[The Hague, Oct., 1674.]

LETTER LXII.

B. DE SPINOZA TO [G. H. SCHALLER, M.D.]

In reply to the above, on Freedom and Necessity.

Experienced Sir!

Our friend J. R.* forwarded to me the letter you were good enough to write me, together with the criticism of your friend † on the views of Descartes and myself concerning free-will, both of which, I assure you, were very agreeable to me. And although my health at present is indifferent, and I am much taken up with other affairs, still your

* John Rieuwerts, bookseller of Amsterdam, to whom Spinoza's papers were sent immediately after his death, and who published the Opera Posthuma.—ED.

† W. von Tschirnhaus.—ED.

courtesy and friendliness to me, as well as your love of truth, which I value above all things, induce me to accede to your wishes, and reply to the extent of my ability. I do not exactly know, however, what your friend can expect from me previous to appealing to experience and giving his best attention to the subject. His proposition concerning the difference between two persons, one of whom affirms what the other denies, is true if he understands that they, whilst using the same words, are yet thinking of different things; several instances of the sort I lately sent to our friend J. R., and I have written to him begging him to communicate them to you.

I go on to the definition of freedom which your friend says is mine; but I know not whence he had it. I say that a thing is *free* which exists and acts by the sole necessity of its nature; and I call that constrained which is determined to exist and to act in a certain definite way by something external to itself. Thus: God, though existing necessarily, exists freely, because he exists by the necessity of his nature alone. So, also, God understands himself and all things freely, because it follows from the necessity of his nature alone that he understands himself and all things else. You see, therefore, that I place freedom not in any free decree of the will, but in free necessity.

But descending to things of creation, all of which are determined to exist and act in a certain and definite manner, let us take such a simple thing as a stone by way of illustration. Impelled by an external cause, it receives a certain quantity of motion, whereby, the impulse of the external cause ceasing, it is necessarily moved. This assumption and continuance of motion on the part of the stone is, therefore, compelled, not necessary, because it must be defined from or referred to the impulse of the external moving cause. Now, what is here said of the stone is to be understood of every in-

dividual thing, although it be conceived as compound and possessed of various aptitudes, because every individual object is determined to existence and action in a certain definite and determinate way.

Now conceive, further, that the stone as it proceeds in its motion thinks and knows that it is striving so far as in it lies to continue in motion; inasmuch as it is only conscious of its endeavour and in nowise indifferent, it will believe itself to be most free and to persevere in its motion from no other cause than that it wills to do so. And this is precisely that human freedom of which all boast themselves possessed, but which consists in this alone: that men are conscious of their desires and ignorant of the causes by which these are determined. Thus the infant believes that it freely seeks the mother's breast; the angry boy that he is free to seek revenge; the timid that he freely takes to flight; the tipsy man that he said things of free motive, which afterwards when sober he wishes he had not uttered; so too the foolish man, the gossip, and others of the same sort believe that they act by the free decision of their minds, and not by any blind impulse. And inasmuch as this prejudice is innate in all men, it is not so readily escaped from as is imagined. For though experience sufficiently and more than sufficiently teaches that men are able to do nothing less than to moderate their appetites, and that often, when torn by conflicting emotions, they see the better yet follow the worse, they still believe themselves to be free; this comes to pass simply because they desire certain things slightly, the appetite for which they can easily control by calling to mind some other thing familiarly present to the memory.

In what precedes, I have, unless I deceive myself, satisfactorily explained my views of free and forced necessity, and of that freedom of which man feigns himself possessed; from which the objections raised by your friend may readily

be answered. As to what he says with Descartes, 'that he is free who is constrained by no outward cause,' I reply, If by constraint he means action against will, I admit that in certain things we are under no kind of compulsion, and in this respect are free. But if by constraint he understands action, though not against will yet of necessity (as I have explained it above), I deny that we are free in anything.

Your friend, however, affirms on the contrary that we can use our reason with perfect freedom, i. e. absolutely and without respect to anything else; and hereon he takes his stand with sufficient—I will not say with too much—confidence. 'Who,' he asks, 'without a contradiction of his proper consciousness can deny that he is free to think his thoughts, to write what he pleases, or to leave writing alone?' But I should much like to know what the consciousness is of which he speaks,—whether it is other than that which I have explained by the example of the stone. I, for my part, and that I may not contradict my consciousness, that is, that I may not contradict reason and experience and yield to ignorance and prejudice, deny that I possess any absolute power of thinking, and that at pleasure I can will or not will to do this or that—to write for example. I appeal to his own consciousness, as he must doubtless have experienced, that in his sleep he has no power to think that he wills to write or not to write, and that when dreaming he wills to write, he has the power not to dream that he wills to write. I believe, also, he must have learned by experience that the mind is not at all times equally apt for thoughts of the same object; but, as the body is now and then more or less apt to have an image of this or that object excited in it, so the mind is more or less apt at different times for the contemplation of this or another object.

When he goes on to say, further, that the causes which induce him to apply his mind to writing also lead him to

write, though they do not compel him to write; this signifies no more, as you will see if you weigh the matter impartially, than that his mind was at this time in such a state that causes which, had he been under the influence of some violent mental emotion, would have had no power to move him to write, now sufficed to make him do so; in other words, causes which at another time would not have induced or constrained him, now sufficed to induce or constrain him to write, not against his will, however, but necessarily to experience the desire to write.

When he proceeds to say, yet further, that 'were we moved or constrained by external causes, no one could possibly acquire virtuous habits;' I answer that I know not who may have told him we cannot form virtuous resolutions, cannot act of sure and steadfast mind by simple necessity, but only under the decrees of free-will.

And when he winds up by saying that 'if this be so, then is every kind of wickedness excusable,' I ask, What follows from this? For bad men are neither more nor less to be feared, more nor less dangerous, when they are bad through necessity, than they are through free-will. But on this topic be good enough to refer him to paragraphs 1 and 2, Part II., Chap. 8, of my Appendix to the Cartesian Principles.*

* § 1. 'The will of God wherewith he wills to love himself follows necessarily from the infinite intelligence wherewith he understands himself. But how or in what way the essence, the understanding, and the love of God for himself are distinguished, passes our comprehension, and are among the things we desire to know. And when I say this I am not unmindful of the word—*personality* to wit—which theologians call in so constantly to explain the matter. But though I do not ignore the word yet am I ignorant of its meaning here; neither can I form any clear and definite conception of what it implies, although I firmly believe that in that most blessed vision of Deity which God promises to the faithful, he will reveal this to his own.'

§ 2. Will and Power as things extraneous are not distinguished from the Intellect of God. 'For God has not only decreed things to exist, but also that they exist with such and such natures; that is, that their essence and existence should depend on the will and power of God. From this we clearly and distinctly perceive that the Intellect of God, and his will and power whereby he created all things, and understands and preserves or loves them,

In conclusion I would ask your friend who makes these objections against me, how he conceives human virtue, which, as he thinks, arises from the free decree of the mind, can consist with the preordinations of God? Does he own with Descartes that he knows not how to reconcile them, then I say he would fix me on the horns of the dilemma on which he himself is fast. If you will but examine my ideas with due attention I think you will find them in consonance with all we know.

LETTER LXIII.

* * * TO B. DE SPINOZA FROM W. E. VON TSCHIRNHAUS.

[From a correspondent until very lately unnamed, but now known to be W. E. von Tschirnhaus, urging Spinoza to publish his works, and asking various questions—on motion, on the difference between a true and an adequate idea, &c., Jan., 1675.]

LETTER LXIV.

B. DE SPINOZA TO WALTER E. VON TSCHIRNHAUS.

Noble Sir!

Between a true and an adequate idea I acknowledge no difference, save that the word 'true' refers to the agreement of the idea with its ideate [or object], the word 'adequate' to the nature of the idea itself; so that there is really no difference between a true and an adequate idea beyond extrinsic relationship. But that I may know from what idea of a thing among many all the properties of an object may be deduced, I have to take care that the definition or idea of the

are in nowise distinguished from one another, but are distinguished only in respect of our thoughts or understanding.'

thing expresses its efficient cause. For example, on proceeding to investigate the properties of the circle, I inquire whether, on the assumption that it consists of an infinite number of rectangles, I can thence deduce all its properties, and so assure myself that this assumption or idea involves the efficient cause of the circle? and finding that it does not, I ask again: whether a circle is not a figure described by a line one of the points of which is fixed and the other moveable? And now seeing that this definition expresses the efficient cause, I know that I can thence deduce all the properties of a circle, &c. So, also, when I define God to be a being consummately perfect, as this definition does not express an efficient cause (for by an efficient cause I understand a cause intrinsic as well as extrinsic), I cannot thence infer all the properties of God; but when I define God as a Being absolutely infinite, that is, as substance constituted of an infinity of attributes each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence [then do I form to myself an adequate idea of God]. Vide Ethics., Pt i., Def. 6.

I shall take another opportunity to say something of *motion* and *method*, &c. * * *

LETTER LXV.

G. H. SCHALLER, M.D., TO B. DE SPINOZA.

(Proposing four questions on the attributes of God for solution.)

Most Excellent Sir,

I should blush for my long silence, whence you might suppose me forgetful and ungrateful for all your favours and kindnesses to me, did I not know that your generous and forgiving nature (generosa tua humanitas) rather leads you to excuse than to find fault with your friends. But I knew that to interrupt you in your serious meditations without sufficient cause was really to prejudice the interests

of your friends. For this reason have I been silent, content to be assured through other channels that you were well. The cause of my present writing is to let you know that our friend Herr von Tschirnhaus is now in England, and that on three several occasions in letters to me he has desired me to salute you most respectfully, and to request of you a solution of the following difficulties, viz.: First, whether by ostensible and direct demonstration—not by reduction to the impossible—it can be shown that we may have a knowledge of more of the attributes of God than thought and extension? * * *

2nd, Since the understanding of God in its essence as well as its existence differs from our understanding it can have nothing in common with ours, and therefore (by Eth. Pt i. Prop. 3*) cannot be the cause of our understanding.

3rd, You say, 'Nothing in nature is clearer than that each particular entity must be conceived under some attribute (and this I perfectly understand), and that the more of reality or actual being it possesses the greater the number of attributes it reckons.' (Eth. Pt i. Schol. to Prop. 10.) From this it would seem to follow that there are beings which have three, four, or a greater number of attributes, although we might gather from your demonstrations that each several Entity owned or was constituted of two attributes only, viz.: a certain determinate attribute of God and the idea of this attribute.

4th, I would gladly be referred to instances of things immediately produced by God, and of others mediately produced by a certain infinite modification. Thought and extension appear to me to be instances of the former; consciousness of thought, and motion in space, to furnish examples of the latter.

These are the topics on which Von Tschirnhaus desires

* 'Things that have nothing in common cannot be the cause of one another.'

explanations from your worship, should leisure permit you to favour his request. I may here inform you that the Honourable Mr Boyle and Mr Oldenburg had formed a strange conception of your person and character (Persona), which Von Tschirnhaus not only corrected and set to rights, but added grounds on which they have both been again led to think not only most worthily and favourably of you, but also of your Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. I have ventured to communicate so much for your guidance, assured, as I hope you are, that I am always ready to serve you—

I am, most excellent Sir (nobilissimus vir),

Your obedient Servant,

G. H. SCHALLER.*

Amsterdam, July 25, 1675.

P. S. Mynheer a Gent and J. Rieuwerts desire to be remembered to you.

LETTER LXVI.

B. DE SPINOZA TO G. H. SCHALLER, M.D.

Reply to the foregoing.

Excellent Sir,

I rejoice that you have at length found an opportunity to send me a letter—always most welcome to me. Let me beg of you to write often to me.

I go at once to the difficulties you mention; and as regards the first, I say that the human mind can only have cognizance of that which involves an idea of the body existing in act, or of that which can be deduced from this idea. For the power of each individual thing is defined from its essence alone

* This letter till Dr van Vloten wrote had always been given to Dr Meyer. Dr Schaller is the writer, Von Tschirnhaus the questioner through him. The beginning of the letter and the concluding paragraph are from Van Vloten's Supplement.

(Ethics, Pt iii. Pr. 7); now the essence of the mind consists in this alone, that it is the idea of the body existing in act (Eth., Pt ii. Pr. 13); hence the mind's power of conception extends to that alone which this idea of the body involves, or to so much as can be deduced from this idea. But the idea of the body involves and expresses no other attribute belonging to God save thought and extension; for its ideate or object—the body, has God for its cause (Eth., Pt ii. Pr. 6), in so far as God is considered under his attribute of extension and no other; and this idea of the body, therefore, involves cognition of God in so far only as he is considered under his attribute of extension. This idea, moreover, as it is a modification of thought, has God also for its cause, in so far as he is a thinking being (by the same Proposition), and is not considered under any attribute but thought; and so the idea of this idea involves the cognition of God in so far as he is considered under the attribute of thought and of no other. It follows, therefore, that the human mind, or the idea of the human body, includes and expresses no attribute of God other than the two particularly named. From these two attributes, indeed, or their affections, no other attribute of God can be inferred or expressed (by Pr. 10, Pt i.). I therefore conclude that the human mind can have cognizance of no attribute of God but thought and extension—the proposition from which I started.

As to what you add when you ask, whether as many worlds must not be presumed as there are attributes? I refer you to the Scholium to Proposition 7 of Part ii. of the Ethics, for an answer. That proposition may however, and even more readily, be demonstrated by the reductio ad absurdum, a form of demonstration which I am wont to adopt rather than any other when the proposition is of a negative kind, because it is more congruous with the nature of such negative propositions. But as you ask for that which is *positive*

only, I pass on to another of your queries which is to this effect: 'Whether a thing can be produced by another thing different in essence as well as existence, seeing that things which differ from one another have nothing in common?' But inasmuch as individual things, save and except such as are produced by their like, differ from their causes both in essence and existence, I can see no room here for doubt.

The sense in which I understand that God is the efficient cause of all things, both as to essence and existence, I think I have sufficiently explained in the Scholium and Corollary to Proposition 25 of the first part of the Ethics.

The axiom involved in the Scholium to Proposition 10, Part i., as I say at the end of the Scholium, is arrived at from the idea we have of a Being absolutely infinite, and not because there are or may be entities possessed of three, four, or a greater number of attributes.

To conclude, the examples you desire are, as regards the first kind, to be found in the absolutely infinite Intelligence as respects thought; in motion and rest as respects extension. As regards the second: I instance the aspect of the universe at large, which, though varying in infinite ways, still continues ever the same. On this see the Scholium to Lemma 7, preceding Proposition 14, Part ii. of the Ethics.

In what I have now said, most excellent Sir, I think I have answered the difficulties proposed by yourself and our friend. Should you still feel doubts of anything, however, I hope you will not hesitate to say so, and give me an opportunity—if I may—of removing them. Meantime, farewell, &c.

The Hague, July, 1675.

LETTER LXVI. (A.)

G. H. SCHALLER TO B. DE SPINOZA.

From Van Vloten's Supplement.

Most Learned and Excellent Sir, Respected Patron,

I hope my last was duly delivered to you, and that you continue in good health. I had heard nothing from von Tschirnhaus for about three months, and had begun to fear that he might have had some mishap in his journey from England to France. But now I have letters from him, and think I ought—as indeed he desires me to do—to inform your worship, with his respects, that he had reached Paris in safety; that there he met with M. Huygens, with whom, as I have admonished you, he had had a misunderstanding, but that this had been accommodated, and he was now on the best of terms with him. He had spoken of your worship with M. Huygens, who, in his turn, spoke in high terms of you, saying that he had lately procured a copy of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, which was highly commended by many in those parts, and much inquired after. He was further anxious to know whether there were any other works by the same hand extant. Von Tschirnhaus informed him that he knew of nothing more than the Two Parts of the Cartesian Principles. * * *

To the objections I lately forwarded to you, von Tschirnhaus says that he has now, and with further reflection, discovered the more intimate meaning of the passages that had puzzled him, &c. * * * Von Tschirnhaus informs me, further, that he had met with a gentleman in Paris of singular erudition, very well versed in the various sciences, and quite free from vulgar theological prejudices, Leibnitz by name, with whom he had contracted a close intimacy, and with whom he continued to cultivate his intellectual powers. With moral philosophy he reports Leibnitz to be thoroughly conversant: all morality,

without allowing anything to the emotions, he bases exclusively on reason. In physics and metaphysics, in his studies of God and the mind of man, von Tschirnhaus continues, he finds his new friend very far advanced; and he concludes by saying that he thinks this accomplished person highly worthy to have the writings of your worship communicated to him—your leave to do so having first been obtained; for he thinks that much advantage would accrue to their author from this, as he would show more at length, were you pleased to accede to his wishes. Do you not consent, however, he would have you assured that, in conformity with the understanding entered into, he will not even allude to your views. Leibnitz, he says, prizes your Tractatus Theologico-Politicus very highly, and, if you remember, he formerly wrote a letter to you on the subject.* I therefore request of you, dear Sir, unless some special reason stands in the way of your granting my request, that you will be pleased in the excess of your goodness to authorize me to give von T. the permission craved, &c.

Dr Bresser, just returned from Clives, has sent a large quantity of the ale of his native country hither; and I hinted to him that he should send half a barrel to your worship. This, with the most friendly readiness, he at once engaged to do.

Begging you to overlook the rudeness of my style and poor penmanship, but to give me an opportunity of serving you in any way, to show how much I am your most obedient servant, I am, &c.

G. H. SCHALLER.

Amsterdam, Nov. 14, 1675.

* This letter of Leibnitz, had it only come down to us, would have been a curiosity, in contrast with what he has indited elsewhere in connection with Spinoza, and when he was writing for the ladies.—ED.

LETTER LXVI. (B.)

B. DE SPINOZA TO G. H. SCHALLER, M.D.

Learned Sir, esteemed Friend!

It was extremely gratifying to me to learn by your letter which I received to-day, that you were well and that von Tschirnhaus had accomplished his journey to France in safety. In the conversation he had with M. Huygens about me, he appears, in my opinion, to have comported himself with great prudence, and I am very glad to know that he found occasion to bring his own business to the conclusion he desired.

As to the contradiction he thinks he discovers between Axiom 4, Pt i., and Proposition 5, Pt ii., I, for my part, cannot see any. In the Proposition I affirm that the essence of every idea has God for its cause, God being considered as a thinking entity; and in the Axiom I say that knowledge (cognitio) of an effect or an idea, depends on our knowledge or idea of the cause. But, to say the truth, I do not quite follow the meaning of your letter in this matter, and I rather think that either in your letter or in the copy of my MS. sent you, there is some mistake through a slip of the pen. You say, for instance, that I affirm in Proposition 5, that the *ideate* is the efficient cause of the *idea*, the fact being that this is the very thing I expressly deny. The confusion has, doubtless, arisen from incorrect transcription, so that it were useless to proceed further in the discussion of the matter at this time. I shall wait patiently till you have explained yourself more clearly and I know that you have a correct copy of my papers.

I believe I know, by letters, the Leibnitz of whom von Tschirnhaus writes, but why he who was councillor at Frankfort has gone to France I know not. In so far as I could judge by his letters, he appeared to me a man of liberal mind,

and extremely well versed in science of every kind. But that I at this early day should intrust him with my writings does not seem to me prudent. I would first know what he is doing in France, and have the opinion of von Tschirnhaus after he has known him somewhat longer and become better acquainted with his moral character.

For the rest, pray salute our friend von Tschirnhaus from me, and say that if I can be of use to him in any way he has only to command me; he will find me disposed to do everything he wishes. I am glad to hear of the safe return of our esteemed friend Bresser; and for the promised ale I send him, through you, my best thanks.

I have not yet tried your and your relation's process, neither do I believe that I shall ever bring my mind to try it; for the more I think of the matter the more thoroughly persuaded I am that you did not make any gold, but only separated the small quantity of the metal that was combined with the antimony. But of this and other matters want of time prevents me from speaking at greater length at present. Meanwhile, if I can assist you in any way, you will always find me, yours, dear Sir, with all friendly devotion,

B. D'ESPINOSA.

[The Hague, Nov. 18th, 1675.]

LETTER LXVII.

W. E. VON TSCHIRNHAUS TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Distinguished Sir!

I have now to ask of you a demonstration of your proposition to the effect: that the mind can apprehend no attributes in God save those of thought and extension. It seems to me obvious that an opposite inference might be

drawn from the Scholium to Proposition 7, Part ii., of the Ethics; but this, perhaps, is only because I have not properly understood the meaning of this Scholium. I have therefore determined to lay before you, dear Sir, the grounds of my inference, and beg you with your wonted kindness to come to my assistance wherever you see that I have not properly understood you.

Although I gather plainly enough from the seventh Proposition and its Scholium that the world is certainly one, it seems to me no less clear from the terms, that it is manifested in an infinite number of ways, and hence that particular things are also expressed in numberless modes. Whence it seems to follow that the modification which constitutes my mind, and the modification which constitutes my body, though it be one and the same modification, is still expressed in an infinite number of ways, one mode by thought, another by extension, a third by an attribute of God unknown to me, and so on to infinity, inasmuch as an infinity of attributes belong to God, and the order and connection of the modifications appear to be the same in all. Hence now arises the question: Why should the mind (which represents a certain modification, this same modification being expressed not only in extension but in an infinity of other modes) perceive the body (a modification expressed by extension) by the attribute of extension only and by no other? But time does not allow me to enter further into this subject; and all my doubts may perhaps disappear with further reflection.

London, Aug., 1675.

LETTER LXVIII.

B. DE SPINOZA TO W. E. VON TSCHIRNHAUS.

(A fragment in reply to the preceding.)

Noble Sir,

* * * In answer to your objection I say, that although each individual thing is expressed in an infinity of modes in the infinite mind of God, still that the infinite ideas whereby it is expressed cannot constitute one and the same mind of a particular thing, but infinities, inasmuch as these infinite ideas have no reciprocal connection, a point I have shown in the Scholium to Proposition 7, Part ii., of the Ethics, and in Proposition 10, Part i., of the same. If you but give a little attention to these you will find all your difficulties vanish.

The Hague, Aug., 1675.

LETTER LXIX.

[W. E. VON TSCHIRNHAUS] TO B. DE SPINOZA.

(A fragment.)

Dear Sir,

* * * I must say, in the first place, that I find great difficulty in conceiving how the existence of bodies having form and motion can be demonstrated *à priori;* since in extension, the matter being considered absolutely, nothing of the kind occurs. In the second, I beg to be informed by you how I am to understand those words which you will remember in your letter on The Infinite,* 'Yet do they not conclude that such things exceed all number by reason of the multitude of their parts.' Mathematicians, when speaking of these infinities, appear to me always to demonstrate that the multi-

* Vide Letter xxix.

tude of parts is such as to exceed all assignable number; and in the example of the two circles you cite in the same place, you do not seem to me to accomplish the demonstration you propose. You only show that no conclusion is arrived at in consequence of the excessive number of the parts of the interposed space, and because we have not its maximum and minimum; but you do not demonstrate, as you proposed to do, that the conclusion is not come to because of the multitude of parts.

May 2, 1676.

LETTER LXX.

B. DE SPINOZA TO W. E. VON TSCHIRNHAUS.

Noble Sir,

The reason why, in my letter on the Infinite, I say that the conception of an infinity of parts is not come to from their multitude, is obvious from this: that were it derived from their multitude we should not be able to conceive any greater multitude of parts, but that the multitude of the parts as given, must be the greatest possible, which is absurd. For in the entire space between two circles having different centres, we conceive a two-fold greater multitude of parts than in half of the same space; yet may the number of parts in the half as well as in the whole be greater than any possible assignable number.

From space, again, as conceived by Descartes, viz., a quiescent mass, it is not merely difficult to demonstrate the existence of bodies, as you say, but altogether impossible. For quiescent matter, as it is in itself, will continue in its state of quiescence,—will be aroused to no kind of motion, unless excited by a more powerful external cause; and it was for this reason that formerly I did not hesitate to declare the

Cartesian principles of natural things to be useless, not to say absurd.

Hague, May, 1676.

LETTER LXXI.

W. E. TSCHIRNHAUS TO B. DE SPINOZA.

Learned Sir,

Will you kindly gratify me by showing how, from the idea of extension in conformity with your views, a multiplicity of things may be demonstrated *à priori?* You will recollect, doubtless, that Descartes says he can deduce this from extension in no other way than by supposing it the effect of motion excited by God in space. He therefore seems to me not to have deduced the existence of bodies from matter at rest, unless we are to exclude the notion of God as a moving cause. You have yourself shown that multiplicity of being does not follow necessarily *à priori* from the essence of God. What Descartes would have demonstrated he himself believed to surpass man's powers of comprehension. I ask a solution of the difficulty from you, aware as I am that you have your own views on the subject,—unless perchance you have some weighty reason for keeping your opinion secret. Had there been nothing of this kind standing in the way, indeed, I cannot doubt but that you would already have said something on the subject. Only be assured that whether you impart or do not impart your views to me, my affection for you will remain unaltered.

My reasons for the particular inquiry I now make are these: because in the mathematics I have always observed that from a thing considered in itself, i. e. from the definition of a particular thing, we are competent to deduce one property only; and if we desire to arrive at several properties, it is necessary to refer the thing defined to something else;

and then it is that from the conjunction of definitions new properties are evolved. Thus: do I consider the periphery of a circle only, I shall be able to conclude nothing more than that it is everywhere alike or uniform; a property by which indeed it differs essentially from the properties of all other curves, but one from which I can deduce no others. If I refer to something else however—to radii, for instance, drawn from the centre to the circumference of a circle, or to two or several intersecting lines within its area, I am competent thence to deduce many other properties. Now this would seem opposed in some sort to the 16th Proposition of the Ethics, and generally to the first book of your Treatise, in which it is assumed as known that from the definition of an individual thing a variety of properties may be deduced. But, this appears to me impossible if we do not refer the thing defined to some other thing; so that I cannot see in what way from any attribute considered in itself—from infinite extension, for example, [the idea of] variety among bodies can arise. Should you also think that this cannot take place from one attribute considered singly, but may do so from all taken together; I would gladly be informed by you on the matter, and learn how it were to be understood. Farewell.

Paris, 1676.

LETTER LXXII.

B. DE SPINOZA TO W. E. VON TSCHIRNHAUS.

(In answer to the last.)

Noble Sir,

You ask whether variety or multiplicity in things can be deduced *à priori* from the idea of extension alone? I think I have already shown with sufficient clearness that this

is impossible; consequently that the matter was badly defined by Descartes from extension, and that it must necessarily be explained by an attribute that expressed an eternal and infinite essence. But I shall, perhaps, if life be spared me, speak with you on this matter more fully at another time; for so far I have had no opportunity of bringing anything that bears upon the subject into order.

But when you add that we are only competent to deduce a single property from the definition of a thing considered in itself, I say that this may perhaps be so in connection with the most simple things or with the entities of reason (to which I add figures), but not with real things. For, from my definition alone of God as a Being to whose essence belongs existence, I can conclude as to many of his properties, such as that he exists necessarily, that he is one, immutable, infinite, &c., &c. To this instance I could add many others, but for the present quit the subject.

I beg you to inquire whether the pamphlet of Huet against the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, about which I wrote before, has yet been published; and if it has, be good enough to send me a copy. Further, to let me know if you have heard anything of recent discoveries in the subject of refraction. Farewell, noble Sir, and continue to hold me in your best regard.

The Hague, July, 1676.

LETTER LXXIII.

ALBERT BURGH [BURCK BELGICE] TO B. DE SPINOZA.

[Albert Burgh was a young gentleman who appears to have lived for a time under the same roof with Spinoza, to have had instructions from him, for whose use he first arranged the Cartesian Principles, and with whose family he was well acquainted. Having finished his home-education,

and about to set forth on a tour to the south of Europe, Burgh engaged to give Spinoza an account of anything he met with that particularly interested him in the course of his travels. His very first letter opens with the startling intelligence of his 'reception, through the infinite mercy of God, into the bosom of the Catholic Church.' The poor lad had scarcely crossed the mountains, as it seems, before he was pounced on by some one among the proselytizing spirits of the Romish Church ever on the watch for the ignorant, the sensitive, and the timid, to whom precedent and prescription suffice for principles, and dogmatic teaching for absolute truth, and by him induced to forswear the simple faith of his forefathers for the ornate ritualism and incomprehensible mysteries of Rome. With the characteristic zeal of the 'Convertite,' Burgh proceeds to show his newly-acquired familiarity with the more prominent dogmas of the Romish Church, and does not fail to heap plentiful abuse upon all philosophy. He assures his old friend and teacher that it depends on himself to have God Almighty rescue his soul from everlasting damnation; and is pleased to inform him, if he delays to listen to the good advice now tendered, that 'the anger of the Lord would be let loose to burn fiercely against him, and that he would be left the lamentable victim of the divine justice'—very modest and considerate advice from a pupil to his master, from a youth to a man of mature years, of widespread name and fame, of spotless life, as Burgh well knew, and better versed in biblical and general theological lore than any scholar of his age! Spinoza's reply to Burgh's effusion, in which we may well suspect that he was aided by his Jesuit perverters, follows, and has been well characterized by Herr B. Auerbach as 'Ein ewiger blanker Waffe gegen religiöse Schwärmerei,'—a drawn sword ever at hand against religious fanaticism.]

LETTER LXXIV.

BENEDICT DE SPINOZA TO ALBERT BURGH.

My Dear Young Friend,

I now learn, under your own hand, what I should never have believed on the report of another—namely, that you have not only become, as you say, a member of the Church of Rome, but that you are also one of its zealous defenders. I see, too, that you have learnt betimes to rail against and everlastingly to damn those who think otherwise than you do yourself. I had purposed, at first, to make you no reply, in the persuasion that you do not so much lack understanding as that you will be without the leisure and opportunity to think of returning to your senses and your friends, to say nothing of other reasons which you yourself formerly adduced when we spoke of Steno, in whose footsteps you have now seen fit to tread; but several of your relations, who, as well as myself, had expected much from your excellent parts, entreated me so earnestly to fulfil the duties of a friend, and rather to think of what you lately were than of what you have since become, that I have resolved to write these few lines, which I earnestly request you will read with your best attention.

I will not here, as the opponents of the Church of Rome are wont to do with those from whom they differ, bring up the shortcomings and the crimes of Popes and priests, with the purpose of disgusting you, and turning you from them; for instances of the kind are often adduced fron evil and unworthy motives, and when paraded, serve much rather to irritate than to persuade. More than this, I will allow that in the Church of Rome there have been a greater number of men of learning and irreproachable life than in any other Christian community; for, as this communion is by far the most numerous, so do we find a greater number of every

stamp among its members. But this, I think you, on your part, will not venture to deny (if you have not, with your reason, lost your recollection also), that there are in every Church or Communion many good, honourable, and most worthy men, who worship God in sincerity and in truth, for you and I have known many such among Lutherans, Calvinists, Mennonites, &c.: and not to speak of others more particularly, you know that your ancestors, in the days of the Duke of Alva, suffered soul-tortures of every kind with unflinching constancy, for the sake of their religion and their liberties. You must, therefore, admit that sanctity of life and virtuous conduct are not peculiar to the Church of Rome, but are common to all Churches whatsoever; and, to speak with the Apostle John, 'because by these we know that we are in God, and God is in us,' it follows that all which distinguishes the Church of Rome from others is really non-essential, superfluous throughout, and therefore connected with it by no tie but superstition. For Love and Righteousness, as I have said with John, are the sole, as they are the certain signs of the true Catholic faith, the very fruits of the Holy Spirit; where they are there indeed is Christ also, and where they are not there too is Christ wanting: for the Spirit of Christ is that alone which leads us to righteousness and brotherly love. Had you but weighed these truths in your mind, you would not have foundered in your course as you have done, and you would surely have spared your parents the bitter sorrow in which they now lament your fall. But I return to your letter, in which you are pleased to commiserate my condition, in that 'I have suffered myself to be deceived by the Prince of the Powers of Darkness.' *

* Burgh, in his letter, had said: 'The more I formerly admired you for the power and penetration of your spirit, the more do I now pity and grieve over you; for you, endowed with the most wonderful aptitude of mind, gifted by God with a soul possessed of all the noblest qualities of man, you, full of love, yea, of passion for truth, permit yourself to be deceived and led astray by the lost and presumptuous Prince of the Evil Spirits.'

But be of good cheer; and do you yourself, I pray you, return to your senses. Whilst you were yet of sound mind you addressed your prayers, if I err not, to the Infinite God, by whose inherent power all things were made, all things are ceaselessly sustained. But what do you now? You dream of another Divinity—a hostile spiritual power or prince, who, against the will and purpose of the Almighty, deceives and betrays the mass of mankind (for the good are few), who are then delivered over to endless torments at the hands of their seducer and teacher of iniquity; you believe, forsooth, that the Divine Justice permits the Devil to deceive mankind, and that man, deceived and betrayed by the Devil, suffers punishment for evermore!

But even this unreason were to be borne did you but continue to adore the Eternal and Infinite God, and addressed not yourself to that imaginary Deity, whom Chastillon, in the town of Thionville, gave with impunity as provender to his horse. And you, wretched boy, you presume to lament for me! to style my Philosophy, which you do not understand, a chimera! You, a youth, forsaken of sense and spirit! —who can thus have blinded you? who led you to believe that you can take God the Ineffable, the Infinite, into your mouth and entrails?

You, nevertheless, do sometimes condescend to reason, as when you ask me 'how I know that my philosophy is the best of all that was ever taught in the world, that is taught now, or that ever will be taught in time to come?' With much better title might I put a parallel question to you; for I, for my part, have never presumed to say that I had found the best philosophy. I have but said that I profess the philosophy I believe to be true. And if you inquire how I know that it is so, I answer, even as you know, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; and no one in his senses, and who does not dream that there be lying spirits who put into

our mind false ideas that resemble true ideas, will deny that this suffices, for the True is the index of itself and of the False.

But of you who presume that you have discovered the best religion, or rather some of the best among men professing a certain form of religion, to whom you have plighted your easy faith—of you I ask, in my turn, How do you know that this is the best of all the religions hitherto taught, taught now, or that ever will be taught in time to come? Have you put all the religions that exist in the world to the proof—the old as well as the new—those that are believed in by the millions of India and of China? And if you have duly proved them all in their vast diversity, how, in fine, do you know that you have chosen the best? You can, indeed, show no sufficient grounds for your preference. But you may say that you comfort yourself in your assurance of salvation, rely on the inward testimony of the Holy Spirit, and believe that the rest of mankind, who do not think as you do, are misled and betrayed by the Prince of the Powers of Darkness. What, then, shall all who are without the pale of the Church of Rome reply to this? Even that they have as much right as you to speak of their religion as the best. All that you say about uniformity and agreement among the myriads who belong to the Roman Catholic Church, of the uninterrupted succession of her bishops, &c., is even the old song of the Pharisees, who, with the same confidence as the Romanists, parade their myriads of witnesses, and cling with the same pertinacity to matters which they only know by tradition, as if they were self-evident and came by intuition. The Pharisees, indeed, go much further back than your new friends: they trace their descent in uninterrupted succession from Adam, and boast with like presumption that their Church, despite the hate of Pagan and of Christian alike, has been handed down unchanged to the present day; they,

too, find their chief support in antiquity, and unanimously declare that they have their traditions direct from God himself, that they, indeed, are the sole and only possessors of the written and unwritten word of God. And it is unquestionable that, though all the schisms may be said to have proceeded from them, they themselves have maintained their doctrine and discipline unchanged through thousands of years without other bond or constraint than that supplied by superstition. The miracles of which they boast it would weary a thousand of the glibbest tongues to relate; but what they especially pride themselves upon is the multitude of their martyrs—a multitude already far greater than can be shown by any other people; and of whom, the number that suffer with a constancy of soul unparalleled, increases every day. And this, indeed, is undeniable. I was myself acquainted with a certain Juda, surnamed The Faithful, who, in the midst of the flames (to which he had been cruelly condemned), when believed to be already dead, began to sing the words of the Thirty-first Psalm, 'Into thy hands, O God, I commit my soul,' and in the midst of the singing, died.

The discipline of the Church of Rome, with which you express yourself so much delighted, I acknowledge as politic, and for too many lucrative. I am also ready to admit that for the deception of the people, and for crushing the spirit of inquiry in the mind of man, nothing better can be imagined, unless perchance it be the discipline of the Mahommedan Church, which certainly surpasses that of Rome in these respects; for since the day the Mahommedan superstition appeared in the world it has not been disturbed by any schism.*

If you cast up the reckoning correctly, therefore, you will find that there is but one of the points you insist on that turns

* This, in one sense, will, perhaps, be disputed, the Mahommedans being divided into what may be called two sects—Sufites and Schiites—followers of Omar and of Ali. As regards fundamentals and Confession of Faith, however, the Mahommedan Church is without schism.—TR.

out to the especial advantage even of the Christian faith in general, and it is this: that unlettered and simple men were the means of converting so much of the world to Christianity. This ground, however, must be held as possessed by all in common who acknowledge the name of Christ; it is not the peculiar appanage of the Church of Rome.

And even admitting all the grounds you adduce as favourable to the Romish Church alone, do you imagine that then, and on such a basis, you have mathematically demonstrated the authority of this association? As you do nothing of the sort, however, and as nothing of the sort can be done, how can you require of me to believe that my arguments and conclusions are suggested by the Prince of the evil spirits, whilst yours are imparted by God? And this, too, when by your letter it plainly appears that it is not so much from love of God as fear of Hell—this single ground of all superstition —that you have become a member of the Church of Rome? Are you indeed so very humble, so very submissive, that you dare not trust yourself, but must rely on others, who are, in their turn, rejected by so many as authorities? Do you reproach me with pride and presumption, or do you lay it to pride and presumption in me that I make use of my reason, resting in this true word of God which is in the mind and can never be falsified or corrupted? Cast this deadly superstition from your soul, my friend, acknowledge the reason which God has given you for your guidance, and go on improving and progressing in all good gifts if you would not sink to the level of the beasts of the field. Cease to speak of senseless absurdities as unapproachable mysteries, and mix not up depreciatingly things that are unknown, or are not yet inquired into, with things against reason and absurd in themselves, such as the hateful dogmas of the Church of Rome, which you now esteem the more worthy of admiration the more they exceed comprehension and contradict reason.

As to what else you say concerning the fundamentals of my Theologico-Political Treatise, and in especial of my position, that 'the Scriptures are only to be interpreted by themselves,' against which you so pertly and presumptuously inveigh as alike false and indefensible, I reply: that the ground I assume is not taken theoretically, but is shown, is proved irrefragably, to be true. I even feel persuaded that, if you will condescend to consider somewhat carefully what is said in my seventh and at the end of my fifteenth chapter, where the whole subject of the right mode of interpreting Scripture is discussed, and where the arguments of those who take different views are answered—I feel persuaded, I say, that you may yet come round to my way of thinking on the matter. If you will, in addition, make yourself in some small measure acquainted with Church History,—a subject, by the way, of which I perceive you are at present profoundly ignorant,—you will then, I think, begin to see in what false lights ecclesiastical writers are wont to exhibit certain things, and come to know by what accidents and artifices the Bishops of Rome first attained their power, and still continue, sixteen centuries after the birth of Christ, to assert supremacy over the world of Christendom. Do but so much, and I shall not despair of your yet recovering your senses, a consummation which I assure you I very heartily desire. Farewell!

POSTSCRIPT BY THE TRANSLATOR.

Whilst in Roman Catholic countries the Papacy as an institution which had served its ends in the world has been gradually dying out, and at the present moment is seen, in the immediate seat of its power, supported against the will of an entire nation by foreign bayonets, it is not without

amazement that we witness the ceaseless, and not always unsuccessful, efforts made by the Church of Rome to regain lost ground in lands that had espoused the Reformation and hoped to be rid of Popery and Jesuitry for ever. In England, especially, ever since the abrogation of the unjust laws which imposed civil disabilities on Roman Catholics because of their religion, the Romish hierarchy and priesthood appear to have been impressed with the idea that a measure demanded by justice couched of its blindness, and imperatively required by the less bigoted or more tolerant spirit of the age, was a concession to what they are pleased to regard as the superior claims of their Church! Nor have they been backward in acting on this presumption, but have been unwearied in their efforts to seduce the women and youth of this country from the faith of their immediate forefathers, wherein the natural intelligence and moral freedom of the individual are not merged in the corporate sovereignty of an outward and visible Church, but are left in his own keeping as a significant and responsible being by the fiat of God.

What should induce a Christian outside the Romish communion to abandon his freedom for the soul-repressing slavery which seeks to merge the inalienable right of private judgment in a thing called the true Church? It cannot be a motive derived from the present world, because material prosperity or outward success is no exclusive privilege of Roman Catholics. It must therefore be one drawn from the future, from the fear of punishment hereafter, which designing ecclesiastics hold over the heads of the weak and timid. But the love of God to His children of all denominations should be a bulwark of confidence to all. The sincere soul is safe for ever, though it should assent to none of the dogmas of men, set up as idols to be worshipped, and so often repugnant to the reason, or natural revelation, by which the Father of lights communicates to mankind that portion of

truth which he has put within reach of the faculties wherewith He has endowed them.

'You are a Catholic?' said Pope Pius the Ninth—the *Infallible per se,* as he is about to be proclaimed, to Frederika Bremer in that remarkable interview she had with him in the course of her Italian travels.*

'Not a *Roman* Catholic,' replied the lady.

'Then you must become one,' rejoined the Pope.

Frederika Bremer. 'Will your Holiness permit me to ask a question?'

The Pope. 'Yes; ask it.'

F. B. 'I love with my whole heart our Lord and Master Jesus Christ. I believe in his Divinity, in his redeeming efficacy; I will obey and serve him alone. Will your Holiness not acknowledge me for a Christian?'

The Pope. 'For a Christian!—most certainly—But—'

F. B. 'And as a member of the Church of Christ?'

The Pope. 'Ye—s, in a certain sense; but then people must acknowledge as true everything which this Church says and enjoins. *You ought not, in the mean time, to believe that the Pope sends to Hell all who do not believe in the infallibility of the Catholic Church! No!* I BELIEVE THAT MANY PERSONS OF OTHER CREEDS MAY BE SAVED BY LIVING ACCORDING TO THE TRUTH WHICH THEY ACKNOWLEDGE—*I believe so, most certainly.*'

F. B. 'It delights me infinitely to hear this from your Holiness, because other Catholics say: "You are not a Christian; you cannot be saved if you do not believe as we and our Church do."'

The Pope. '*In this they are wrong.* But you see, my daughter,' &c.

* Vide Two Years in Switzerland and Italy by Frederika Bremer, vol. ii. p. 145. London, 1861.

The unqualified admission of the Infallible head of the Church suffices; no amount of after reservation can take a jot from its force, and no Protestant has henceforth the shadow of a plea for deserting his Protestantism lest it might prove insufficient to secure his soul's safety.

THE ETHICS.

I. OF GOD.

II. OF THE NATURE AND PRINCIPLE OR SOURCE OF THE MIND.

III. OF THE SOURCE AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTIONS.

IV. OF HUMAN SLAVERY, OR THE POWER OF THE PASSIONS OR INORDINATE AFFECTIONS.

V. OF HUMAN FREEDOM, OR THE POWER OF THE INTELLECT.

THE ETHICS.

PART I.—OF GOD.

DEFINITIONS.

1. By ITS OWN CAUSE I understand that the essence of which involves existence; or that which by its nature can only be conceived as existing.

2. The thing is said to be FINITE IN ITS KIND which may be limited by another thing of the same nature. A body, for example, is said to be finite, because we can always conceive another larger than it. In the same way is thought limited by another thought. But a body is not limited by a thought, nor a thought by a body.

3. By SUBSTANCE I understand that which is self-comprised and is conceived by and through itself alone; that is to say, Substance is that the conception of which requires the conception of no other thing whence it has to be derived.

4. By ATTRIBUTE I mean that which the understanding apprehends in Substance as constituting its essence.

5. By MODE I understand an affection of Substance, or that which is in something else, by which also it is apprehended.

6. By GOD I understand the Absolutely Infinite Being; in other words: God is Substance constituted by an infinity of attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence.

Explanation. God, I say, is absolutely infinite, not infinite in his kind; for that which is infinite in its kind only might

be denied infinity of attributes; but to the essence of that which is absolutely infinite belongs whatsoever expresses essence and involves no negation.

7. The thing is said to be FREE which exists by the sole necessity of its nature, and is determined to action by itself alone. That, on the contrary, is *necessary* or rather *constrained* which is determined to exist and to act in a certain determinate manner by something else.

8. By ETERNITY I understand Existence itself—very Existence, conceived as following necessarily from the sole definition of an eternal thing.

Explanation. For existence of this kind is conceived as an eternal truth,—as the essence of a thing; and cannot consequently be explained by duration or time, although duration may be conceived of as without beginning and without end.

AXIOMS.

1. All that is, is either in itself or in something other than itself.

2. That which cannot be conceived by another thing must be conceived by itself.

3. From a given determinate cause an effect necessarily follows; and contrariwise, without a given determinate cause it is impossible that an effect can follow.

4. Knowledge of an effect depends on knowledge of a cause and involves the same.

5. Things that have nothing in common cannot severally be understood by one another, or the conception of one does not involve the conception of the other.

6. A true idea must agree with its ideate or object.

7. Whatever can be thought of as non-existing does not in its essence involve existence.

PROPOSITIONS.

PROP. I. Substance is prior in nature to its affections.

Demonstration. This is comprised in Definitions 3 and 5.

PROP. II. Two substances having different attributes, have nothing in common with one another.

Demonst. This, too, appears from Definition 3; for each must be comprised in itself and be conceived by itself; or, the conception of the one does not involve the conception of the other.

PROP. III. Things that have nothing in common cannot be cause one of another.

Demonst. If they have nothing in common, neither can they (by Ax. 5) be severally understood from one another, and so (by Ax. 4) cannot be cause one of another: q. e. d.

PROP. IV. Two or more different things are distinguished from each other either by diversity of the attributes of substances, or by diversity in the affections of these attributes.

Demonst. All that is, is either in itself or in something else (by Ax. 1); that is to say, there is nothing out of or beyond the understanding except substances and their affections (by Defs. 3 & 5). There is consequently nothing out of the understanding by which individual things can be distinguished from each other except substances, or—and this comes to the same thing—their attributes and affections (by Def. 4): q. e. d.

PROP. V. In the nature of things there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute.

Demonst. Did several distinct substances exist, they would be distinguished from each other either by diversity of attributes or by diversity of affections, [modes,] (as appears by the proposition immediately preceding); if by diversity of attributes only, it were then conceded that there is but one Substance of the same attribute; if by diversity of affections, inas-

much as substance is prior in nature to its affections (by Prop. I.), its affections set aside and considered in itself, i.e. truly considered (by Defs. 3 & 6), it could not be conceived as distinct from anything else; so that, as stated in the preceding proposition, there cannot be several substances but one substance only: q. e. d.

PROP. VI. One substance cannot be produced by another substance.

Demonst. In the preceding proposition we have seen that there cannot in the nature of things be two Substances of the same attribute, or that have anything in common (by Prop. II.); and so (by Prop. III.) one cannot be the cause of, or be produced by, another: q. e. d.

Corollary. Hence it follows that Substance cannot be produced by anything else. For in the nature of things there is nothing but substances and their affections, as appears by Axiom 1, and Definitions 3 & 5. But as Substance cannot be produced by Substance, as just demonstrated, therefore and absolutely, Substance cannot be produced by anything else: q. e. d.

Otherwise. This is still more readily shown by the reductio ad absurdum; for if Substance could be produced by something else, the knowledge of Substance would have to depend on a knowledge of its cause (by Ax. 4.); in which case it would not be substance (by Def. 3).

PROP. VII. To exist belongs to the nature of substance.

Demonst. Substance, we have seen by the corollary to the preceding proposition, cannot be produced by anything else; it must, therefore, be the cause of itself, i. e. its essence necessarily involves existence (by Def. 1), in other words, to exist belongs to its nature: q. e. d.

PROP. VIII. All substance is necessarily infinite.

Demonst. Substance of one attribute exists not save as one (by Prop. V.); and to exist belongs to its nature (Prop. VI.). It will therefore be in its nature to exist finitely or infinitely. Not finitely however, for then would it have to be conceived as limited by another substance of the same nature (by Def. 2), which would also have to exist necessarily (by Prop. VII.); in which case there would be two substances of the same attribute, which is absurd (by Prop. V.). Substance, therefore, exists infinitely: q. e. d.

Scholium 1. As finity is in truth partial negation, and infinity absolute affirmation of existence of every kind, it follows from Proposition VII. alone that all substance must be infinite.

Scholium 2. I do not doubt but that they who judge of things confusedly, and are not accustomed to apprehend things by their first causes, will find some difficulty in understanding the demonstration of our Seventh Proposition. The difficulty here arises from the distinction between modifications of substances and substances themselves being overlooked, and from ignorance of the way in which things are produced; whence it comes that such a beginning as natural things are seen to have is connected with substances. They, indeed, who are ignorant of the true causes of things confound all, and without the slightest mental misgivings imagine plants and animals as well as man to be endowed with speech, human beings to spring from stones as well as from parents, and one form to be transmuted without difficulty into another. So also do they who confound the Divine with human nature readily ascribe human affections and passions to God, especially when they are uninformed as to how affections are produced in the mind of man. Were the nature of Substance, however, but properly considered, our seventh Proposition would be questioned by none; on the contrary, it would become an axiom to every one, and be reckoned among the number of common notions or self-evident truths. For by Substance would be understood that which is in itself and is conceived by itself, or that the conception of which requires not the conception of any other thing; and by affections, modes or modifications, again, that which is in something else, and of which the conception is formed from the conception of the thing in which it is; whereby it comes that we can have true conceptions of non-existent modifications, inasmuch as, although non-existent in act out of the understanding, still their essence is so involved in something else, that they can be conceived by or through it. But the verity of substances in themselves is beyond the understanding only because they are conceived through themselves. Did any one say, therefore, that he had a clear and distinct, in other words, a true, idea of substance, and nevertheless doubted whether such substance existed, this were the same, in sooth, as if he said that he had a true idea and yet doubted whether it was not a false idea (as must be obvious to every one who duly considers the matter). In the same way, did he maintain sub-

stance to be created, this would be equivalent to declaring that a false idea might be true—than which nothing more absurd can be imagined.

It must necessarily be admitted, therefore, that the existence as well as the essence of substance is an eternal truth. So that thus, and in another way, we may conclude that there exists no more than one substance of the same nature, a point which I think it worth the pains to develop still more fully here.

That I may do this in due order, however, it is to be observed:

1st, That the true definition of a particular thing neither involves nor expresses aught beyond the nature of the thing defined. From this it follows,

2nd, That no definition implies or expresses any particular number of individuals, inasmuch as it expresses nothing but the nature of the individual defined. The definition of a triangle, for example, expresses nothing more than the simple nature of the triangle, and not any particular number of triangles.

3rd, It is to be noted that there is necessarily some particular cause why each individual existing thing exists.

4th, and last, It is to be observed that the cause by reason of which each individual thing exists, must either be involved in the nature and definition of the existing thing itself—viz. when it belongs to its nature to exist, or must be out of or beyond it.

These positions taken it follows that if in nature any certain number of individuals exist, there must be a cause wherefore this precise number of individuals—neither fewer nor more—should exist. If, for example, in the nature of things 20 men exist—and these for the sake of greater clearness I suppose to exist together, and that no others existed before them—it will not be enough that we show a cause in human nature at large, why 20 men should exist; it will be further imperative on us to show a cause why no greater and no smaller a number than 20 men exist, inasmuch as by premiss No. 3 there must necessarily be a cause why each individual among them exists. Now this cause by premisses Nos. 2 and 3 cannot be comprised in human nature itself, inasmuch as the true definition of the nature of man does not include the number 20; so that, by No. 4, the cause why these 20 men exist, and consequently why each one among them exists,

must necessarily be beyond themselves both collectively and individually.

We are therefore to conclude absolutely that everything which by its nature may exist in numbers, must necessarily have a cause for its existence external to itself. And as it has been already shown that it pertains to the nature of substance to exist, so must its definition include necessary existence. From the definition of substance alone, therefore, is its existence proclaimed; but it does not follow from its definition that several substances exist (as has been shown in Nos. 2 and 3). From the definition itself consequently does it follow necessarily that there exists one substance only of the same nature—as proposed.

PROP. IX. The more of reality or being possessed by each individual thing, the greater the number of attributes that pertain to it.

Demonst. This proposition is clearly proven by the terms of our 4th Definition, where we show that attribute is that which the understanding apprehends as the essence of Substance.

PROP. X. Each particular attribute of the one substance must be conceived by and through itself.

Demonst. Attribute is that which the mind perceives as constituting the essence of substance (Def. 4) and so must be conceived by means of itself (Def. 3): q. e. d.

Scholium. From the above it appears that though two attributes may be conceived as really distinct, i. e. conceived severally, the one without the aid of other,—we cannot however conclude from this that these constitute two entities or two different substances. For it is of the nature of substance that each of its attributes should be conceivable by itself, inasmuch as all the attributes it has were always present in it, and no one of them was ever produced by another, but each individually expresses the reality or being of substance. It is therefore far from absurd to ascribe several attributes to one substance. Nothing in nature, indeed, is clearer than that each several entity must be conceived under one attribute or another, and that the more of reality or being it has, the greater must be the number of attributes expressive of neces-

sity or eternity as of infinity which it possesses; and as a further consequence, that the Absolutely Infinite Entity or Being is necessarily to be defined as the Being consisting of an infinity of attributes, each of which expresses a certain eternal and infinite Essence (vide Def. 6). Does any one now ask: by what sign diversity of substances may be distinguished? I request him to read the following propositions, which go to demonstrate that in the nature of things there exists but one substance and that this is absolutely infinite, so that a sign of the kind must be required in vain.

PROP. XI. God, or Substance comprising an infinity of attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence, exists necessarily.

Demonst. If you deny this, conceive, if it be possible in the face of our 7th axiom, that God does not exist. In such case the essence of God would not involve existence, which is absurd, as shown in Prop. VII. God therefore necessarily exists: q. e. d.

Otherwise. A cause or reason must be assignable for the existence as well as the non-existence of each individual thing. Thus if a triangle exists, there must be a cause for its existence; and did it not exist, there must also be a cause for its non-existence,—a cause which prevents it from existing or which annuls its existence. Now this cause must either be comprised in the nature of the thing or lie beyond it. The reason why there is no such thing as a square circle is obvious from the nature of the circle, and because the idea involves a contradiction. But the reason on the contrary why Substance exists, follows from its proper nature, inasmuch as this involves existence. See Prop. VII. But the reason why a circle or a triangle exists or not, does not follow from the nature of either, but from the order of material nature in general, from which it must follow either that the triangle exists necessarily or that it was impossible it should ever exist. This is obvious of itself.

It follows from this, that that exists necessarily for the non-existence of which no cause or reason can be assigned. If, therefore, no reason nor cause can be assigned that would stand in the way of the existence of God, or that implicates or annuls his existence, it is on every ground to be concluded that God necessarily exists. Were, however, any such reason or cause to be given, it must reside either in the

nature of God himself or extraneously to God; in other words, in another substance of another nature. But substance of another nature could have nothing in common with God (by Prop. II.), and so could neither affirm nor gainsay his existence. Since, therefore, there can be no cause nor reason contravening the Divine existence extraneous to itself, did it not exist the cause or reason for this could only be within itself or in its own nature, which, as involving a manifest contradiction, it were absurd to affirm in connection with the absolutely infinite and consummately perfect Being. Therefore, as neither in God nor out of God can cause or reason which negatives his existence be given, we conclude that God necessarily exists: q. e. d.

Yet otherwise:

Demonst. 3. The possibility of non-existence is impotence, as existence, on the contrary, implies power. If, therefore, that which exists necessarily comprised finite beings only, finite beings were then more powerful than the absolutely infinite being; but this is obviously absurd. Consequently either nothing whatsoever exists, or the absolutely infinite being exists necessarily. But we either exist in and of ourselves, or we exist in something else which necessarily exists. See Axiom I. and Proposition VII. An absolutely infinite being therefore, i. e. God, exists necessarily: q. e. d.

Scholium. In this last demonstration I desired to show the existence of God *à posteriori*, simply because the demonstration in this way is more easily apprehended, and not because the existence of God does not follow *à priori* from the very same grounds. For as the possibility of existence is a power, it follows that the more of reality the nature of anything possesses, the greater the power it has of itself to exist; now as the absolutely infinite being, or God, has an absolutely infinite power of existence in himself, he, in virtue of this, exists necessarily. Some, perchance, may not clearly see the force of this demonstration, because they are accustomed to consider those things only that result from external causes; and because they see that among such as grow quickly, in other words, as seem to exist easily, they also see speedy decay, whilst, on the contrary, among those that are formed with greater difficulty, in other words, that do not exist so readily, they observe greater powers of endurance, they conclude that various qualities pertain to these.

Now to free these persons from such prejudices, I need not,

I think, here show for what reason the adage, *quick growth, quick decay,* is true, nor yet discuss the question, whether in respect of nature at large, all things are not alike easy, or the contrary; it will suffice for the present to observe that I do not now speak of things produced by external causes, but of Substance only, which can be produced by no external cause (vide Prop. VI.). For whatever of perfection or reality things that arise from external causes possess, whether the things consist of many parts or of few, the perfection is wholly in virtue of the external cause; so that their existence depends on the perfection of the external cause alone, and not on any quality inherent in the things themselves. Perfection therefore never gainsays but always affirms existence, as imperfection, on the contrary, negatives existence; so that we cannot be more certain of the existence of anything than of that of the absolutely infinite and perfect being, i. e. God; for inasmuch as the essence of God excludes all imperfection and includes all perfection absolutely, we seem in this consideration alone to have every cause for doubt in his existence removed, and entire assurance of his Being brought home to us, —a conclusion which I believe will be obvious to every one with even a very moderate amount of attention.

PROP. XII. No attribute of substance can be properly conceived whence it could follow that substance might be divisible.

Demonst. The parts into which substance—assuming it divisible for the moment—could be divided, would either retain the nature of substance or they would not. Did they retain the nature of substance, then by Proposition VIII. every individual part would be infinite, its own self-sufficing cause (by Prop. VI.), and constituted by a different attribute (by Prop. V.); so that out of one substance several substances would be constituted. But this is impossible; for we have seen that one substance can neither produce, nor be produced by, another (by Prop. VI.). Add to this that the parts would then have nothing in common with the whole which they composed, and that a whole without parts would both exist and be conceivable as existing, a proposition of the absurdity of which no one will doubt. Were it said again, that the parts retained nothing of the nature of the original substance; in this case, if the whole of substance were to be divided into equal parts, it would lose its proper nature and

cease to exist, which is absurd; for by Proposition VII. we have seen that existence pertains to the nature of substance: q. e. d.

PROP. XIII. The absolutely infinite substance is indivisible.

Demonst. If it were divisible, the parts into which it was divided would either retain or lose the nature of the absolutely infinite substance. In the first case, several substances of the same nature would then exist, which is absurd; for in the nature of things there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature, or possessed of the same attributes (Prop. V.). In the second, the absolutely infinite substance might cease to exist, which is also absurd; for we have seen that God, the absolutely infinite, exists necessarily (Prop. XI.): q. e. d.

Corollary. From this it follows as a corollary that no substance, and consequently no corporeal substance, so far as it is substance, is divisible.

Scholium. That substance is indivisible is perhaps more easily to be understood from this alone: that substance, by its nature, cannot be conceived save as infinite; and that by a part of substance nothing could be understood but finite substance, which involves a manifest contradiction; for we have learned that all substance is necessarily infinite (Prop. VIII.).

PROP. XIV. Besides God no substance can exist or be conceived to exist.

Demonst. Since God is the absolutely infinite being to whom no attribute which is or which expresses the essence of substance can be denied (Def. 6), and as this exists necessarily (by Prop. I.), did any substance other than God exist, it would have to be interpreted by some attribute of God, and thus would two substances of the same attribute co-exist, which is absurd (by Prop. V.). No substance other than God, therefore, can either exist or be conceived to exist. For if conceived at all it must necessarily be conceived as existing, and this, by the first part of the demonstration, is absurd. Wherefore, beyond or beside God no substance can either exist or be conceived as existing: q. e. d.

Corollary. From this demonstration it clearly results, 1st, that God is SOLE or SINGLE; for one absolutely infinite entity

existing (Def. 6), there can, in the nature of things, be but one absolutely infinite substance,—as shown in our Scholium to Proposition X.

Corollary 2. It follows, in the second place, that the extended thing, and the thinking thing—thought and extension—are either attributes of God, or are modes or affections of the attributes of God; for by Axiom 1, we know that all things which be either exist in themselves or in something else.

PROP. XV. Whatever is, is in God; and nothing can be, neither can anything be conceived to be, without God.

Demonst. Except God no substance either is, or can be conceived to be (Prop. XIV.); that is, there is no substance but God which is of itself, or may be conceived by itself (Def. 3). Modes or affections of substance, however, inhering in something else, by which they are also conceived (Def. 5), can neither exist nor be conceived to exist without substance. Wherefore, modes inhere exclusively in the Divine nature, and can be conceived through it alone. But as nothing exists save substances and modes (by Ax. 1.), therefore can there be nothing without God, neither can anything be conceived to be without God: q. e. d.

Scholium. Some persons I am aware feign to themselves an image of God consisting like man of a body and mind, and susceptible of passions. But how far these persons fail of the true knowledge of God, appears sufficiently from the demonstrations already given. These [childish fancies] I pass by; for all who have ever thought of the Divine nature in any proper way, deny that God is corporeal,—a truth which is excellently shown in this, that by body we understand a certain measure or quantity, having length, breadth, and thickness, and bounded by a definite outline. But nothing can be more absurd than a conception of the kind associated with God, the absolutely infinite being. From other reasons adduced by these persons in their endeavours to demonstrate the same thing, they clearly show that they sever corporeal or extended substance entirely from the Divine nature, and maintain that it was created by God. By what Divine power created, however, they are wholly ignorant, which clearly shows that they themselves know not what they say. But I, in my own opinion at least, think I have satisfactorily demonstrated that no substance can be produced or created by another. See the Corollary to Prop. VII. and the Scholium to Prop. VIII. By

Proposition XIV., moreover, we have shown that save God no substance either is or can be conceived to be; and hence we have concluded that extended substance is one among the infinite attributes of God.

For fuller explanation I shall here enter on a refutation of the arguments of opponents, all of which may be comprised under the heads that follow. 1st. It is said that corporeal substance, as substance, consists of or is made up of parts, and therefore is it denied that these can be infinite and so pertain to God. And this they explain by a number of instances, one or two of which I shall discuss. If bodily substance be infinite, say they, it may be conceived as divisible into parts, let us say two parts. Each part will now either be finite or infinite. If finite, then would the infinite have to be conceived as constituted of two finite parts, which is absurd; if infinite, then were there an infinite twice as great as another infinite, and this also is absurd. Moreover, were infinite quantity to be measured by parts equal to feet, it would consist of an infinity of such parts, precisely as it would were it to be measured by parts equal to inches, and consequently one infinite number would be twelve times greater than another infinite number. Finally: If from a point of any infinite area two diverging lines, A B and A C, be drawn and produced indefinitely,



it is obvious that the distance between B and C will go on increasing continually, and from determinate become indeterminable. Since such absurdities follow, as opponents say, from quantity being supposed infinite, they conclude that corporeal substance must be finite, and consequently cannot pertain to the essence of God.

The second argument is also derived from the supreme perfection of God; for God being a supremely perfect being, they say, can suffer in nowise; but corporeal substance, as it is divisible, is open to suffering, and cannot therefore pertain to the essence of God. Such I find are the arguments by which writers endeavour to show that corporeal substance is unworthy of the Divine nature, and cannot therefore belong to it. But every one with a little attention will see that I have

already replied to the reasonings they advance; for these are all alike based on the assumption that corporeal substance is composed of parts, and this I have shown to be absurd; for in our twelfth proposition we have seen that no attribute can really be conceived in substance compatible with the idea of divisibility. Every one, again, who properly weighs the matter will perceive that all the absurdities—if, indeed, all are absurd, which I am not disposed to dispute—from which the conclusion as to the finiteness of extended substance is sought to be derived, are by no means consequences of the presumption that quantity is infinite, but that infinite quantity is mensurable and constituted of finite parts. These absurd assumptions, and the false inferences that follow from them, do, in fact, lead to no other conclusion than that we have drawn, for they show definitively that infinite magnitudes are not mensurable, and do not consist of parts (vide Prop. XII.). The arrow therefore they point at us, they really direct against themselves. And did they still persist, despite the mesh of absurdities in which they are involved, in maintaining that extended substance must be finite, they, in sooth, proceed no otherwise than would he who out of some fancy should conclude that the circle possessed the properties of the square, and that all the lines drawn from the centre to the circumference of a circle are not equal to one another. For extended substance, which cannot be conceived of save as infinite, save as one, save as indivisible (by Props. V., VII., and XII.), they, that they may reach their conclusion, have to imagine as finite, as constituted of finite parts, and as multiple and divisible; in the same way as those who feign a line to be composed of points seek a variety of arguments to show that a line, nevertheless, cannot be divided to infinity. And it is indeed no less absurd to maintain that corporeal substance is made up of parts or bodies, as that a body is composed of superficies, superficies of lines, and lines finally of points. And this, methinks, all must admit, who know right reason to be infallible; those, above all, who deny a vacuum in nature. For if corporeal substance could be so divided that its parts became really distinct, why might not one part be annihilated, the remaining parts continuing connected as before? and why should all be so fitted and conjoined that there cannot be a vacuum? But of things that are really and truly distinct, one can exist and continue in its state without another. Since in nature, then, there is no vacuum (of which more elsewhere), all its parts concurring

in such wise that there shall be none, it follows further that these cannot be really distinguished—in other words, that corporeal substance as substance cannot be divided. Should it be asked why we are by nature so much disposed to hold quantity divisible; I reply, because quantity is conceived by us in two ways—abstractly and superficially, i. e. as it is imagined, or as it is apprehended by the understanding. If we think of quantity as it is presented to us by the imagination, as is constantly and most easily done, it is found to be divisible and made up of parts; but if we consider it as it is in the understanding and as it is substance, which it is extremely difficult to do, then is it discovered, as already demonstrated, to be infinite, one, and indivisible. This is obvious enough to those who know how to distinguish between imagination and understanding; it is made still more so if the fact that nature is everywhere the same be kept in view, that parts are nowhere to be distinguished in its constitution, save and except as we conceive matter to be affected in various ways, whereby its parts come to be distinguished in respect of mode (*modaliter*), but not in respect of reality (*realiter*). Water, for example, as water we conceive divisible, and its particles distinct from each other; but not so as it is corporeal or extended substance, for in this respect it is indivisible, neither are its particles distinct from one another. Water, moreover, as water, is produced and corruptible, but as substance it is neither produced nor corruptible.

And now I think I have replied to the second argument, inasmuch as it, too, is based on the assumption that matter as substance is divisible and made up of parts. And though this were not the case, I know not wherefore matter should be held unworthy of the Divine nature, seeing that extraneously to God there can be no substance by which the Divine nature can be affected (vide Prop. XIV.). All things, I say, are in God, and all that happens comes to pass in virtue of the laws of the infinite God of nature alone, following from the necessity of his essence, as I have but just demonstrated. With no semblance of reason, therefore, may it be shown that God can be affected, influenced, or made to suffer by anything; or that extended substance is unworthy of the Divine nature —were it even supposed to be divisible, provided only it were admitted to be eternal and infinite. But of these matters enough for the present.

PROP. XVI. From the necessity of the Divine nature

infinities in infinite modes must follow; i. e. all that can come under the Divine intelligence follows of necessity.

Demonst. The truth of this proposition must be apparent to all, if this only be kept in view: That from the definition of each individual thing the understanding infers a number of properties—which, indeed, necessarily follow from the nature or essence of the thing defined, and that these are by so much the more numerous as the amount of reality expressed in the definition is greater, or as the essence of the thing defined involves a larger share of reality. Now, as the Divine nature is possessed of absolutely infinite attributes (by Def. 6), each one of which also expresses an essence infinite in its kind, therefore, and by the necessity of the same, infinities in infinite modes must necessarily follow; in other words, everything that falls under the Divine intelligence follows as matter of course and necessity: q. e. d.

Coroll. 1. Hence it follows, 1st, that God is the EFFICIENT CAUSE of all that falls under the infinite intelligence.

Coroll. 2. 2ndly, that God is this Cause *per se*—of himself, not *per accidens*—contingently.

Coroll. 3. And 3rdly, that God is THE FIRST CAUSE ABSOLUTELY.

PROP. XVII. God acts by the sole laws of his own nature, and by constraint of nothing.

Demonst. We have but just shown in our last proposition, that by the sole necessity of the Divine nature, or—and this is the same thing—by the laws alone of the same nature, infinites follow absolutely; and in the 15th proposition we have demonstrated that all things are in God and nothing can be conceived to be without God. Wherefore, there can be nothing extraneous to God whereby he can be determined or constrained to act. God consequently acts by the sole laws of his Divine nature, and is moved to action by nothing beyond himself: q. e. d.

Coroll. 1. It follows from this, 1st, that no cause moving God to action exists either extrinsically or intrinsically beyond the perfection of his own nature.

Coroll. 2. And 2ndly, that God alone is a FREE CAUSE; for God by the sole necessity of his own nature exists (by Prop. XI. and the 1st Coroll. to Prop. XIV.); by the sole necessity of his own nature acts (by the preceding Prop.); and

so (by Def. 7) is alone and of himself free cause of all: q. e. d.

Scholium. Some think that God is Free Cause of All, because they conceive God could have had it so that the things which we have said come to pass in consequence of his nature, that is, which are in his power, should not have happened, or should not have been produced or brought about by him. But this were in effect to say that God might have had it so that from the nature of the triangle it should not follow that the sum of its angles was equal to two right angles, or that from a given cause no effect should follow, which is absurd. For by-and-by, and independently of the proposition now under discussion, I show that neither understanding nor will [in the human sense] pertain to God. I know full well that many are of opinion they can demonstrate that consummate intelligence and free will belong to the Divine nature; for they say to themselves they can conceive nothing more perfect that may be ascribed to God than that which is of highest perfection in ourselves. Moreover, although they conceive God as consummately intelligent in act, yet do they not believe that he could have called into being everything he actually understood; for they think they would in this way be compromising the power of God. Had God created everything that was in his mind, they say, he could have had nothing more to create; and this, they think, were opposed to his omnipotence. They have, therefore, preferred to imagine God as indifferent to all, and only to have created that which by a certain arbitrary will he determined to create. But I think I have shown with sufficient clearness in my 16th Proposition that infinities in infinite modes follow from the supreme power or infinite nature of God; in other words, that all that is has necessarily flowed, or by the same necessity flows, as from the nature of the triangle it follows, and from eternity has followed, that its three angles are equal to two right angles. Wherefore, the omnipotence of God in act was from eternity, and to eternity will remain potentially the same. In this way, I opine, is the omnipotence of God asserted much more completely and satisfactorily than in any other. The opponents of this view, indeed, if I may speak plainly, appear to deny the omnipotence of God; for they are compelled to allow that God had knowledge of an infinity of creatable things, which nevertheless he did never create: had he created everything present in his understanding, he would have exhausted his omnipotence and been left empty and so imperfect. Still to maintain God perfect, they

would be reduced to the necessity of assuming at the same time that he had not been competent to effect all within the range of his power—a conclusion than which, I confess, I can imagine nothing more repugnant to the idea of the omnipotence of God.

Moreover,—and that I may say something of the Understanding and Will which are commonly ascribed to God,—I observe that, if we say understanding and will belong to the eternal nature of God, we must conceive these as differing *toto cœlo* from our human understanding and will,—as agreeing with them in nothing but the name; in a word, that the Divine understanding and will have no more in common with human understanding and will than the Dog, a sign in the heavens, has with the barking animal we call a Dog on earth; a position which I thus demonstrate:

Did understanding pertain to the Divine nature, it could not, like our understanding, be posterior to—as most are pleased to suppose—or cognate in nature with the things understood, inasmuch as God is prior in causality to all things (by Coroll. 1, to Prop. XVI.); on the contrary, the truth and formal essence of things are such as they are because they existed subjectively such as they are in the understanding of God. Wherefore the understanding of God, conceived as constituting his essence, is verily the cause of all things,—of their essence as well as of their existence; a view that seems to have been espoused by those also who maintain that the understanding, will, and power of God are one and the same. If, then, the understanding of God be the sole cause of things—of their essence (as shown) as well as of their existence—it must necessarily differ from these in respect both of essence and existence; for that which is caused differs from its cause in that precisely which it has from its cause. For example: one man is cause of the existence of another man, but not of his essence (for this is an eternal truth); and the two may consequently agree completely in respect of essence, but in respect of existence they must differ. On this ground, did the existence of one cease, that of the other need not therefore come to an end; but could the essence of one be destroyed, the essence of the other would also perish. Wherefore the thing that is cause of both the essence and existence of an effect, must differ from such effect in respect of essence as well as of existence. Now, the understanding of God is cause both of the essence and existence of our understanding; wherefore the Intelligence of God, conceived as constituting a Divine essence,

differs from our intelligence in respect both of essence and existence, and can agree with it in nothing save the name. The same train of reasoning applies to Will, as every one must at once perceive.

PROP. XVIII. God is the immanent or indwelling, not the transient or outside cause of all things.

Demonst. All things that be are in God, and must be conceived through God, as shown in Proposition XV., and thus is God the cause of the things that are in him (Coroll. 1 to Prop. XVI.). This in the first place. Again: extraneous to God there can be no substance (Prop. XIV.); i. e. out of God there can be nothing existing of itself (by Def. 3). This in the second. God, therefore, is the immanent, not the transient or extrinsic, cause of all things: q. e. d.

PROP. XIX. God, or all the attributes of God, are Eternal.

Demonst. For God is substance, which exists necessarily (Def. 6 and Prop. XI.): he is that to whose nature pertains existence (Prop. VII.), or—and this is the same thing—from whose definition it follows that he necessarily exists, and so is eternal (Def. 8). Again,—by attributes of God we are to understand that which expresses the essence of the Divine substance (by Def. 4); in other words, that which pertains to substance and which I say must itself involve the attributes. Now, eternity pertains to the nature of substance, as already shown in Proposition VII.; each attribute must therefore involve eternity and every one of its attributes be eternal: q. e. d.

Scholium. The truth of this proposition also appears very clearly from the manner in which I have already demonstrated the existence of God (vide Prop. XI.), and shown his existence as well as his essence to be eternal truths. In the Principia Philosophiæ Cartesianæ, Prop. XIX., I have also demonstrated the eternity of God by another chain of reasoning.*

PROP. XX. The existence and essence of God are one and the same.

* 'God is the supremely perfect being, whence it follows that he necessarily exists. Were limited existence ascribed to God, the limits of such existence must be known to him because he is supremely intelligent. God, or the supreme intelligence, would therefore understand himself as non-existent beyond the limits supposed, which, however, is absurd. The existence of God, therefore, is not limited, but infinite or eternal.'

Demonst. God and all his attributes are eternal, or each of the attributes of God expresses existence (by the preceding Proposition and Def. 8). The same attribute of God, therefore, that is expressive of eternal essence is expressive at the same time of eternal existence; in other words: that which constitutes the essence of God constitutes at the same time his existence; so that the essence and existence of God are one and the same: q. e. d.

Coroll. 1. Hence it follows, 1st, that the existence as well as the essence of God is an eternal truth.

Coroll. 2. And, 2ndly, that God, or all the attributes of God, are immutable. For were God to change in respect of existence, he would also change in respect of essence; that is to say, truths would be turned to falsehoods, which is absurd. Vide preceding Proposition.

PROP. XXI. All that follows from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must have existed from eternity and been infinite, or is, by the same attribute, eternal and infinite.

Demonst. If this be denied, conceive if it be possible anything to follow in any attribute of God from its own absolute nature which shall be finite and have a merely determinate existence, the idea of God in thought, for example. Now, thought assumed as an attribute of God is by its proper nature infinite (Prop. XI.). But thought comprehending the idea of God, is now presumed to be finite. By Definition 2, however, thought cannot be conceived as finite unless determined by thought itself; not by thought, however, as constituting the idea of God (for so it has been presumed to be finite); by thought, therefore, as it does not constitute the idea of God, which must yet and necessarily exist (by Prop. XI.). Thus is there thought not constituting the idea of God, and from the nature of which, in so far as it is absolute thought, the idea of God does not necessarily follow (for it is conceived as constituting, and as not constituting, the idea of God), which is in opposition to the hypothesis. Wherefore, if the idea of God in thought, or aught in any attribute of God—for it is indifferent which is assumed, the demonstration being universal—follows from the necessity of the absolute nature of this attribute, it must necessarily be infinite. This in the first place.

Further, that which thus follows from the necessity of

the nature of any attribute cannot have a determinate duration. For, denying this, let some particular be supposed in an attribute of God which follows from the necessity of this attribute—the idea of God in thought, for instance,—and let this particular be presumed not to have existed at some former time, or to be destined not to exist in the future. As thought, however, is assumed to be an attribute of God, it must exist both necessarily and immutably (by Prop. XI. and Coroll. 2 to Prop. XX.), so that thought without the idea of God, would have to exist beyond the limits of the duration of the idea of God,—for it is assumed not to have existed at some previous time, and that it may not exist at some future time. But this is contrary to the hypothesis, for from thought given, it is assumed that the idea of God follows necessarily.

The idea of God in thought consequently, and anything else that follows of necessity from the absolute nature of any attribute of God, can have no determinate duration, but by the same attribute is eternal. This in the second place.

N.B. All that is now said of the attribute of thought is to be affirmed of everything else which follows necessarily from the absolute nature of God in any of his attributes.

PROP. XXII. Whatever follows from an attribute of God, in so far as it is affected by a mode which exists both necessarily and infinitely in virtue of the same, must also follow or exist both necessarily and infinitely.

Demonst. The demonstration here proceeds in the same way as that of the preceding proposition.

PROP. XXIII. Every mode which exists necessarily as well as infinitely must follow of necessity either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, or from some attribute affected by a mode which exists both necessarily and infinitely.

Demonst. For mode is in something else by which it has to be conceived (by Def. 5); that is, mode is in God alone and can be conceived through God alone (by Prop. XV.). If therefore mode be conceived to exist necessarily and to be infinite, this in either case must necessarily be concluded or perceived through some attribute of God in so far as the

same is conceived to express infinity and necessity of existence or eternity (for these by Def. 8 are of like import), in other words, as it is considered absolutely (by Def. 6 and Prop. XIX.). A mode, therefore, which exists necessarily as well as infinitely, must follow from the absolute nature of some attribute of God, and this either immediately (on which see Prop. XXI.) or mediately through some modification which follows from its absolute nature, i. e. (by the preceding Proposition) which exists both necessarily and infinitely: q. e. d.

PROP. XXIV. The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence.

Demonst. This is obvious from Def. 1; for that whose nature considered in itself involves existence is its own cause, and exists by the sole necessity of its nature.

Coroll. It follows from this that God is not only the cause, why things begin to exist, but is the cause also why they continue in existence; or, making use of the scholastic term, God is *Causa Essendi*—cause of the being and existence of things. For whether things exist or do not exist, when we fix our attention on their essence, and ascertain that this involves neither existence nor continuance,—that their essence consequently cannot be the cause either of their being or of their persistence in being, we conclude that God alone to whose nature existence belongs, is the absolute cause of all existence and of all continuance in existence (see Coroll. 1 to Prop. XIV.).

PROP. XXV. God is not only the efficient cause of the existence of things but of their essence also.

Demonst. Do you deny this, then is God not the cause of the essence of things; and the essences of things were conceivable without God (see Ax. 4). But this is absurd, as we have shown in Proposition XV. Consequently God is cause of the essence of things as well as of their existence: q. e. d.

Scholium. This Proposition follows even more clearly perhaps from Proposition XVI., where we have seen that the essence as well as the existence of things must be necessarily inferred from the Divine nature; and that I may say the word, I here maintain that in the same sense in which God is said to be the cause of himself, is he also to be declared the

cause of all things, as will be made to appear more clearly by the following corollary.

Coroll. Individual things are nothing more than affections of the attributes of God, or modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in certain determinate manners. For the demonstration of this see Proposition XV. and Definition 5.

PROP. XXVI. The thing that is determined to effect anything is necessarily so determined by God; and that which is not determined by God cannot determine itself to act.

Demonst. That whereby things are said to be determined to action is necessarily something positive (as is obvious of itself); and so God by the necessity of his nature is the efficient cause both of the essence and existence of the action (Props. XXV. and XVI). This first. From what precedes, that which is proposed in the second place follows most obviously. For if a thing which is not determined by God to act could determine itself, the first part of this demonstration would be false; but this is absurd, as we have shown.

PROP. XXVII. The thing that is determined by God to do or effect anything cannot render itself indeterminate.

Demonst. This is manifest from Axiom 3, which is to this effect: from a given cause a definite effect necessarily follows; and contrariwise, where there is no cause no effect can possibly ensue.

PROP. XXVIII. The individual thing that is finite and has a determinate existence, cannot be determined to exist or to act unless it be itself determined to exist and to act by another cause which is also finite and possessed of a determinate existence; and this cause, again, can neither exist nor be determined to act save by another cause which is also finite and has a determinate existence; this yet again by another, and so on to infinity.

Demonst. Whatever is determined to existence and action is so determined by God (Prop. XXVI. and Coroll. to Prop. XXIV.). But that which is finite and has a determinate

existence, cannot be produced by the absolute nature of any attribute of God; for whatever follows from the absolute nature of an attribute of God is infinite and eternal (by Prop. XXI.). It must therefore follow from God or one of his attributes considered as affected in some particular way; for there is nothing in being save Substance and Modes (Ax. 1, and Defs. 3 and 5), and modes are nothing but affections of the attributes of God (by Coroll. to Prop. XXV.). But neither could it follow from God or any attribute of God in so far as this is affected by a modification that is eternal and infinite (by Prop. XXII.). The finite individual thing must therefore follow or be determined to existence and action by God, or one of his attributes in so far as it is affected by a mode that is finite and has a determinate existence. This in the first place.

Further, this cause or this mode, again—for the reasons adduced in the first part of this demonstration—must be determined by another, which in like manner is finite and endowed with determinate existence, this last by yet another, and so on, for similar reasons, to infinity: q. e. d.

Scholium. Since some things must have been produced immediately by God—those to wit which follow necessarily from his absolute nature, and from these primaries those mediately which yet can neither be nor be conceived to be without God, it follows, 1st, that God is the absolute proximate cause of the things immediately produced by him,—but not in their kinds, as is often said; for an effect of God without its cause can neither be nor be conceived to be (by Prop. XV. and Coroll. to Prop. XXIV.). It follows, 2ndly, that God cannot be spoken of otherwise than improperly as the remote cause of individual things; unless perchance on the ground that we are thereby enabled to distinguish such things from those that are immediately produced by, or rather that follow immediately from, the absolute nature of God. For by remote cause we understand such a cause as is in no way conjoined with its effect. But all things that be are in God, and so depend on God that without him they can neither be nor can be conceived to be.

PROP. XXIX. In the nature of things there is no contingency; all things are determined by the necessity of the Divine nature to exist and to act in a certain definite manner.

Demonst. Whatever is is in God (Prop. XV.). But God cannot be spoken of as anything contingent; for he exists necessarily, not contingently (by Prop. XI.). The modes of the Divine nature, for the same reason, follow necessarily, not contingently (Prop. XVI.), and this whether they be considered as determined to action by the Divine nature absolutely (by Prop. XXI.), or by some certain mode of the Divine nature (by Prop. XXVII.); for God is not only the cause of these modes as they exist simply (by Coroll. to Prop. XXIV.), but further as they are considered to be determined in their actions (by Prop. XXVI.). Because, if not determined by God, it is impossible, and not contingent merely, that they should determine themselves; and, on the contrary, if determined by God, it is impossible and not contingent that they should make themselves indeterminate. Wherefore we conclude that all things are determined by the necessity of the Divine nature not only to exist, but also to exist and to act in a certain definite manner, and that there is no such thing as contingency in nature: q. e. d.

Scholium. Before proceeding further, I desire to explain, or rather to inform the reader, what is to be understood by the expressions *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*—*nature acting* and *nature acted on*. From all that precedes I think it will appear that by the expression *natura naturans* is to be understood that which is in itself and is conceived by itself, or such attributes of Substance as express an eternal and infinite essence, in other words God (Coroll. 1 to Prop. XIV., and Coroll. 2 to Prop. XVII.)—God, regarded as free cause of all that is. By *natura naturata*, again, I understand all that follows from the necessity of the nature of God, or from each of the several attributes of God; in other words, all the modes of the attributes of God, these being considered as things or qualities that are in God, and which without God could neither be nor be conceived as being: q. e. d.

PROP. XXX. Understanding (intellectus), whether as finite or infinite in act, must comprehend the attributes and affections of God and nothing else.

Demonst. A true idea must agree with its ideate or object (by Ax. 6); that is to say: That which is contained subjectively* in the understanding, must necessarily exist

* Spinoza's word here is objectively; but at the present day subjective is the word universally used in connection with the acts of the understanding.—TR

[objectively] in nature. But in nature there is only one substance, God (by Coroll. 1 to Prop. XIV.), and no affections other than those which are in God (Prop. XV.), and which without God can neither exist nor be conceived as existing. Therefore must understanding, whether as finite or infinite in act, comprehend the attributes and affections of God and nothing besides: q. e. d.

PROP. XXXI. Intellect or understanding in act, whether it be finite or infinite, as also will, desire, love, &c., must be referred to the *natura naturata*, not to the *natura naturans*.

Demonst. For, by intellect or understanding we do not mean absolute thought, but only a certain mode of thought, which differs from its other modes, such as desire, love, &c., and so must be conceived by or through absolute thought (by Def. 5), that is, by or through some attribute of God which expresses the eternal and infinite essence of thought, without which human thought can neither be nor be conceived to be (by Prop. XV. and Def. 6). Understanding, therefore, as also the other modes of thought, must be referred to nature passive (nat. naturata), not to nature active (nat. naturans): q. e. d.

Scholium. The reason why I here speak of understanding in act, is not because I acknowledge that there is any potential understanding, but because I desire to avoid all ambiguity, and am not disposed to speak of anything save that which we most clearly comprehend, or of intellection itself, than which there is nothing more certainly perceived by us. For we can understand nothing that does not conduce to a more perfect knowledge of intellection.

PROP. XXXII. Will cannot be called a free cause, but a necessary cause only.

Demonst. Will, like understanding, is but a certain mode of thought. A particular volition, therefore, can only arise or be determined to action by some cause other than itself, this again by another, this by yet another, and so on to infinity (Prop. XXVIII.). But if an Infinite Will be supposed, it must needs be determined to exist and to act by God; not however as God is the absolutely infinite substance, but as he is possessed of an attribute that expresses the infinite

and eternal essence of thought (by Prop. XXIII.). In whatever way conceived, therefore, Will, whether as finite or infinite, requires a cause whereby it is determined in respect both of existence and action. Will consequently (by Def. 7) cannot be called a free cause, but must be spoken of as a cause necessary or by constraint: q. e. d.

Coroll. 1. Hence it follows, first, that God does not act from freedom of will.

Coroll. 2. And, secondly, that will and understanding stand in the same relationship to the nature of God as motion and rest, and indeed and absolutely as all natural things whatsoever which are determined by God to exist and to act in certain definite ways (by Prop. XXIX.). For will, like everything else, requires a cause whereby it is determined to be and to act in a certain definite manner. And although from a given will or understanding infinites followed, this could with no more propriety be said to happen because God acted of free will, than that those things which follow from motion and rest (and from these also follow an infinity of things) can be said to come to pass by the freedom of motion and rest. Will, consequently, does not pertain to the nature of God any more than to other natural things, but stands in the same relation to that as do motion, rest, and everything else which we have shown necessarily to follow from and to depend on the Divine nature, whereby they are constrained to exist and to act in certain determinate ways.

PROP. XXXIII. Things could have been produced by God in no other way or order than as they have been produced.

Demonst. All things have followed necessarily from the nature of God (Prop. XVI.); and by the necessity of his nature are all things determined to exist and to act in certain determinate ways (by Prop. XXIX.). If, therefore, things could have been of another nature than they are, or been determined to act in some other way than they are, whereby the order of nature would not have been what it is, God himself would then have been different in nature from what he is. In such case, by Proposition XI., another divine nature, or other divine natures must have existed, and so there might then have been two or more gods, which is absurd (Coroll. to Prop. XIV.). Wherefore we conclude that things could have been produced in no other way, &c.: q. e. d.

Scholium 1. That I may present these conclusions with noon-day distinctness, and show that there is absolutely nothing in things because of which they should be regarded as contingent, I shall explain in a few words what we are to understand by *contingent*. Before doing so, however, I shall speak of the meaning I attach to the words *necessary* and *impossible*.

A thing is said to be necessary in respect either of its essence or of its cause. For the existence of a thing follows necessarily either from its essence and definition, or from a given efficient cause. A thing, again, is said to be impossible on such grounds as these, viz.: either because its essence or definition involves a contradiction, or because no external cause adequate to the production of such a thing can be assigned.

Further, a thing is said to be contingent for no reason save in respect of some defect in our knowledge or understanding. For the thing in whose essence we do not know that contradiction is involved, or in the essence of which we know precisely that no contradiction is involved, and yet of the existence of which we can affirm nothing certainly (because the order of causes lies hidden from us), this thing can never present itself to us either as necessary or impossible; and then we speak of it as contingent or possible.

Scholium 2. From what precedes it follows clearly that things were produced by God possessed of the highest perfection, inasmuch as they followed necessarily from the most perfect of natures, that, namely, of God. Nor does the necessity here imply aught of imperfection in God; for his very perfection forces us to speak as we do. Were the contrary the case, indeed, it would clearly ensue (as I have but just shown) that God was not the most perfect of Beings; inasmuch as had things been produced otherwise than they are, another nature must then have been ascribed to God, different from that which the contemplation of the most perfect of Beings compels us to ascribe to him. Now I do not doubt but many will regard this view as absurd, and will not even give their mind to weigh and consider it, for no other reason than that they have been used to attribute to God a kind of freedom totally different from that absolute freedom with which we conceive him to be endowed (vide Def. 6). Yet, neither do I doubt that did they but meditate on the subject and carefully consider our series of demonstrations, they would come at length to regard the freedom they are wont to ascribe to God

not only as nugatory, but would even scout it as a grand obstacle to the progress of science. Nor is there any reason why I should here repeat what I have already said in the Scholium to Proposition XVII. Still, for the sake of objectors, I shall proceed to show, that were it even conceded that Will belonged to the essence of God, it would, nevertheless, follow from his perfection that things could have been created in no other way and in no other order than as they exist in fact. This, indeed, will be most easily shown if we first consider that which objectors themselves concede, namely, that it depends on the will and decree of God alone that every individual thing is what it is; for otherwise, God would not be the cause of all things; further, that all the decrees of God were from eternity approved by their author; for otherwise imperfection and inconstancy would have to be presumed in God. But as there is neither a *when*, a *before*, nor an *after* in eternity, it follows, as from the sole perfection of God, that God never decreed and never could have decreed anything else than that which is; in other words, God was not anterior to his decrees, and could not be without them.

But here it may perhaps be said, that although it were assumed that God had created a different order of things, or from eternity had decreed another nature and a different order of the same, this would imply no imperfection in God. If this is assumed by my opponents, however, I say they thereby admit that God might change his decrees. For if God could have decreed another nature and another order of nature than those he has established, i. e., could have willed and ordained nature otherwise than as it is, he would necessarily have had another understanding and another will than those he has ever possessed. And if it be permitted to ascribe to God another understanding and another will without coincident change in his essence and perfection, what reason were there why he should not alter his decrees in respect of created things, and yet remain perfect as ever? For his understanding and will in respect of created things and their order, continue the same in respect of his essence and perfection, in whatever way conceived. Further, all the philosophers with whose ideas I am acquainted acknowledge that the mind of God is not in power but in act. And as his understanding and his will are not distinct from his essence—as all agree—it follows, that had God possessed a different understanding in act and a different will, he would also necessarily have possessed a different essence. Hence, and

on every ground (as at first concluded), had things been created by God other than they are, then had the understanding and the will, or the very essence, of God been other than it is—which is absurd.

Since therefore things could have been produced by God no otherwise and in no other order than as they are (and that this is certain follows from the consummate perfection of God), no good reason can be assigned wherefore we should believe that God willed that all things which are or were in his mind should not be created with the same perfections as those wherewith he conceived them. And if it be said here that in created things there is neither perfection nor imperfection, but that the qualities which inhere in them and by which they are styled perfect or imperfect, good or bad, depend entirely on the will of God, and thus, God so willing, that that which is now perfection might have been the veriest imperfection, and the contrary, what were this but openly to affirm that God, who necessarily understands that which he wills, might by his will understand the things he has made otherwise than as he has willed to do?—a conclusion, as I have just shown, the most absurd. I therefore turn the argument of these reasoners against themselves in this way: All things depend on the power of God. That a thing should be other than it is, it were essential that the will of God should be other than it is; but the will of God can be no other than it is, the perfection of God making such a contingency impossible; nothing, consequently, could be or could have been other than it is.

I own, nevertheless, that they whose opinion I am controverting, who subject all to a certain indifferent will of God, and declare everything to depend on his arbitrary pleasure, stray less from the truth than do those who maintain that God has acted in every case with reference to that alone which is *good*. For these persons seem to put something outside of God which does not depend on him, to which in his acts he refers as to a pattern, or at which he aims as a particular mark or with a particular purpose. Now, this is indeed to subject God to Fate, than which nothing in connection with the supreme perfection can be imagined more absurd; for we have shown God to be the first, sole, free cause as well of the essence of all things as of their existence. It were waste of time, however, further to rebut the absurdities that have been propounded on this subject.

PROP. XXXIV. The power of God is his very essence.

Demonst. For it follows from the sole necessity of his essence that God is the cause of himself (by Prop. XI.), and of all things (by Prop. XVI. and its Corollary). Wherefore the power of God, whereby he himself is, and all things are and act, is his very essence: q. e. d.

PROP. XXXV. Whatever we conceive to be in the power of God is so necessarily.

Demonst. Whatever is in the power of God must by the preceding proposition be comprised in his essence, and follow necessarily therefrom; consequently must be necessary: q. e. d.

PROP. XXXVI. Nothing exists from the nature of which some effect does not follow.

Demonst. Whatever exists expresses the nature or essence of God in a certain and determinate manner (by Coroll. to Prop. XXV.), that is: whatever exists expresses the power of God who is the cause of all things, in a certain determinate manner (by Prop. XXXIV.); thus and therefore, as shown by Proposition XVI., nothing exists from which some effect does not follow: q. e. d.

APPENDIX.

In these propositions I have sought to explain the nature of God and his properties, such as: that HE NECESSARILY EXISTS; that HE IS THE SOLE, THE ONE; that BY THE SOLE NECESSITY OF HIS NATURE HE IS AND ACTS; that HE IS THE FREE CAUSE OF ALL THINGS, and how he is so; that ALL THINGS ARE IN GOD, and so depend on him that without him they could neither be, nor could be conceived to be: lastly, that ALL THINGS WERE PREDETERMINED BY GOD, not, indeed, through freedom of will [in the vulgar sense] or as it seemed merely good to him (ex absoluto beneplacito), but by the absolute nature or infinite power of God.

Whenever occasion has offered, I have, moreover, striven to remove such prejudices as might oppose the reception of my demonstrations; but as many such prejudices still remain which stand greatly in the way of mankind and prevent them

from adopting the views of the concatenation of things now enunciated, I deem it worth the pains to bring these prejudices before the bar of reason and to examine them carefully. And inasmuch as the whole of the prejudices which I mean to discuss here depend on this single one: that all natural things act as such to a certain end, and that God himself directs all things with a certain definite aim in view,—for it is universally said that God made all things for the sake of man, and man that he might worship Him,—this is the subject with which I shall commence my examination, inquiring in the first place how it happens that most men acquiesce in this notion, and why all are by nature so much disposed to admit its truth. In the second place, I shall show that this prejudice is utterly groundless. Finally, I shall explain how from it have arisen the ideas generally entertained of good and evil, merit and demerit, sin, praise, and blame, order and confusion, beauty and deformity, and other abstractions of the same description.

This is not the proper place to show how such notions have arisen from the constitution of the human mind. It will suffice if I assume as a basis for my explanations that in which all are agreed, namely, that men are born ignorant of the causes of things, and that all have a disposition to seek after that which is useful to themselves—a matter of which they are perfectly conscious.

From what precedes it follows, 1st, that men believe they are free, inasmuch as they are conscious of their volitions and appetites, and ignorant of the causes by which they are disposed to desire and to will, not thinking of these even in their dreams. It follows, 2ndly, that men imagine all things to act to an end, namely, to something useful which they desire. Hence it comes that they only seek to know the final causes of things done, and when they have heard of these they are satisfied, because as it seems they have no motive for further doubt or inquiry. If, however, they obtain no information of these from others, nothing remains for them but to turn to themselves, and reflect on the ends whereby under similar circumstances they have been wont to be determined; and thus they necessarily judge of the views of others by their own. Moreover, as they discover various means both in themselves and beyond themselves which conduce in no small degree to their comfort and convenience,—as, for example, eyes for vision, teeth for chewing, herbs and animals for food, the sea for the production of fishes, the sun to give light, &c., it comes to pass

that they regard all natural things as means intended to be useful to them; and as they know that these means are discovered but not prepared by themselves, they think they have reason for believing that there is some one else who has prepared them for their use. For after having regarded things as means, they could never believe that these created themselves, but must conclude that there is some one or some others, director or directors of nature, endowed with human freedom, who have cared for all and made all things for their use. Never having heard of the endowments of the presumed director or directors, they must judge of these by their own, and have hence concluded that God or the gods directed all for the use of man, in order to attach him to themselves and be held by him in the highest honour.

In this way has it come to pass that every one following the bent of his own disposition has conceived a different manner of honouring God, with the purpose always of propitiating and rendering God more favourable to himself than to others, of inducing him to make all nature conduce to the gratification of his blind cupidity and insatiable desires. In this way, too, has such prejudice turned into superstition and struck its roots deeply into the minds of men. Here still further do we discover the reason why all in all times have been so eager to know and explain the *final causes* of things.

Whilst striving to show that nature does nothing in vain —that is, nothing which is not for the use of man—men have, however, done nothing but proclaim that nature and the gods were as foolish as themselves. Look, I entreat, at the upshot! Among the many conveniences of nature not a few inconveniences are encountered, such as tempests, earthquakes, diseases, &c.; and these are presumed to be due to the anger of the gods, because of the short-comings of mankind—of sins committed through neglect of their worship, &c.; and although every-day experience and multiplied instances declare that good and evil befall the pious and the impious alike, this has never yet availed to divest vulgar man of inveterate prejudice. For he will rather relegate contradictory facts to the limbo of things unknown and of uses unapprehended than consent to pull down the scaffolding of his superstition and begin to consider the world anew. Wherefore men have conceived that the judgments of the gods far exceeded human comprehension; a conclusion which were cause sufficient in itself wherefore eternal truths should be hidden from man-

kind for ever, were it not that the mathematics, which take no note of ends, but are solely occupied with the essences and properties of figures, happily presented them with another standard for the apprehension of truth. Besides the mathematics indeed, other causes might be assigned whereby men would be admonished of their vulgar prejudices, and so guided to a true knowledge of things; but of these it is needless to speak in this place.

I have thus, as I conceive, sufficiently explained the first head on which I promised to animadvert. And it will not take me long [having thus cleared the way] to show that nature has no special predetermined ends; and that final causes are nothing more than human fictions. I believe, indeed, that this ought sufficiently to appear from what has already been said, as well in our consideration of the grounds and causes whence such prejudices arise, as in our 16th Proposition and in the Corollary to Proposition XXXII., to say nothing of the general scope of the whole of this First Part of my Philosophy, the burden of which has been to show that everything in nature proceeds by a certain eternal necessity, and in conformity with consummate perfection. To these, however, I add, that the vulgar doctrine of finality or final causes contravenes nature entirely. For it assumes as effect that which is truly cause, and as cause that which is verily effect; further, it makes that which is prior in nature ulterior; and finally, that which is supreme and all-perfect it renders subordinate and most imperfect. For (passing by the two first assumptions bearing on cause and effect as obvious of themselves), by Propositions XXI., XXII., and XXIII. it is shown that that effect is most perfect which proceeds immediately from God, and that less perfect which requires several intermediate causes for its production. But if the things which are produced by God immediately were produced in order that God might attain his end, then were the last cause, for which all preceding causes were instituted, the most excellent of all. Such a conclusion however divests God of his perfection. For if God acts for an end or purpose, he necessarily desires something which he is without. And although theologians and metaphysicians distinguish between the *finis indigentiæ* and the *finis assimilationis*—the end desiderate and the end assimilate, they still confess that God always acted in respect of himself and not in respect of things to be created; because, before creation, nothing wherefore he might act can be conceived but God himself; and so are they neces-

sarily forced to admit that God wanted or was without those things for which he willed to prepare means, and must have desired them—a conclusion which is obvious enough.

But we are not to overlook the fact, that they who advocate this doctrine, and who have desired to find scope for the display of their ingenuity in assigning causes, have had recourse to a new style of argument to help them in their conclusions, namely, by reductions not to the impossible or absurd, but to ignorance or the unknown; a procedure which shows very plainly that there was no other course open to them. If, for instance, a stone or tile fell from a house-top on the head of any one and killed him, they demonstrated in their way that the stone or tile fell to the end that the man might be killed. For if not for this end, and by the special will of God, how should so many concurring circumstances (and very many circumstances do often concur in such a case) have led to the event? You will reply, perhaps, that the event happened because of the rough wind, the loose tile, and the presence of the man on the spot. But they will then urge: wherefore blew the wind so rudely? Why was the man at the particular instant on the very spot on which the tile must fall? If you now answer, that the wind blew because of the neighbouring tempest, whose approach was indicated by the heaving of the sea on the preceding day, though the weather was then fine, and because the man had been invited and was on his way to the house of a friend, they will still go on to ask—for in such a case there is no end of asking—why the tempest arose at a distance on the day before, and why the man was invited at that particular time,—the cause of a new cause inquired for in endless sequence, until shelter is sought in what in such a case is called the Will of God, the asylum of ignorance. So also when they regard the structure of the human body they are amazed; and because they are ignorant of the cause of so much art, they conclude that it has been contrived and put together by no mechanical, but by some divine or supernatural art, in such wise that each part in serving its own purpose is not injurious to another. And thus it comes that he who inquires into the true causes of miracles and prodigies, and who admires the harmony of natural things as a person of knowledge and understanding and not as a simpleton, is everywhere proclaimed an infidel and impious person, and is so regarded by those whom the vulgar bow before as the interpreters of nature and the Divine decrees. For these men know that with ignor-

ance removed wonder ceases, and the only means they have of enforcing their dicta and preserving their authority comes to an end. But I quit this head, and proceed to the discussion of my third topic.

3. When men had persuaded themselves that everything in nature was made for them, they of course came to this pleasant conclusion from noting those things especially which, in so far as they were concerned, they found most useful, most excellent, and by which they were most agreeably affected. And these are the grounds whereon they base the notions whereby they explain natural things, calling them Good, Bad, Orderly, Confused, Hot, Cold, Beautiful, Deformed, &c. On these grounds, too, have men concluded that they themselves were Free; and, further, have spoken of Praise and Blame, and of Merit and Demerit or Sin. Of these last epithets I shall speak by-and-by when I come to discuss the constitution of human nature; of the former, however, I shall say a few words in this place, explaining briefly what is to be understood by the several terms.

All that conduces to the health and well-being of man and that has the reverence of God for its object, is called Good, as everything that is opposed to these is denominated Bad. And it is because they do not understand the nature of things and define nothing, but only imagine matters and take imagination for understanding, that men believe in a prevailing Order of things, ignorant though they be of the nature of these. And things being so disposed that when represented to us by our senses they are readily imagined, and therefore easily remembered, we say that they are well arranged; but if otherwise disposed, then we say that they are ill arranged or confused. And since those things are agreeable to us beyond others that are readily imagined, therefore do we prefer order to confusion, as if order in nature were anything except what relates to our imagination. It is said, further, that God 'created all things in order,' and the imagination of man is then unconsciously ascribed to God,—unless, indeed, it were maintained that God, provident of human imagination, had disposed all things in such a manner that they might be the more easily imagined by man; nor would they who took this view find any great obstacle in the fact that many things exist which far surpass our imagination, and many which, by reason of its weakness, confound it. But of this enough.

The other notions—beauty and deformity, hot and cold, &c., are nothing more than modes of the imagination—

modes whereby the faculty of imagining is affected in diverse ways, but which are esteemed by the vulgar among the principal attributes of things, because, as already said, the vulgar believe that all things were made for man, and solely as they themselves are affected do they call each thing good or bad, wholesome or pernicious, sound or corrupt, &c. Thus, if the impressions made on the nerves by objects through the senses, the eye, for example, are agreeable or cause satisfaction, these objects are said to be beautiful; but if the impressions are of an opposite and disagreeable character, the objects are then said to be deformed or ugly. In the same way are impressions received through the nerves of the nose and tongue spoken of as odorous or fœtid, sapid or insipid, sweet or bitter. Impressions made on the nerves of touch in like manner are hardness and softness, roughness or smoothness, &c.; and those on the ears are sound or noise, harmony or discord; and so much delighted are men themselves with harmony that they have even thought the concord of sweet sounds agreeable to the gods. Nor have philosophers been wanting who have persuaded themselves that the celestial motions made harmony. All of which shows sufficiently that every man judges of things by the state or disposition of his brain, or rather that each individual takes the affections of his imagination for real entities. Wherefore it is not wonderful—and this we remark on by the way—that so many controversies have arisen in the world, with general scepticism as the result. For though men agree in their bodily constitution in many things, they still differ in many more, and therefore does that which seems good to one appear bad to another, that which is grateful to one disagreeable to another, that which is orderly to one disorderly to another, with many other instances, which I pass by, both because this is not the place in which to speak of them particularly, and because they must be familiar to all. Every one knows the adage—*tot homines, quot sententiæ*—so many men, so many minds, so many palates, so many tastes,—admissions which show sufficiently that men judge in all cases by the disposition of their brain, and imagine things rather than understand them. Did men truly understand things, as the mathematics bear witness, the several considerations now set forth, though they might not please, would not fail to convince.

We thus discover all the explanations which the vulgar are wont to give of nature to be mere modes of imagining,—to be definitions of nothing, but evidences of the activity

and constitution of the imagination merely; and as these modes are designated by particular names, as if they were entities existing beyond the imagination, I entitle them entities of the imagination, not of the reason, and so find no difficulty in meeting all the arguments derived from such notions that are brought against the views I take. Many indeed are wont to argue in this way: If all things have followed from the necessity of the most perfect nature of God, whence have the many imperfections encountered in nature arisen—the corruption that causes fetor, the deformity that excites disgust, the confusion, the sin, the crime we see in the world? But, as I have said, it is easy to confute arguments raised on such grounds; for the perfection of things is to be estimated from their own nature and power alone; nor is a thing either more or less perfect because it flatters or offends the sense or convenience of man, because it assimilates with or is repugnant to human nature. And to those who ask why God has not made all men so that they should walk by the rule of reason, I make no other answer than this: that it was not because God was without material for the creation of all things from the highest to the lowest grade of perfection; or, to speak more properly, because the laws of his nature were not so ample as to suffice for the production of all absolutely that can be conceived by an infinite intelligence, as I have shown in my 16th Proposition.

These are the prejudices upon which I proposed to descant in this place; and if there be others of the same sort on which I have not touched, they will readily be apprehended and set aside by every one for himself with the aid of a little reflection.

PART II.

OF THE

NATURE AND ORIGIN OF THE MIND OR SOUL.*

I NOW proceed to explain the things that must necessarily follow from the Essence of God, the Eternal and Infinite Being. I do not say *everything*,—for we have seen by our Proposition XVI. Part I., that from this Being an infinity of things in infinite modes must follow,—but those things only that may serve us as guides to a knowledge of the human mind, and of that wherein true happiness consists.

DEFINITIONS.

1. By BODY I understand a mode which in a certain definite way expresses the essence of God, so far considered as God is an extended entity. (See Prop. XXV. Pt I. Coroll.)

2. To the ESSENCE of a particular thing appertains that which, being granted, the thing itself necessarily exists, and which, abstracted, the thing necessarily ceases to be. In other words, the essence of a thing is that without which it cannot be conceived to be; and, *vice versâ*, that which without the thing neither is nor can be conceived as being.

3. By IDEA I understand a concept of the mind, which the mind forms because it is a thinking thing.

* Spinoza's word is *mens*, mind, the thinking conscious element in the nature of man. The word by the German translators is rendered indifferently by *Geist* or *Seele*, *Spirit* or *Soul*, and by the French by *Ame*, Soul. I use the words mind and soul synonymously. When in the references to propositions there is no mention made of the preceding First Part of the Ethics, the Part in hand is always to be understood.—TR.

Explanation. I say a concept or *con*ception rather than a *per*ception, the word perception seeming to imply that the mind is passively affected by an object, whilst conception appears to express an action of the mind.

4. By an ADEQUATE IDEA I understand an idea which, considered in itself without relation to an object, possesses all the properties and intrinsic characters of a true idea.

Explan. I say intrinsic that I may exclude that which is extrinsic, viz., the agreement of the idea with its ideate or object.

5. DURATION is indefinitely continued existence.

Explan. I say indefinitely continued, because it can in no-wise be determined by the proper nature of an existing thing, neither can it be determined by the efficient cause which necessarily establishes but does not abrogate the existence of a thing.

6. By REALITY and PERFECTION I understand one and the same thing.

7. By INDIVIDUAL THINGS I understand things that are finite and have a determinate existence. But if several individuals so concur in one act that altogether they are the cause of a single effect, so far do I consider these in the aggregate as constituting one particular thing.

AXIOMS.

1. The Essence of man does not involve necessary existence; i. e., it might as well happen in the order of nature that this or that man existed as that he did not exist.

2. Man thinks.

3. Modes of thought, such as love, desire, hate, &c.,—or by whatever other name the affections of the mind are designated, do not arise in the same individual, unless ideas of the things loved, desired, &c., arise. But an idea may arise without the presence of any other mode of thought.

4. We feel or are conscious that a particular individual body may be affected in many ways.

5. We perceive and are conscious of no other individual things than bodies and modes of thought.

(For Postulates see after Proposition XIII.)

PROPOSITIONS.

PROP. I. THOUGHT is an attribute of God, or God is a thinking Entity.

Demonst. Individual thoughts, or this and that thought, are modes which express the nature of God in a certain and determinate manner (Coroll. to Prop. XXV. Pt I.). To God, therefore, belongs an attribute the concept of which involves all particular thoughts—the concept whereby these are all conceived (Def. 5, Pt I.). Thought, consequently, is one of the infinite attributes of God which expresses his infinite and eternal essence (Def. 6, Pt I.), or God is a thinking being: q. e. d.

Scholium. The truth of the above proposition also appears in this—that we can conceive an infinite thinking being. For the more a thinking entity can think, the more of reality or perfection do we conceive it to embrace. The entity, therefore, capable of thinking in infinite ways is necessarily infinite in virtue of its thought. When thus taking account of thought only we conceive an infinite being, thought is necessarily one of the infinite attributes of God, as we have said. (Vide Defs. 4 and 6, Pt I.)

PROP. II. EXTENSION is an attribute of God, or God is an extended Being.

Demonst. The demonstration proceeds in the same way as in the preceding proposition.

PROP. III. The idea of his own essence, as of all things that necessarily follow from it, necessarily exists in God.

Demonst. For God thinks an infinity of things in an infinity of ways (by Def. 1 of this 2nd Part), or, what comes to the same thing, God can form an idea of his own essence and of all that necessarily follows from this,—a truth which is embraced in Prop. XVI. Pt I. But all that is in the power of

God, is necessary (by Prop. XXXV. Pt I.); therefore such an idea necessarily exists, and can exist nowhere save in God (Prop. XV. Pt I.): q. e. d.

Scholium. By power of God the vulgar understand free-will of God and his right over all things, which are therefore commonly considered as contingent. For they say that God has the power of destroying all things, and reducing them to nothing. Moreover, they very commonly compare the power of God with the power of an earthly potentate. But we have shown the futility of such a notion in Corollaries 1 and 2 to Prop. XXXII. Pt I.; and in Prop. XVI. Pt I. we have shown that God acts by the same necessity as that whereby he understands himself; that is to say, as from the necessity of the Divine nature it follows that God understands himself (a point on which all are agreed), of the same necessity it follows that God enacts an infinity of things in an infinity of ways. Finally, it has been shown in Prop. XXXIV. Pt I. that the power of God is nothing other than his essence in act; so that it is even as impossible for us to conceive God not acting as it is to conceive him not existing.

Were I disposed to pursue this subject further, I could show that this power which the vulgar connect with God, is not only human in its kind (which proves that God is always thought of as a man, and as possessed of mere human faculties), but even involves imperfection and impotence. But I am unwilling again to discuss this subject, and so refer my reader to Part I., requesting him again and again to peruse and ponder what I have said from Prop. XVI. onwards to the end. For no one can rightly appreciate what I wish to inculcate who does not most carefully guard himself against confounding the power of God with the powers and privileges of a human potentate or ruler.

PROP. IV. The Idea of God whence infinities follow in infinite modes can only be single.

Demonst. Infinite intelligence comprises nothing save the attributes of God and his affections (Prop. XXX. Pt I.). But God is one (Coroll. to Prop. XIV. Pt I.), therefore can the idea of God, from which follow infinities in infinite modes, be one or single only: q. e. d.

PROP. V. The formal being or reality of ideas (Esse formale idearum) acknowledges God as cause in so far only as he

is considered under his attribute of thought, and not as he is regarded under any other of his attributes. In other words, ideas, whether of the attributes of God or of particular things, do not acknowledge the ideates or things perceived as their efficient cause, but God himself considered as a thinking being.

Demonst. This is plain from the third Proposition above; for there we have concluded that God forms an idea of his essence and of all that necessarily ensues from this alone, viz., because he is a thinking being, and not because he is the object of his idea. Wherefore the formal or real being of ideas has God considered as a thinking entity, for cause. But the proposition may be demonstrated in a different way: The formal being of ideas is a mode of thought (as is obvious of itself), i. e., is a mode which in a certain definite way expresses the nature of God in so far as he is a thinking being (by Coroll. to Prop. XXV. Pt I.); but this involves the concept of none of his other attributes (by Prop. X. Pt I.), and consequently is the effect of no attribute save thought alone (by Ax. 4, Pt I.). Ideas formally existing, therefore, have God in his aspect of a thinking entity only for their cause: q. e. d.

PROP. VI. The modes of any attribute have God for their cause in so far only as he is considered under the aspect of the particular attribute to which these modes pertain, and not as he is considered under any other attribute.

Demonst. For each attribute is conceived by and through itself alone (by Prop. X. Pt I.). Wherefore the modes of each particular attribute involve the conception of the attribute to which they pertain, but of none other; and so, by Axiom 4, Part I., they have God for their cause, but only in so far as he is considered under the special attribute of which they are the modes: q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it follows that the formal being of things which are not modes of thought, does not follow from the Divine nature because it had prescience of things; but that the things conceived—*res ideatæ*—follow and are deduced in the same way and by the same necessity from their attributes as we have shown ideas to follow from the attribute of thought.

PROP. VII. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.

Demonst. This appears plainly from Axiom 4, Pt I. For the idea of everything that is caused depends on a knowledge of the cause of which it is the effect.

Coroll. Hence it follows that God's power of thought is equal to his virtual power of action. That is to say, all that follows formally from the infinite nature of God, follows objectively in God in the same order and with the same connections from the idea of God.

Scholium. Before proceeding further it were well in this place briefly to recall to memory what has been already said, viz., that all that can be perceived by the infinite intelligence as constituting the essence of Substance belongs or is referable to the one substance only; consequently that thinking substance and extended substance are one and the same substance, conceived now under this attribute, now under that. So also the attribute of extension, and the idea of this attribute, are one and the same thing, expressed in two ways; a truth which seems to have been perceived obscurely as through a haze by the Hebrews, who declare that God, the understanding of God, and the things understood of God, are identical. For example: a circle existing in nature, and the idea of an existing circle, which is also in God, are one and the same thing expressed by different attributes; and so, whether we conceive nature under the attribute of extension, or under the attribute of thought, or under any other attribute whatever, still do we find one and the same order or one and the same connection of causes—the same things severally in sequence of each other. Nor have I said that God is cause of the idea of the circle, for example, in so far only as he is considered as thinking being, and cause of the circle itself, in so far only as he is extended being, for any other reason than because the formal being of the idea of the circle can only be perceived by another mode of thought as its proximate cause, this again by another, this by another still, and so on to infinity.

So long, therefore, as things are considered as modes of thought, we are bound to explain the entire order of nature or the connection of causes by the attribute of thought alone; and again, when they are considered as modes of extension, the order of nature at large is to be explained by the attribute

of extension only. The same procedure I understand as applicable in the discussion of other attributes.

We conclude, therefore, that of things as they are in themselves, God, as constituted by an infinity of attributes, is the true and only cause. I cannot at present nor in this place explain these matters more clearly.

PROP. VIII. Ideas of individual things or of modes non-existent must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God, in the same way as the virtual essences of things or of modes are comprised in the attributes of God.

Demonst. This proposition follows from the Scholium of the preceding proposition.

Coroll. Hence it follows that so long as individual things have no existence save in so far as they are comprised in the attributes of God, their objective essences or ideas do not exist save in so far as the infinite idea of God exists; and where individual things are said to exist not merely in so far as they are comprised in the attributes of God, but in so far also as they are said to endure, the ideas of these things, whereby they are said to endure, also involve existence.

Scholium. If an example be desired for the better explanation of this subject, I can, indeed, give none which adequately explains it, inasmuch as it stands by itself alone. I shall try, however, to the best of my ability to give an illustration of it. The nature of the circle, for instance, is such that all the rectangles formed by straight lines falling perpendicularly and intersecting each other within its area are equal to one another. In the circle, consequently, there may be contained an infinity of rectangles severally equal to one another. None of these, however, could be said to exist save in so far as the circle existed; neither can the idea of any of them be said to exist save in so far as the idea of the circle exists. Now let two of these rectangles, D and E, from among the infinite number possible, be conceived to



exist. Then, indeed, do the ideas of these exist not only in so far as they are comprised in the idea of the circle, but they exist also in so far as they involve in themselves the existence of their rectangles, whereby it comes to pass that they are distinguished from other ideas of other possible rectangles.

PROP. IX. The idea of an individual thing existing in act, has God for its cause, not as he is infinite, but as he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing existing in act, of which God is also the cause in so far as he is affected by a third idea existing in act, and so on to infinity.

Demonst. The idea of an individual thing extant in act, is a particular mode of thought, distinct from other modes (by Coroll. and Schol. to Prop. VIII. of this Part), and so, by Prop. VI., has God for its cause, but only in so far as he is considered under his attribute of thought or as a thinking Entity; not, however, as the absolute thinking Entity (by Prop. XXVIII. Pt I.), but as he is affected by another mode of thought, this in its turn by another, and so on to infinity. But the order and enchainment of ideas is the same as the order and enchainment of causes (by Prop. VII. above). Therefore is the cause of every particular idea always another idea, or God as affected by this other idea, which in its turn has God for its cause, and so on to infinity. Wherefore, the idea of an individual thing, &c.: q. e. d.

Coroll. God has knowledge of all that happens in the individual object of an idea, in so far only as he is possessed of the idea of the object.

Demonst. Whatever occurs in the object of any idea, an idea of the same is present in God (by Prop. III. of this part), not as he is infinite, but as he is affected by the idea of another individual thing (by the preceding proposition). The order and connection of ideas, however, is the same as the order and connection of things (by Prop. VII. above). There will therefore be present with God a knowledge of what transpires in any individual object, in so far only as he has an idea of the same: q. e. d.

PROP. X. Substantive being (*esse Substantiæ*) does not belong to the essence of man, or Substance does not constitute the Formal or Actual in the nature of man.

Demonst. For substantive being involves necessary existence (Prop. VII. Pt I.). Did substantive being belong to the essence of man, therefore, Substance given, man were also necessarily given (by Def. 2, above), and consequently man would exist necessarily; which is absurd (Ax. I. above). Therefore, &c.: q. e. d.

Scholium 1. The demonstration of this proposition is also included in that of Prop. V. Pt I., where it is proved that there exist not two substances of the same nature. But, as many men can co-exist, therefore is that which constitutes the essential (forma) in man, not substantive being. The present proposition is made further manifest when the other properties of substance are taken into account,—such as that it is by its nature infinite, immutable, indivisible, &c., as must be obvious to every one.

Coroll. Hence it follows that the essential nature of man is constituted by certain modifications of the attributes of God; for substantive being does not pertain to man (by the preceding Proposition). It must, therefore, be something which is in God, which without God neither is, nor can be conceived to be (by Coroll. to Prop. XXV. Pt I.), and so is an affection or mode which expresses the nature of God in a certain and determinate manner.

Scholium 2. All must indeed allow that nothing can be, neither can anything be conceived to be, without God. For all admit God as the sole cause of all things,—of the essences as well as of the existences of things; that is to say, God is not only the cause of things as regards their *becoming* (fieri) as is said, but as regards their *actuality or being* (esse). Nevertheless it is mostly said that that belongs to the essence of a thing without which the thing can neither be nor can be conceived to be; whereby it comes to pass that the nature of God must either belong to the essence of created things, or it must be held that created things can both be and be conceived to be without God; or,—and this is much more certain,—that they who reason in this way are inconsistent with themselves. These persons, as I apprehend, observe no proper order in their reasonings, but make considerations of the Divine nature, to which they ought to have given precedence as prior both in conception and in nature, the last element in their argument, and regard things which are styled objects of sense as anterior to everything else. In this way it has come to pass that contemplating natural things, they have thought of nothing less than of the Divine nature; and when

in the end they gave their minds to the contemplation of this, they could think of nothing other than of the conceits and figments on which their superstructure of natural things was reared. But a knowledge of natural things does not aid us in a knowledge of the Divine nature, and so it is no wonder that they who build on it should be found contradicting themselves continually. But I pass on; for my purpose here is only to give a reason why I have not said that that belongs to the essence of a thing without which it can neither be nor be conceived to be (on the ground, namely, that without God individual things can neither be nor can be conceived to be), and yet have said that God pertains not to their essence, but that this necessarily constitutes the essence of some other thing, which being given, the thing is given, and which being denied, the thing is not; or it is that without which the thing, and, *vice versâ*, that without the thing which can neither be nor be conceived to be (Conf. Def. 2).

PROP. XI. The Prime which constitutes the Actual or Real being of the human mind is nothing other than the Idea of a particular thing existing in act.

Demonst. The essence of man is constituted by certain modes of the attributes of God (Coroll. to preced. Prop.), viz., by modes of thought (by Ax. 2), the ideas of all of which are prior in nature, and being given (by Ax. 3) the other modes the ideas of which are prior in nature must also be present in the same individual (by Ax. 4). Thus, therefore, is Idea the *prime* which constitutes The Actual of the human mind. But not the Idea of a non-existing thing, for then the idea itself could not be said to exist (by Coroll. to Prop. VIII.); nor yet the idea of an infinite thing, for an infinite thing must necessarily and eternally exist (by Props. XXI. and XXIII., Pt I.). But assumptions of these kinds are absurd (by Ax. 1). Therefore is the idea of a particular thing existing in act the prime which constitutes the actual of the human mind: q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it follows that the human mind is part of the infinite intelligence of God; so that when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we say nothing other than that God—not as he is the Infinite, but as he is manifested by the mind of man, or as he constitutes the essence of the human mind—has this or that idea. And saying this we not only say that God has an idea of this or that in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind, but in so far as

along with the human mind he has also an idea of another thing, in which case we say that the human mind perceives a thing partially or inadequately.

Scholium. And here, I doubt not, but some of my readers will pause and imagine various reasons making further progress in this direction difficult. It is on this account that I now interpose, and request them to proceed with me deliberately step by step, and to suspend their judgment until they have perused what I have still to say on this subject.

PROP. XII. All that takes place in the object of the idea which constitutes the mind of man must be perceived by the mind, or an idea of that object is necessarily present in the mind; that is, if the object of the idea be body, nothing can take place in the body which is not perceived by the mind.

Demonst. All that takes place in the object of an idea is necessarily known to God (Coroll. to Prop. IX.) considered in so far as he is affected by the idea of this object; in other terms (by Prop. XI.), in so far as he constitutes the mind of a particular thing. Whatever happens, consequently, in the object of the idea which constitutes the human mind will be necessarily cognized by God, in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind; i. e., by Coroll. to Prop. XI., the consciousness of this thing will be necessarily in, and perceived by, the mind: q. e. d.

Scholium. The above proposition is demonstrated, and is perhaps even more readily to be understood, by the Scholium to Proposition VII. of this 2nd Part.

PROP. XIII. The object of the idea which constitutes the human mind is the body, or a certain mode of extension existing in act and nothing else.

Demonst. Were not the body the object of the mind of man, ideas of the affections of the body could not be in God (by Coroll. to Prop. IX.), in so far as he constitutes our mind or soul, but in so far only as he constituted the mind or soul of some other thing; that is to say, ideas of the affections of the body could not be present in our minds at all (by Coroll. to Prop. XI.). But we know that we have ideas of our bodily affections (by Ax. 4); wherefore, the object of the

idea which constitutes the mind of man is the body existing in act (Conf. Prop. XI.).

Again: Had there been any other object of the mind besides the body, inasmuch as nothing exists from which there follows not some effect (by Prop. XXXVI. Pt I.), there must necessarily have been some idea of such an effect present in our mind (by Prop. XI. above). But there is no idea of any effect of the kind present with us, and therefore, by Axiom 5 above, no such idea exists. The object of our mind, consequently, is our body actually existing and nothing else: q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it follows that man consists of mind and body, and that the human body exists as we feel and are conscious of it.

Scholium. From the above we not only understand that the mind is united to the body, but also what is to be understood by the union of mind and body. No one, however, can understand this distinctly or adequately unless he first adequately understand the nature of the human body. For what we have spoken of thus far is sufficiently general, and does not belong to man any more than to other creatures, which are all, although in different degrees, animated. For the idea of everything of which God is cause, necessarily exists in God in the same way as the idea of the human body; so that all we have said of the idea of the human body must be held as necessarily to be said of the idea of every other thing. Still it cannot be denied that ideas differ precisely as their objects do, and that one is more excellent than another and has more of reality belonging to it, precisely as the object of one is more excellent than the object of another and has more of inherent reality than others. To determine, consequently, wherein the human mind excels other minds, and whereby it is distinguished from these, it is necessary that we know its object, that is, that we know the nature of the human body. This, however, I can neither explain in this place, nor is it necessary that I should do so in respect of that which I wish to demonstrate at present. So much do I say generally, however: the more apt any body is than others at once to do and to suffer many things, by so much the more apt is its associated mind simultaneously to perceive a variety of things; and, the more entirely the actions of a particular body depend on itself alone, and the less other bodies concur with it in acting, the more apt is the mind conjoined with that body to understand things distinctly. And it is by this that we appreciate the excellence of one mind over another, and fur-

ther apprehend the reason why we have no other than confused notions of our body as well as of many other things, which in what follows I shall deduce from this contingency. For this reason it appears to me worth while to explain the matter more fully, in which view I hold it needful to premise a few words concerning the nature of bodies.

AXIOMS AND LEMMAS.

Axiom 1. All bodies are either in motion or at rest.

Axiom 2. Every body in motion moves now more slowly, now more rapidly.

Lemma 1. Bodies are distinguished from one another by reason of their state of motion or rest and of the slowness or rapidity of their motions, not in respect of Substance.

Demonst. The first part of this Lemma I presume to be self-evident. And that bodies are not distinguished by reason or in respect of substance appears by Props. V. and VIII. of Part I., and yet more clearly from what is said in the Scholium to Prop. XV. Part I.

Lemma 2. All bodies agree in some things.

Demonst. All bodies agree in these particulars, viz.: that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute (by Def. 1); further, that they move now more slowly, now more rapidly; and lastly, that they may now move, now remain absolutely at rest.

Lemma 3. A body in motion or at rest must be determined to motion or rest by another body, which in its turn was determined to motion or rest by another, this again by another, and so on to infinity.

Demonst. Bodies are individual things distinguished from one another by their states of motion and rest (Def. 1 and Lem. 1); each therefore (by Prop. XXVIII. Part I.) must necessarily be determined to motion or rest by some other particular thing, viz., another body which is itself either in motion or at rest (Prop. VI. and Ax. 1). But this other body could neither move nor rest unless determined to do so by another, and this again by another and another to infinity.

Corollary. Hence it follows that a body in motion, continues to move so long as it is not determined to cease from its motion and come to rest by another body; and the quiescent body also continues at rest until it is put in motion by

another. This is obvious of itself. For when I suppose a body, say A, at rest, and give no heed to the motions of other bodies, I cannot say more of A than that it is at rest. But if it happens by-and-by that A should move, this certainly could not proceed from its state of rest; for of this nothing could come but continuous rest. If, on the contrary, we suppose A in motion, in referring to it we could affirm nothing save that it moved. But if it subsequently happened that A came to rest, this assuredly could not come to pass in virtue of the motion it possessed; for of motion nothing could come but continuous motion. The rest, therefore, came of something which was not in A, namely, of an external cause, whereby it was brought to rest.

Axiom 1. All the modes in which one body is affected by another, follow from the nature of the affected and affecting body at once; so that one and the same body is diversely moved by diversity in the nature of the moving bodies, and, vice versâ, different bodies are moved in diverse ways by one and the same body.

Axiom 2. When a body in motion impinges on another body at rest which it cannot move, it suffers reflection in continuing its motion, and the angle of the line of reflection is the same as that of the line of incidence referred to the plane of the surface impinged upon.



This much in respect of the simplest bodies, those, to wit, that are distinguished from one another by motion and rest, and by rapidity or slowness of motion alone. Let us now proceed to composite bodies.

Definit. When several bodies of the same size or of different magnitudes are so situated that they severally overlie one another, or when they move with like or unlike degrees of velocity in such wise that they severally communicate their motions in some certain measure to one another, we say that these bodies are united so as together to constitute one body or individual which is distinguished from other bodies by this union.

Axiom 3. As the parts or particles of an individual or composite body press one on another by surfaces of greater or less extent, so are they forced with more ease or greater difficulty to change their places, whereby the individual assumes

a different shape with more or less facility. It is on this ground that bodies whose parts are severally in contact with large surfaces are said to be *hard*, whilst those whose parts are in contact with small surfaces are soft, and those finally whose parts are severally moveable on each other are *fluid*.

Lemma 4. If from a body, or individual composed of several bodies, some of these are detached, and other bodies of the same sort are added or take their places at the same moment, the individual body retains its nature and its figure without change.

Demonst. For bodies are not distinguished in respect of substance (by Lem. 1). But that which constitutes the form or essential nature of an individual thing consists in the union of parts or bodies (by the preceding Definition), and this is retained, hypothetically, although there be continual change of constituent parts or bodies. An individual thing, therefore, will retain its original nature both in respect of substance and of mode.

Lemma 5. If the parts composing an individual become larger or smaller, in such relative proportion however as that all preserve the same ratio in respect of motion and rest as before, the individual will likewise retain its nature without any change of form.

Demonst. This is similar to that of the preceding Lemma.

Lemma 6. If the bodies composing a certain individual thing are compelled to change the motions they had in one direction to some other, but still so that they can continue their motions, and inter-communicate these in the same manner as before, the individual will in like manner retain its nature, without any change of form.

Demonst. This is obvious of itself. For the individual is supposed to retain everything which, in its definition, we have said constituted its form.

Lemma 7. The individual thus composed further retains its nature, whether it be moved as a whole or rests as a whole, and whether it be moved hither or thither, provided only each several part retains its motion and communicates this as before to the other parts.

Demonst. This will be found in the Definition which precedes Lemma 4.

Scholium. From what precedes we see how a composite

individual body may be affected in many different ways, yet all the while preserve its proper nature.

Thus far we have conceived an individual compounded of bodies distinguished from one another by nothing but motion or rest, or by greater or less velocity of movement, that is to say, an individual composed of the very simplest bodies. But had we conceived another, composed of numerous individuals of different natures, then should we have found that it was capable of being affected in various other ways, its nature being, nevertheless, preserved to it unchanged. For inasmuch as each of its several parts is composed of many bodies, these severally and without any change of their nature may move now more slowly, now more rapidly, and consequently communicate their slower or more rapid motions to the rest. Did we again conceive a third kind of individual compounded of this second order of bodies, we should in like manner perceive that it might be affected in many different ways without any change occurring in the form of the individual; and did we thus proceed on and on to infinity, we should readily conceive that the whole of nature was verily but One Individual, the several parts of which, in other words, all bodies whatsoever, varied in infinite ways without change in the individual at large. And this, were it my purpose to treat of body professedly, I should feel bound to explain and demonstrate more at large. But I have already said that I have another object in view, and I only say so much as I have done, because I could from thence readily deduce the conclusion I meant to attain.

POSTULATES.

1. The human body is composed of numerous individual parts or things (of diverse nature), each of which is itself highly composite.

2. Of the individual parts or things of which the human body is composed some are *fluid*, some *soft*, and some *hard*.

3. The individual things composing the human body, and consequently the human body itself, are affected by external bodies in very many ways.

4. The human body requires for its preservation many other bodies, by which it is as it were incessantly regenerated.

5. When the fluid part of the human body is determined by an external body frequently to impinge upon another soft

part, it alters the plane of the part so impinged upon, and impresses on it some trace as it were of the impelling external body.

6. The human body can move external bodies in many ways, and in many ways dispose or influence them.

PROP. XIV. The human mind is capable of perceiving many things; and is by so much the more capable as its body may be disposed in different ways.

Demonst. For the human body is affected in many ways by external bodies (by Postulates 3 and 6), and is also disposed to influence external bodies in various ways. But all that transpires in the human body must be perceived by the human mind (by Prop. XII.). Therefore is the human mind apt to perceive many things, and is by so much the more apt as its body, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. XV. The idea which constitutes the actual or formal being (*esse formale*) of the human mind is not simple but composed of numerous ideas.

Demonst. The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is the idea of the body (by Prop. XIII.), which is composed of many compound individuals (Postul. 1). But the idea of each individual component of the body necessarily exists in God (by Coroll. to Prop. VIII.). Therefore (by Prop. VII.) is the idea of the body of man composed of many ideas of these different component parts: q. e. d.

PROP. XVI. The idea of every mode whereby the human body is affected by external bodies, must involve the nature of the human body and the nature of the external affecting body at one and the same time.

Demonst. For all the modes whereby any body is affected follow from the nature of the affected body and that of the affecting body at once (by Ax. 1 after the Coroll. to Lemma 3). Wherefore the idea of the modes necessarily involves the nature of both bodies (by Ax. 4, Pt I.); and so the idea of every mode whereby the human body is affected through an external body, involves the nature both of the human body and of the external body: q. e. d.

Coroll. 1. Hence it follows, first, that the human mind along with the nature of its own body apprehends the nature of many other bodies.

Coroll. 2. Secondly, it follows, that the ideas we have of external bodies rather proclaim the constitution of our own body than the nature of external bodies, a conclusion which I have explained by numerous examples in the Appendix to Part I.

PROP. XVII. If the human body be affected by a mode which involves the nature of an external body, the human mind apprehends this external body as actually existing, or regards it as present in fact until the body is possessed by an affection which excludes the existence or presence of the same external body.

Demonst. This is obvious; for so long as the body of man is thus affected so long will the mind (by Prop. XII.) dwell on the affection of the body; that is, it will have an idea of the mode which exists in act, and involves the nature of the external body,—in other words, an idea which does not exclude but asserts the existence or presence of the nature of the external body. Thus will the mind (by the Coroll. to preceding Proposition) contemplate an external body as actually existing, or as present to it, until possessed by an affection which excludes this: q. e. d.

Coroll. The mind has the power of contemplating as existing or as present the external bodies by which the body has once been affected, though they do not then exist and are not actually present.

Demonst. So long as external bodies determine the fluid parts of the human body to impinge repeatedly on softer parts, they effect a change in the planes of these (by Postul. 5); whereby it happens (see Ax. 2 after the Coroll. to Lem. 3) that they become deflected in other ways than before, and that they are again and similarly deflected from the new planes when in their spontaneous motions they impinge against these, precisely as though they had been impelled by external agencies against them; and consequently that they affect the human frame by these reflected motions in the same manner as they did by their original motions. By such means will the mind be brought to think anew (by Prop. XII.), i. e. the mind will again contemplate the external body

as actually present (by Prop. XVII.); and this it will do as often as the fluid parts of the human body by their spontaneous motions impinge on the same planes. Wherefore, although the external bodies by which the human body was once affected no longer exist, the mind contemplates them as things present, as often as certain bodily processes are repeated: q. e. d.

Scholium. We thus perceive how it may happen that things non-existent are frequently regarded as things actually present. And it may chance that the same effect shall follow from other causes. But it suffices that I should here have shown one cause whereby I explain the matter, as though I had demonstrated it by a true cause; nor do I believe that I thus stray far from the truth, seeing that among all the Postulates I assume, scarcely one can be pointed out that is not in conformity with experience, or that may be called in question after it has been shown that the human body, as we ourselves are conscious of it, exists (vide Coroll. to Prop. XIII.). Besides this we clearly perceive (from the preceding Corollary and the second Corollary to Prop. XVI.) what difference there is betwixt the idea, say of Peter, which constitutes the essence of the mind of Peter himself, and the idea of Peter which is present to another man, say Paul. For the one is directly expressive of the essence of the body of Peter himself, and only implies existence so long as Peter is actually present; the other again rather indicates the condition of the body of Paul than the nature of Peter; and so will the mind of Paul, so long as this same state of his body continues, regard Peter as present to it, although he is not so in fact. Moreover, and that we may continue to make use of common language, we shall call the affections of the human body, the ideas of which present external objects to us as realities, by the title of *Images of things*, although they do not really reflect the figures of things; and when the mind considers bodies in this way we shall say that it *imagines* them. And here, that I may enter on the consideration of *error*—of that wherein error consists, I desire it to be observed that the imaginations of the mind considered in themselves involve no error, or that the mind errs not because of that which is imagined, but in so far only as it is held to be without the idea which excludes the existence of the things it imagines to be present to it. For if the mind, whilst things non-existent are imagined as present, were at the same time conscious that these things did not really exist, this would have to be ascribed to a higher power

rather than to any deficiency in its nature, especially if the faculty of imagining depended on its proper nature alone—that is to say (by Def. 7, Pt I.), if the mind's faculty of imagining were free.

PROP. XVIII. If the human body has been once affected by two or more bodies simultaneously, then will the mind, if it afterwards imagines aught in respect of one of these bodies, immediately remember the other or the others also.

Demonst. The mind (by the preceding corollary) imagines a body as present because the human body is influenced and affected by the traces of an external body, in the same way as it would be were any of its parts touched or impinged upon by an external body. But (by our hypothesis) the human body was then so disposed that the mind imagined two or more bodies simultaneously; therefore will it now imagine two bodies at once; and, further, imagining either of these severally, it will forthwith also remember the other: q. e. d.

Scholium. From this we readily understand what *memory* is. It is nothing more than a certain concatenation of ideas involving the nature of things external to the body which takes place in the mind according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the body. I say, in the *first place*, that memory is a mere concatenation of ideas involving the nature of things external to the body, but not of ideas which explain the nature of these things. For there are indeed (by Prop. XVI.) ideas of affections of the human body which involve the nature both of this and of external bodies.

Secondly. I say this concatenation takes place according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the human body, in order that I may distinguish them from the concatenation of ideas which takes place according to the order of the understanding, whereby the mind perceives things by their first causes, and is the same in all men. Hence, further, we clearly understand why the mind from the thought of one thing often immediately falls into the thought of another which has no resemblance to the first; for example, from the thought of the word *pomum* a Roman immediately thinks of a certain fruit—an apple, which has no resemblance to the articulate sound, nor anything in common with it, save that the body of the man was often affected at once by the two things—the word and the apple, he having

often heard the word *pomum* when seeing the fruit it signified. It is in this way that thoughts of one thing lead to thoughts of another, according as custom or habit orders the imagination of the thing in the body. A soldier, for instance, when he sees the foot-prints of a horse in the sand, from thoughts of the horse immediately falls into thoughts of the rider of the horse, thence into thoughts of war, &c., &c.; whilst a peasant, from such foot-prints, forthwith falls into thoughts of fields, ploughs, &c.,—that is, each in his own way, and as he is wont to connect the images of things, passes from one thought into another of this or that complexion.

PROP. XIX. The human mind does not know the human body in itself; neither does it know that the body exists except through the ideas of the affections by which the body is influenced.

Demonst. For the human mind is the very idea or consciousness of the human body (by Prop. XIII.), which is verily in God (by Prop. IX.), in so far as he is considered as affected by another idea of an individual thing (by Postulate 4); or because the human body requires many bodies, whereby it is, as it were, continually regenerated; and as the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of causes (by Prop. VII.), so will this idea be in God in so far as he is considered to be affected by the ideas of numerous individual things. God, therefore, has the idea of the human body, or God cognizes the human body, in so far as he is affected by numerous other ideas, and not as he constitutes the nature of the human mind;—in other words (by Coroll. to Prop. XI.), the human mind does not cognize the human body. But the ideas of the affections of the body are in God in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind, or the human mind perceives these same affections (by Prop. XII.), and consequently the body itself as existing in act (by Props. XVI. and XVII.). The human mind, therefore, only perceives the body itself in so far as it perceives the ideas of the affections that influence the body: q. e. d.

PROP. XX. There is also present in God an idea or consciousness of the human mind, and this follows in the same way, and is referred to God in the same manner, as the idea or consciousness of the human body.

Demonst. Thought is an attribute of God (by Prop. I.), and so (by Prop. III.) God will necessarily have an idea as well of himself as of all his affections, and consequently of the mind of man also. But it does not follow that this idea or consciousness of the human mind exists in God as he is infinite, but only as he is affected by another idea of a particular thing (by Prop. IX.). The order and connection of ideas is the same, however, as the order and connection of causes (by Prop. VII.); and it follows, therefore, that this idea or cognition of the mind is present in, and referred to, God in the same way as the idea or cognition of the body: q. e. d.

PROP. XXI. This idea of the mind is united with the mind in the same way as the mind itself is united with the body.

Demonst. We have shown that mind is united with body in the fact that the body is the object of the mind (Props. XII. and XIII.); the idea of the mind must, therefore, and in like manner, be united with its object; that is, the idea of the mind must be connected with the mind in the same way as the mind is connected with the body: q. e. d.

Scholium. This proposition is, perhaps, to be comprehended more clearly from what is said in the Scholium to Prop. VII., where we have shown that the idea of the body and the body itself, i. e., the mind and the body, are one and the same individual thing, conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under that of extension (by Prop. XIII.). Wherefore the idea of mind, and mind itself, are one and the same thing, conceived under one and the same attribute, viz., that of thought. The idea of mind, I say, and mind itself, follow and are present in God by the like necessity from the same power of thinking. For the idea of mind, indeed, i. e., the idea of an idea, is nothing other than the form or reality of the idea, in so far considered as it is a mode of thought without relation to its object. For so soon as any one knows anything, he himself knows that he knows it, and at the same time knows that he knows what he knows, and so on to infinity. But of this more hereafter.

PROP. XXII. The mind not only perceives the affections of the body, but the ideas of these affections also.

Demonst. The idea of the ideas of the affections follow in God in the same way, and are referred to God in the same

way, as the ideas themselves of the affections; the demonstration being the same as in Prop. XX. But the ideas of the affections of the body are in the mind (by Prop. XII.); that is, they are in God, seeing that God is the essence of the human mind (by Coroll. to Prop. XI.). Therefore the ideas of these ideas will be in God in so far as he has the consciousness or idea of the human mind; that is to say (by Prop. XXI.), these ideas are present in the mind itself, which consequently apprehends not only the affections of the body, but the ideas of these affections also: q. e. d.

PROP. XXIII. The mind has no consciousness of itself, save in so far as it perceives ideas of the affections of the body.

Demonst. The idea or consciousness of the mind follows and is referred to God in the same way as is the idea or consciousness of the body (by Prop. XX.). But inasmuch as the mind does not know the body (by Prop. XIX.), or inasmuch as consciousness of the body is not referred to God in so far as he constitutes the nature of the human mind (by Coroll. to Prop. XI.), therefore neither is consciousness of the mind referred to God in so far as he constitutes the essence of the mind, and so and in so far the human mind does not know or is not conscious of itself (by Coroll. to the same Prop. XI.). The ideas, again, of the affections by which the body is influenced involve the nature of the body itself (by Prop. XVI.), that is to say, they agree with the nature of the mind (by Prop. XIII.). Wherefore the consciousness of these ideas necessarily involves the consciousness of the mind. But we have seen in the preceding proposition that the consciousness of these ideas is in the mind itself. Consequently, the mind is not conscious of itself save in so far as it perceives ideas of affections of the body: q. e. d.

PROP. XXIV. The human mind involves no adequate knowledge of the parts composing the human body.

Demonst. The constituent parts of the body do not pertain to the essence of the body itself, save in so far as they severally intercommunicate their motions in a certain definite manner (see the Definition following the Corollary to Lemma 3), and not in so far as they can be viewed as individuals having no relation to the body. For the constituent parts of the body are highly composite individuals (by Post.

1), the parts of which may be completely detached from the body, its nature and form being still retained (by Lem. 4), and their motions communicated in other ways to other bodies (see Ax. 2 following Lem. 3). Thus (by Prop. III.) the idea or consciousness of each part will be in God, and this, indeed (by Prop. IX.), in so far as he is considered to be influenced by another idea of an individual thing, which thing on its part is prior in the order of nature (by Prop. VII.). Now, the same is to be said of each particular part entering into the constitution of the body of the same individual. And therefore is the consciousness of each particular part composing the human body in God, in so far as he is affected by the ideas of a number of things and not merely and in so far as he has an idea of the human body; in other terms, as demonstrated in Prop. XIII., God is possessed of an idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind. The mind, consequently (by Coroll. to Prop. XI.), does not involve an adequate conception of the parts composing the body: q. e. d.

PROP. XXV. The idea of each affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of an external body.

Demonst. We have shown in Prop. XVI. that the idea of an affection of the human body involves the nature of an external body in so far as this determines the human body in some certain manner. And inasmuch as an external body is an individual thing which is not referred to the human body, the idea or knowledge of it is in God (by Prop. IX.) in so far as God is considered to be affected by the idea of another thing which (by Prop. VII.) is prior in nature to the external body. Consequently, the adequate knowledge of the external body is not in God, in so far considered as he has an idea of an affection of the human body; or the idea of an affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the external body: q. e. d.

PROP. XXVI. The human mind perceives no external body as existing in fact, save through ideas of affections of its body.

Demonst. If the human body be affected in no way by an external body, neither is it affected by an idea of itself (by Prop. VII.); in other words, and by Prop. XIII., there is

no idea in the mind of the existence of an external body, neither can the mind be in any way affected by, or percipient of, the existence of such body. But in so far as the human body is in any way affected by an external body, so and in so far (by Prop. XVI. and Coroll.) does it perceive the external body: q. e. d.

Coroll. In so far as the human mind imagines an external body, so far has it no adequate conception of that body.

Demonst. When the human mind contemplates external bodies through ideas of the affections of its body, we say that it imagines these bodies (vide Schol. to Prop. XVII.); nor can the mind in any other way imagine external bodies as actually existing (by the preceding proposition). Consequently (by Prop. XXV. above), in so far as the mind *imagines* external bodies, it has no adequate knowledge of them: q. e. d.

PROP. XXVII. The idea of any condition or affection of the human body does not involve the adequate cognition of the human body itself.

Demonst. Every idea of every affection of the human body involves the nature of the human body, in so far as the human body itself is regarded as affected in a particular manner (vide Prop. XVI.). But so far as the human body is an individual thing that may be affected in many different ways, its idea does not include an adequate conception of the human body itself (see the Demonst. of Prop. XXV.).

PROP. XXVIII. Ideas of the affections of the human body, in so far as they are referred to the mind only, are not clear and distinct, but confused.

Demonst. For ideas of the affections of the human body involve the nature as well of external bodies as of the human body itself (by Prop. XVI.), and this not only of the body at large but of its several parts also. For affections of the body are modes (by Postul. 3), by which the parts of the body and consequently the whole of the body are affected. But (by Props. XXIV. and XXV.) adequate conceptions of external bodies, as well as of the component parts of the human body, are in God not in so far as he is considered as affected by the human mind, but in so far as he is considered as affected by other ideas. The ideas of these affections, therefore, in so far

forth as referred to the human mind alone, are consequences without premisses, that is—as self-evident—they are confused ideas: q. e. d.

Scholium. The idea which constitutes the nature of the human mind, when considered in itself alone, is demonstrated in the same way not to be clear and distinct; as are also the idea of the human mind and the ideas of the ideas of the affections of the human body, in so far as they are referred to the mind alone,—as must be readily perceived by every one.

PROP. XXIX. The idea of the idea of each of the affections of the human body does not involve the adequate cognition of the human mind.

Demonst. For the idea of an affection of the body (by Prop. XXVII.) does not involve an adequate conception of the body itself, or does not adequately express its nature; i. e., as by Prop. XIII. expressed, it does not adequately agree with the nature of the mind. Therefore (by Ax. 6, Part I.) the idea of this idea does not adequately express the nature of the human mind, or does not involve its adequate conception: q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it follows, that the mind so often as it perceives a thing out of the common course of nature has no adequate conception either of itself or of its body, or of external bodies, but a confused and defective conception only. For the mind is not conscious of itself, save as it perceives or has ideas of its bodily states or affections (by Prop. XXIII.). But the body does not perceive or is not conscious of itself (by Prop. XIX.) save through the ideas themselves of its affections, whereby alone also it perceives external bodies (by Prop. XXVI.). Thus, therefore, in so far as it is possessed of these the mind has no adequate conception either of itself (Prop. XXIX.) or of its body (Prop. XXVII.), or of external bodies (Prop. XXV.), but confused and defective conceptions only (Prop. XXVIII. and Schol.): q. e. d.

Scholium. I say expressly that the mind has not an adequate but only a confused conception either of itself, of its body, or of external bodies, when things are perceived out of the common order of nature; that is, so often as, externally to itself and by the accidental concurrence of things, the mind is determined to contemplate this or that thing, and not so often as internally and by reason of its contemplating a variety of things simultaneously it is determined to take

cognizance of their agreements, differences, and oppositions. For so often as the mind is internally disposed in this, in that, or in such another manner, then is a thing conceived clearly and distinctly, as I shall proceed to show.

PROP. XXX. Of the duration of our body we can have nothing but a very inadequate conception.

Demonst. The duration of our body does not depend on its essence (by Ax. 1); neither does it depend on the absolute nature of God (by Prop. XXI. of Part I.); but is determined in its being and action by causes such as themselves are determined in being and action by other causes, these by yet others, and so on to infinity (vide Prop. XXVIII. of Part I.). The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order and constitution of the things of nature. But the adequate conception of the way and manner in which things are constituted exists in God, in so far as he has ideas of all of these, and not as he has an idea of the human body alone (by Coroll. to Prop. IX.). Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is extremely inadequate in God, in so far as he is held to constitute the nature of the human mind only; i. e. (by the Corollary to our XI.th Proposition), this conception is extremely inadequate in our mind: q. e. d.

PROP. XXXI. We can only have very inadequate conceptions of the duration of individual things external to ourselves.

Demonst. For each individual thing, like the human frame, must be determined to exist and act in a certain determinate manner by some other individual thing, this by another, this by yet another, and so on to infinity (vide Prop. XXVIII. Pt I.). But as we have in the preceding proposition demonstrated from this common property of individual things that we have only a very inadequate conception of the duration of our body, the same must be inferred in respect of the duration of individual things at large; viz., that we have and can have nothing save an extremely inadequate conception of their duration: q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it follows, that all particular things are contingent and corruptible; for of their duration we can have none but an inadequate conception; and this is what we are to understand by the contingency and possible corruptibility of things (vide Scholium 1 to Prop. XXXIII. of Pt I.).

For (by Prop. XXIX. Pt I.), save this, there is nothing contingent.

PROP. XXXII. All ideas, in so far as they are referred to God, are true.

Demonst. For all ideas that are in God accord entirely with their ideates or objects (by Coroll. to Prop. VII.), and are therefore true (by Ax. 6, Pt I.): q. e. d.

PROP. XXXIII. There is nothing positive in ideas because of which they can be said to be false.

Demonst. If you deny this, conceive, if possible, a positive mode of thought which constitutes a form of error or falsity. Such a mode of thought could not be in God (by the preceding Prop.); but beyond or out of God it can neither be, nor can be conceived to be (by Prop. XV. Pt I.). Therefore there can be nothing positive in ideas because of which they may be said to be false: q. e. d.

PROP. XXXIV. Every idea which in us is absolute, or adequate and perfect, is true.

Demonst. When we say that we have or are conscious of an adequate and perfect idea, we only say (by Coroll. to Prop. XI.) that in God, in so far as he constitutes the essence of our mind, there is extant an adequate and perfect idea; consequently (by Prop. XXXII.), we say nothing more than that such an idea is true: q. e. d.

PROP. XXXV. Falsehood consists in the absence of the cognition which inadequate or imperfect and confused ideas involve.

Demonst. There is nothing positive in ideas which constitutes the form or reality of falsehood (by Prop. XXXIII.). But falsehood cannot consist in any absolute privation (for minds, not bodies, are said to err and to be deceived); nor yet in any absolute ignorance; for to err and to be ignorant are different things. Falsehood, therefore, consists in the lack of the cognition, which the inadequate cognition of things, or inadequate and confused ideas, involves: q. e. d.

Scholium. In the Scholium to Prop. XVII. I have explained the reasons why I say that error consists in the privation of cognition. But for the better elucidation of

this point, I shall here adduce as an example the fact that men deceive themselves when they suppose they are free. But men believe themselves to be free entirely from this: that though conscious of their acts they are ignorant of the causes by which their acts are determined. The idea of freedom, therefore, comes of men not knowing the cause of their acts. For when they say that human acts depend on WILL, they use language with the meaning of which they connect no idea. What will is and how it moves the body are altogether unknown to us; and they who tell us that the will is the seat and habitation of the soul (*animæ*), either move our laughter or excite our contempt. Thus, when we look at the sun we imagine that it is only some two or three hundred paces distant from us, an error which does not consist in this imagination only, but in this, that whilst we imagine such a thing we are ignorant of the true distance of the sun and of the cause of our imagination. For afterwards, and when we know that the sun is more than a thousand diameters of the earth distant from us, we, nevertheless, continue to imagine it to be not very remote; for we do not imagine the sun to be so near us because we are ignorant of its true distance, but because the affection of our body involves the essence of the sun in so far only as our body is affected by the same.

PROP. XXXVI. Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity as adequate, i. e. clear and distinct ideas.

Demonst. All ideas are in God (by Prop. XV. Pt I.), and in so far as referred to God are true (by Prop. XXXII.) and adequate (by Coroll. to Prop. VII.). Ideas, therefore, are not inadequate or confused save as they are referred to the individual mind of a particular person (see Props. XXIV. and XXVIII.). Consequently all ideas, adequate and inadequate alike, follow by the same necessity (see Coroll. to Prop. VI.): q. e. d.

PROP. XXXVII. That which is common to all things (vide Lemma 2 above), and which is equally in a part as in a whole, does not constitute the essence of any individual thing.

Demonst. If this be denied, conceive, if it be possible, that this common quality constitutes the essence of some particular

thing, say the essence of B. This thing then without B could neither be nor be conceived to be (by Def. 2 above). But this is opposed to the hypothesis. Therefore it belongs not to the essence of B, neither does it constitute the essence of any other particular thing: q. e. d.

PROP. XXXVIII. That which is common to all things, and which is equally in a part as in a whole, can only be conceived as adequate.

Demonst. Let A be something which is common to all bodies, and which is alike in a part as in the whole of each body; I say then that A cannot be conceived otherwise than adequately. For the idea of A will necessarily be adequate in God (by Coroll. to Prop. VII.), both as he has an idea of the human body, and as he has ideas of its affections, which (by Props. XVI., XXV., and XXVII.) partially involve the nature of the human body as well as of external bodies. That is to say (by Props. XII. and XIII.), the idea A will necessarily be adequate in God in so far as he constitutes the human mind, or as he has ideas which are in the human mind. The mind therefore (by Coroll. to Prop. XI.) necessarily perceives A adequately; and this it does in so far as it perceives itself, its own body or any external body. Nor can A be conceived in any other manner: q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it follows that there are some ideas or notions common to all men. For by Lemma 2 all bodies agree in some things, and these by the preceding proposition must be perceived adequately, or clearly and distinctly, by every one.

PROP. XXXIX. The idea of that which is common to the human body and to certain external bodies by which it is wont to be affected, as well as the idea of that which is common and proper to the parts as to the whole of these bodies, will be adequate in the mind.

Demonst. Let A be that which is common and proper to the human body and to certain external bodies, which is present alike in the human body and in these external bodies, and which, finally, is present alike in a part as in the whole of each external body. Then will there be in God an adequate idea of A (by Coroll. to Prop. VII.), both in so far as he has an idea of the human body and ideas of the given external bodies.

Let us now assume the human body to be affected by an external body through that which it has in common with this, namely A. The idea of the affection produced will involve the property of A (by Prop. XVI.); and thus (by the Corollary to Prop. VII.) will the idea of this affection, in so far as it involves the property of A, be adequate in God in so far as he is affected by the idea of the human body; in other words, and by Prop. XIII. above, in so far as God constitutes the nature of the human mind. By the Coroll. to Prop. XI., consequently, is this idea also adequate in the human mind: q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it follows that the mind is the more apt to perceive many things adequately, as its body has more things in common with other bodies.

PROP. XL. The ideas which follow in the mind from adequate ideas are also adequate.

Demonst. This is obvious. For when we say that in the human mind an idea follows from ideas which are adequate in it, we say no more (by Coroll. to Prop. XI.) than that an idea is present in the Divine intelligence, whereof God is the cause, not as he is infinite, nor as he is affected by the ideas of several individual things, but solely in so far as he constitutes the essence of the human mind.

Scholium 1. In what precedes I have explained the causes of the notions or conceptions that are entitled *common*, and that are the fundamentals of our reasonings. But other causes of certain axioms or notions are assigned, which it seems desirable to explain by this our method; inasmuch as it will then appear what notions are more useful than others, and what are of scarcely any utility at all; what notions are common, and which of them are clear and distinct to those only who labour under no prejudices; finally, what notions are ill-founded. Besides this, it will further appear whence those notions that are called *secondary*, or of the second order, and consequently the axioms founded on them, have taken their rise, and yet more of the same sort upon which I have occasionally meditated. But as I have determined to discuss these in a separate treatise, and lest I should excite distaste in my reader's mind by too great prolixity, I have resolved to pass the whole subject by for the present. Still, and that I may not seem to omit anything that was most necessary to be known, I shall briefly add the causes whence such *tran-*

scendental terms as *Entity, Thing, Something,* have derived their origin.

These terms, then, have originated in this: that the human body, because limited, is only capable of forming to itself distinct images of things within certain limits as to number. (I have explained what I understand by an *Image* in the Scholium to Prop. XVII.) If these numerical limits be somewhat exceeded, the images begin to be confused; and if the limits be greatly surpassed, they become utterly confused and blended together. That this should be so appears from the Coroll. to Prop. XVII., and from Prop. XVIII., wherein it is declared that the human mind can only imagine with distinctness and at once as many bodies as there can be images simultaneously formed in the body. But when the images in the body are thoroughly confused, the mind will also imagine all bodies confusedly and without distinction, and will comprehend them under a single attribute as it were, viz., under the attribute of Entity, Thing, &c.

The same thing may be inferred from this: that images do not always present themselves to us with like force, as well as from other considerations, which it seems needless to speak of in this place. With the object before us it will be enough if we take one only into consideration; and, indeed, everything we know points to the conclusion that such terms import ideas confused to the last degree. It is, further, from the same causes that the notions called *universal,* such as *man, horse, dog,* &c., have arisen. That is to say, so many images—say of *men,* to take a single instance—are formed simultaneously in the body, that they exceed the power of imagining, if not wholly, yet to such an extent that the slighter differences of each man—complexion, stature, as well as exact numbers, &c.—cannot be imagined by the mind, and that only in which all, in so far as they affect the body, agree is distinctly imagined. It is by each individual man, indeed, that the body is chiefly affected; but the affection is expressed by the comprehensive term *men,* a word by which, through our inability to imagine any definite number of *singulars,* we predicate and comprehend an infinity of particulars.

It is to be observed, however, that these notions are not formed by all in the same way, but vary in every one in the ratio in which the body has been frequently affected, and in which the mind is apt to imagine or recollect. For example: they who have usually contemplated man with admiration, because of his stature, carriage, mind, &c., by the

word *man* understand a creature with an erect body, &c.; and they who have used themselves to regard man under one or other of his particular faculties or accidents conceive other common images of him, and characterize him as a laughing animal, a two-footed, a featherless, a rational animal, &c. In the same way, and in accordance with bodily disposition, it comes that every one forms universal images of things. We are not to wonder, therefore, that so many controversies should have arisen among philosophers, who have mostly chosen to explain natural things by their images alone.

Scholium 2. From all that precedes it appears clearly that we perceive many things and form universal notions, 1st, from *singulars* altered to us by our senses and represented confusedly and without order to the understanding (vide Coroll. to Prop. XXIX.). Such perceptions I am therefore accustomed to characterize as cognition *from vague experience.* 2nd, from *signs;* for example, because from certain words which we hear or read we remember things and form certain ideas of these like to those by which we imagine the things themselves (vide Schol. to Prop. XVIII.). Both of these modes of contemplating things I shall for the future designate as cognition of the first kind—as *opinion* or *imagination.* 3rd and lastly, inasmuch as we have common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things (vide Coroll. to Props. XXXVIII. and XXXIX. and Prop. XL.), I shall speak of these under the titles of *reason, and cognition of the second kind.*

Besides these two kinds of cognition, there is a third, as I shall presently show, which I shall entitle *intuitive,* and which proceeds from the adequate idea of the real essence of some of the attributes of God to the adequate cognition of the essence of things. The whole of the above considerations I shall illustrate by a single example: given three numbers, to find a fourth which shall be to the third as the first is to the second. The merchant proceeds to multiply the second number by the third and to divide the product by the first; and this he does either because he has not forgotten what he had learned from his teacher without any demonstration, or because the ratio discovered has frequently been found to hold good in the most simple reckonings, or in virtue of the demonstration comprised in the 19th Proposition of the 7th Book of Euclid, viz., from the common property of proportionals. Dealing with the simplest numbers, however, no process of the kind followed is required; for with the

numerals 1, 2, 3 given, who does not see at a glance that the fourth proportional must be 6? and this, indeed, much more clearly, because from the ratio which the first bears to the second we conclude immediately as to the fourth.

PROP. XLI. Cognition of the first kind is the sole cause of untruth, as that of the second and third kinds is necessarily true.

Demonst. In the preceding Scholium we have said that all those ideas that are inadequate or confused belong to the first kind of cognition; consequently (by Prop. XXXV.) cognitions of this kind are the sole cause or source of falsehood. We have further said, that to the second and third kinds of cognition belong those ideas that are adequate, and such therefore, as shown by Proposition XXXIV., are necessarily true: q. e. d.

PROP. XLII. Cognition or knowledge of the second and third kinds, and not of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish the true from the false.

Demonst. This Proposition carries its demonstration on the face of it. For he who knows how to distinguish between the true and the false must have an adequate idea of that which is true and of that which is false, i. e. (by Schol. 2 to Prop. XL.), he must perceive the true and the false by means of the second and third kinds of cognition.

PROP. XLIII. He who has a true idea is aware at the same time that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt of the truth of the thing.

Demonst. The true idea in us is that which is in God, in so far as God is expressed by the soul of man, and it is adequate (by Coroll. to Prop. XI.). Let us assume then that in God, in so far forth as he is expressed by the nature of the human mind, there is the adequate idea A. The idea of this idea must also necessarily be in God, as it is referred to God in the same way as the idea A (by Prop. XX., the demonstration of which is universal). But the idea A is supposed to be referred to God in so far as God is expressed by the nature of the human mind; therefore is the idea of the idea A also and in the same way referred to God; that is to say (by the

same Corollary to Prop. XI.), this adequate idea of the idea A will be present in the mind that possesses the adequate idea A; so that he who has an adequate idea or (by Prop. XXXIV.) truly knows a thing, must at the same time have an adequate idea or true conception of his conception; in other words (as is self-evident), he must be certain of the conception he has: q. e. d.

Schol. In the Scholium to Prop. XXI. of this Part, I have explained what an idea of an idea is. But the preceding proposition must appear sufficiently evident of itself; inasmuch as no one who has a true idea is otherwise than assured that a true idea involves the highest certainty. For to have a true idea signifies nothing less than to know a thing intimately, perfectly; nor, indeed, can any one doubt of this unless he thinks that an idea is something mute, like a picture on a slab, and not a mode of thought, not conception itself. And I ask, who can know that he understands a thing unless he first understands the thing? That is, who can know that he is certain of any thing unless he is first certain of the thing? What true idea, further, can be conceived more certain as a sign of truth than that which s perceived clearly and adequately? Verily, as the light reveals itself and the darkness also, so is truth the standard both of the true and the false.

In what precedes I think I have also replied to such queries as these, namely: if a true idea is distinguished from a false idea in so far only as it is said to agree with its object, a true idea cannot therefore have more of reality or perfection than a false idea, seeing that the one is distinguished from the other by a mere extrinsic denomination; consequently, neither can the man who has true conceptions be distinguished from the man who has false conceptions. How comes it then that men have false ideas? and further: how can we know for certain that we have ideas which correspond with their ideates or objects? To these questions, I say, I think I have already replied. For as to what concerns the difference between a true and a false idea, it appears, from Proposition XXXV., that truth is to falsehood as entity is to non-entity. And from Proposition XIX. to XXXV. I have clearly shown wherein the causes of error or falsehood consist; from all of which it appears sufficiently how he who has true ideas is distinguished from him who has false ideas. With reference to the last point, as to how a man can know that he has an idea which agrees

with its ideate or object, I have over and above shown, that it consists in the simple fact that he has such an idea as agrees with its object; in other words, that truth is its own standard. To all which be it added, that our mind, in so far as it perceives things truly, is part of the infinite understanding of God (by Corollary to Prop. XI.), and so is it as necessary that the clear and distinct ideas of the mind should be true as that the ideas of God are true.

PROP. XLIV. It is in the nature of reason, to contemplate things not as contingent but as necessary.

Demonst. It belongs to the nature of reason to perceive things truly (by Prop. XLI.), i. e., as they are in themselves (by Ax. 6, Pt I.); in other words, to conclude that things are not contingent but necessary (by Prop. XXIX. Pt. I.): q. e. d.

Coroll. 1. Hence it follows, that it depends entirely on imagination when we contemplate things as contingent whether this be in respect of the past or of the future.

Scholium. I shall explain briefly how this comes to pass. We have seen above (vide Prop. XVII. with its Coroll.) that the mind always imagines things even when non-existent as present to it, unless causes intervene which exclude the possibility of their immediate existence. We next saw (Prop. XVIII.) that if the human body were once simultaneously affected by two external bodies, when the mind subsequently imagined one of these it immediately recalled the other also; that is, it contemplated both as things present, unless causes occurred which precluded the possibility of their present existence. Further, no one doubts but that we conceive or imagine time from this: that bodies are imagined to move some faster some slower and others with equal celerity. Let us therefore suppose a youth who in the morning of yesterday saw Peter for the first time, at noon Paul, and in the evening Simeon, and this morning Peter again. From Prop. XVIII., it is obvious that with the morning light he will also see the same sun pursuing the same course in the heavens as on the preceding day, and with the morning hour he will at the same time be apt to imagine Peter, at noon Paul, and in the evening Simeon; that is, he will imagine the existence of Paul and Simeon with reference to a time to come, and, on the other hand, seeing Simeon in the evening he will refer the existence of Peter and Paul to a by-gone time, associating the two simultaneously with a time that is past; and

this the more assuredly the oftener Peter, Paul, and Simeon are seen in the same order. If it occasionally happens that instead of Simeon he sees James in the evening, then will he next morning and next evening imagine now Simeon now James, but not the two as present at once and together; for we have supposed one or other only, not both at once, to have been seen in the evening. The imagination of our youth will therefore fluctuate, and with future evening hours he will imagine now Simeon now James, but not either of them with certainty: each henceforward will be contemplated contingently. Now, there is the same fluctuation of the imagination whether things or persons be the subjects of contemplation in respect of the past, the present, and the future; consequently things imagined with reference to time past, present, or future will be regarded as contingent.

Coroll. 2. It is in the nature of reason to perceive things under a certain form or species of eternity.

Demonst. Reason by its nature leads us to contemplate things as necessary, not as contingent, as we have just seen. Now reason apprehends this necessity of things as true (by Prop. XLI.), that is, as they are verily in themselves (by Ax. 6, Pt I.). But this necessity of things is the very necessity of the eternal nature of God (by Prop. XVI. Pt I.). Therefore it pertains to the nature of reason to contemplate things under a certain aspect of eternity. To this let us add, that the fundamentals of reason are notions which explain what is common to all things (by Props. XXXVII. and XXXVIII.), and do not render an account of the essence of any individual thing (by Prop. XXXVII.); notions which must therefore be conceived without any relation to time and under a certain species of eternity: q. e. d.

PROP. XLV. Every idea of every actually existing body or individual thing necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Demonst. The idea of an actually existing thing necessarily involves both the essence and the existence of the thing (by Coroll. to Prop. VIII.). But individual things cannot be conceived without God (by Prop. XV. Pt I.); and as they have God for their cause (by Prop. VI. of this Part), in so far as he is considered under an attribute whereof things themselves are modes, the ideas of these must necessarily involve the conception of that attribute (by Ax. 4, Pt I.); that is

(by Def. 6, Pt I.), ideas of really existing things involve the eternal and infinite essence of God: q. e. d.

Scholium. By existence I do not here understand duration, or existence abstractly conceived and as a certain species of quantity. I speak of the very nature of existence which appertains to individual things; of existence because of which infinities follow in infinite modes from the eternal nature of God (vide Prop. XVI. Pt I.). I speak, I say, of the very existence of individual things in so far as they are in God. For although each individual thing is determined by some other thing to exist in a certain manner, still the force whereby each persists in its existence follows from the eternal necessity of the nature of God. On this point vide Coroll. to Prop. XXIV. Pt I.

PROP. XLVI. The cognition of the eternal and infinite essence of God, which every idea involves, is adequate and perfect.

Demonst. The demonstration of the preceding proposition is general; and whether a thing be considered as a part or as a whole, its idea, whether as a part or as a whole, involves the eternal and infinite essence of God (vide preceding Prop.). Wherefore that which gives a conception of the eternal and infinite essence of God is common to parts as to wholes, and so is adequate and perfect (by Prop. XXXVIII.): q. e. d.

PROP. XLVII. The human mind has an adequate cognition of the eternal and infinite essence of God.

Demonst. The human mind has ideas by which it perceives itself, its body, and external bodies actually existing (by Props. XXII. and XXIII., XIX., XVI. and XVII.); and consequently (Props. XLV. and XLVI.) possesses an adequate cognition of the eternal and infinite essence of God: q. e. d.

Scholium. Hence we see that the infinite essence and the eternity of God are known to all. But as all things are in God and through God are apprehended, it follows that from this cognition we derive most of all that is known to us adequately, and so it forms the third kind of cognition whereof we have spoken in Scholium 2 to Proposition XL., and of the excellence and usefulness of which we shall find occasion to speak at large in our Fifth Part. The reason, however, why men generally have not so clear a knowledge of God

as of common notions, proceeds from this, that they cannot imagine God in the same way as they do bodies, and because they associate the name of *God* with the images of things they are accustomed to see—a habit which it is scarcely possible to avoid, surrounded as men ceaselessly are by external bodies. Numerous errors, indeed, consist entirely in this, that names are not appropriately applied to things. Did any one say that lines drawn from the centre of a circle to its circumference are not equal to one another, he certainly would understand by a circle something different from the figure so designated by mathematicians. So when men make mistakes in their arithmetical calculations, they have numbers of one denomination in their head, others of a different denomination on their paper. Wherefore, if we regard their minds, they do not properly err; they are seen to err, however, because they think they have in their minds the numerals they have on their paper. Were this not so we should not believe that they erred; as I did not believe that a certain person erred whom I lately heard exclaiming that his poultry-yard had flown into his neighbour's fowls, for I thought I perfectly understood what he meant to say. It is indeed because men have not exactly expressed their meaning, or because they have interpreted the meanings of others amiss, that so many controversies have arisen. For in contradicting one another, they either think the same thing or something else, so that the errors and absurdities they find in their opponents have frequently no foundation in reality.

PROP. XLVIII. In the mind there is no such thing as absolute or free will, but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause which is determined by another cause, this by yet another, and so on to infinity.

Demonst. The mind is a certain and determinate mode of thought (by Prop. XI.), and so (by Coroll. 2 to Prop. XVII., Pt I.) cannot itself be the free cause of its actions—cannot have any absolute faculty of willing or not willing, but must be determined to will this or that by a cause which is itself determined by another, this again by yet another, and so on to infinity: q. e. d.

Scholium. In the same way it may be shown that in the mind there is no absolute faculty of understanding, of desiring, of loving, &c. Whence it follows that these and other similar faculties are either entirely fictitious or are nothing

more than metaphysical entities or universals which we are wont to form from particulars; so that understanding and will are related to this or that idea, to this or that volition, precisely as stoniness is related to this or that stone, or as humanity is related to Peter or Paul. But we have already explained the reason why men imagine that they are free, in the Appendix to Part I.

Before proceeding further, however, I have to observe in this place, that by WILL I understand the power not the desire of affirming and denying; the power, I say, by which the mind affirms or denies what is true or false, and not the desire by which the mind craves or is turned away from this thing or that. But since we have demonstrated that these faculties only express universal notions, which are not distinct from the particulars whence they are formed, we have now to inquire whether volitions are themselves anything more than ideas of things. We have to inquire, I say, whether there be in the mind any affirmation or negation except that which an idea as idea involves. Vide on this point the next Proposition, as also Definition 3 of this Part, lest thought should fall into mere images; for by ideas I do not understand images such as are formed at the bottom of the eye, or, if you please, in the middle of the brain, but conceptions of thought.

PROP. XLIX. In the mind there is no volition, i. e., neither affirmation nor negation, other than that which idea, as idea, involves.

Demonst. In the mind there is no absolute faculty of willing and not willing (by last Prop.), but only particular volitions, namely, affirmations of this or that, negations of this or that. Let us conceive some particular volition, i. e., some mode of thought, such, for example, as that where the mind affirms that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. This affirmation plainly involves the idea of the triangle, that is, without the idea of the triangle it cannot be conceived. For it is the same thing if I say that A involves the conception of B, as if I said that A cannot be conceived without B; neither, further, can such an affirmation be made without the idea of the triangle (by Ax. 3.). The affirmation as to the angles of the triangle can therefore neither be, nor be conceived to be, without the idea of the triangle. Moreover, this idea of the triangle must involve the affirma-

tion of the sum of its angles being equal to two right angles. Wherefore, *mutatis mutandis*, the idea of the triangle can neither be, nor be conceived to be, without the affirmation in question; and so the affirmation belongs to and, indeed, is nothing other than the assertion of the essence of the triangle (by Def. 2). What has now been said of this special volition, —which we assumed, as we might have assumed any other— is to be said of every volition whatsoever, viz., that it is nothing but an idea: q. e. d.

Coroll. Will and understanding are one and the same thing.

Demonst. Will and understanding are nothing but particular volitions and ideas themselves (by Prop. XLVIII. and Schol.). But a particular volition and idea are identical; consequently will and understanding are one and the same: q. e. d.

Scholium. By what immediately precedes we have exposed and set aside that which is a common cause of error; and have further shown that falsehood consists entirely in the deficiency involved in imperfect and confused ideas. A false idea as such, and in so far as it is false, does not involve certainty; so that when we say a man acquiesces in a falsehood, has no doubts about a falsehood, this is not because he is certain of the falsehood, but only because he does not doubt or question, or because he acquiesces in, the falsehood, there being no cause that should lead his imagination to hesitate or feel otherwise than assured. On this point, see the Scholium to Prop. XLIII. above. However closely a man may therefore be supposed to cling to untruths, we never say that he is certain of these; for by certainty we understand something positive, and not mere uncertainty or freedom from doubt (vide Prop. XLIII. and its Schol.), for the want of certainty implies falsity.

For the more complete explanation of the preceding proposition, however, there still remain certain matters to be noticed. When I have spoken of these I shall reply to the objections that may be made to my views. Finally, and that I may remove every scruple to their acceptance, I shall think it opportune to point out certain useful applications of my doctrine—certain applications, I say; for all that I now set forth will be better understood by what will be found at length in my Fifth Part [where I treat of the moral freedom of man].

I begin, then, by admonishing my readers that they ac-

curately distinguish between an idea or conception of the mind and the images of things which they imagine. Further, that they distinguish between ideas and the words whereby things are signified. For these three—images, words, and ideas—are often either entirely confounded, or are not discriminated with sufficient care and accuracy; and it is mainly because of this that the doctrine of the will, which is so necessary to be understood, both as regards speculation and the usages of life, remains, in many cases, totally unknown. They who think that ideas consist in images produced in us by the concurrence of bodies, persuade themselves that those ideas of things of which we can form no similar images are not ideas, but only fictions which we form to ourselves by the free play of the will; these persons, therefore, regard ideas as mute pictures upon a slab, and with their minds preoccupied by this prejudice, they do not see that an idea as idea involves either affirmation or negation. Further, they who confound a word with an idea, or with the affirmation itself which an idea involves, presume that they can exercise will against that which they perceive, when in words they merely affirm or deny that which they perceive. He, however, readily escapes such prejudices who has regard to the nature of thought, which in no wise involves the conception of extension, and so apprehends clearly that an idea as a mode of thought consists neither in an image of anything nor in any word used to designate it. For the essential of words and images is constituted by corporeal motions only, which in no way involve the conceptions of thought.

So much concerning our first head [the distinction to be made between ideas and images].

I pass on to the consideration of objections to my doctrine. The first of these is based on the presumption that will is of wider scope than understanding, and is therefore different from it. But the reason why will is presumed to be of ampler range than understanding consists in this, that men feel by experience that they require no greater a faculty of assenting to or denying an infinity of things that are not subjects of perception than that they already possess; but that they need a greater faculty of understanding. The will here is consequently distinguished from the understanding in this, that it is regarded as infinite, whilst the understanding is looked on as finite only.

It may be objected to us, in the second place, that experience appears to teach nothing more clearly than that we

can suspend our judgment and not assent to everything we perceive,—a conclusion which is further confirmed by the fact that no one is said to be deceived in so far as he perceives anything, but only as he assents thereto or dissents therefrom. For example, he who imagines a horse with wings does not therefore concede that there is such a thing as a winged horse; i. e., he is not deceived, if he do not at the same time concede that there exists a horse with wings. Experience, therefore, seems to teach nothing more clearly than that will or the faculty of assenting is free, and distinct from the faculty of understanding.

It may be objected, in the third place, that one affirmation does not appear to contain more of reality than another; i. e., we do not seem to require any greater power to affirm as true that which is true in fact, than to affirm as true that which is false. We do, however, perceive that more of reality or perfection is connected with the one idea than with the other, for even as some objects are more excellent than others, so and in the same measure are the ideas of these more excellent than the ideas of the others; whereby the difference between will and understanding appears still further to be proclaimed.

Fourthly, it may be objected, that if a man act not from freedom of will, what will happen if he be in a state of suspense or equilibrium like the ass of Buridanus? Will he perish of hunger and thirst? If I concede this, I seem then to conceive an ass indeed, or the statue of a man, not a human being; but if I deny it, then will the man determine his actions, and consequently possess the faculty of moving hither or thither and of doing what he desires.

Besides these there may perchance be various other objections urged; but as I do not feel bound to notice all that every one may dream of by way of objection, I reply to those only which I have specified above, and this as briefly as possible. To the *first*, then, I say that I admit that will is of wider scope than understanding, if by understanding clear and distinct ideas only be implied; but I deny that will has a wider scope or an ampler range than perception or the faculty of conceiving. Nor, indeed, do I see why the faculty of will is to be characterized as infinite rather than the faculty of feeling or perception; for as we can affirm infinities—one after another, however, for we cannot affirm infinities simultaneously—by the same faculty of willing, so can we perceive an infinity of bodies—one, namely, after another—by the same faculty of perceiving. But if it be said

that there are infinities which we cannot perceive, I reply that we can then apprehend these by no power of thought, and consequently can assent to them by no faculty of will. But it may be said: if God would have it that we should also perceive these, then would he have to give us a more powerful faculty of perception, indeed, but not a greater faculty of willing than he has already endowed us withal. Now this were the same as saying, that if God desired that we should understand an infinity of other beings, he would necessarily have had to give us a higher intelligence, but not a more universal idea of being than he has bestowed, in order to enable us to apprehend these infinite existences. For we have shown that will is an universal entity or idea, whereby we explain all individual volitions, i. e., everything that is common to the whole of these. If, therefore, these common volitions, these universal ideas, are assumed as a faculty, it is not wonderful that it should be conceived as extending beyond the limits of understanding to infinity. For universality may be equally affirmed of one as of several or of an infinite number of individuals.

To the *second* objection I reply, by denying that we have any free power of suspending our judgment. For when we say of any one that he suspends his judgment, we say no more than that he perceives he does not adequately apprehend the matter to be judged. Suspension of judgment therefore is perception, not free will. And that we may have a clear understanding of this, let us conceive a boy imagining to himself a horse, and taking note of nothing else. As this imagination involves the existence of the horse (by Coroll. to Prop. XVII.), and the boy has no perception which annuls its existence, the horse will necessarily be contemplated as present, and, although not certain of its existence, yet will he not call it in question. The same thing do we every day experience in our dreams; nor do I believe that there is any one who thinks that whilst he sleeps he has free power to suspend his judgment concerning the things about which he dreams, and of bringing it to pass that he shall not dream of the things about which he dreams; nevertheless it does happen that in our dreams we sometimes suspend our judgment, namely, when we dream that we are dreaming. Further, I concede that in so far as perception is concerned no one is really deceived; in saying which I mean that imaginations of the mind considered in themselves involve nothing erroneous (vide Schol. to Prop. XVII.); but I deny

that a man in so far as he perceives affirms nothing. For what were it to perceive a winged horse, but to affirm the existence of a horse with wings? Did the mind therefore understand nothing but a winged horse, it would contemplate the creature as present, would have no cause to call its existence in question, and no cause to dissent from its existence, if it were not that to the imagination of the winged horse is joined an idea which annuls the existence of such a creature, or which perceives that the idea entertained of a winged horse is inadequate, in which case the existence of any such horse is necessarily either questioned or denied.

Now in what precedes I think I have also replied to the third objection, namely, that the will is an universal something which is predicated of all ideas, and that it only signifies that which is common to all ideas, viz., affirmation, the adequate essence of which in so far as it is abstractly conceived, must exist in every idea, and for this reason only be the same in all ideas, but not in so far as it is held to constitute the essence of ideas at large; for in this respect single affirmations are as different from each other as ideas themselves. For example, the affirmation which involves the idea of the circle differs as much from the affirmation which involves the idea of the triangle as the idea of the circle differs from the idea of the triangle. Further, I absolutely deny that we require the same power of thought to affirm as true that which is true as to affirm that as true which is false. These two affirmations, if we regard the mind, are indeed to each other severally as entity is to non-entity; for there is nothing positive in ideas which constitutes the form of falsity. Vide Prop. XXXV. and Schol., and Schol. to Prop. XLVII. Wherefore it is to be particularly noted in this place, that we are readily deceived when we confound universals with singulars, and the entities of reason and abstractions with realities.

Finally, as to what concerns the *fourth* objection, I say I am ready to concede that a human being in such a state of equilibrium, percipient, to wit, of nothing but hunger and thirst, and of such meat and such drink at the same distance from him on either hand, would perish of hunger and thirst. If I am asked whether such a human being were not rather to be regarded as an ass than a man, I answer that I cannot tell; even as I cannot tell how he is to be estimated who hangs himself, and how children, idiots, mad men, &c., are to be estimated.

I have now only further to show how salutary the recog-

nition of this doctrine must prove in the affairs of life. This becomes obvious enough when we see that it teaches us that we act by the behests of God alone, and are participators in his Divine nature; wherefore the more excellent, the more perfect the acts we do, the more and more do we know God. Besides conferring entire peace of mind, our doctrine consequently has this further advantage, that it teaches us wherein our true happiness or beatitude consists, viz., in the knowledge of God alone, whereby we are led to do those things only that persuade to piety and love. Whence we clearly understand how much they are mistaken in their estimate of virtue who for virtue and good works expect to be richly rewarded and especially regarded by God as for some great service done, as if virtue and the service of God were not of themselves no slavery, but supreme felicity and most perfect freedom. 2nd, We are taught by our doctrine how we are to comport ourselves in respect of the things of fortune and of things not within our own power,—that is to say, of things that do not follow from our nature: we are to bear the smiles of prosperous and the frowns of adverse fortune with like equanimity, seeing that both befall by the eternal decrees of God, and with the same necessity as it follows from the essence of the triangle that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles. 3rd, Our doctrine furthers and favours the amenities of social life, inasmuch as it teaches us to hate no one, to despise no one, to ridicule no one, to be angry with no one, to envy no one; and teaches, besides, that every one is to be content with his own, and helpful to his neighbour, and this not of womanly pity, partiality, or superstition, but under the guidance of reason and as times and circumstances require, as I show in my Third Part. 4th, Finally, the doctrine is not of slight importance in connection with the commonweal; inasmuch as it teaches in what way citizens are to be governed and led, viz., not servilely, as slaves, but as free men, thinking and doing that which is best.

Thus have I accomplished what I had to say in this Scholium, and here, too, I bring to an end this the Second Part of my Philosophy, in which I think I have explained the nature of the human mind and its properties at sufficient length and as clearly as the difficult nature of the subject permitted; I trust I have also enunciated principles whence much that is most excellent, useful, and needful to be known may be inferred, as will yet further be set forth in what is to follow.

PART III.

OF THE

SOURCE AND NATURE OF THE AFFECTIONS OR EMOTIONS.†

INTRODUCTION.

Most of the writers on the affections of man and the conduct of life appear to treat not of natural things which follow the usual laws of nature, but of things beyond nature; they seem, indeed, to conceive man as an imperium in imperio. For they believe that man rather disturbs than conforms to the order of nature, and, further, that he possesses absolute power over his actions, being influenced and determined in all he does by himself alone. And then they refer the cause of human shortcomings and inconsistencies to no common natural power, but to some—I know not what—vice or defect in human nature, which they forthwith proceed to lament, to deride, to decry, and even more generally to loathe and to execrate; so that he who discourses upon the infirmities of the human soul with more fluency and fervour than common is looked upon as a kind of divine or inspired person. There has been no lack of most estimable men, however (to whose works and ingenuity we are bound to confess our great obligations), who have written much that is most excellent on

* When there is no mention of Parts I. or II., the Part that is being proceeded with is to be understood.—TR.

† In this Part the words Affection and Emotion are used synonymously, as are also the terms Soul and Mind. Spinoza's words are mostly *Affectio*, and almost invariably *Mens*.—TR.

the proper conduct of life, and have given counsels to mankind that are fraught with wisdom; but no one to the best of my knowledge has yet determined the nature and powers of the affections, nor discussed the influence which the mind may have in controlling their manifestations. I am aware, indeed, that the celebrated Descartes, in spite of his belief that the mind possessed the absolute control of its actions, endeavoured to explain the human affections by their first causes, and, further, strove to show how the mind might obtain complete mastery over its emotions. In my opinion, however, Descartes exhibits nothing but his own singular ingenuity and acumen, as I shall show in the proper place. Here I would restrict myself to speak of those who have shown themselves disposed to disparage and deride the affections and actions of men rather than to understand them. To such persons it will doubtless appear strange that I should set about treating the vices and follies of mankind in a geometrical way, and seek to demonstrate on definite principles things which they cry out against as repugnant to reason, as vain, absurd, and even horrible. Yet such is my purpose, for nothing happens in nature that can be ascribed to any vice in its constitution, nature being ever the same, everywhere one, and its inherent power and power in act identical; that is to say, the laws and ordinances of nature, in accordance with which all things come to pass, and from one form change into another, are always and everywhere the same, and so one and the same also must be the mode of understanding and interpreting the nature of things at large, viz., by the universal laws and ordinances of nature. Such affections, therefore, as hatred, anger, envy, &c., considered in themselves, follow by the same necessity and power of nature as other particulars; and then they acknowledge certain causes by which they are comprehended, and have certain properties which are equally worthy of consideration as the properties of anything else,

the mere contemplation of which delights us. I shall therefore proceed in my investigation of the nature and powers of the affections and of the power of the mind in controlling them, in the same way as I have done in the two preceding parts, in which I have treated of God and of the mind. I shall; in a word, discuss human actions, appetites, and emotions precisely as if the question were of lines, planes, and solids.

DEFINITIONS.

1. I call that an ADEQUATE CAUSE the effect of which can through it be clearly and distinctly perceived. An INADEQUATE or partial cause, again, I call that the effect of which cannot be understood through it alone.

2. I say that we ACT when anything takes place within or without us of which we are the adequate cause; that is (by the preceding Definition), when by our nature something follows within us or without us which from that alone can be clearly and distinctly understood. I say, on the contrary, that we SUFFER (are passive or are acted on) when anything takes place within us or anything follows from our nature of which we ourselves are only partly the cause.

3. By AFFECTIONS or EMOTIONS I understand states or conditions of the body, whereby its power to act is increased or diminished, aided or controlled, and at the same time the ideas of these affections.

Explanation. If we, therefore, can be the adequate cause of any of these affections, then by affection I understand an *action;* otherwise a *passion.*

POSTULATES.

1. The human body may be affected in many ways by which its power of acting is increased or diminished, and also in other ways which neither add to nor take from its power of action.

(This Postulate or Axiom rests on Post. 1 and Lem. 5, 6, 7, which see after Prop. XIII. of Pt II.)

2. The human body may undergo many changes, and nevertheless retain impressions or vestiges of objects (concerning which vide Post. 5, Pt II.), and consequently images of the same (vide Schol. to Prop. XVII. Pt II.).

PROPOSITIONS.

PROP. I. The mind in certain cases acts, but in others is passive or suffers: in so far as it has adequate ideas in so far does the mind necessarily act; and in so far as its ideas are inadequate in so far does it necessarily suffer.

Demonst. In every human mind some ideas are adequate, but some, also, are truncate and confused (by Schol. to Prop. XL. Pt II.). But ideas that are adequate in the mind of any one are adequate in God, inasmuch as he constitutes the essence of mind (by Coroll. to Prop. XI. Pt II.); and, again, ideas inadequate in the mind of man are also inadequate in God (by the same Coroll.), not as he is the essence of a particular mind alone, but as he also includes in himself the minds of other things. Further, from every given idea some effect must necessarily follow (by Prop. XXXVI. Pt I.) of which effect God is the adequate cause (vide Def. 1 of this Part), not as he is infinite, but considered as affected by the idea given (vide Prop. IX Pt II.). But the same mind is the adequate cause of the effect whereof God, in so far as he is affected by the idea that is adequate in the mind of any one, is the cause (by Coroll. to Prop. XI. Pt II.). Wherefore our mind (by Def. 2 above), inasmuch as it has adequate ideas, acts of necessity in certain ways. So far in the first place.

Again, whatever follows of necessity from an idea that is adequate in God, not as he involves in himself the mind of any single man only, but as he has in himself the minds of other things along with the mind of this same man, then is the mind of the particular man not an adequate but a partial cause (by the same Corollary to Prop. XI. Pt II.). Consequently (by Def. 2) the mind in so far as it has inadequate ideas necessarily suffers in some way. This in the second place. Therefore the mind in certain cases acts, &c.: q. e. d.

Corollary. Hence it follows that the greater the number of inadequate ideas the mind possesses the more is it exposed to various passions; and, on the contrary, the greater the number of adequate ideas possessed the greater is its power of action.

PROP. II. The body can neither determine the mind to thought, nor the mind determine the body to motion or rest, nor to anything else—if there be anything else.

Demonst. All the modes of thought have God for their cause, in so far as he is considered to be a thinking being, and not in so far as he is explained or interpreted by any other attribute (by Prop. VI. Pt II.). That, therefore, which determines the mind to think is a mode of thought, and not of extension, in other words, it is not body (by Def. 1, Pt. II.). This in the first place. Again, the motion and rest of the body must be determined by or arise from some other body, which was itself determined to motion or rest by another body, and absolutely whatever arises in the body must arise from God, in so far considered as he is affected by some mode of extension and not as affected by any mode of thought (by Prop. VI. Pt II., as before); that is, motion and rest cannot arise from mind, which is a mode of thought (by Prop. XI. Pt II.). This in the second place. Wherefore the body can neither determine, &c.: q. e. d.

Scholium. What has just been said may perhaps be better understood from what will be found stated under Prop. VII. of Pt II., viz., that mind and body are one and the same thing, conceived now under the attribute of thought, now under that of extension. Whence it comes that the order or connection of things is one and the same, whether nature be conceived under this or under that attribute; consequently that the order of the actions and passions of the body are consentaneous in nature with the order of the acts and passions of the mind. This truth is also proclaimed and made manifest in our demonstration of Prop. XII. Pt II. Although no reasonable doubt can remain, then, that all is as now stated, I still scarcely believe that the world will be induced to accept my doctrine without reservation, unless I also demonstrate the matter experimentally; so firmly are men persuaded that on the mere hint of the mind the body is made now to move, now to rest, and to do many things besides, and all in virtue of volitions of the mind and its modes of thinking. No one, however, has as yet determined what the body can do; that

is, no one has yet shown by experiment what the body can accomplish from the sole laws of nature, in so far as corporeal things only are considered, and what it can not accomplish unless it be disposed by the mind. For no one has yet mastered the structure of the body so thoroughly that he could explain all its functions—and here I say nothing of the many things that are observed in the lower animals which far exceed human sagacity, and of those things that somnambulists do in their sleep which waking men would not dare to attempt; and this shows sufficiently that the body in virtue of the laws of its nature alone can do many things which its mind may admire.

Moreover, no one knows in what way and by what means the mind moves the body, what amount of motion it can give to the body, nor with what rapidity it can cause the body to move. Whence it follows that when people speak of this or that act of the body as originated or produced by the mind, which is by them presumed to overrule the body, they do not know what they say, and only confess in high-sounding terms that they, without any kind of misgiving, do verily know nothing of the true cause of the bodily actions. But they may say, whether they know or do not know by what means the mind moves the body, that they are assured by experience that unless the mind were capable of thinking the body would be inert and without action; that they feel it lies in the power of the mind alone to speak or to be silent, and to do or abstain from doing many other things which they believe must depend on resolutions of the mind. But, as regards the first point, I ask these persons whether experience does not also teach that if the body be incompetent the mind is not at the same time powerless for thought? For when the body lies sunk in sleep, the mind slumbers at the same time, and has no power of thought, as it has when the body is awake. Further, I imagine that every one must have felt in himself that the mind is not at all times equally fit for thought on the same subject; but that as the body is more apt to have images of this or that subject aroused in it, so is the mind now more now less apt for the contemplation of this or of that subject. But it may still be said, that when the body only is considered, it is impossible from the laws of nature to presume that the causes of such things as buildings, pictures, &c., which human art alone produces, can be referred to it; and that the human body, unless moved and determined by the mind, cannot be competent to build a temple.

But I have already shown that these objectors know nothing of what the body can do of itself, nor of what can be inferred from the mere consideration of its nature, and that they themselves must have had experience of things done in conformity with natural laws, which they would never have believed could be done save under the direction of the mind, such as the feats performed by somnambulists which are subjects of wonder to the sleep-walkers themselves when awake. I add that, from the structure of the human body itself, which in artifice so far surpasses everything fashioned by the art of man, and leaving out of the question all I have but just insisted on,—from the structure of the human body, I say, and from its nature, under whatever attribute considered, an endless number of capabilities present themselves to us.

As regards the second head, all will allow that human affairs would indeed proceed much more happily were it in the power of men indifferently to speak or to keep silence. But experience more than sufficiently shows that men have nothing less under their control than the tongue,* and that they can do everything rather than curb and control their appetites. Whence it has come to pass that many believe we only act freely in those cases where we desire things slightly; because the appetite for the things coveted is then readily controlled by the recollection of some other thing that is brought to mind; whilst we by no means act freely in those cases in which things are eagerly desired, and which the memory of another thing is incompetent to curb or control. But indeed unless these parties have experience of the fact that we do many things of which we afterwards repent, and that we often, when we are distracted by contending emotions, see the better course and yet pursue the worse, nothing should hinder them from believing that we always and under all circumstances act freely. Thus would the infant believe that it desires the breast of free-will, the spiteful boy that he seeks revenge, the timid that he takes to flight, &c., all of free-will. The tipsy man, moreover, should then believe that by the free purpose of his mind he utters things which when sober he wishes he had kept to himself, &c. Even thus do the foolish and the garrulous, children, and others of the same stamp, believe that they speak in freedom of soul, when nevertheless they cannot restrain the impulse they feel to speak, as experience not less than reason sufficiently teaches. But all this is in

* Vide James iii. 8.

consequence of men believing themselves free, because, whilst conscious of their actions, they are ignorant of the causes whereby they are moved to action; and, further, because resolutions of the mind are nothing more than appetites which are various in conformity with various dispositions of the body. For every one orders or would order all in harmony with his own mental state; and they, moreover, who are torn by contending emotions know not truly what they desire, as they who are apathetic feel it matter of indifference whether they yield this way or that, so that they are easily led, whether it be to the right hand or to the left.

All that has now been said shows clearly enough that the resolves of the mind, as well as the appetites and determinations of the body, are alike and consentaneous in nature, or rather that they are one and the same thing, which, regarded under the attribute of thought and explained by this, we entitle a *resolution*, and which, regarded under the attribute of extension, and interpreted by the laws of motion and rest, we entitle a *determination;* but these truths will appear yet more clearly from what is to follow. There is still one point, however, to which I would call particular attention in this place, viz., that we can perform no act from a resolution of the mind unless we carry it in our memory;—we cannot, for instance, speak a single word if we do not remember it. Further, it lies not within the free power of the mind to remember or to forget anything. Wherefore, we only believe that we have the power by the sole decree of the mind to speak or to keep silence concerning a thing remembered. But when in sleep we dream that we speak, we believe we speak by the free decision of the mind; yet we either do not speak at all, or if we do, it is by an automatic or spontaneous motion of the body. Do we dream, further, that we conceal certain things from the world, this is in virtue of the same resolution of the mind, whereby when awake we keep silence on things that we know. Do we dream, in fine, that by a resolve of the mind we do something which awake we should not dare to do, I should then be glad to know whether in the mind there co-exist two kinds of resolves, one fantastical, another free? And if we do not incline to proceed so far on the path of unreason as to say that there are, then we must needs acknowledge that the decree of the mind which is believed to be free is not distinguishable from imagination or memory, and is nothing, in fact, but the affirmation which an idea, in so far as it is an idea, necessarily involves. (See on this point

Prop. XLIX. of Part II.) Such decrees of the mind consequently arise of the same necessity in the mind as the ideas of things actually existing arise there. They, therefore, who believe that they speak or are silent or do anything whatsoever by the free resolves of their mind, dream with their eyes open.

PROP. III. The actions of the mind arise from adequate ideas only; the passions, again, depend on inadequate ideas alone.

Demonst. That which constitutes the prime or essence of the mind is nothing but the idea of the body existing in act (by Props. XI. and XIII. Pt II.), this idea itself (by Prop. XV. Pt II.) is composed of many others, some of which (by Coroll. to Prop. XXXVIII. Pt II.) are adequate, some however inadequate (Coroll. to Prop. XXIX. Pt II.). Whatever follows from the nature of the mind, therefore, of which the mind is proximate cause, and by which it must be understood, follows necessarily either from an adequate or an inadequate idea. But in so far as the mind has inadequate ideas, in so far does it necessarily suffer. Consequently the mind's actions follow from adequate ideas only, and the mind only suffers in so far as it has inadequate ideas: q. e. d.

Scholium. We see, therefore, that passions are not to be referred to the mind save as it has something belonging to it which involves negation, or in so far as it is considered as a part of nature which cannot be clearly and distinctly perceived by itself and without the concurrence of something else. On this ground, for this reason, I could show that passions bear relation to particular things in the same way as to the mind, and are to be apprehended in no other manner. But my intention is to treat of the human mind only.

PROP. IV. Nothing can be destroyed save by an external cause.

Demonst. This proposition is self-evident. For the definition of every individual thing is affirmation not negation of the essence of the thing defined—the definition alleges and does not negative the essence of the thing. When we consider a thing in itself, therefore, and without respect to external causes, we discover nothing in it whereby it can be destroyed: q. e. d.

PROP. V. Things in so far as they are of contrary or opposed natures, i. e., things in so far as one is competent to destroy the other, cannot be in the same object.

Demonst. For if they could associate or be present together in the same object, there would then be present in the same object something which would cause its destruction, which is absurd. Things, therefore, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. VI. Each individual thing strives in so far as it is able to continue in its state of being.

Demonst. For individual things are modes by which attributes of God are expressed in certain and determinate ways (by Coroll. to Prop. XXV. Pt I.); in other words, they are entities which express the power of God—the power whereby God is and acts in certain determinate ways (by Prop. XXXIV. Pt I.). Neither has a thing aught within it by which it can be destroyed or its existence abrogated (by Prop. IV.); on the contrary, it is opposed to all that implicates its existence (by the preceding Proposition). Therefore, in so far as it can and as depends on itself every individual thing strives, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. VII. The effort which each individual thing makes to continue in its state of being is nothing but the very essence of the thing itself.

Demonst. From the essence of a thing as assigned certain consequences necessarily ensue (by Prop. XXXVI. Pt I.), nor can things effect aught that does not necessarily follow from their determinate nature (by Prop. XXIX. Pt. I.). Therefore the power of each thing, or the effort whereby it does anything either alone or associated with others, or whereby it endeavours to act in any way, in other words (by Prop. VI. above), the power it has or the effort it makes to persevere in its state of being is nothing but the assigned or actual essence of the thing itself: q. e. d.

PROP. VIII. The effort whereby each several thing seeks to continue in being involves no finite time, but indefinite time.

Demonst. Did it involve limited time—time which should determine the continuance of the thing, then by the sole

power whereby a thing exists it would follow that the thing after the expiration of this limited time would not exist, but must cease to be. But this (by Prop. IX. above) is absurd. Therefore the effort whereby a thing exists involves no definite time, but, on the contrary (by Prop. IV. above), with no external cause of destruction intervening, the same power by which it already exists will cause it to exist for ever. The effort of a thing to continue in being, therefore, involves indefinite time: q. e. d.

PROP. IX. The mind, both as it has clear and distinct ideas, and as it has confused ideas, endeavours to continue in its state of being for an indefinite time, and is conscious of this its striving so to continue.

Demonst. The essence of the mind is constituted of adequate and inadequate ideas (as we have shown in our third Proposition above); and so, both as it possesses these and those (by Prop. VII. above), it endeavours to persevere in its state of being, and for an indefinite time, as shown in Prop. VIII. above. But inasmuch as the mind is necessarily conscious of itself by means of its ideas of the corporeal affections (by Prop. XXIII. Pt II.), therefore is it also conscious of its effort to continue in being: q. e. d.

Scholium. This effort when referred to the mind alone is entitled WILL; but when referred to mind and body together it is called APPETITE, which is thus nothing less than the very essence of man, from the nature of which all that serves for his preservation necessarily follows, and under the influence of which he is impelled to act out his life. Further, betwixt appetite and desire there is no difference, save that desire is commonly referred to man as he is conscious of his appetites. *Desire* is consequently definable as *appetite with consciousness.* From all that precedes, it appears that we do not strive, will, crave, or desire, because we judge a thing to be good; but, on the contrary, we judge a thing to be good because we desire it, strive after it, will to possess it, &c.

PROP. X. An idea that excludes the existence of the body cannot have place in the mind, but is in contradiction to it.

Demonst. There can be nothing in our body that tends to destroy it (by Prop. V. above); and so neither can there be

any idea of such a thing in God, in so far as he has an idea of our body (by Coroll. to Prop. IX. Pt II.); that is, the idea of such a thing cannot be present in the mind (vide Prop. XI. and XIII. Pt II.); but, on the contrary, and inasmuch as the prime or very essence of the human mind is the idea of the body actually existing, the first and grand effort of the mind (by Prop. VII. above) is affirmation of the existence of the body. Therefore an idea which denied the existence of our body would be in opposition to the constitution of our mind: q. e. d.

PROP. XI. Whatever increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, the power of our body to act, in the same measure does the idea of the same thing increase or diminish, aid or restrains the power of our mind to think.

Demonst. This proposition is evident from Prop. VII. and also from Prop. XIV. of Pt II.

Scholium. We see, therefore, that the mind may suffer great changes and pass now to states of greater, now to states of less perfection—states or passions which the affections of joy and sorrow explain to us. By *joy* in what follows, I understand a passion in which the soul passes to higher perfection; by *sorrow* a passion which indicates a passage to a lower state of perfection. Further, I designate the affection of joy when referred to mind and body at once, *pleasure* or *hilarity;* and the affection of sorrow, referred in the same way, I call *pain, grief,* or *melancholy.* It is to be observed, however, that pleasure and pain are then referred to man, when one part of his frame is affected more than another; hilarity and melancholy, again, when all its parts are alike affected. In the Scholium to Prop IX. I have explained what *desire* is; and here I take occasion to state that I acknowledge no more than these three grand or primary affections or emotions—viz., joy, sorrow, and desire; for I shall show by-and-by that all the others arise from these. Before proceeding further, however, it seems proper to explain Proposition X. more fully, in order that we may better understand how and in what way one idea is opposed to another.

In the Scholium to Proposition XVII. of Pt II. we have shown that the idea which constitutes the essence of the mind

involves the existence of the body so long as the body itself exists. Further, from what is said in the Corollary to Prop. VIII. of Pt II., and in the Scholium appended, it follows that the present existence of our mind depends on this alone, viz., that the mind involves the actual existence of body. Finally, we have shown that the power of the mind whereby things are imagined and remembered also depends on this, that the mental power involves the actual existence of the body (vide Props. XVII. and XVIII. Pt II.). From whence it follows that the present actual existence of the mind and its faculty of imagining, being suspended or annulled, the mind at the same moment ceases to affirm the present actual existence of the body. Now the reason why the mind ceases to affirm this existence of the body cannot be in the mind itself (by Prop. IV. above), neither can it consist in the cessation of the being of the body; for by Proposition VI. of our second Part we have seen that the reason why the mind affirms the existence of the body is not because of the body's beginning to exist (wherefore, on the same ground, neither does it cease to affirm the existence of the body because the body ceases to be). By Proposition VIII. Pt II., it is shown to arise from another idea which excludes or sets aside the present existence of our body, and consequently of our mind also,—an idea contrary therefore to the idea which constitutes the essence of our mind.

PROP. XII. The mind strives to the extent of its power to imagine such things as aid or augment the power of the body to act.

Demonst. So long as the human body is affected by a mode that involves the nature of some external body, so long will the human body contemplate the same external body as present (by Prop. XVII. Pt II.); and consequently (by Prop. VII. Pt II.) so long as the mind contemplates—that is, imagines (by Coroll. to the same Proposition), any external body as present, so long is the human body affected by the mode which involves the nature of the external body in question. And thus, so long as the mind imagines things that increase or assist the capacity of the body to act, so long is the body affected by modes that increase or assist its capacity to act (vide Post. 1. above); and consequently (by Prop. XI. above) so long is the power of the mind to think increased or assisted. Wherefore (by Prop. VI. or IX.

above) the mind strives to the extent of its power to imagine those things, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. XIII. When the mind imagines such things as lessen or repress the active powers of the body, it strives to the extent of its capacity to remember things that exclude the existence of these.

Demonst. So long as the mind imagines things of such a kind, so long is the power of both mind and body diminished or restrained (as demonstrated in the preceding proposition), yet will the mind continue to imagine such things, so long as it does not imagine something else which excludes their existence, something which the mind, consequently (by Prop. VI. above), to the extent of its power, endeavours to imagine or remember: q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it follows that the mind is indisposed to imagine such things as diminish or restrain its own and the body's power of action.

Scholium. From the above we can understand what constitutes love and hate. Love, viz., is nothing more than joy associated with the idea of an external cause; and hatred is sorrow accompanied by the idea of an external cause. We perceive also that he who loves necessarily endeavours to have present and to hold fast the thing he loves; and contrariwise, he who hates does his best to set aside and annul the thing he dislikes. But of these things more and at greater length in what follows.

PROP. XIV. The mind having once been simultaneously affected by two emotions, when subsequently affected by either of them it is also affected by the other.

Demonst. The body having been once affected by two bodies at the same time, when the mind subsequently imagines either of these, immediately is the other also remembered (by Prop. XVIII. Pt II.). But the imaginations of the mind rather indicate the affections of our body than the nature of external bodies (by Coroll. 2 to Prop. XVI. Pt II.). Wherefore, if the body, and by consequence the mind, be once affected by two emotions, when it is subsequently affected by either, forthwith is it also affected by the other: q. e. d.

PROP. XV. Any thing whatsoever may accidentally be the cause of joy, of sorrow, or of desire.

Demonst. Suppose the mind to be affected by two emotions at once,—one which neither increases nor diminishes its power of action, another which either increases or diminishes this power (by Post. 1. above). From the immediately preceding proposition it then appears that the mind when at some other time it is affected by the former emotion as true cause—the former which, hypothetically, of itself neither increases nor diminishes the mind's power of thinking,—the mind is forthwith affected by the latter, which either increases or diminishes its power of thinking; that is to say, the mind is then affected either by joy or by sorrow. It is thus that emotions not of themselves but by accident become the cause of joy or of sorrow. In the same way it can be readily shown that every emotion may by accident be the cause of desire also: q. e. d.

Coroll. It is only because we have contemplated a thing with feelings of pleasure or of pain, of which the thing itself is not the efficient cause, that we are led to like or to dislike, to love or to hate it.

Demonst. For it comes to pass from this alone, that the mind when it subsequently imagines such a thing, is affected by the emotion of pleasure or of pain (by Prop. XIV. above); that is to say (by Schol. to Prop. XI. above), the power of the mind and body is increased or diminished; and consequently (by Prop. XII. above) the mind seeks to imagine the thing (by Coroll. to Prop. XIII. above), or strives to turn from it; in other words (by Schol. to Prop. XIII. above), the mind likes the thing, or, otherwise, has it in dislike: q. e. d.

Scholium. Hence we understand how it may happen that we have likings and dislikings, loves and hatreds, without any cause known to us, but only by *sympathy* and *antipathy*, as is said. To the same category are those objects also to be referred which affect us with joy or sorrow from this alone: that they bear some resemblance to objects which are wont to affect us with one or other of these emotions, as I shall show in the following propositions. I know, indeed, that the writers who first introduced the names sympathy and antipathy intended to signify thereby certain occult qualities of things; but I believe notwithstanding that we are at liberty to understand known and manifest qualities by the terms.

PROP. XVI. We love or hate certain things solely because we imagine that they bear a resemblance to an object which has been wont to excite feelings of pleasure or pain, of love or hate, in our mind, although that wherein the things resemble this object is not the efficient cause of the emotions experienced.

Demonst. We have (by hypothesis) contemplated with an emotion of joy or of sorrow that which resembles an object in the object itself, and (by Prop. XIV. above) seen that as the mind is affected by the image engendered, so is it also immediately affected by this or that emotion. Consequently the thing perceived as having a certain similitude will prove by accident the cause of joy or sorrow (by Prop. XV. above). And thus (by the preceding Corollary) we come to like or dislike that which resembles an object, although the resemblance is not the efficient cause of the emotion experienced: q. e. d.

PROP. XVII. If a thing which used to excite in us an emotion of sorrow be imagined to resemble something else which was wont to move us equally to joy, it may be held alike in love and in hate.

Demonst. For the thing here is itself hypothetically the cause of pain or sorrow, and in so far as we imagine ourselves affected through it by such an emotion (see Schol. to Prop. XIII.) we have it in hate; further however, and in so far as we imagine we have something like it which used to affect us with as great joy, we then love it with a joy that is equally great (by the preceding Proposition). Thus it is that we may sometimes love and hate the same thing at once: q. e. d.

Scholium. Such a condition of mind, the effect of two contrary emotions, is characterized as *vacillation*, and bears the same relation to emotional feeling that doubt does to imagination (vide Schol. to Prop. XLIV. Pt II.); nor do vacillation and doubt differ from one another save in respect of more and less. It is to be observed, however, that in the preceding proposition I have deduced these fluctuations of mind from sources which in themselves are causes of one, and by accident causes of another, emotion. And this I have done because the conclusions could be more easily arrived at from what had gone before, and not because I deny that vacillation of mind arises for the most part from an object which is the

efficient cause of the emotions both of pleasure and pain. For the human body (by Postulate 1, Pt II.) is composed of numerous individual parts of divers nature, and so is susceptible of being affected in many and various ways by one and the same body (by Ax. 1 after Lem. 3, following Prop. XIII. Pt II.). On the other hand, again, inasmuch as one and the same thing may be affected in various ways, so may one and the same part of the body be affected in many different ways. From these considerations we can readily conceive how one and the same object may be the cause of numerous and conflicting emotions.

PROP. XVIII. Man experiences the same emotion of joy or sorrow from the image of a past or future, as of a present thing.

Demonst. So long as a man is affected by the image of any thing, he contemplates that thing as present although it has no existence in fact (by Prop. XVII. Pt II. and its Coroll.); nor does he imagine it with reference either to the past or the future, save and in so far only as its image is connected with the past or the future (vide Schol. to Prop. XLIV. Pt II.). Wherefore the image of a thing considered in itself alone is the same whether it be referred to time past, to the future, or to the present; that is (by Coroll. 2 to Prop. XVI. Pt II.), the condition of the body, or the emotion experienced, is identical whether the image be of a thing past, present, or future. The emotion of joy or sorrow, therefore, is the same whether the image be that of a past, present, or future thing: q. e. d.

Scholium 1. I here designate a thing as past or future in so far as we were, or will be, affected by the same, in so far as we have regarded or will regard it, in so far as it has pleased or pained us, or as it will give us pleasure or pain, &c. For imagining a thing thus, we so far affirm its existence; i. e., the body is affected by no emotion which excludes the existence of the thing; and so (by Prop. XVII. Pt II.) is affected by its image in the same way as if the thing itself were present. Nevertheless, as it frequently happens that they who have great experience hesitate so long as they contemplate a thing in reference to the future or the past, and mostly doubt of the issues of things (vide Schol. to Prop. XLIV. Pt II.), it comes to pass that emotions which arise from such images of things are not fixed and constant, but

are for the most part disturbed by images of other things, until the event is known for certain.

Scholium 2. From what has now been said we understand what is meant by hope, fear, despair, remorse, and the gnawings of conscience. *Hope* is nothing more than an inconstant joy arising from the image of an event or thing past, or of an event or thing to come, of the issue of which we are in doubt; *fear*, on the contrary, is an inconstant sorrow, induced by the imagination of a doubtful event or thing. But if doubt be discarded in connection with these emotions, hope is turned into *security*, and fear into *despair*, that is to say, into kinds of joy and grief which arise from the images of the thing we fear or hope. *Delight* (*gaudium*), again, is joy arising from the image of a thing past, of the issue of which we had been in doubt. The sting of conscience, or *remorse*, in fine, is sorrow in opposition to joy or gladness.

PROP. XIX. He who imagines the thing he loves to be destroyed is grieved, as on the contrary he rejoices if he knows it to be safe.

Demonst. The mind strives to the extent of its power to imagine such things as aid or add to the power of the body to act (by Prop. XII. above), i. e. (by Schol. to Prop. XIII.), to imagine such things as it loves. Now imagination is aided by all that tends to confirm things in their state of being, and on the contrary is repressed by all that compromises the existence of things (by Prop. XVII. Pt II.). Consequently the images of things that imply the existence of a beloved thing aid the effort of the mind whereby it strives to imagine this thing, i. e., they affect the mind with joy (by Schol. to Prop. XI.); and on the contrary, those images that exclude the existence of the thing beloved constrain the efforts of the mind, i. e., they affect the mind with sadness. He, therefore, who imagines the thing he loves to be lost or destroyed is made sorrowful, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. XX. He who imagines that the thing he hates is destroyed, rejoices.

Demonst. The mind (by Prop. XIII.) strives to imagine things which exclude the existence of the things that lessen or restrain the power of the body to act; in other words (by Schol. to the same Prop.), the mind strives to imagine those things that annul the existence of the things it dis-

likes. Thus does the image of the thing which the mind dislikes aid endeavour in the mind, or affect it joyfully (by Schol. to Prop. XI.). He, therefore, who imagines that the thing he hates is destroyed, rejoices: q. e. d.

PROP. XXI. He who imagines the thing he loves to be affected with joy or sadness is himself affected with joy or sadness; and either emotion will be greater or less in him who loves, as the affection is greater or less in the thing that is loved.

Demonst. The images of things (as demonstrated in Prop. XIX. above) which affirm the existence of a thing beloved assist the mind in the endeavour it makes to imagine the beloved thing itself. But joy affirms the existence of the thing joyed in, and this by so much the more as the emotion of joy is greater, for joy is transition to a state of higher perfection (by Schol. to Prop. XI.). Therefore the image of joy in the thing loved furthers effort in the mind of him who loves. So much in the first place. Again, in so far as any thing is affected with sorrow, in so far is that thing invalidated, and this by so much the more as the emotion of sorrow is greater (by Schol. to Prop. XI.); so that he who imagines the thing he loves to be affected with sorrow (by Prop. XIX.) is himself sorrowfully affected also, and this by so much the more as the affection in the thing beloved is greater: q. e. d.

PROP. XXII. If we imagine any one to feel love or a liking for the thing we love, we ourselves are affected with love for that person; if, on the contrary, we imagine him to dislike the thing we love, we are moved to dislike him.

Demonst. He who moves the thing we love to joy or sorrow also moves us to joy or sorrow, if we imagine the thing we love to be affected by the joy or sorrow so caused (by the preceding proposition). The joy or sorrow experienced by us here, however, is presumed to occur along with a concomitant idea of an external cause; so that if we imagine any one to regard the thing we love under the influence of love or hatred, we feel ourselves affected with love or hate towards him (by Schol. to Prop. XIII.): q. e. d.

Scholium. Proposition XXI. explains to us what we are

to understand by *commiseration*. It may be defined, sorrow arising from injury befalling another. But by what special title we are to designate the joy that arises from good befalling another, I cannot tell. We shall call the love felt for one who does good to another *goodwill* or approbation (*favor*), and, on the contrary, the hatred experienced against whosoever does another an injury we shall entitle *indignation*. Finally it is to be observed, that we not only pity or commiserate the thing we have loved (as shown in Prop. XXI.), but that also for which we had previously had no affection, provided only we fancy that it resembles ourselves (as I shall show immediately); and, further, that we feel kindly disposed towards him who does good to one like ourselves, and, on the contrary, indignantly towards him who does injury to one who resembles us.

PROP. XXIII. He who imagines that the thing he hates is affected by sorrow, will rejoice; if, on the contrary, he imagines that it is joyfully affected, he will grieve; and each of these affections will be greater or less as its opposite is greater or less in that which is held in hate.

Demonst. In so far as the hated object is unpleasantly or sorrowfully affected so far is it incapacitated or injured, and this by so much the more as the unpleasantness or sorrow experienced is greater (by Schol. to Prop. XI.). He, therefore (by Prop. XX. above), who imagines the thing he hates to be unpleasantly affected, rejoices; and this the more as the thing hated is more grievously affected. This in the first place. Again, joy affirms the existence of the joyful thing (by the same Schol. to Prop. XI.), and ever the more, the more the joy abounds. If any one imagines the thing he hates to be joyfully affected, this imagination will disturb or constrain him in his endeavours, i. e., will cause him who hates to be still more sorrowfully affected (by Schol. to Prop. XI.): q. e. d.

Schol. Such joy or satisfaction, however, can scarcely be solid and without conflict of soul. For, as I shall immediately show (vide Prop. XXVII. below), in so far as we imagine a thing having affinity with ourselves to be sorrowfully affected so far must we too be grieved; and contrariwise, so far as we imagine a thing so circumstanced to be joyfully affected. But here I have the feeling of hatred only under consideration.

PROP. XXIV. If we imagine any one causing joy or pleasure to a thing which we dislike, we shall then conceive dislike of him. If, on the contrary, we imagine him causing displeasure to the same thing, we shall be moved to love him.

Demonst. This proposition is demonstrated in the same way as Prop. XXII. above, which therefore see.

Schol. These and similar dislikes or hatreds are referred to *envy*, which consequently is nothing but hatred considered as disposing or influencing men in such wise that they rejoice in the ill and lament the good that befalls others.

PROP. XXV. We strive to affirm everything of ourselves and of a loved object which we imagine will move us or the loved object to gladness; and, on the contrary, to negative everything we imagine will move us or the thing we love to sorrow.

Demonst. Whatever we imagine as likely to affect the thing we love with joy or sorrow, affects us with joy or sorrow (by Prop. XXI. above). But the mind strives as far as it may to imagine all that can affect us with joy (by Prop. XII. above), or to contemplate such things as present existences (by Prop. XVII. and Coroll. Pt II.); and, on the contrary, to negative the existence of whatever affects us with sorrow (by Prop. XIII. above). Therefore do we strive to affirm everything of ourselves and of cherished objects which we imagine will move us or them to gladness, and, on the contrary, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. XXVI. We seek to affirm of the thing we dislike all that we imagine will affect it unpleasantly, and, on the contrary, to negative all we fancy might affect it pleasantly.

Demonst. This proposition follows from Prop. XXIII., as XXIV. follows from XXI.

Schol. From the above we see how readily it comes to pass that men feel more favourably towards themselves and the things they love than is just, and, on the contrary, less favourably than is due towards the things they dislike. The imagination here, when it refers to the individual himself, is

called *pride*, or *haughtiness*, and is a kind of folly; for the haughty man dreams with his eyes open that he is and can accomplish all he feigns by his mere imagination; and, because he looks on his fictions as realities, he rejoices; i. e., he rejoices so long as he does not imagine things that exclude the existence of his fancies and that determine and define his own proper powers of action. *Pride* or *haughtiness* therefore is a kind of joy arising from a man's exaggerated opinion of himself. The joy, again, that arises from thinking highly of another, more highly perhaps than he deserves, is entitled *respect* or *esteem;* and the sentiment that arises when one is thought of less worthily than he perhaps deserves is called *contempt.*

PROP. XXVII. When we imagine an object like ourselves, but towards which we are indifferent, to be affected by some particular emotion, we forthwith become affected by a like emotion.

Demonst. The images of things are affections of the body, the ideas of which represent external bodies to us as virtual presences (by Schol. to Prop. XVII. Pt II.), that is (by Prop. XVI. Pt II.), the ideas of which involve the nature of our body at once and the present nature of the external body. If, therefore, the nature of an external body resemble the nature of our body, then will the idea of the external body we imagine involve an affection of our body similar to the affection of the external body. Consequently if we imagine one like ourselves to be affected by some mental emotion, this imagination expresses an affection of our body of the same kind as the emotion of the individual supposed. In this way it comes to pass that in imagining one like ourselves to be affected by an emotion, we forthwith experience an emotion of the same kind. If, however, we dislike the individual who resembles us, then (by Prop. XXIII. above) are we affected by an emotion the opposite of that wherewith he is affected, and not by an emotion of the same kind: q. e. d.

Schol. 1. This imitation of the emotions, when referred to sorrow, is called *pity* or *commiseration* (vide Schol. to Prop. XXII. above); when referred to desire it is entitled *emulation*, which, therefore, seems to be nothing but a desire of something aroused in us by our imagining others like ourselves to be affected by similar desires.

Coroll. 1. If we imagine one towards whom we are in-

different to occasion pleasure to an individual like ourselves, we then feel pleasantly disposed towards him. If, on the contrary, we imagine him causing pain to such an individual, we dislike him.

Demonst. This is to be demonstrated in the same way as the preceding proposition, or precisely as Prop. XXII. is demonstrated from Prop. XXI.

Coroll. 2. We cannot hate the thing that moves our pity, because the suffering of the thing causes us sorrow.

Demonst. Were it possible to hate anything from such a cause, then should we also rejoice in its suffering, which is against the hypothesis (vide Prop. XXIII.).

Coroll. 3. We strive to the extent of our power to free the thing we pity from its suffering.

Demonst. That which painfully affects the thing which excites our pity affects us also with a like painful feeling (by the preceding proposition); in which case we endeavour to remember all that militates against the existence of the thing in question or destroys it (by Prop. XIII. above); that is to say, we desire or are moved to seek its destruction (by Schol. to Prop. IX.), and in this way endeavour to free the thing that moves our pity from its suffering: q. e. d.

Schol. 2. The will or inclination to confer benefits which arises from this, that the thing we would benefit distresses or causes us sorrow, is called *benevolence*, and is nothing but a desire sprung of commiseration or compassion. For what might here be said further of the love and hate felt for that which has done good or ill to the thing we imagine resembles ourselves, vide the Schol. to Prop. XXII. above.

PROP. XXVIII. We strive to bring about all that we imagine may conduce to joy and happiness, and we seek to avoid or to annul whatever opposes these or tends to induce grief and melancholy.

Demonst. We endeavour to the extent of our power to cherish the imagination of whatsoever we believe will conduce to joy (by Prop. XII. above); in other words, we strive in so far as we may to contemplate this as present or actually existing (by Prop. XVII. Pt II.). But the effort or power of the mind in thinking is equal and like in nature to the effort or power of the body in acting, as clearly appears from the Corollaries to Props. VII. and XI. Pt II. Therefore do we endeavour absolutely to secure or we desire and intend the ex-

istence of that which gives us joy. This in the first place. Again, if we imagine that that which occasions us grief is put an end to,—in other words, if the thing we dislike is annulled, we rejoice (by Prop. XX. above), and are led either to seek to destroy it (by our first paragraph above), or (by Prop. XIII. above) so to set it aside that we may not have to contemplate it as present. This in the second. Therefore do we, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. XXIX. We endeavour to do everything which we imagine men * regard with pleasure; and, on the contrary, we avoid doing anything we think will be displeasing to other men.

Demonst. When we imagine that men love this or hate that, we ourselves are disposed to love or hate the same things (by Prop. XXVII. above), i. e. (as shown in the Schol. to Prop. XIII. above), we rejoice in or are pained by the presence of that thing, and consequently we endeavour to do that which we imagine men mostly like or take pleasure in: q. e. d.

Schol. The endeavour to do as also to avoid doing anything for the sole purpose of pleasing other men, is styled *ambition*, especially when we strive so disinterestedly to please the world that we leave undone something to our own advantage, and do something to the advantage of others. Under different circumstances, the emotion is entitled *politeness*, *complaisance*. Further, I designate as *gratitude* the feeling we experience from the act of another done as we imagine to gratify us, and *aversion* the uneasy sense we experience when we imagine anything done with a view to our disadvantage—and whilst we *praise* the former, we are disposed to *blame* the latter.

PROP. XXX. When any one has done that which he imagines will give pleasure to others, he himself will be pleased, associated as the act must be with the idea of himself as its cause; in other words, he will regard himself with satisfaction. If, on the contrary, he has

* I here use the word *man* or *men* in reference to those towards whom we are indifferent, for whom we have no affection or emotional feeling whatever.

done something which he imagines will be painful or displeasing to others, he will regard himself with dissatisfaction.

Demonst. He who imagines that he affects others with pleasure or pain, will thereby himself be pleasantly or painfully affected (by Prop. XXVII. above). But as man is self-conscious through the emotion whereby he is determined to act (by Prop. XIX. and XXIII. Pt II.), so will he who has done something which he imagines will give pleasure to another, be himself pleased through the consciousness of himself as its cause; or he will look on himself with pleasure—and *vice versâ*: q. e. d.

Schol. As love (by Schol. to Prop. XIII. above) is pleasure connected with the idea of an external cause, and hate is pain also connected with an outward cause, so will this pleasure and pain appear as a species of love and hate. But as pleasure and pain bear reference to external objects, we have to indicate these emotions by other names. The pleasure experienced in connection with the idea of an external cause, accordingly, we designate *glory* (*gloria*), and the kind of pain or displeasure which is opposed to this we call *disgrace* or *shame* (*pudor*)—it being understood that the pleasure or pain arises from the belief a man entertains that he will be praised or blamed for his deeds. Otherwise, I designate the pleasure that is connected with the idea of an external cause, *self-satisfaction* (*acquiescentia in se ipso*), and the unpleasant emotion associated with the opposite of *self-contentment* I call *diffidence* or *modesty*. As, further (by Schol. to Prop. XVII. Pt II.), the pleasure which any one imagines he occasions another, may be entirely in his own imagination, and (by Prop. XXV. above) every one may imagine all of himself which his fancy presents to him as pleasant, so is it very possible that the *self-satisfied* person becomes arrogant, and persuades himself or imagines that he is agreeable to everybody, when, in fact, he is very distasteful to all.

PROP. XXXI. If we imagine that a certain person loves, desires, or hates aught which we ourselves love, desire, or dislike, we shall be disposed to desire, love, or to hate that thing more thoroughly than before. But if we imagine that he feels aversion for what we love, or, on the contrary, loves what we dislike, then shall we be

apt to experience uncertainty or fluctuation of mind in respect of him.

Demonst. In the mere fact of imagining one to love anything, we are ourselves disposed to love the same thing (by Prop. XXVII. above). But let us suppose that without this we love the thing in question. There then arises a new cause of love by which the affection is fostered, so that we then love more constantly the thing we loved already. Again, from merely imagining some one to entertain aversion for a certain thing, we shall ourselves feel averse to it (by the same proposition). But if we suppose that we at the same time love this thing, we shall then both love and hate it at the same time (by Schol. to Prop. XVII.), or we shall suffer uncertainty and vacillation of mind: q. e. d.

Scholium. From the above and Prop. XXVIII. of the present Part, it follows that every one strives to the extent of of his ability, that all should love that which he loves himself, and hate that which he hates, whence the poet:

> Speremus pariter, pariter metuamus amantes;
> Ferreus est, si quis, quod sinit alter, amat.
>
> Let lovers hope and fear alike; believe
> He were of steel who loves what others leave.*

This disposition to have others agree with us in our likings and dislikings is really ambition (*ambitio*) (vide Scholium to Prop. XXIX. above). And thereby do we see how it comes to pass that almost every one naturally desires to have every one else live according to his fancy. Did each obstinately insist on this, each would be in the other's way, and all desiring to be loved and applauded by all, would be severally hated and decried by all.

PROP. XXXII. If we imagine that another enjoys a certain thing which one alone can enjoy, we strive to bring it about that he shall no longer possess the thing in question.

Demonst. In the mere circumstance that we imagine one enjoying a particular thing, we forthwith love that thing (by Prop. XXVII. and Coroll. 1) and seek to enjoy it. But we picture to ourselves, as an obstacle to this pleasure, the fact of the other person enjoying it, and therefore do we then en-

* Ovidii Amor. Eleg. XIX. v. 4, 5.

deavour to bring it about that he shall no longer enjoy it (by Prop. XXVIII.): q. e. d.

Scholium. We thus see human nature so constituted, that he with whom things go amiss is for the most part pitied, whilst he who prospers is envied; and this by so much the more intimately as the thing whereof another is imagined to be possessed is more loved and desired. We see, further, that it is from the same peculiarity of human nature which makes men pitiful or compassionate that they are also made envious and vain-glorious. Further, when we consult experience, we find that it teaches all this most especially when the earlier years of our lives are referred to. For children, because their bodies are in a persistent state of equilibrium, as it were, are wont to laugh or cry because they see others laugh or cry; to imitate straightway what they see others do; and to covet everything for themselves which they imagine others to enjoy, because, as we have said, the images of things are the affections of the body, which, influenced by external agencies, are by these disposed to act in this or in that particular way.

PROP. XXXIII. When we love a thing which resembles ourselves, we endeavour as much as possible to make it love us in return.

Demonst. We strive to imagine the thing in especial which we love (by Prop. XII. above). If therefore the thing resembles us, we strive above all to give it pleasure (by Prop. XXIX. above), or endeavour that it shall be pleasurably affected in connection with the idea of ourselves; in other words, we desire that it shall love us in turn: q. e. d.

PROP. XXXIV. The more we imagine the affection felt for us by a thing beloved to be great, the more shall we boast ourselves.

Demonst. We do all we can to have the thing we love love us in return (by the preceding Prop.); that is to say (by Schol. to Prop. XIII. above), to have the loved object experience pleasure in connection with the idea of us; so that the greater the pleasure with which we imagine the loved object to be affected on our account, the more shall we strive to increase its love, i. e. (by Prop. XI. and Schol.), the more shall we experience joyful emotions. But if we rejoice because we have influenced one who resembles us pleasurably, then do we

regard ourselves with satisfaction (by Prop. XXX. and Schol.). The greater the degree of emotion, therefore, with which we imagine a loved object to be affected towards us, with the greater degree of satisfaction shall we contemplate ourselves, or the more shall we be disposed to vaunt ourselves: q. e. d.

PROP. XXXV. Whoever imagines that the thing he loves unites itself in an equal or more intimate and friendly bond with another than himself, will be moved to hate the thing he had hitherto loved and to feel jealous or envious of the more favoured party.

Demonst. The greater the love we believe the object we admire to feel for us, the higher are we raised in our own estimation (by the preceding proposition), i. e., the more are we gratified (Prop. XXX. of this Part). It is because of this that we use our best endeavour to imagine the object we love especially bound to us in the closest and most intimate manner (by Prop. XXVIII.). Now, this our endeavour or desire is increased if we fancy that another person affects the object of our admiration (Prop. XXXI. above). But it is presumed that the endeavour is compromised by the image of the loved object when accompanied by that of a rival; so that we are sorrowfully affected (by Schol. to Prop. XI. above) by the concomitant idea of the object beloved, as cause, and simultaneously by the image of the rival—that is to say (by Schol. to Prop. XIII. above), we are moved by an emotion of hate both as regards the object of our love and our rival (by Coroll. to Prop. XV. above), of whom we are further envious or jealous, because of the delight he takes in the object of our attachment: q. e. d.

Scholium. This hatred combined with envy of an object beloved is called *Jealousy*, and consequently is nothing other than a vacillation of mind engendered of love conjoined with hate, the idea of some one else of whom we are envious being associated. The hatred of the loved object will, besides, be great in the ratio of the joy wherewith the jealous man was wont to be affected by the reciprocated love of his mistress, and, further, in the ratio of the affection he may formerly have felt for him with whom in his imagination he now associates the object of his love. If he had hated this person, he will for this reason alone dislike the object of his love (by Prop. XXIV. above); because he imagines that what he himself hates is pleasurably affected; and also (by Coroll. to Prop.

XV. above) from this, that he is forced to join the image of the object of his love with the image of one whom he hates. This is a state of things that occurs especially in love affairs towards women. For he who imagines that the woman he loves yields her person to another, will not only be saddened by the reflection that his own desires are ungratified, but by the idea of female delicacy and propriety outraged. To which let it be added that the jealous person imagines he is not received by the object of his affections with the same warmth as of yore, and this straightway becomes another cause of vexation to him, as I shall now proceed to show.

PROP. XXXVI. He who recalls to mind an object in which he once took delight, desires to enjoy the same under circumstances similar to those amid which he was first delighted with it.

Demonst. All that a man sees in conjunction with an object which delights him, becomes contingently a cause of joy to him (by Prop. XV. above), and so does he desire to possess this along with the object (by Prop. XXVIII. above); in other words, man desires to possess a cherished object along with the whole of the circumstances under which it first became a source of joy to him: q. e. d.

Coroll. If the lover perceives that any one of these circumstances is wanting, he is grieved.

Demonst. For in so far as some circumstance is wanting, so far is something imagined that precludes the existence of the thing in question. Since, however, we desire through love of this thing or circumstance, in so far as we imagine the same to be wanting, we are grieved (by Prop. XIX.): q. e. d.

Schol. The grief which refers to the absence of the thing we love is entitled *longing*.

PROP. XXXVII. The desire which arises from joy or sorrow, from love or hate, is great as the emotion which induces it is powerful.

Demonst. Sorrow diminishes or restrains man's power of acting (Schol. Prop. XI. above), i. e., sorrow lessens or restrains the endeavour man makes to continue in his state of being (by Prop. VII. above); and so is opposed to this endeavour (by Prop. V.). But whatever effort a man under

the influence of sorrow makes, is made with a view to be rid of the sorrow; so that the greater the grief, the greater must necessarily be the amount of active power brought by the man against it; in other words (by Schol. to Prop. IX.), with so much stronger purpose or desire must a man strive to set aside his grief. Further, as joy (by Schol. to Prop. XI.) aids or adds to man's power of action, it is easy in the same way to demonstrate that man under the influence of joy has no other desire but to preserve his state of being, and this so much the more ardently as the joy he feels is greater. Lastly, as hate and love are themselves affections of sorrow and joy, it follows in like manner that the endeavour, appetite, or desire which arises from hate or love will be great in proportion as the hate or love experienced is great: q. e. d.

PROP. XXXVIII. Should any one begin to conceive hate of a thing once loved, and all love be at length destroyed, he will for the same reason hate that thing with a more perfect hatred than if he had never loved it at all, and with a hatred the greater in proportion as his love formerly was great.

Demonst. When hate begins to take the place of love a greater number of desires or affections are outraged than if no love had ever been conceived. For love is a joy which man strives to the extent of his power to hold fast (by Schol. to Prop. XIII., and by Prop. XXVIII. above); and this he does by contemplating the thing he loves as present with him, by imagining that it also is affected with love and joy in the same degree as himself, and is influenced by these emotions to the degree in which he would have his love returned (by Props. XXI., XXVII. and XXXIII. above). But all these emotions are repressed by hate of the thing loved (by Coroll. to Prop. XIII. and Prop. XXIII. above). Wherefore the lover (by Schol. to Prop. XI.) becomes affected with grief; and this the more intense as the love he formerly felt was great; that is to say, besides the grief which was the first cause of the hatred, other emotions engendered by love had sprung up which induce still more sorrowful imaginings in connection with the idea of the thing loved, and causing deeper hate than if no love had ever been felt; hate all the stronger, too, as the love it supersedes was great (Schol. Prop. XIII.): q. e. d.

PROP. XXXIX. He who hates another will be disposed to do him evil, unless he fears that greater evil will ensue to himself by doing so; and, on the contrary, he who loves another will by the same law be disposed to do him good.

Demonst. To hate another is (by Schol. to Prop. XIII. above) to imagine him a cause of sorrow to ourselves; and so (by Prop. XXVIII.) he who hates another will endeavour to get him out of his way or to destroy him. But if he thence imagines a greater sorrow, in other words, a greater evil, as likely to befall himself, and he thinks he can escape this by not doing the injury he had meditated, he will desire to abstain from it (by Prop. XXVIII.), and this in virtue of a greater effort (by Prop. XXXVII.) than that which had possessed him to do the injury, and which, therefore, as the stronger, prevails over the other. The second part of the demonstration proceeds in the same way. Wherefore, he who hates another, &c.: q. e. d.

Schol. By *Good* I here understand every kind of joy, and all that conduces to it, especially when the tendency is to satisfy a specific desire, whatever its nature; by *Evil*, again, I mean every kind of sorrow, especially whatsoever opposes desire. For I have shown above (in Scholium to Prop. IX.) that we do not desire a thing because we judge it to be good, but, on the contrary, call that good which we desire; as, on the other hand, we call that evil to which we are averse. Wherefore every one judges or estimates from his own affections what is good, what is evil, what is better, what worse, and lastly, what is best, what worst. Thus the avaricious man looks on plenty of money as the best thing on earth, and he holds poverty as the worst of evils. The ambitious man, again, thinks there is nothing worth living for but position and glory, and, on the contrary, nothing so terrible as disgrace and defeat. To the envious and malevolent there is nothing pleasanter than another's misfortune, nothing more distressing than his success. Thus does each individual judge of good and evil, of the useful or the useless, &c., from his own affections. But the emotion or affection whereby man is disposed to resist what he desires, and to yield to what he does not desire, is called *fear* (*timor*), which consequently appears to be nothing but cowardice (*metus*) influencing man to avoid an evil he deems contingent, by submitting to a present minor unpleasantness or evil (vide Prop. XXVIII.). But if the

evil he fears be *shame*, then is the fear that is felt characterized by the name of *bashfulness* or *modesty* (*verecundia*). Finally, if the desire to avoid contingent evil be influenced or restrained by the fear of some other evil, so that we know not truly what part to choose, then is the fear that is experienced designated *alarm* (*consternatio*), especially if either of the evils from which escape is sought be one of the greatest.

PROP. XL. He who imagines that he is an object of hatred to another, yet believes that he has never given just cause of offence, will in return hate that other.

Demonst. Whoever believes another to be under the influence of hatred, is himself, on this account, moved to hate (by Prop. XXVII. above); that is, he is affected by grief, accompanied with the idea of an external cause (Schol. to Prop. XIII.). But he (on our hypothesis) imagines no cause for this grief but the person who hates him. Therefore, he who imagines that he is hated by another is moved by dislike, the idea of the person who has him in hate being associated with his dislike,—in few words (by the same Scholium), he hates because he is hated: q. e. d.

Schol. 1. If a man, however, imagines that he has given just cause of offence and of hate, then will he be affected by a sense of shame (by Prop. XXX. and Schol.); but this rarely happens (by Prop. XXV.). Besides, the reciprocation of hatred here may also arise from the fact that the hatred has followed an attempt to injure him who is hated (by Prop. XXXIX.). He, therefore, who imagines that he is hated by another will be apt to imagine this other as the cause of any evil or misfortune that befalls himself, and so will he be sorrowfully affected, his distemper being associated with the idea of the person who hates him as its cause.

Coroll. 1. He who imagines that he is disliked by the object he loves will be distracted by the contending emotions of love and hatred. For in so far as he imagines that he is hated, he is moved to hate the hater (by preceding Prop.); but (by hypothesis) he loves him nevertheless; therefore will he be moved by hate and love at once.

Coroll. 2. He who imagines that an injury has been done him by another towards whom he had hitherto been perfectly indifferent, will immediately be disposed to retaliate by doing that other an injury.

Demonst. Whoever imagines that a certain person is spitefully disposed towards him, will hold that person in despite, threaten him with whatever may cause him displeasure, and even strive to injure him (by Props. XXVI. and XXIX.). But (by hypothesis) the first thing he imagines is the evil done to himself; therefore will he forthwith seek to injure his enemy: q. e. d.

Scholium 2. The desire to do him an injury whom we hate is called *anger*; and the desire to pay back an evil done to ourselves is styled *revenge*.

PROP. XLI. He who imagines that he is loved by another, yet believes that he has given no cause for the love (which by the Corollary to Prop. XV. and by Prop. XVI. above, may very well happen), will love that other in return.

Demonst. This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the one that precedes; the Scholium to which may also be consulted.

Scholium 1. If he believes, however, that he has given just cause for the love shown him, he will be apt to vaunt himself (by Prop. XXX. and Scholium)—a matter of common enough occurrence; but the contrary, as has been said, also happens when he fancies that he is hated. Now, reciprocation of love and the endeavour to benefit him who loves us and would do us a kindness is styled *gratitude* (*gratia*, *gratitudo*) (vide Prop. XXXIX.). But it would seem that men are much more ready for revenge than the reciprocation of good offices.

Coroll. He who imagines that he is loved by him whom he hates will be agitated by emotions of love and hate at once, as may be demonstrated in the same way as the Coroll. to Prop. XL.

Scholium 2. If the hatred wherewith a man is affected prevails, he will seek to injure him by whom he is loved. This state or affection of the mind is characterized as *cruelty* (*crudelitas*), especially if he who loves is believed to have given none of the usual causes of hatred.

PROP. XLII. He who has done a service to another from love or hope of renown will be grieved if he perceives that the kindness is taken in a thankless spirit.

Demonst. He who loves his like endeavours to have the object of his love return his affection (Prop. XXXIII. above). He therefore who confers a benefit on another from love does so from the desire he feels to be loved in return, that is, either from hope of the renown or the pleasure he expects to accrue from the act (Props. XXXIV. and XXX.); therefore will he strive to imagine this cause of renown as present, or contemplate it as actually existing (by Prop. XII. above). But (by hypothesis) he imagines something else which excludes the existence of this cause; therefore and from this alone is he made to grieve (vide Prop. XIX.): q. e. d.

PROP. XLIII. Hate is increased by reciprocal hate, and, on the contrary, may be supplanted by love.

Demonst. He who imagines that the person he hates is reciprocally affected by hate towards him, is thereby (the old grudge still continuing) moved to fresh hatred (by Prop. XL.). But if, on the contrary, he imagines the person he hates to be affected with love towards him, to the same extent as this is imagined will he contemplate himself with satisfaction (Prop. XXX. above); and in the same measure will he strive to show satisfaction with the person who returns his hate with love (by Prop. XXIX.); in other words, to the extent of his power will he strive to entertain no hatred and to cause no evil to the person concerned (by Prop. XL.). And the effort here (by Prop. XXXVII.) will be greater or less in the ratio of the emotion from which it proceeds; if more powerful than that which is induced by the hate and likely to bring grief upon the object hated (by Prop. XXVI. above), it will prevail and cast hatred out of the soul: q. e. d.

PROP. XLIV. Hate, when fairly vanquished by love, is turned into love; and the love thus engendered is often greater than if no hatred had gone before.

Demonst. This is similar to that of Prop. XXXVIII. above. For he who begins to love the thing he had hated or had looked upon with displeasure, is made joyful on the ground that he now loves; and the joy which love involves also accompanies that which arises from the effort made to be rid of the grief which involves hatred (vide Prop. XXXVII.), and is strengthened and aided by connection with the idea of him who was the object of hatred as cause of the present satisfaction.

Scholium. Although the matter be as just stated, still no one will strive to hate anything and seek to cause it sorrow with a view to his own greater delight; in other words, no one desires, in the hope of recovering an injury, to injure himself, any more than he will desire to fall sick in the hope of regaining his health. For every one strives so far as he can to preserve his state of being, and to keep sorrow and sadness far away. If it were possible, however, to conceive a man desiring to hate another, in order that he might afterwards love him more fondly, he would be forced to hold him in perpetual hate; for the greater the hatred, by so much greater would be the love; and therefore would he have to desire that the hatred should go on continually increasing. In the same way would the man who would fall sick in order to get well have to desire to be more and more distempered, in the prospect of the increased pleasure to be derived from recovered health; he would consequently strive incessantly to fall more and more sick, which is absurd.

PROP. XLV. He who imagines one like himself to hold the thing which resembles himself and which he loves in hate, will hate the hater.

Demonst. For the thing that is loved holds him in hate who hates it (by Prop. XL. above). And, in the same way, the lover who imagines any one to hate the object of his love, may on this ground conceive the object he loves to be affected with hate, i. e., with grief (by Schol. to Prop. XIII. above); in this case (by Prop. XXI.) he himself will be grieved, and this in connection with the idea of him who hates the beloved object as cause of his grief. Therefore will he (by Schol. to Prop. XIII. above) have the hater in despite: q. e. d.

PROP. XLVI. He who is made to rejoice or grieve by another of a class or nation not his own, by associating this individual under the general head of his class or nation as cause of the joy or grief experienced, will regard not the individual only, but the whole of his class or nation with love or with hatred.

Demonst. This is evident from the Demonst. of Prop. XVI. of this Part.

PROP. XLVII. The joy which arises when we imagine that the thing we hate has been destroyed or injured, is not unaccompanied by a sense of sorrow.

Demonst. For this see the Demonstration of Proposition XXVII. For as we imagine the thing that has affinity with or that resembles us to be influenced by sorrow, we ourselves are grieved.

Scholium. This Proposition is also demonstrated in the Corollary to Prop. XVII. Pt II. For as often as we remember a thing, although it may not then actually exist, we nevertheless contemplate it as present, and are corporeally affected precisely as we should be were it actually so. Wherefore, and as the recollection of the thing in question is clear, in the same measure are we moved to consider it sorrowfully, whereby the image of the thing, though still contemplated as present, is overlaid by the recollection of other things which tend to obscure but do not annul its existence. Man, therefore, only rejoices in so far as this motion or disposition is controlled; and hence it is that the pleasure we feel from an injury done to the thing we dislike, is renewed as often as we recall that thing to memory. For, as we have said, when the image of the thing in question is excited in the mind, inasmuch as the idea of its existence is involved, we are moved to contemplate it with the same distaste as we were wont to regard it when it existed in fact. But because we associate the image of the thing with other things that cast its existence into the shade, therefore is the disposition to grieve immediately controlled, and we rejoice anew, and this as often as the same process is repeated. And it is from the same cause that men rejoice as often as they recall past evils to memory, and that they delight to speak of dangers from which they have escaped. In imagining particular dangers prospectively, men are moved to dread them; but this inclination is forthwith controlled by the idea of the freedom which they associate with dangers overpast and when they feel themselves in safety, so that they then rejoice anew.

PROP. XLVIII. Love and hate of an individual—say of Peter—are annulled if the joy which the former and the grief which the latter involve are joined with the idea of another cause; and each, again, is lessened in the same

measure as Peter is imagined not to have been the cause of either.

Demonst. This is contained in the Definition of Love and Hate (vide Schol. to Prop. XIII.). For it is because of this alone that love is called joy, and hate is called sorrow in reference to Peter, viz., because Peter is considered as cause of one or other of these emotions. These, therefore, wholly or partially removed, the emotion as regards Peter is wholly or partially removed also: q. e. d.

PROP. XLIX. Love or hate towards an object which we consider free must be greater in either case and from a like cause, than it would be were the object necessary.

Demonst. The object or thing which we imagine as free is perceived by itself without the concomitance of other objects or things (by Def. 7, Pt I.). If, therefore, we imagine a free thing to be the cause of joy or grief, it is on this ground alone that we love or hate it (by Schol. to Prop. XIII. above), and this with the highest degree of love or hate that can arise from the emotion specified (by the preceding Prop.). But if the thing which is the cause of the emotion be imagined as necessary, then (by the same Def. 7, Pt I.) do we conceive it not the sole cause, but the cause associated with something else, of the emotion experienced; and consequently the love or hatred felt for it will be less: q. e. d.

Schol. Hence it follows that men, because they fancy themselves free, conceive greater love or hate for one another than for anything else. To the ground now specified, however, must be added imitation or simulation of one or other of the emotions, on which topic vide Props. XXVII., XXXIV., XL., and XLIII. above.

PROP. L. Everything may by accident be the cause of hope or of fear.

Demonst. This Proposition is demonstrated in the same way as Prop. XV., which see, along with the Scholium to Prop. XVIII.

Schol. Things or incidents that are accidentally held to be the causes of hope or fear are entitled *good* or *bad omens;* and as these are causes of hope or fear, in so far are they causes of joy or sorrow (by Schol. 2 to Prop. XVIII. above), and consequently (by Coroll. to Prop. XV. above) of love or

of hatred; so that (by Prop. XXVIII. above) we strive either to hold them fast as means to the end we desire and hope for, or to put them away as obstacles to our wishes and causes of our fears. Further, from Prop. XXV. above, it follows that we are so constituted by nature that we readily believe the things we hope for, and are indisposed to give credit to those we fear, and also that we judge more or less correctly in regard to each of these severally. Now it is from this state of things that the superstitions with which mankind are universally distracted have arisen. For the rest, I do not think it worth while to descant upon the fluctuations of soul which arise from hope and fear, seeing that from the mere definitions of these emotions it follows that there is no hope without fear, nor any fear without hope (as I shall explain at length in the proper place); and further, that we love or hate anything so far as we feel love or fear in connection with it. All we now say concerning love and hatred will readily be referred by every one to the true sources of these emotions, viz., hope and fear.

PROP. LI. Different men are liable to be differently affected by one and the same object; and the same man may at different times be differently affected by the same object.

Demonst. The human body (by Post. 3, Pt II.) is affected in many and various ways by external bodies. Two men may, therefore, be diversely affected at the same time by the same object (by Ax. 1, following Lem. 3, which succeeds Prop. XIII. Pt II.). Again: the human body is liable to be affected now in this way now in that (by the same Postulate and Axiom), and consequently to be variously affected by the same object at different times: q. e. d.

Scholium. We, therefore, see how it comes to pass that what one loves another hates, and what one fears another does not fear; and that the same man now loves what he had once hated, and now bravely dares what he had formerly feared to attempt, &c. Further, as every one judges from his own feelings what is good, what bad, what better, what worse (vide Schol. to Prop. XXXIX. above), it follows that men may vary both in judgment and affection;* and thus it happens, when we compare certain persons with ourselves and others, we perceive that they differ from us and from each

* That this may be the case, although the human mind is part of the Divine intelligence, we have shown in the Schol. to Prop. XVII. Pt II.

other through diversity in their affections alone; some being timid, some bold, some prudent, others rash, &c. For example, I call him intrepid who despises the evil which I myself fear; him I call daring who is not restrained in his desire to injure him he hates or to benefit him he loves by fear of any contingent evil whereby I am myself controlled; him I designate timid, who dreads the evil which I myself contemn; and I hold him pusillanimous who is restrained in his desires by fear of the evil which does not restrain me; and so on, every one judging of others by and from himself. To conclude: it is from this constitution of the nature of man, and this inconsistency in his judgments, that he frequently judges of things from mere affection; and that things which he believes conduce to joy or grief, and which he therefore strives to promote or to put aside (by Prop. XXVIII.), are often mere imaginations. And here I pass over other points which, in my Second Part (where I treat of the uncertainty of things) I have shown enable us readily to conceive man as being himself the cause wherefore he grieves or rejoices, the idea of himself being associated as source of the grief or joy experienced. Thus we can easily understand wherein *repentance* or regret (*pœnitentia*) and acquiescence or *self-content* (*acquiescentia*) consist. Repentance is grief, and self-content is joy, in each case associated with the idea of self as its cause, and these emotions are most powerfully felt because men believe themselves free (vide Prop. XLIX.).

PROP. LII. The object we formerly saw along with other objects, or which we imagine to have nothing but what is common to other objects, will not engage our attention so much as one that we imagine has something peculiar to itself.

Demonst. When we imagine any object we have seen along with others, we forthwith remember those others (by Prop. XVIII. Pt II. and its Schol.), and so from the contemplation of one thing we fall into contemplation of another or others. And it is even so as regards the object which we imagine has nothing about it but what is common to others. For we then presume that we contemplate nothing in it which we have not already observed in others.

But if we presume that in a particular object we perceive something which we have never seen before, we then say that

the mind, whilst contemplating this object, has nothing in it by which it can be led to contemplate the object in question; and so will it be determined to abide in the contemplation of the particular object alone. Wherefore an object, &c.: q. e. d.

Schol. This emotion of the mind, or imagination of a particular thing, in so far as it proceeds in the mind exclusively, is called *admiration;* but if the emotion be excited by an object which we fear, it is then called *alarm,* because amazement (*admiratio*) in presence of an evil holds a man in such a state of suspense through mere self-contemplation that he becomes incompetent to think of any means whereby he might escape the evil. If, however, the object of our admiration be the wisdom of a man, the industry of a man, or any other thing of the same complexion, then, and because we contemplate the man as far excelling ourselves, our admiration becomes *respect* or *esteem;* or otherwise, *mutatis mutandis,* when we contemplate the meanness and folly of mankind it is turned into *aversion.* Further, when we admire the wisdom, industry, &c., of a man whom we love, our love is increased thereby (by Prop. XII.), and love in combination with admiration or respect we entitle *reverence.* In like manner can we conceive hate, hope, prudence, &c., combined with wonder or admiration to produce yet other emotional forms, which however we are not accustomed to distinguish by particular names.

Admiration is opposed to *disdain,* which mostly springs from this: that we see some one admire, love, fear, &c., a certain thing which we ourselves admire, love, fear, &c.; or from this: that a certain thing appearing at first sight to resemble things which we admire, love, fear, &c. (by Prop. XV. with its Coroll. and Prop. XXVII.), we are disposed to admire, love, fear, &c., this same thing. But if, through the presence of the thing in question, or more careful consideration, we are forced to gainsay all we had connected with it as the cause of our admiration, &c., then is the mind determined by the presence of the object to think of those things rather which belong not than to those which belong to it. The contrary of this, however, happens when, with the object present, we continue to associate with it all we had conceived to pertain to it. Moreover, as from affection for the thing we love we pass to admiration of it, so does *contempt* arise from the hatred or fear we conceive of an object, and *scorn,* from our dislike of folly or stupidity; precisely as reverence arises from our admiration of prudence and understanding. In the

same way can we conceive love, hope, glory, and various other affections conjoined with disdain, and deduce other emotions besides those discussed, which, however, we are not wont to distinguish particularly and to designate by special names.

PROP. LIII. When the mind contemplates itself and its capacity for action, it rejoices, and this the more as it imagines itself and its power of action more distinctly.

Demonst. Man only knows himself by the affections of his body and the ideas of these (by Prop. XIX. and XXIII. Pt II.). When the mind therefore proceeds to contemplate itself, this implies transition to a state of greater perfection, or supposes it to be joyfully affected (by Schol. to Prop. XI. above), and this so much the more as it more distinctly imagines its own power of action: q. e. d.

Coroll. This joy is more and more increased the more man imagines himself to be lauded by others. For the more he imagines himself the object of praise with others, the more does he imagine others to be joyfully or pleasurably affected through him, the presumption being associated with the idea of himself (by Schol. to Prop. XXIX.); and so (by Prop. XXVII.) is he himself affected with the greater gladness, the idea of himself accompanying the emotion: q. e. d.

PROP. LIV. The mind endeavours to imagine those things only which affirm its power of action.

Demonst. Effort, endeavour, power of action, is the very essence of the mind itself (by Prop. VII.). But the essence of the mind (as is self-obvious) affirms that only which the mind is, and is able to do; not what it is not, and cannot effect. The mind therefore only strives to imagine that which affirms its own power of action: q. e. d.

PROP. LV. When the mind imagines incapacity of action in itself, it is grieved.

Demonst. The essence of the mind affirms that only which the mind is and can accomplish; or it belongs to the nature of the mind to imagine those things only which affirm its capacity to act (by the preceding Prop.). If we say therefore that the mind in contemplating itself imagines any incapacity on its own part to act, we say nothing more

than that the mind, whilst striving to imagine something which its power of action affirms, feels constraint in its effort, or (by Schol. to Prop. XI.) that it is grieved.

Coroll. 1. The grief in such a case is increased if we imagine that we are therein blamed by others, as may be demonstrated in the same way as the Corollary to Prop. LIII.

Schol. Such grief associated with the idea of our own weakness is entitled *humility;* whilst the joy arising from contemplation of ourselves is called *self-love* or *self-satisfaction.* And as this last emotion is experienced as often as man contemplates his own good qualities or powers of action, so also does it follow that almost every one is disposed to speak of his own doings, and to parade his powers of mind and body to his hearers; in this way do men often make themselves obnoxious to one another. For the same reason, also, are men naturally envious of one another (vide Scholia to Props. XXIV. and XXXII.), or are disposed to rejoice over the foolishness of their fellows, and on the other hand to feel aggrieved by their virtues. For as often as men delight to recur in imagination to their own doings, so often are they pleasantly affected (by Prop. LIII.), and this in measure by so much the greater as the acts imagined express more of perfection, and are more distinctly brought before the mind, i. e. (by what is said in Schol. 1 to Prop. XL. Pt II.), the more clearly the acts in question are distinguished from others and contemplated in their individual characters. Wherefore every one will vaunt himself most when he contemplates in himself something which he denies to others. But if he refers that which he affirms of himself to the general idea of man and the lower animals, he will not feel so much self-elation; on the contrary, he will be grieved or discontented, if, in comparing his own acts with those of others, he imagines them of an inferior stamp; and then (by Prop. XXVIII.) he may endeavour to get rid of his discontent by interpreting the acts of his fellows amiss, or by unduly exalting and embellishing his own doings. It appears, therefore, that men in general are disposed to hatred, envy, and uncharitableness, tempers of mind to which education as commonly pursued contributes not a little; for parents are mostly wont to excite their children to good conduct and diligence by the stimulus of rivalry and distinction alone. But it may perhaps be said that from this point of view the difficulty remains, viz., that we not unfrequently admire and

even venerate men for their virtues. To meet this I add the following corollary:

Coroll. 2. No man envies or begrudges his virtues to any one but an equal.

Demonst. Envy is hatred itself; in other words, envy is an affection whereby man's power of action is repressed, and his natural strength diminished (as we have seen above in Props. XXIV., XIII., and XI.). But man (by Schol. to Prop. IX.) makes no effort, and desires nothing, which by his nature he may not attain. Therefore does he neither desire any power of action, nor incline to predicate any virtue, which shall be peculiar to the nature of another and foreign to his own; consequently, he does not repress any desire of his own; in other words, he does not vex himself when he contemplates a certain virtue in another unlike himself; therefore neither is he disposed to envy such a one, but one only who is his equal—one he supposes to be impressed with the same stamp of nature as himself (Schol. to Prop. XI.): q. e. d.

Schol. When we say, as we do above, in the Scholium to Prop. LII., that we respect a man because we admire his prudence, his fortitude, &c., it is because he has these virtues in high perfection, and not because we imagine them as common to his nature and our own; and we consequently envy them no more than we envy their height to lofty trees, their strength to lions, &c.

PROP. LVI. There are as many species of joy, grief, and desire, and consequently of the affections compounded of these, as also species of instability of mind and derivatives from these, viz., love, hate, hope, fear, &c., as there are species of objects by which we are affected.

Demonst. Joy and sorrow, and consequently the affections compounded of these or derived from them, are passions (by Schol. to Prop. XI.); now (by Prop. I.) we necessarily suffer so far as we have inadequate ideas, and it is only in so far as we have such ideas that we suffer (by Prop. III.); that is to say, we necessarily suffer to the same extent only as we imagine an emotion or as we are affected by an emotion which involves the nature of our own body and the nature of an external object (vide Schol. to Prop. XL. Pt II., and Prop. XVII. Pt II. with its Scholium). The nature of each individual passion whereby we are affected

must therefore necessarily be so explained, that the nature of the object whereby we are affected shall be expressed therein. The joy, for example, which arises from an object—say A, involves the nature of the object A; and the joy which springs from the object B involves the nature of the object B; therefore are these two kinds of joyful affection of different natures inasmuch as they arise from causes differing in their nature. So also is the emotion of sorrow which arises from one object different in nature from the sorrow which arises from another object; and the same is to be understood of love, hate, hope, fear, perturbation of spirit, &c.; so that there are as many species of love, hate, hope, &c., as there are species of objects by which we are affected. But desire is the very essence or nature of each and all of the affections, so far forth as they are conceived to be determined by their several natures to act in a particular way. Vide Schol. to Prop. IX. above. Therefore as each individual is affected through external causes by this or by that species of love, hate, hope, &c., that is, as his nature is affected in this, in that, or in some other way,—so must his desire necessarily differ in its nature and state from the nature and state of another desire, but this only in so far as the emotion from which each several desire arises differs from another. There are consequently as many species of desire as there are species of love, hate, hope, joy, &c., and consequently even by as many species of objects are we affected: q. e. d.

Schol. Among the various species of appetites and affections,—and of these, from what has just been said, we perceive there must be a great number,—the more remarkable are gluttony, drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition. These are but forms or modifications of love or desire, which explain the nature of each particular affection by the object to which it is referred; for by gluttony, drunkenness, lust, avarice, and ambition we understand nothing more than the immoderate love or desire of eating, of drinking, of sexual indulgence, of riches, and of glory. Moreover these affections, inasmuch as we distinguish them from others solely by the object to which they are severally referred, have no opposites. For moderation, which we are wont to oppose to gluttony, sobriety to drunkenness, and chastity to lust, are not affections or passions, but only indicate the power of soul whereby certain appetites or affections are controlled. For the rest, I cannot here enter on an explanation of various other species of affection, for they are as numerous as the objects to which they refer;

nor if I should, were there any occasion to do so. For with the purpose I have in view, viz., to determine the force of the affections and the power of the mind over them, it is sufficient if we have a general definition of each particular affection. It is enough, I say, for us to understand the common properties of the affections and of the mind, to be enabled to determine the nature and extent of the power possessed by the mind of moderating and controlling the affections. Although therefore there be a vast difference between this and that form of love, this and that form of hate, cupidity, &c., for example, between love for children and love for a wife, there is really no occasion for us to ascertain these differences, and further to investigate the nature and origin of the affections on which they depend.

PROP. LVII. The affection or emotion of one individual differs from the affection or emotion of another so far only as the essence of one differs from the essence of another.

Demonst. This proposition is already explained by Ax. 1, following Lem. 3 of the Schol. to Prop. XIII. Pt II. Nevertheless we shall proceed to demonstrate it from the definitions of the three primary affections of the mind.

All the emotions are referred to desire, joy, and sorrow, as the definitions we have given of these proclaim. But desire is itself the nature or essence of each emotion (vide the defin. of desire in the Schol. to Prop. IX.); therefore does the desire of one man differ from that of another only in so far as the nature or essence of one man differs from the nature or essence of another. Joy and grief, again, are emotions whereby the power or effort of each individual to continue in his state of being is augmented or diminished, aided or repressed (by Prop. XI. and its Schol.). But by the effort to continue in his state of being, in so far as it is referred to mind and body at once, we understand appetite or desire (vide Schol. to Prop. IX.); therefore joy and sorrow are themselves desire or appetite, in so far as they are increased or diminished, aided or repressed, by external causes; in other words (by the same Schol.), desire constitutes the very nature of each. The joy or sorrow of one man, therefore, differs from the joy or sorrow of another only in so far as the nature or essence of one man differs from the essence of another; and consequently the emotion of one individual differs

from the emotion of another in so far only as the essence, &c.: q. e. d.

Schol. Hence it follows that the affections of the lower animals, which are said to be without reason—for we can have no doubt, when we are aware of the source of the mind, that animals have feeling—differ from the affections of man only in so far as the nature of the lower animals differs from that of the human being. Man and the horse are alike impelled by the sexual appetite to procreate their kind, but the one is human lust, the other equine lust. And so must the lusts and appetites of birds, reptiles, fishes, and insects be proper to each. Although every individual, therefore, lives contentedly and enjoys existence in the way its nature determines, the life, nevertheless, and the enjoyment with which each is satisfied are nothing but the idea or mind of the individual; and so the enjoyment of one only differs in nature from the enjoyment of another, as the essence of one differs from the essence of another. Lastly, from the foregoing proposition it follows that there is no trifling difference between the enjoyment which the drunkard, for example, has in his drunkenness and that which the philosopher experiences in his studies,—a point which I was anxious to mention by the way.

So much for the affections referred to man, in so far as he *suffers*. I have still to speak of those affections that are referred to him in so far as he *acts*.

PROP. LVIII. Besides the joy and desire which are passions, there are other joys and desires which are referred to us in so far as we ourselves are *agents*.

Demonst. When the mind conceives or is cognizant of itself and its power of action, it is gladdened (by Prop. LIII.). But the mind necessarily contemplates or is conscious of itself when it conceives true or adequate ideas (by Prop. XLIII. Pt II.). Now it does conceive certain adequate ideas (by Schol. 2 to Prop. XL. Pt II.). Therefore does the mind also rejoice in so far as it conceives such ideas,—that is (by Prop. I.), in so far as it acts. Further, the mind, whether it have clear or confused ideas, endeavours to preserve its state of being (by Prop. IX.). But by endeavour we understand desire (by Schol. to Prop. IX.); wherefore desire is alike referred to us whether we are regarded as understanding or (by Prop. I.) acting: q. e. d.

PROP. LIX. Among all the affections referred to the mind as agent, there are none save such as are referable to pleasure or desire.

Demonst. All the affections are referred to desire,—to pleasure or pain, as the definitions we have given of these make manifest. By pain, grief or sorrow, however, we understand constraint of the mind's power of thought (by Prop. XI. and its Schol.); and in so far as the mind is grieved or constrained, its power of understanding, *i.* e., of acting, is lessened or annulled (by Prop. I.). Therefore no sorrowful or painful affection, but joyful and pleasant affections only, can be referred to the mind considered as agent, (by the preceding proposition): q. e. d.

Scholium. All actions that follow from emotions referred to the intelligent mind I assign to *fortitude*, which I distinguish into *magnanimity* (*animositas*), and *generosity* (*generositas*); understanding by the former that desire whereby every one seeks to preserve his state of being in conformity with the dictates of reason alone; and by generosity, the desire whereby each seeks to aid and to live in amity with other men. Those actions, therefore, that tend to the advantage of the agent only, I refer to fortitude; those that bear upon the good of others I assign to generosity. Temperance, sobriety, self-reliance amid dangers, &c., are species of fortitude; whilst modesty, civility, clemency, are species of generosity.

I have now, I think, discussed and referred to their first causes the principal emotions and fluctuations of the mind that arise from the three primary affections, Desire, Joy, and Sorrow [or the equivalents of the two last—Pleasure and Pain]. From all that has been said it appears that we are liable to be affected and influenced by external causes in a great variety of ways, and that like the sea, agitated by opposing winds and currents, we are tossed about unconscious of our destiny and the issues of events. I have spoken, as I say, of the principal, but by no means of all, the conflicting emotions of the soul. For, proceeding as we have done above, it would be easy to show love combined with remorse, with modesty, with contempt, &c. I believe, indeed, that every one will allow from what has already been said that emotions of such various stamp and character may arise as to exceed all power of computation. With the object I have in view, however, it was enough to have enumerated the principal of

these emotions. Those I have omitted to speak of are, indeed, rather objects of curiosity than of importance. Yet it seems right to say of love, that it mostly happens, whilst enjoying the thing we desire, that the body from such fruition acquires a new constitution, by which it is otherwise determined than it was before; so that other images of things are aroused in it, and the mind begins forthwith to imagine and to crave new things. For instance, when we imagine something the savour of which has given us pleasure on former occasions, we immediately desire to partake of it, to enjoy it. But when we have enjoyed it for a certain time, the stomach is replete and the body becomes otherwise affected; so that now, the body being differently disposed, if the image of the same article be present to and therefore approved by the mind, the desire will be felt and the attempt made to partake of it; but the new frame or constitution of body will be opposed to this desire, to this attempt, and consequently the food formerly craved and enjoyed will now be loathed. This is the state characterized by the epithets *repugnance*, *loathing*, and *disgust*. I have also passed over without notice the outward affections of the body, such as tremor, pallor, laughter, sighing, &c., because they belong exclusively to the body and have no relation to the mind. Something, however, still remains to be said in the way of definition of the several emotions, which I shall therefore proceed to enunciate *seriatim*, interposing remarks upon points peculiar to each.

DEFINITION OF AFFECTIONS OF THE MIND.

1. DESIRE (*cupiditas*) is the very essence of man, in so far as he is conceived to be determined by a given affection to enact or to do anything.

Explanation. We have said above in the Scholium of Proposition IX. that desire was appetite with consciousness of the same. But appetite is the very essence of man in so far as he is determined to do those things that subserve his preservation. In the Scholium just referred to, however, I have also said that I acknowledged no real difference between human appetite and desire. For whether man be conscious of his appetites or not, appetite is still one and the same; and therefore have I, lest I should seem guilty of tautology, been unwilling to explain desire by appetite, but have endeavoured so to define it that all the strivings of our human nature which

we signify by the names of appetite, will, desire, and impulse or emotion, might be comprehended in one. For I might have said that desire is the very essence of man conceived as determined to do anything; but from this definition it would not have followed that the mind was conscious of any particular desire or appetite (by Prop. XXIII. Pt II.). Wherefore it was necessary to include the cause of the consciousness (by the same Prop.), and to add: in so far as determined by some one of the affections. For by affection of the human essence we understand a certain constitution of that essence, whether it be innate, or be conceived by the attribute of thought alone, by the attribute of extension alone, or lastly be referred to both of these attributes at once. Hence, therefore, under the name of desire, I understand efforts, impulses, appetites, and volitions of every kind, which vary with each variety of constitution encountered in man, and are not unfrequently so opposed severally that he is torn this way and that, and knows not whither to turn, what part to take.

2. JOY (*lætitia*) is the transition of man from a less to a higher state of perfection.

3. SORROW, GRIEF (*tristitia*), is the passage of man from a higher to a lower state of perfection.

Explan. I say passage or transition, for joy is not perfection itself. For were man born with the degree of perfection to which he attains, he might possess it without any emotion of joy,—a proposition that appears more clearly from the emotion of sorrow which is opposed to joy. For no one can deny that sorrow consists in transition to a lower state of perfection, and not in the minor perfection itself, inasmuch as man cannot grieve so far as he participates in any perfection whatsoever. Neither can we say that sorrow consists in the absence of a higher perfection, for privation is nothing real. Sorrow, however, is the act of an affection which can be no other than the act of transition to a lower state of perfection, i. e., an act whereby man's power of action is lessened or controlled (vide Schol. to Prop. XI.). I pass over any definition of mirthfulness, exaltation, melancholy, and grief or pain, because these are all especially referable to the body, and are nothing more than species of Joy and Sorrow.

4. ADMIRATION (*admiratio*) is the imagination of anything wherein the mind remains wrapt up, because the peculiar im-

agination here has no connection with any others (vide Prop. LII. with its Schol.).

Explan. In the Schol. to Prop. XVIII. Pt II., we have shown the reason why the mind from the contemplation of one thing immediately falls into thoughts of another, viz., because the images of these things are so enchained and co-ordinated that one inevitably brings up or follows the other; this, however, cannot be conceived to occur when the image of a thing is new or meets the mind for the first time; then will the mind be held fast, as it were, in the contemplation of the object just imagined, until it is determined by other causes to think of different objects. The imagination of a new object considered in itself is of the same nature as other imaginations; and this is the reason why I have not included admiration among the affections; nor do I see any reason why I should do so, conceiving that this form of mental distraction arises from no positive cause disjoining the mind from the contemplation of other objects, but only from this, that a cause is wanting which should turn the mind from the contemplation of one thing to thoughts of another. I, therefore, acknowledge no more than three primary affections, viz., Joy, Sorrow, Desire; and I mention admiration only because it is a common practice to indicate certain affections derived from the three primaries by other and special names when they are referred to objects that are much thought of or admired,—a consideration which leads me to append a definition of contempt to those that precede.

5. CONTEMPT (*contemptus*) is an imagination of anything which touches the mind so little that the mind itself is more moved by its presence to imagine what does not than what does belong to it (vide Schol. to Prop. LII.).

The definitions of Veneration (*veneratio*) and Disdain (*dedignatio*) I pass by, because, in so far as I am aware, none of the affections derive their titles from these.

6. LOVE (*amor*) is joy associated with the idea of an external object.

Explan. This definition explains the essence of love with sufficient clearness. They who define love to be the desire of the lover to unite himself with the object beloved do not express the essence but the property of love; and inasmuch as the essence of love has not been perfectly appreciated by writers,

they have not been able to form any clear conception of its properties, so that the definitions hitherto given of love have always been held obscure. I beg it to be observed here, that when I say that the property of love is the will or wish of the lover to unite himself with the object he loves; I do not understand by *wish* or *will* consent, deliberate purpose, or free resolve (for I have demonstrated this as fictitious in Prop. XLVIII. Pt II.); neither do I use the word as implying the desire of the lover to unite himself with the object of his love when absent, or ceaselessly to dwell in its presence when near (for love can be conceived without this or that desire); but I understand by will in this case that contentment or pleasure which the lover feels in the presence of the thing he loves, whereby the joy he feels in his love is cherished and increased.

7. HATE (*odium*) is sorrow accompanied by the idea of an external cause.

Explan. Anything that might be said here is already obvious, and will be found set forth in the preceding definition (vide, further, the Schol. to Prop. XIII.).

8. LIKING (*propensio*) is joy accompanied by the idea of an object which is accidentally the cause of joy.

9. AVERSION (*aversio*) is grief accompanied by the idea of anything that is accidentally the cause of sorrow (on this see Prop. XV.).

10. DEVOTION (*devotio*) is love of that which we admire.

Explan. We have shown that admiration arises from the novelty of a thing, in Prop. LII. If it happens consequently that we very frequently bring to mind the object we admire, we end by admiring it no more; and so the feeling of devotion readily degenerates into simple love.

11. SCORN (*irrisio*) is pleasure sprung from this: that something we despise is imagined in the thing we hate.

Explan. In so far as we contemn the thing we hate, in so far do we negative its existence (vide Schol. to Prop. LII. above), and in so far do we rejoice (by Prop. XX. above). But as we suppose that a man must hate what he scorns, it follows that the joy here experienced is not real. Vide Schol. to Prop. XLVII. above.

12. HOPE (*spes*) is unstable joy sprung of an idea of some-

thing past or to come, of the issue of which we are more or less in doubt.

13. FEAR (*metus*) is unstable sorrow sprung of the idea of something past or to come, of the issue of which we are to some extent in doubt (vide Schol. 2 to Prop. XVIII. above).

Explan. From the two preceding definitions it follows that there is no hope without fear, and no fear without hope. For he who lives in hope, and doubts of the issue of anything, is supposed to imagine something which prevents the existence of a future thing; in so far therefore does he feel pain or sorrow (by Prop. XIX.), and in so far, further, as he dwells in hope, does he fear that this thing may come to pass. On the other hand, he who fears, i. e., who doubts of the issue of something he dislikes, also imagines something which abrogates the existence of the thing in question; in so far therefore does he rejoice, and consequently lives in the hope that it will not come to pass.

14. SECURITY (*securitas*) is joy derived from the idea of something past or to come, in connection with which all cause of doubt is removed.

15. DESPAIR (*desperatio*) is sorrow sprung from the idea of a future or past thing combined with no cause for doubt.

Explan. Security, therefore, is derived from hope, and despair from fear, when cause for doubt of the issue of anything is removed; which happens by reason of man's imagining things past or to come as actually existing, and contemplating them as present; or because he imagines other things which either do away with the existence of the things in question, or suggest doubts concerning them. For although we can never be *certain* of the issues of individual things (by Coroll. to Prop. XXXI. Pt II.), it may still happen that we *do not doubt* of their issues. For we have shown (by Schol. to Prop. XLIX. Pt II.) that it is one thing to doubt and another to be certain of anything; so that it may happen that we are affected by the same emotion of joy or of grief by the image of a thing past or to come, as by the image of a thing present; a principle we have demonstrated in Proposition XVIII. above, to which as well as to its 2nd Scholium we therefore refer.

16. REJOICING, GLADNESS (*gaudium*), is pleasure accom-

panying the idea of a thing past which happens against our hopes.

17. ATTRITION (the gnawings of conscience) is sorrow accompanying the idea of a thing past which happens against hope.

18. PITY (*commiseratio*) is sorrow attending the idea of some evil befalling another whom we imagine like ourselves (vide Schol. to Prop. XXII. and Schol. to XXVII. above).

Explan. Between commiseration and compassion (*misericordia*) there would seem to be no difference, unless perhaps it be, that commiseration bears reference to an individual emotion, and compassion to a mental habit produced by pity.

19. GOODWILL (*favor*) is love for one who does good to another.

20. INDIGNATION (*indignatio*) is hatred of one who does evil to another.

Explan. These words, I know, are commonly used in a different sense. But it is my purpose not to explain the meaning of words, but the nature of things, and to indicate this by words the ordinary meaning attached to which does not wholly differ from the meaning I would connect with them. Let it suffice that I allude to this matter once for all. With regard to the causes of these mental emotions, I refer to Corollary 1 to Prop. XXXII., and the Scholium to Prop. XXII. of this part.

21. LAUDATION (*existimatio*) is the thinking too highly of one through too much love of him.

22. DEPRECIATION (*despectus*) is the thinking more meanly through hate of any one than he deserves.

Explan. Laudation is therefore an affection or property of love; as depreciation is one of hate; and so laudation might be defined as love so influencing us that we think more favourably of a thing than is right, and depreciation as hate so moving us that we feel less favourably than is just of a thing we dislike. On these points vide Schol. to Prop. XXVI. above.

23. ENVY (*invidia*) is hatred influencing man in such wise

that he is grieved by another's happiness, and pleased by another's grief.

Explan. Sympathy (*misericordia*) is commonly opposed to envy, and may therefore, in spite of the meaning usually attached to the word, be thus defined:

24. SYMPATHY (*misericordia*) is love so affecting man that he rejoices in another's weal, and, on the contrary, grieves over another's woe.

Explan. See further concerning Envy the Schol. to Prop. XXIV. and the Schol. to Prop. XXXII. above. Thus far I have spoken of the pleasurable and painful emotions which the imagination of some *external* thing either of itself or by accident accompanies as their cause. I now pass on to the enunciation of those emotions which the idea of something *internal* accompanies as their cause.

25. CONTENTMENT (*acquiescentia*) or self-satisfaction is joy originating in man's contemplation of himself and his powers of action.

26. HUMILITY (*humilitas*) is sorrow arising from man's contemplation of his own impotency or helplessness.

Explan. Self-contentment is opposed to humility inasmuch as by self-content we understand joy sprung from contemplation of our power of action. But inasmuch as by the same term we also understand joy accompanying the idea of a deed which we believe we have done of our own free-will, then is self-content opposed to repentance or regret, which we thus define:

27. PENITENCE (*pœnitentia*) is sorrow accompanying the idea of something we believe we have done of free-will.

Explan. The causes of these emotions have been specified above (vide Schol. to Prop. LI. and Props. LIII., LIV., LV. with its Schol.), and concerning free-will, see Schol. to Prop. XXXV. of Pt II. But here we have to observe, in addition, that it is not surprising that actions which by use and wont are designated as *wicked* should be followed by sorrow, and those called *good* by joy; for that this mainly depends on education is readily to be understood from what has been said above. Parents in reproving and often warning children against the one order of actions, and, on the contrary, in praising and inciting them to the practice of the other, necessarily

bring it to pass that pleasure is associated with the former, and grief or pain with the latter. And this is sufficiently attested by experience. For habit and religion are not the same to all; but, on the contrary, what one esteems sacred another looks on as profane, and what to one seems honourable is base to another. As men are brought up, therefore, do they glory in certain courses of conduct; or otherwise they shun these and are ashamed of them.

28. PRIDE (*superbia*) comes of higher thoughts of one's self through self-love than is right.

Explan. Pride, therefore, differs from self-esteem in this, that whilst pride is referred to the man thinking too highly of himself, self-esteem is connected with love for an external object. For the rest, as esteem is an effect or property of love for another, so is pride an effect or property of self-love, and might therefore be defined as love of one's self, or esteem affecting a man in such a way that he thinks more highly of himself than is proper (vide Schol. to Prop. XXVI. above). There is no opposite to this sentiment; for no man, through hatred of himself and as he imagines he cannot do this or that, thinks less of himself than is right. For so long as he thinks that he cannot do this or that, so long is he undetermined to action; and consequently so long is it impossible that he should act. Nevertheless, if we have regard to matters that depend on opinion only, we can conceive it possible that a man should think less highly of himself than is just. For it is very possible that a man, in sorrowfully contemplating his own helplessness, should imagine himself despised by all the world, all the while that the world is thinking of everything rather than of despising him. A man may, further, think too meanly of himself if he denies a thing concerning himself at the present time of which, as regards the future, he is uncertain,—such as denying that he should ever conceive anything as certain, or that he should ever do anything that was not base and wicked, &c. Finally, we may say that a man thinks less favourably of himself than is just when we see that through shyness or timidity he dares not do things which others, his equals, dare. We might therefore oppose to pride or haughtiness a sentiment which might be designated *self-abasement* (*abjectio*). For as self-esteem arises from pride, so does self-abasement spring from humility, and we therefore define self-abasement thus:

29. SELF-ABASEMENT (*abjectio*) is the act of thinking, through sorrow, less of ourselves than is right.

Explan. We are accustomed, however, to place humility in opposition to pride; but we then attend more to both of these emotions than to nature. For we are wont to call him proud [Qy vain?] who is boastful or given to self-glorification (vide Schol. to Prop. XXX. above), who speaks of nothing but his own virtues and of others' vices; who would have himself preferred to everybody else, and whose forwardness and bearing are such as are only assumed by persons much his superior in rank and social position. On the contrary, we call him humble who is modest, given to blushing, who takes shame to himself and owns his faults whilst he dilates on the virtues of others, and who, finally, moves about with downcast looks, and is negligent of his personal appearance. For the rest, these emotions—humility and self-abasement—are extremely rare; for human nature, considered in itself, strives as it were against them to the extent of its power (vide Props. XV. and LIV. above); and therefore are they who pass for persons the most humbly disposed very frequently both the most ambitious and envious.

30. GLORY (*gloria*) is joy associate with the idea of an action of ours which we imagine others will praise.

31. SHAME (*pudor*) is sorrow accompanying the idea of an act which we imagine others will blame.

Explan. Concerning these two emotions see the Schol. to Prop. XXX. above. But we have here to note the difference between shame and modesty. Shame is grief following an act of which we are ourselves ashamed; bashfulness, again, is fear of doing something that may not be approved by others. Modesty is commonly opposed to impudence, which however is not an emotion, as I shall show in the proper place; but the titles of emotions, as I have already said, rather bear reference to their applications than to their nature.

So far I have said all I proposed on the emotions of joy and sorrow; and I now proceed to speak of those emotions which I refer to desire.

32. LONGING (*desiderium*) is desire to possess a thing, cherished by recollection of the thing, and restrained at the

same time by the recollection of other things which set aside the existence of the thing desired.

Explan. When we remember anything, as I have already had frequent occasion to observe, we are by the act disposed to contemplate the thing by the same affection as we should do were it actually present; but this disposition or endeavour, whilst we are awake, is for the most part restrained by the images of things which exclude the existence of that which is remembered. When, therefore, we remember a thing which affects us with any kind of joy, we endeavour in the act to contemplate that thing with the same pleasure as we should were it present, which endeavour, however, is immediately fettered by the recollection of things that exclude its existence. Wherefore *longing* is truly a grief, which is opposed to the joy arising from the absence of a thing we dislike. On this point vide Schol. to Prop. XLVII. above. But as longing seems to bear reference to lust or appetite, I am induced to refer this emotion to the head of desire.

33. EMULATION (*æmulatio*) is the desire of achieving anything engendered in us because we imagine others to be possessed by the same desire as ourselves.

Explan. He who flees because he sees others fly, or who fears because he sees others afraid, and he also who, because he sees another burn his hand, draws back his own hand and moves his body as if he had actually burnt himself, *imitates*, but cannot be said to *emulate*, another; not because we are aware of one cause for emulation and of another for imitation, but because it is customary only to call him emulous who imitates what we regard as honourable, useful, or agreeable. For the cause of emulation see Prop. XXVII. with its Schol. above; and for the reason why envy is so commonly conjoined with this emotion see Prop. XXXII. with its Schol.

34. THANKFULNESS, or GRATITUDE (*gratia, gratitudo*) is a desire or purpose of love whereby we strive with a like emotion of love to benefit him who has conferred a benefit on us. Vide Prop. XXXIX., and the Schol. to Prop. XLI.

35. BENEVOLENCE (*benevolentia*) is the desire to benefit him who excites our pity. Vide Schol. to Prop. XXVII.

36. ANGER (*ira*) is the desire with which we are moved

by hate to do him an injury whom we dislike. Vidè Prop. XXXIX.

37. VENGEANCE (*vindicta*) is the desire whereby we are incited through reciprocal hate to injure him who from a like motive would injure us. Vide Coroll. 2 to Prop. XL. and its Schol.

38. SEVERITY or CRUELTY (*crudelitas seu sævitia*) is desire moving any one to do an injury to him whom we love or who moves our pity.

Explan. To severity is opposed clemency, which is not a passion, but a power of the mind, whereby man moderates his anger or desire for vengeance.

39. FEAR (*timor*) is the desire by which we are moved to seek escape from a greater by submitting to a minor evil. Vide Schol. to Prop XXXIX.

40. BOLDNESS (*audacia*) is the desire whereby a man is incited to do something attended with danger which his equals fear to face.

41. PUSILLANIMITY (*pusillanimitas*) is laid to his charge whose desire is restrained by fear of the danger which his equals face.

Explan. Pusillanimity is therefore nothing more than fear of some evil which is not commonly or universally dreaded; wherefore I do not refer it to the affections that spring from desire. But I was anxious to give a definition of pusillanimity here, because when we consider desire merely it is really opposed to the emotion of audacity.

42. CONSTERNATION (*consternatio*) is the term used to express his state who, desiring to avoid an evil, is restrained in his wish by the wonder and embarrassment induced by the evil he apprehends.

Explan. Consternation is therefore a kind of pusillanimity. But as consternation arises from a twofold fear, it may therefore be more conveniently defined as a fear which so stupifies a man and throws him into such uncertainty that he cannot escape or oppose impending evil. I say *stupifies*, as we understand the desire of the man to escape an evil

to be restrained by wonder; and I add *uncertainty* as we conceive the same desire to escape the evil to be restrained by the fear of another evil harassing him with equal force; whence it comes that he knows not which of the two it were best to face or to shun. On these matters see the Schol. to Prop. XXXIX., and the Schol. to Prop. LII. On pusillanimity and audacity see further the Schol. to Prop. LI.

43. HUMANITY, POLITENESS (*humanitas*), is the desire to do such things as give pleasure, and to avoid doing such things as give pain to others.

44. AMBITION (*ambitio*) is the immoderate desire of glory.

Explan. Ambition is desire whereby all the emotions of the soul are cherished and strengthened; and therefore is this affection itself scarcely to be coerced or overcome. For so long as a man is bound by any desire, so long is he at the same time necessarily under the influence of ambition. 'The very best of men,' says Cicero,* 'are especially led by glory; and philosophers even, who have written books on the contempt of glory, inscribe their works with their names.'

45. LUXURY (*luxuria*) is the immoderate desire or even love of feasting.

46. DRUNKENNESS (*ebrietas*) is the immoderate desire and love of intoxicating drinks.

47. AVARICE (*avaritia*) is the immoderate desire and love of riches.

48. LUST (*libido*) is the immoderate desire and love of sexual intercourse.

Explan. Whether the sexual appetite be moderate or immoderate it is commonly spoken of as lust.

The five affections last defined, as I have already admonished my reader in the Scholium to Prop. LII.), have no opposites properly speaking; for modesty is a kind of ambition (vide Schol. to Prop. XXIX.), and temperance, sobriety, and chastity indicate mental dispositions, but not passions, as before stated. And although it may happen that an avaricious, ambitious, or timid man may abstain from excess in meat and drink and sexual indulgence, still avarice, ambition, and fear are not the opposites of luxuriousness,

* Pro Archia Poeta, cap. 11. Conf. Disput. Tuscul. L. i. cap. 15.

drunkenness, and continence. For he who is greedy of meat and drink, frequently desires to indulge his appetite at the cost of others. The ambitious man, again, provided he but thinks he can do so secretly, puts no kind of restraint on himself; living among the intemperate and libidinous, he will, merely because he is ambitious, be more disposed to yield to the vices of his associates. The timid man, further, does that which he would rather not do. The miser, did he cast his treasures into the sea to escape drowning, would still remain avaricious; and if the libidinous man is sad because he cannot indulge himself in the way he desires, he is not, therefore, the less libidinous. These affections, indeed, do not so much regard the acts of gormandizing, drinking, &c., as the appetites and the likings that lead to indulgence. There is, therefore, nothing opposed to these affections but generosity and magnanimity, of which by-and-by.

I pass over Definitions of *jealousy* and the other unstable emotions of the mind, because they originate in combinations of the affections already defined, and are scarcely designated by more particular titles, which shows that it is enough to know them generally. For the rest, from the Definitions of the affections we have given, it appears that they all flow from desire, joy, and sorrow, or rather that they are but these three affections severally designated by different names by reason of their various relations and extrinsic peculiarities. If now we only keep our thoughts fixed on these three primary emotions and on what has been said above of the nature of the mind, the affections or emotions, in so far as they are referred to the mind alone, may be generally defined as is done below.

GENERAL DEFINITION OF THE AFFECTIONS:

The affection which is characterized as a passion of the mind is a confused idea, whereby the mind affirms a stronger or weaker power of existing than was before experienced in its body or in parts of its body, and which being affirmed, the mind itself is determined to think of this thing rather than of that.

Explanation. I say, first, that an affection or passion of the soul is a 'confused idea;' for we have shown that the mind only suffers (by Prop. LIV.) in so far as it has confused or inadequate ideas. Secondly, I say, 'in so far as the mind affirms a greater or less force of existence than before in its

body or the parts of this.' For all the ideas we have of bodies rather proclaim the actual constitution of our own body than the nature of any external body; and these ideas which constitute emotional forms or essences, must indicate or express the constitution of the body or of some of its parts, whereby its power of acting or existing is increased or diminished, aided or constrained. But it is to be observed that when I speak of 'a greater or less power of existing than before,' I do not mean that the mind compares the present with the past constitution of its body; but that the idea which constitutes emotional reality affirms something of the body, which positively involves more or less of reality than before. And inasmuch as the essence of the mind consists in this (by Prop. XI. and XIII. Pt II.), that it affirms the actual existence of the body, and that by perfection we understand the essence of a thing itself, it therefore follows that the mind passes to a greater or less state of perfection when it is led to affirm something of its body or of the parts of this which involves more or less of reality than it or they had before. When I said above, therefore, that the thinking power of the mind was increased or diminished, I meant to signify no more than that the mind formed an idea of its body or of some part or parts of its body which expressed less or more of reality than it had previously affirmed of its body or the parts of the same. For excellence of idea and actual power of thought are estimated by the excellence of objects. I added in conclusion: 'and, which being affirmed, the mind itself is determined to think of this thing rather than of any other thing,' in order that, besides enlarging on the nature of joy and sorrow which is expressed in the first part of the definition, I might further explain the nature of desire.

PART IV.

OF

HUMAN SLAVERY, OR THE STRENGTH OF THE AFFECTIONS.*

INTRODUCTION.

I CALL man's inability to moderate and control the affective or emotional element in his nature SLAVERY. For man under the dominion of his affections is not master of himself, but is controlled by fate, as it were, so that in seeing and even approving the better course, he, nevertheless, feels himself constrained to follow the worse. In this Fourth Part of my Philosophy I propose to inquire into the cause of this state of things, and to show besides what there is of good and evil in the affections. Before setting out on my task, however, I am disposed to say a few words on *perfection* and *imperfection*, and on *good* and *evil*, by way of preface.

He who proposes anything and completes it, may himself, as may also any one else who rightly apprehends or believes he apprehends his purpose, say of his work that it is *perfected*. If for example any one sees a certain structure—which I shall suppose not yet completed—and knows that the purpose is to build a house, he will say that the house is unfinished or *imperfect*, and on the contrary that it is finished or *perfect* so soon as he sees the work brought to the state of completeness predetermined by the builder. But should any one observe a work, the like of which he had never seen before, and should have no knowledge of the purpose of the artificer, he could not tell whether the work were complete or incomplete, perfect or imperfect. And this is the sense in which the words appear to have been first em-

* The Propositions, &c., cited are those of this Fourth Part when there is no reference to preceding Parts.—TR.

ployed. But after men began to form general ideas, to conceive houses, towers, palaces, &c., and to prefer one example of such structures to others, it came to pass that each individual called that perfect which agreed with the general idea he had formed; and on the contrary, he styled that imperfect which he saw accorded less with the pattern he had chosen for himself as the most perfect, although it was obviously complete according to the design of the builder. Nor does there seem any other reason why natural things also, things not fashioned by human hands, should commonly be styled perfect or imperfect; for men are wont to form general ideas of natural things as well as of things produced by art, which they hold up to themselves as models, and which nature (nature according to them doing nothing without a purpose), they think, presents to them and disposes them to regard as patterns. When these persons, therefore, witness aught in nature which does not entirely agree with the pattern of the thing they had imagined, they believe that nature itself is in fault or has erred and left the thing imperfect. Men, therefore, we perceive are accustomed to call natural things perfect or imperfect from prejudice rather than true knowledge. But we have shown in the Appendix to our First Part that nature does not act with a purpose; for the eternal and infinite Being whom we call God or Nature, as he exists of necessity, so does he act of necessity. In our 16th Prop. Pt I., we have shown that by the same necessity that God exists, by the same necessity does he act. The reason, therefore, or the cause why God acts and why he exists is one and the same, and as he does not exist for any end or purpose, so does he not act for any end or purpose; for as he is without beginning or end, as regards his existence, so is he infinite and eternal as regards his acts. Now a final cause, as it is called, is nothing but a human appetite or desire considered as the origin or cause of anything. For example, when we say that the final cause of the houses men build is that they may serve for habitations, we understand nothing more than that man, moved by what he regards as a convenience of domestic life, experiences a desire to build himself a house. A habitation consequently, in so far as final causes are concerned, is but the expression of this particular desire, which is, in fact, the efficient cause considered as the primary cause, for men are commonly ignorant of the causes of their appetites and affections. They are, indeed, as I have often said before, conscious of their appetites and actions, but unconscious of the

causes which move them to desire anything. How it comes, further, that men say nature occasionally fails or goes awry and produces imperfect things, I have explained in the summary remarks appended to my First Part. *Perfection* and *Imperfection* are only to be conceived of as modes of thought; notions, to wit, which we are wont to have from comparisons made between individuals of the same genus or species. This is the reason why I have said above (Def. 6, Pt II.) that by perfection and reality I understand one and the same thing. We are accustomed, indeed, to refer all the individuals constituting nature at large to one genus, which we speak of as *universal* or most general,—in other words, to a notion of entity or existence appertaining to the whole of the individuals in nature absolutely. In so far, therefore, as we refer the individual things constituting nature at large to this genus, and as we contrast them with one another, and perceive that one of them has more of entity or reality than another, so far do we say that one is more perfect than another; and in so far as we ascribe anything to an object which involves negation,—such as boundary, termination, impotence, &c.,—to this extent do we characterize it as imperfect, because it does not affect our mind in the same measure as the things we call perfect, and not because there is anything wanting which properly belongs to the object, or because nature has failed in regard to it in any way. For nothing belongs to the nature of an object save that which follows from the necessity inherent in the nature of its efficient cause; and whatsoever follows from the nature of an efficient cause follows necessarily.

With regard to *good* and *evil*, as applied to things considered in themselves, these terms signify nothing of a positive nature; they are nothing more than modes of thought or notions we form to ourselves from comparisons of things with one another. For the same thing may be both good and evil at once, and it may also be neither the one nor the other, but indifferent. For example, lively music is good or agreeable to one in high spirits, bad or disagreeable to one who mourns, and neither good nor bad to a deaf man. But though the matter stands thus, the words good and evil must still be retained in our vocabulary, because, desiring to form the idea of a man as an example of human nature, in the way we apprehend it, we shall find it useful to employ the words in the sense attached to them above. By *good*, consequently, in what follows I shall understand that which we know for

certain to be a means of approaching more and more closely to the pattern of human nature we are in search of; and by *evil*, that which we know for certain to be an obstacle to the attainment of our exemplar. Further, we shall speak of mankind as more perfect or imperfect in proportion as they approach our exemplar of humanity at large. For it is to be particularly observed, that when I say of any one he proceeds from a less to a higher degree of perfection, and *vice versâ*, I do not understand that he changes from one being or one form into another (a horse, for instance, would lose his identity as completely were he changed into a man as he would were he changed into a gnat), but rather that we conceive his power of action, in so far as we apprehend this from his proper nature, to be increased or diminished. Lastly, I shall, as I have said, understand by perfection, *reality* in general,—in other words, the essence of each several thing in so far as it exists and acts in certain ways, and without reference to its duration in time. For no particular thing can be called more perfect by reason of its longer or shorter continuance in being, inasmuch as the duration of things cannot be determined from their essence, the essence of things including within it no certain and definite term of being; but each individual thing, be it more or less perfect, will continue to be with even the same amount of power as that wherewith it began to be, so that in this respect all things are on the same footing.

DEFINITIONS.

1. By GOOD I understand that which we know for certain to be useful to us.

2. By EVIL I understand that which we know for certain prevents us from enjoying something good.

These two definitions have been anticipated in the preceding Introduction.

3. Individual things I call CONTINGENT or ACCIDENTAL in so far forth as, their essence only being considered, nothing appears that necessarily proclaims their existence or that necessarily hinders them from existing.

4. Those individual things, again, I call POSSIBLE when, referring to the causes whence they must proceed, we do not know that these are so determined as to produce them.

In Scholium to Prop. XXXIII. Pt I., I have made no distinction between contingency and possibility, because there

was then no occasion to distinguish them accurately from each other.

5. By CONTRARY or OPPOSITE AFFECTIONS, in what follows, I understand those affections which, although they are of the same genus, draw men in opposite directions—such as luxury and avarice, which are species of desire, and are not opposites by nature but by accident.

6. As to what I understand by an AFFECTION as regards the future, the past, and the present, I have already explained everything in Scholia 1 and 2 to Prop. XVIII. Pt III., which see.

But here I have further to observe, that as regards distance of place, as well as time, we can only distinctly imagine remoteness within certain limits; that is, as objects more than 200 feet distant from us, or the distance of which from the place we occupy exceeds 200 feet, are imagined to be about equally remote, and are further wont to be imagined by us as if they were in the same plane, so also are objects whose time of existence is more remote than any interval of time we are accustomed to contemplate, imagined to be all equally remote from the present, and are referred as it were to a single instant of time.

7. By the END or PURPOSE on account of which we do anything I understand appetite or desire.

8. By VIRTUE and POWER I understand one and the same thing; that is to say (by Prop. VII. Pt III.), virtue, as referred to man, is the very essence or nature of man, in so far as he possesses the power of doing certain things which can be understood by the particular laws alone of his nature.

AXIOM.

There is not in the nature of things any individual thing that is not surpassed by others more powerful than itself. Whatever strong thing exists, there exists a stronger by which it may be vanquished and destroyed.

PROPOSITIONS.

PROP. I. Nothing which a false idea involves as positive is abrogated by the presence of the true as true.

Demonst. Falsity consists solely in the absence of true cognition involved in inadequate ideas (by Prop. XXXV. Pt II.), nor have such ideas anything positive belonging to

them because of which they are called false (by Prop. XXXIII. Pt II.); but on the contrary, and in so far as they are referred to God, they are true (by Prop. XXXII. Pt II.). If, therefore, that which a false idea has in it of positive were effaced by presence of the true as truth, a true idea would be abrogated by itself (by Prop. IV. Pt III.), which is absurd. Therefore, nothing which a false idea, &c.: q. e. d.

Schol. This proposition is perhaps more clearly expressed by Coroll. 2 to Prop. XVI. Pt II. For imagination is an idea which rather proclaims the present condition of the human body than the nature of an external body, not, indeed, distinctly, but confusedly rather; whence it comes that the mind is said to waver. For example, when we regard the sun, we imagine him some two or three hundred paces distant, in which we deceive ourselves so long as we do not know his true distance. The distance ascertained, the error is removed indeed, but not the imagination, in other words, not the idea of the sun, which explains his nature only in so far as our body is affected by the idea of the same; so that although we are made aware of the real distance of the sun, we nevertheless continue to imagine him present or somewhat close at hand. For as we have said in the Scholium to Prop. XXXV. of Pt II., we do not imagine the sun so near to us because ignorant of his actual distance, but because the magnitude of the sun is conceived by the mind in consonance with the way and manner in which our body is affected by him. Thus, when the rays of the sun fall upon a body of water and are reflected from its surface to our eyes, we imagine him as if he were verily in or on the water, though we are perfectly well aware of his true place in the heavens. And so of the other imaginations by which the mind is deceived, which, whether they proclaim the natural constitution of the body, or indicate increase or diminution in its power of action, are not contrary to truth, and do not disappear in its presence. It happens indeed when we erroneously fear some evil that the fear vanishes with better information; but, contrariwise, it also happens when we fear an evil that will certainly befall us, that the fear of it will vanish with false intelligence. Imaginations therefore are not effaced in the presence of truth as truth, but because other things occur which are stronger than they, and which oppose or put an end to the present existence of the things imagined, as we have shown in Prop. XVII. of Pt II.

PROP. II. We suffer in so far as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived of by itself and independently of other parts.

Demonst. We are said to suffer when anything arises in us of which we ourselves are only partially the cause (by Def. 2, Pt II.), i. e. (by Def. 1, Pt III.), anything which cannot be deduced from the laws of our nature alone. We suffer, therefore, in so far as we are a part of nature which cannot be conceived by itself independently of others: q. e. d.

PROP. III. The force whereby man preserves his state of being is limited; it is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes.

Demonst. The axiom on a preceding page sufficiently demonstrates this proposition. For, given a man, there is something else given, say A, more powerful than he, and A given, there is something else, say B, more powerful than A, and so on to infinity. Thus consequently is the power of man limited, and infinitely exceeded by the power of external causes: q. e. d.

PROP. IV. It is impossible that man should not be a part of nature; and that he can suffer no changes save such as may be understood by his nature alone and of which his nature is the adequate cause.

Demonst. The power by which individual things, and consequently men, preserve their state of being, is the very power of God, or of nature (by Coroll. to Prop. XXIV. Pt I.), not as it is infinite, but as it can be explained by the actual essence of man (by Prop. VII. Pt III.). The power of man, therefore, in so far as it is interpreted by his own actual essence, is part of the infinite power, i. e., of the essence of God or nature (by Prop. XXXIV. Pt I.). This in the first place.

Again, if it were possible that man underwent no changes save and except those that may be understood by his nature alone, it would follow (by Props. IV. and VI. Pt III.) that he could not perish, but must necessarily exist for ever. And this would follow from a cause the power of which was either finite or infinite, viz., either from the sole power of man, which would then be adequate to arrest other changes that might arise from external causes, or from the infinite

power of nature by which all individual things were so ordered that man suffered no changes save such as subserved his preservation. But the first of these suppositions is absurd, as shown by the preceding proposition, the demonstration of which is of universal application. Were it possible, consequently, that man should suffer no changes save those which can be understood by his proper nature alone, and consequently that he should necessarily exist for ever, this must happen from the infinite power of God; and would therefore have to be deduced from the necessity of the Divine nature (by Prop. XVI. Pt I.), in so far considered as it is affected by the idea of a man, and the order of nature at large, in so far as it is considered under the attributes of thought and extension. And so (by Prop. XXI. Pt I.) it would follow that man was infinite. But this is absurd, as we have seen in the first section of this demonstration. It is impossible, therefore, that man should suffer no changes save those of which he was himself the adequate cause: q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it follows that man must always be obnoxious to passion, that he must follow the common course of nature, yield obedience to it, and even accommodate himself to it, to the extent required by the nature of things.

PROP. V. The force and increment of each passion and its persistence in being are not to be defined as a power whereby we strive to continue in our state of existence, but as a power of an outward cause in opposition to our own power of existing.

Demonst. The essence of a passion cannot be explained by the essence of our nature alone (by Def. 1 and 2 Pt III.); that is to say (by Prop. VII. Pt III.), the power of a passion cannot be defined by the power of the effort whereby we strive to continue in existence; but (by Prop. XVI. Pt II.) must necessarily be defined by the power of an external cause in contrast with that which belongs to ourselves: q. e. d.

PROP. VI. The strength of a passion or affection may so far surpass that of the other capacities or actions of man that the passion or affection shall cling tenaciously to its subject.

Demonst. The force and increase of every passion and its persistence are defined as the power of an outward cause

compared with that of a cause internal to ourselves, and which may therefore surpass the power inherent in man: q. e. d.

PROP. VII. An affection can neither be held in check nor overcome, save by a contrary and stronger affection coercing or suppressing the former.

Demonst. An affection or emotion as referred to the mind, is an idea whereby the mind affirms a greater or less power of existing than it had formerly experienced (by the general definition of the affections at the end of Part III.). When the mind, therefore, is agitated by any emotion, the body is simultaneously influenced by an emotion whereby its power of action is increased or diminished. Moreover, this corporeal affection (by Prop. V.) derives its strength from the cause whereby it persists in its state, and can therefore neither be coerced nor suppressed save by a corporeal cause (by Prop. IV. Pt III.) influencing the body with a contrary (by Prop. V. Pt III.) and more powerful affection (by the axiom to this part). The mind is thus affected by the idea of an emotion stronger than the former one opposed to it, and so setting it aside (by Prop. XII. Pt II.). An affection, therefore, can neither be held, &c.: q. e. d.

Coroll. An affection, in so far as it is referred to the mind, can neither be restrained nor suppressed save by the idea of a contrary and more powerful affection of the body under which we then suffer. For an affection from which we suffer can neither be restrained nor destroyed save by another affection stronger than and opposed to it (by the preceding proposition); that is to say, in conformity with the general definition of the affections, save by the idea of an affection of the body stronger than, and opposed to, the affection under which we suffer.

PROP. VIII. The knowledge of good and evil is nothing more than an emotion of joy or of sorrow, in so far as we ourselves are conscious of the same.

Demonst. We call that good or evil which favours or opposes the continuance of our existence (by Def. 1 and 2 above); that is (by Prop. VII. Pt III.), which increases or diminishes, assists or hinders, our power of action. In so far therefore (by the Definition of joy and sorrow in the Scholium to Prop. XI. of Part III.) as we perceive that a thing affects us

with joy or sorrow, we call it good or evil. The knowledge of good and evil, therefore, is nothing more than the idea of joy or sorrow which necessarily follows from the special emotion of joy or of sorrow itself (by Prop. XXII. of Pt II.). But this idea is connected with the emotion in the same way as the mind is united with the body (by Prop. XXI. Pt II.); in other words (and as shown in the scholium of the proposition just referred to), this idea is not really distinguished from the idea of the affection itself, or the idea of the affection of the body, save in the conception alone. Wherefore this knowledge of good and evil is nothing but the emotion itself as far as we are conscious of it: q. e. d.

PROP. IX. The emotion whose cause we imagine as present with us is stronger than one whose cause is not imagined as present.

Demonst. Imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates a thing as present (vide the definition of imagination in the Scholium to Prop. XVII. of Pt II.), but which rather indicates the state or condition of the human body than the nature of an external object (by Coroll. 2 to Prop. XVI. of Pt II.). Imagination, consequently, is an emotion in so far as it indicates the state or constitution of the body. But imagination (by Prop. XVII. Pt II.) is more vivid as we imagine nothing which makes the present existence of an external object impossible. Wherefore also the emotion whose cause we imagine to be present to us is stronger or more intense than it would be, did we imagine its cause not to be present: q. e. d.

Schol. When I said above (in Prop. XVIII. of Pt III.) that we were affected by the image of a thing past or to come in the same degree as if the thing imagined were actually present, I observed expressly that this was true in so far as we have regard to the image only of the thing itself (for it is of the same nature whether we have imagined the thing or not). But I have not denied that the imagination is rendered weaker when we contemplate other things as present to us which exclude the present existence of some future thing, a point which I passed over then, as I had resolved to discuss the force of the affections in the present part of my work.

Coroll. The image of a thing which we contemplate with reference to a future or past time, to the exclusion of the time present, is, *cæteris paribus*, weaker than the image of a pre-

sent thing; and consequently the affection in respect of a thing yet to be or that is past is, *cæteris paribus*, more feeble than the affection connected with a present thing.

PROP. X. We are more powerfully affected towards a future event or thing which we imagine will come to pass speedily than towards an event or thing the time of whose occurrence we imagine is far remote from the present; and we are also more strongly affected by the recollection of a thing which we imagine to have passed but a short time back, than by the memory of a thing which passed very long ago.

Demonst. In imagining a thing that will happen soon, or that happened not long ago, we imagine that which less decidedly excludes the presence of the thing so imagined than if the time of its occurrence were imagined as remote from the present, or as having passed long ago; and so (by the preceding proposition) are we the more intensely affected in regard to things or events imagined as immediately impending: q. e. d.

Schol. From what has been said in connection with Def. 6 of this Part, it follows that we are less powerfully affected in respect of objects remote from the present time by a longer interval than we can determine by our imagination, although we may comprehend them as severed from one another by very long intervals of time.

PROP. XI. The affection in respect of a thing that we imagine as necessary is, *cæteris paribus*, more intense than that which is possible, contingent, or not necessary.

Demonst. In so far as we imagine anything to be necessary, in so far do we affirm its existence; and on the contrary, we question or deny the existence of a thing in so far as we imagine it not to be necessary (by Schol. to Prop. XXXIII. Pt I.); and thence (by Prop. IX. above) an affection as respects a thing necessary is, *cæteris paribus*, more intense than it is as respects a non-necessary thing: q. e. d.

PROP. XII. An affection in respect of a thing which we know not to exist in the present but imagine as possible

is, *cæteris paribus*, more intense than in respect of a contingent thing.

Demonst. In so far as we imagine a thing to be contingent, we are affected by the image of no other thing which declares its existence (by Def. 3 above); on the contrary (speaking hypothetically), we imagine things which exclude the present existence of the thing in question. But in as far as we imagine a thing to be possible in the future, in so far do we imagine things that assert its existence (by Def. 4 above); that is (by Prop. XVIII. Pt III.), things that move us to hope or fear; and thus is an affection as regards a possible thing more intense, &c.: q. e. d.

Coroll. An affection in respect of a thing which we know not to have present existence and which we imagine as contingent, is much weaker than is that of a thing imagined as now present to us.

Demonst. The affection towards a thing which we imagine as existing in the present, is stronger than if we imagine it as about to be (by Coroll. to Prop. IX. above), and very much stronger if the contemplated future thing be imagined as very far remote from the present (by Prop. X. above). Affection, as respects a thing whose time of existence we imagine very remote from the present, is therefore much weaker than if the same thing be imagined as now present, and yet stronger than if it be imagined as contingent merely. The emotion we experience in respect of a thing contingent, therefore, is much more feeble than if the thing be imagined as presently existing: q. e. d.

PROP. XIII. The affection as respects a thing contingent which we know not to exist in the present, is, *cæteris paribus*, much feebler than the affection in respect of a thing past.

Demonst. Imagining a thing as contingent, we are affected by the image of no other thing which establishes the existence of that particular thing (by Def. 3 above). On the contrary (speaking hypothetically), we imagine some things which put its present existence out of the question. But when we imagine a thing in relation to time past, in so far are we supposed to imagine something which brings it to memory or excites in us an image of the thing (vide Prop. XVIII. Pt II. with its Schol.), and then it comes to pass that we con-

template the thing as if it were present (by Coroll. to Prop. XVII. Pt II.). In this way, therefore (by Prop. IX. above), will an affection in respect of a contingent thing which we know not to exist in the present, be, *cæteris paribus*, much weaker than an affection in respect of a thing which we know has actually existed in the past: q. e. d.

PROP. XIV. True knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it is true, can restrain no affection; but only in so far as it is considered as an affection.

Demonst. An affection is an idea whereby the mind affirms a greater or less power of existence in its body than it possessed before (by the general definition of the affections); and thus (by Prop. I. above) has nothing positive about it that can abrogate the presence of the true; consequently, true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as true, can control no affection. But in so far as it is affection (vide Prop. VIII. above), if it be stronger than the affection to be controlled, in so far will it be able to restrain that affection (by Prop. VII.): q. e. d.

PROP. XV. The desire which springs from true knowledge of good and evil can be repressed or controlled by many other desires which arise from the emotions or affections by which we are agitated.

Demonst. From true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as this is emotion (Prop. VIII.), desire necessarily arises (by Def. 1 of the definitions of the affections), and is greater or more powerful as the affection whence it springs is more keenly felt (by Prop. XXXVII. Pt III.). But the desire in this case arising (by hypothesis) from this: that we apprehend some certain thing as true, therefore does it follow that the desire has its source within ourselves in virtue of an agency of our own (by Prop. III. Pt III.). It must consequently be wholly apprehended by our essential human nature (by Def. 2, Pt III.); and its power and increment therefore be explained by human power alone (by Prop. VII. Pt III.). Moreover, the desires which arise from the emotions by which we are torn are by so much the greater as these emotions are more violent; and so their power and increase (by Prop. V. above) must be defined by the power of external causes, which indefinitely surpasses the power inherent in us, when contrasted

with it (by Prop. III. above). Thus and in this wise may the desire that springs from similar emotions be more vehement than the desire which springs from true knowledge of good and evil, and may therefore (by Prop. VII. above) be capable of repressing or controlling it: q. e. d.

PROP. XVI. The desire which arises from the knowledge of good and evil, in so far as this knowledge bears upon the future, is more easily repressed or restrained by the desire of things present that are agreeable.

Demonst. The affection for a thing which we imagine in prospect is weaker than that for a present thing (by Coroll. to Prop IX.). But the desire which arises from true knowledge of good and evil, although this knowledge is connected with things that are present in the time being, may be repressed or controlled by a passing desire of any kind (by the preceding Prop., the demonstration of which is general). Wherefore desire arising from knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it bears on the future, will be more easily repressed or restrained, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. XVII. The desire which arises from true knowledge of good and evil, in so far as it concerns itself with contingencies, can be much more readily restrained by the desire of things present.

Demonst. This proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the last from the Corollary to Prop. XII. above.

Scholium. In the above propositions I believe I have shown why men are more influenced by opinion than by true reason; and why true knowledge of good and evil causes perturbations in the soul and often gives way to sensual appetites of every kind, whence the

'Video meliora proboque, Deteriora sequor'

of the poet.* Ecclesiastes† also seems to have had the same idea in his mind when he wrote these words: 'He that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow.' But I do not make these quotations as if I meant to insinuate that it is better to be ignorant than to be well-informed, or that in the power of controlling their emotions there is no difference between the fool and the sage. I refer to them because I

* Ovid. Metam. vii. 2. † Chap. i. 18.

hold it necessary that we should know both the strength and the weakness of our nature, in order to determine what reason can and what it cannot effect in moderating our affections and passions; and, indeed, I have said that my purpose in the present part was to treat especially of human frailty; for I resolved to treat separately of the power of reason over the affections.

PROP. XVIII. The desire which springs from joy is, *cæteris paribus*, more powerful than that which springs from grief.

Demonst. Desire is the very essence of human nature; in other words (by Prop. VII. Pt III.), of the effort man makes to continue in his state of being. Wherefore the desire which springs from joy is cherished or increased by the emotion of joy itself (vide Def. of joy, and Schol. to Prop. XI. Pt III.); but the desire which arises from grief, on the contrary, is restrained or enfeebled by the sorrowful emotion itself (see the same Schol.). Thus must the power of the desire which springs from joy be defined by human power combined with an external cause; whilst that which springs from grief must be defined by human power alone; consequently the former must be more powerful than the latter: q. e. d.

Scholium. In the above brief expositions I explain the causes of human incompetency and inconstancy, and how it comes that the precepts of reason are so little observed by man. It now remains for me to show what reason prescribes to us, and to indicate the affections that accord with the rules of right reason, and those, on the contrary, that oppose or disagree with these rules. But before I enter more fully on this subject in our geometrical order, I take occasion here briefly to show what I regard as the DICTATES OF REASON, that my readers may the more clearly understand my views.

As reason makes no demand against nature, it requires that every one love himself, that he seek after that which is truly useful to him, that he strive to attain to all that really leads man to higher perfection, and above all and absolutely, that every one strive, so far as in him lies, to preserve his state of being; all of which seems on the face of it as necessarily true as that a whole is greater than a part. Vide Prop. IV. Pt III. Further, as virtue is nothing but action in consonance with the laws of human nature (by Def.

8 above), and no one strives to preserve his state of being save in conformity with the laws of his proper nature, it follows, 1st, That the foundation of virtue is the endeavour itself to preserve our state of being, and that happiness consists in this: that we are able to preserve our state of being. 2nd, It follows that virtue is to be desired for its own sake, and that there is nothing more excellent or more useful to us; for this reason, therefore, is virtue to be desired. 3rd, Lastly, it follows that they who commit suicide are impotent in soul and suffer themselves to be vanquished by external causes opposed to their nature.

It follows, moreover, from Postulate 4 of Part II., that we can never bring it to pass that we shall require nothing out of ourselves for the preservation of our being, and that we can so live as to have no intercourse or relationship with things beyond ourselves; and further, if we regard our mind, that our understanding would really be less perfect if the mind were all and apprehended nothing but itself. There are, therefore, many things beyond ourselves that are useful, that are necessary to us, and that are therefore to be desired. Among these none can be conceived of higher excellence than those that entirely agree with our proper nature. For suppose two individuals of precisely the same nature conjoined, they would form a single individual of double the power of either severally. Nothing, therefore, is more useful to man than his fellow-men; nothing, I say, can be desired of men more excellent as means of continuance in their state of being, than that all should so agree in all things, that the minds and bodies of all should constitute as it were one mind and one body; that all should endeavour, so far as is possible, to persevere in their state of being, and that all together should strive after whatsoever is for the common good. From this it follows that men who are ruled by reason, that is, men who under the guidance of reason strive after what is truly useful, desire nothing for themselves which they do not desire for others, in doing which they are not only true to themselves, but true, just, and honourable to their neighbours.

Such are the precepts of reason, which I desired briefly to enunciate before entering on my task of demonstrating them in regular order and at length; and I may say that I have given the summary with a view to conciliate if possible those who believe that the principle I announce, viz., that each individual is bound to pursue what is useful to him, is the foundation of all immorality much rather than of all

virtue and morality. After I shall have briefly shown, therefore, that this is not so in fact, I shall proceed to the fuller demonstration of the principle I advocate in the same way as we have advanced thus far.

PROP. XIX. Every one by the laws of his nature necessarily desires that which he deems good, and shuns that which he deems evil.

Demonst. The cognition of good and evil is itself (by Prop. VIII. above) an emotion of joy or sorrow of which we are conscious; and so (by Prop. XXIII. Pt III.) does every one necessarily desire what he esteems good, and, on the contrary, avoid what he thinks bad. But the desire or appetite here is no other than the very essence or nature of man (by Def. of Appetite in Scholium to Prop. IX. Pt III., and Def. 1 of the Affections). Therefore, every one by the laws of his nature necessarily desires or shuns, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. XX. The more an individual seeks what is useful to him, that is, the more he strives and is able to conserve his state of being, the greater is the virtue with which he is endowed; and contrariwise: the more an individual neglects what is useful to him, i. e., neglects the conservation of his state of being, the more incompetent is he in every way.

Demonst. Virtue is human power or capacity itself, which is defined from the essence of man alone (by Def. 8 above), i. e. (by Prop. VII. Pt III.), which is, as defined, the effort man makes to conserve his state of being. The more, therefore, each one strives to conserve his state of being and succeeds in his effort, with the more virtue is he endowed; and, *per contra* (by Props. IV. and VI. Pt III.), the more he neglects the conservation of his state of being the more impotent is he: q. e. d..

Scholium. No one, therefore, save by causes external and opposed to his nature, neglects to take such aliment as is useful to him or to conserve his state of being. No one, I say, is ever averse to wholesome food or lays violent hands on himself from any necessity of his proper nature, but only when moved by an external cause which may be of very various character. Thus a man slays himself if the hand in which he holds a sword be twisted by another in such a way

that the weapon pierces his heart; or when by the command of a tyrant, as in the case of Seneca, he opens his veins, in which latter case he seeks to escape a greater by encountering what he esteems a minor evil; lastly, unknown external causes may so dispose a man's imagination and so influence his body that another nature, of which no proper idea can be formed, is assumed as opposed to his proper nature, whereby he is led to lay violent hands on himself (by Prop. X. Pt III.). But that man, by the necessity of his nature, should seek not to exist or should desire to be changed into another shape, is as impossible as that something should be made out of nothing; as every one with a little meditation will perceive.

PROP. XXI. No one can desire to be happy, to do aright, and to live a good life, who does not at the same time desire to be, to act and to live—that is, to exist in act.

Demonst. The demonstration of this proposition, or rather the thing itself, is self-evident, as it is also from the definition of desire. For the desire to live happily, to be doing, &c., is the very essence of man; that is, desire is the effort whereby every one strives to preserve his state of being (by Prop. VII. Pt III.). Therefore no one can desire, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. XXII. No virtue can be conceived prior to this the self-preservative effort.

Demonst. The self-preservative effort is the very essence of a thing (by Prop. VII. Pt III.). Were any virtue therefore conceived prior to this, the essence of the thing would be conceived prior to the thing itself (by Def. 8 above) which is absurd. Wherefore no virtue is prior, &c.: q. e. d.

Coroll. The self-preservative effort or energy is the first and sole foundation of all virtue. For no principle can be conceived prior to this, as just said; and without it no virtue is conceivable (by Prop. XXI. above).

PROP. XXIII. Man, in so far as he is determined to act or to do anything because of his having inadequate ideas, cannot be said to act from virtue absolutely; he can only be said so to act as he is determined by what he understands.

Demonst. In so far as man is determined to action by inadequate ideas, in so far does he suffer (by Prop. I. Pt III.); that is, he does something which cannot be apprehended by

his essential nature alone (by Def. 1 and 2, Pt III.), in other words, something which does not follow from his proper power (by Def. 8 above). But in as far as he is determined to do anything on the ground of his understanding, in so far does he act truly (by Prop. I. Pt III.), in so far does he do something that is perceived by his proper essence (by Def. 2, Pt III.), or that follows adequately from his own inherent power (Def. 8 above). Wherefore, in so far as man, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. XXIV. To act absolutely from virtuous motives is in us nothing but to act under the guidance of reason, to live, and to preserve our state of being—and these three signify the same thing—on the ground of seeking the useful or our own good.

Demonst. To act absolutely from virtue is nothing else but to act in conformity with the laws of our proper nature (by Def. 8 above). But we only act in conformity with these in so far as we have understanding (by Prop. III. Pt III.). Therefore to act virtuously is for us nothing more than to act, to live, and to preserve ourselves by the dictates of reason, and this on the ground that in doing so we are seeking the useful or our own good: q. e. d.

PROP. XXV. Man seeks to preserve his state of being for the sake of nothing but that which he thinks useful or advantageous to him.

Demonst. The effort whereby each several thing strives to continue in its state of being, is defined as the essence of that thing (by Prop. VII. Pt III.), and from this alone, not from the essence of any other thing, does it necessarily follow that every one seeks to preserve himself (by Prop. VI. Pt III.). The above proposition is also evolved from the corollary to Prop. XXII. above. For did man seek to hold himself in being from any other cause, then would that cause be the primary ground of virtuous action (as is self-evident), a conclusion, however, which, from the corollary just referred to, is seen to be absurd. Wherefore man seeks, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. XXVI. Whatever we attempt from reason is nothing else than understanding; nor does the mind, in making

use of reason, judge anything to be of use to it, save that which conduces to understanding.

Demonst. The effort of a thing to continue in being is nothing but the very essence of the thing (by Prop. VII. Pt III.), which being present, in so far as it is such, is conceived to have the power of continuing in existence (by Prop. VI. Pt III.), and of doing those things that follow necessarily from its given nature (see the Definition of Appetite in the Scholium to Prop. IX. Pt III.). But the essence of our reason is nothing but our mind in so far as it is possessed of distinct understanding (see the Definition of adequate understanding in the 2nd Scholium to Prop. XL. Pt II.). Wherefore (by Prop. XL. Pt II.) to make an effort from reason, is nothing other than to understand. Further, inasmuch as this effort whereby the mind, so far as it reasons, strives to conserve its state of being, is nothing but understanding, as stated in the first part of this demonstration, therefore is the effort to understand the prime and sole foundation of virtue (by Coroll. to Prop. XXII. above); and it is not for the sake of any end or object that we strive to understand a thing (by Prop. XXV. above); on the contrary, the mind, as it reasons, can conceive nothing as truly good save that only which conduces to understanding (by Def. 1 above): q. e. d.

PROP. XXVII. We know nothing for certain as good or evil save that which conduces truly to understanding, or which stands in the way of true understanding.

Demonst. The mind, in so far as it reasons, desires nothing but to understand; neither does it judge anything to be useful to it save that which leads to understanding (by the preceding Prop.). But the mind (by Props. XLI. and XLIII. Pt II., and the Scholium to the latter) has no certainty of things save in so far as it is possessed of adequate ideas, or as it reasons (vide Schol. 2 to Prop. XL. Pt II.). Therefore do we know nothing certainly as good save that which leads truly to understanding; and, on the contrary, nothing as evil save that which hinders us from understanding: q. e. d.

PROP. XXVIII. The supreme good of the mind is the knowledge of God, and the highest virtue of the mind is to know God.

Demonst. The highest that the mind can know is God,

—the being absolutely infinite, without whom nothing is, and nothing can be conceived to be (vide Def. 6, Pt I., and Prop. XV. Pt I.). Therefore that which is supremely useful or good to the mind is the knowledge of God (vide Props. XXVI. and XXVII. and Def. 1 above). Again, in so far as the mind understands, in so far only does it act (by Props. I. and III. Pt III.), and so far only can it be said absolutely to act virtuously (by Prop. XXIII. above). The absolute virtue or power of the mind, therefore, is to understand. But the sum or height of the mind's understanding is God (as just demonstrated); consequently the supreme power of the mind is to understand or know God: q. e. d.

PROP. XXIX. The individual thing whose nature is entirely different from our own can neither aid nor impede our power of acting; and nothing can be absolutely good or bad to us, unless it have something in common with us.

Demonst. The power of each individual thing, and therefore of man, to exist and act (vide Coroll. to Prop. X. Pt II.), is not determined save by another individual thing (by Prop. XXVIII. Pt I.), the nature of which (by Prop. VI. Pt II.) must be understood by the same attribute whereby human nature is understood. Our power of acting, therefore, in whatever way conceived, can be determined, and consequently aided or restrained, by the power of another individual thing which has something in common with us, but not by the power of anything whose nature is altogether different from our own; and as we call that good or bad which is the cause of joy or of sorrow to us (by Prop. VIII. above), that is, which adds to, or takes from, our power of action (by Schol. to Prop. XI. Pt III.); therefore can the thing whose nature is wholly different from ours be neither good nor bad to us: q. e. d.

PROP. XXX. Nothing can be evil by that which it has in common with our nature; but, in the same degree as it is evil to us, so is it contrary to us.

Demonst. We designate that as evil or bad which is the cause of grief or pain to us (by Prop. VIII. above), in other words, that which takes from or restrains our power of action (vide Schol. to Prop. XI. Pt III.). If, therefore, a thing were to us evil through that which it had in common with us, it might take from or restrain that which it had in

common with us, a proposition which is absurd (by Prop. IV. Pt III.). Nothing, therefore, can be evil to us through that which it has in common with us; on the contrary, in as far as anything is evil, that is, as anything diminishes or destroys our power of action, in so far is it contrary to our nature (by Prop. V. Pt III.): q. e. d.

PROP. XXXI. In so far as a thing accords with our nature, so far is it necessarily good.

Demonst. In so far as a thing agrees with our nature, it cannot be evil (by the last Prop.). It will therefore necessarily be either good or indifferent. If indifferent—neither good nor evil—nothing (by our Axiom above) can follow from its nature which can serve for the maintenance of our nature, i. e. (by hypothesis), which can contribute to conserve the nature of the thing itself. But this is absurd (by Prop. VI. Pt III.). It will, therefore, in so far as it agrees with our nature, be necessarily good: q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it follows that the more anything accords with our nature, the more useful is it to us, the more is it good; and contrariwise, the more useful anything is to us, the more does it agree with our nature. Not agreeing with our nature it would necessarily be different from or opposed to this. If different, then (by Prop. XXIX. above) it could be neither good nor evil; if opposed, it would then also be opposed to that which agrees with our nature, i. e. (by the preceding proposition), contrary to good or evil. Nothing, therefore, save in so far as it accords with our nature, can be good; even as the more a thing accords with our nature, the more useful it is; and on the contrary, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. XXXII. In so far as men are obnoxious to passion, they cannot in so far be said to accord with nature.

Demonst. Things that are said to agree with nature are understood to agree in power (by Prop. VII. Pt III.); not however in respect to any impotency or negation, neither, consequently, in respect of passion, which involves negation (vide Schol. to Prop. III. Pt II.). Wherefore it cannot be said that men in so far as they are not obnoxious to passion are in accordance with nature: q. e. d.

Schol. The matter here is even self-evident. For he who should say that white and black only agreed in this that neither was red, would say absolutely that black and white

agree in nothing. So also did one say that a stone and a man agreed in this much only, that each was finite and impotent, that they did not exist by the necessity of their proper nature, or that they were indefinitely surpassed by the power of external causes, he would affirm unreservedly that a stone and a man agree in nothing. For things that only agree negatively or in that which they have not, do not truly agree in anything.

PROP. XXXIII. Men may differ in their nature in so far as they are agitated by the emotions that are passions; and in so far also is the same individual man changeable and inconstant.

Demonst. The nature or essence of the affections cannot be explained by our essence or nature alone (by Def. 1 and 2, Pt III.), but must be defined from the power or nature of external causes (by Prop. VII. Pt III.), compared with our proper nature. Whence it comes to pass that there are as many species of each affection as there are species of objects by which we are affected (vide Prop. LVI. Pt III.); and as men are variously affected by one and the same object (vide Prop. LI. Pt III.), and thus and in so far differ in their nature, and, lastly, as the same man may be diversely affected by the same object, and in so far is changeable and inconstant, therefore may men differ in their nature, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. XXXIV. In so far as men are variously affected by the emotions that are passions, they may be opposed to each other.

Demonst. A man—say Peter—may be the cause of grief to Paul, either because he has something about him which Paul dislikes (by Prop. XVI. Pt III.), or because Peter possesses something which Paul likes and covets (by Prop. XXXII. Pt III. and Schol.), or in short, for any other reason (vide Prop. LV. Pt III.). Hence it comes that dislike or hate of Peter takes possession of Paul (by Def. 7 of the affections), and then it as readily happens that Peter in turn conceives dislike of Paul (by Prop. XL. Pt III. and Schol.), the effect of which is that each is led to think of doing the other an injury (by Prop. XXXIX. Pt III.); in other words, they are brought into opposition one towards the other (by Prop. XXX.). But the emotion of hate is always a passion (by

Prop. LIX. Pt III.). Therefore may men agitated by affections which are passions be mutually opposed: q. e. d.

Schol. I have said that Paul would hate Peter because he imagined that Peter possessed something which he liked or coveted. Whence on the first blush it would seem as if these two, Peter and Paul, hated one another because they both liked and desired the same thing, and thus, and because they agreed in their natures, were disposed to injure each other. But if they were so, it would be in contradiction with what has been said in Props. XXX. and XXXI. of this Part. If we look into the proposition more closely, however, we shall find all that has been laid down to be perfectly accordant. For the two men here are not distasteful to one another in so far forth as they agree in nature, i. e., in so far as they both desiderate the same thing, but in so far only as they differ severally. For inasmuch as both love the same thing, the love of both for the same object is excited (by Prop. XXXI. Pt III.), i. e. (by Def. 6 of the affections above), the feeling of joy is aroused in both, through the same cause. It is therefore by no means because they love the same thing and agree in nature, that the two men hate each other. The cause of their mutual dislike lies, as I have said, in the assumed discrepancy of their several natures. For let us suppose that Peter has an idea of a thing he loves and now possesses, and Paul, on the contrary, has an idea of a thing he loved and has now lost; it will happen that the former will experience an emotion of joy, the latter an emotion of sorrow, and in so far will the two men be in opposition to one another. In the same way it were easy to show that the other causes of aversion and hate depend on the discrepancies, not on the accordances, of mankind.

PROP. XXXV. In so far as men live under the guidance of reason, in so far only do they always and necessarily agree with nature.

Demonst. In so far as men are agitated by the affections which are passions, they may be said to be of different natures (by Prop. XXXIII. above), and opposed to each other (by the preceding Prop.). But in so far as men are said to act rationally only or as they live under the authority of reason, so, whatever follows from human nature defined by reason, must be wholly apprehended by human nature, so defined, as its proximate cause (by Def. 2, Pt III.). But as every one by

the laws of his nature craves that which he thinks good, and seeks to escape that he holds to be bad (by Prop. XIX. above), and, moreover, as that which we judge to be good or bad from the dictates of reason, is of necessity good or bad (by Prop. XLI. Pt II.), therefore do men, in so far as they live by the rule of reason, do such things only as are necessarily good in respect of humanity at large, and consequently in respect of every individual human being in particular, in other words (by Coroll. to Prop. XXXI. above), which accord with the nature of each individual man. Wherefore do men, in so far as they live in accordance with reason, necessarily and at all times agree with one another: q. e. d.

Coroll. 1. There is no single thing in nature more useful to man than the example of the man who lives in conformity with the dictates of reason. For that which most agrees with his nature is most useful to man (by Coroll. to Prop. XXXI. above). But man acts absolutely by the laws of his nature when he lives under the rules of reason (by Def. 2, Pt III.), and in so far only does he always necessarily agree with the nature of other men (by the preceding Prop.). Therefore there is no single thing in nature more useful, &c.: q. e. d.

Coroll. 2. When each individual man strives especially for that which is truly useful to himself, then are men most useful to one another. For the more individuals seek the useful and are careful to preserve themselves, the more virtuous are they (by Prop. XX.); or,—and this comes to the same thing,—with the greater power are they endowed to act according to the laws of their proper nature, in other words (by Prop. III. Pt III.), to live by the rule of reason. But men agree most especially when they live under the authority of reason (by the preceding Prop.). Therefore (by preceding Corollary) are men most serviceable mutually when each individual strives especially for that which is useful to himself: q. e. d.

Schol. What has just been said is so fully confirmed by daily experience and illustrated by such numerous examples that it has passed into a common adage that man is a God to man. It seldom happens, however, that men do live by the rule of reason. They are much more commonly found envious of each other and mutually opposed. Nevertheless, no race of men was ever yet discovered the individuals of which led the lives of hermits in solitude and alone; so that the definition of man as a social being has found general acceptance; and,

indeed, things are so ordered that many more advantages than disadvantages accrue from the social state. Satirists and contemners of mankind, therefore, may ridicule human institutions, theologians condemn them, and atrabilious persons vaunt a rude and savage life, vilify mankind and admire the lower animals as they list, the mass of men still feel that with mutual assistance they can much more assuredly obtain all they require for their comfort and convenience, and by united efforts ward off such dangers as threaten them: I say nothing of its being so much nobler, so much more worthy of us, to study the actions of men than those of beasts. But of this more and at greater length by-and-by.

PROP. XXXVI. The highest good of those who abide by virtue is common to all, and all may equally enjoy it.

Demonst. To act virtuously is to act reasonably (by Prop. XXIV. above), and whatever we attempt under the guidance of reason, is to have understanding (by Prop. XXVI. above); so that (by Prop. XXVIII. above) the highest felicity of those who live virtuously is to know God, in other words, to enjoy a good that is common to all, and that may be enjoyed by all, inasmuch as all are of the same essential nature (by Prop. XLVII. Pt II. and its Schol.): q. e. d.

Schol. Did some one now ask, What if the highest good of the virtuous should not be a thing common to all? Would it not then follow that men who live by the rule of reason (Prop. XXXIV.), that men inasmuch as they essentially agree in nature (by Prop. XXXV.), might be found mutually opposed? I reply that it is not by accident, but from the very nature of reason, that the highest good which man can know should be common to all; and this it is, because it follows from the very essence of humanity defined by reason, and because man can neither be, nor be conceived to be, without the power of enjoying this supreme happiness. For it belongs to the essential nature of the human mind (by Prop. XLVII. Pt II.) to have an adequate cognition of the eternal and infinite essence of God: q. e. d.

PROP. XXXVII. The good which every votary of virtue desires for himself, he also desires for his fellow-men, and this so much the more ardently as he has a higher cognition of God.

Demonst. Men as they live reasonably are most useful to their fellow-men (by Coroll. to Prop. XXXV. above); and it is on this account (by Prop. XIX. above) that we necessarily strive to induce men to live by the rule of reason. But the good which every one desires who lives reasonably or is the disciple of virtue is this, that he may understand (vide Props. XXIV. and XXVI. above). Therefore does the votary of virtue desire for all men the good he desires for himself. Again, desire, as referred to the mind, is the very essence of the mind (by 1 of the Defs of the affections); but the essence of the mind consists in understanding (by Prop. XI. Pt II.), which involves the knowledge of God (by Prop. XLVII. Pt II.), without which mind can neither be nor can be conceived to be (by Prop. XV. Pt I.). Thus, therefore, the larger the conception of God involved in the essence of the mind, the greater will be the desire of the disciple of virtue that any good he enjoys himself should also be enjoyed by others: q. e. d.

Otherwise. The good which a man loves and desires, he will love and desire the more constantly if he sees that others love and desire it also (by Prop. XXXI. Pt III.); and so will he strive to make others love it (by Coroll. to same Prop.). And because this good is common to all, and all may equally share it, he will further strive that all should enjoy it, and this so much the more as he himself enjoys it the more (by Prop. XXXVII. Pt III.): q. e. d.

Schol. 1. He who from affection only would have others love what he loves himself, and who would have all the world like after his fancy, acts from mere impulse, and is therefore obnoxious to others, to those especially who have different tastes and inclinations, and who, prompted by like impulses, would also have others live as they do. Further, as the highest good which men desire from mere affection is often such that one alone can possess or enjoy it, it comes to pass that in desiring they are not satisfied in their minds, and whilst delighting to laud the thing they love, they yet fear to be taken at their word. But he who would persuade others to live in conformity with the laws of reason proceeds on no mere impulse, but amiably, humanly; and so is ever at one with himself in spirit. Now, whatever we desire, whatever we do whereof we are ourselves the cause in so far as we have the idea of God in our minds, or in so far as we know God, I refer to *Religion;* and the desire of doing well which is engendered by a life in accordance with reason, I call *Piety*

(*pietas*). Further, the desire which the man who lives by reason experiences to bind others to him in friendship, I designate *propriety* (*honestas*); and I entitle that *proper* or *seemly* (*honestus*) which men who live reasonably commend, as, on the contrary, I call that *base* or *improper* (*turpis*) which is adverse to friendly relations. I have besides and further shown wherein consist the foundations of the civil state. The difference between true virtue and poverty of spirit clearly appears from what is above set forth, namely, that true virtue is neither more nor less than the product of a life according to the rule of reason; whilst poverty of spirit is implied in this, that men, led by things external to themselves, are induced to do acts such as the common constitution of outward things may demand, but not such as things considered in themselves—their proper nature being alone regarded—proclaim to be right.

These are the points which in the Scholium to the 18th Proposition of this Part I promised to demonstrate, and from which it appears that any law against slaying the lower animals [for our use or advantage] is based on a vain superstition and womanly pity rather than on any principle of reason. Reason, indeed, teaches the necessity of our joining with our fellow-men in the quest of things useful to us, not with the lower animals or things differing in their nature from the nature of man:—we have every right over them that they can have over us. Inasmuch, indeed, as every right is defined by the virtue or power of each individual thing, man has a much greater right over animals than they over him. And here I would by no means be supposed to deny that animals feel; I only deny that it is not lawful or proper for us by reason of their feeling to consult our convenience and to use them in such wise as is for our advantage, seeing that their nature does not accord with ours, and that their affections are different from those of mankind (vide Schol. to Prop. LVII. Pt III).

I have still to explain the meaning of the words *just* and *unjust*, of *sin*, and lastly of *merit*. This I shall do in the following Scholium.

Schol. 2. In the Appendix to the First Part of this work I promised to explain what is to be understood by Praise and Blame, what by Merit, what by Demerit, or Crime, and what by Just and Unjust. With regard to what I understand by Praise and Blame, I think I have sufficiently explained myself in the Scholium to Prop. XXIX. Pt III.: so that I have only

to enter here on the explanation of the other terms. But I must premise a few words on the Natural and Civil State of man.

Every one exists by the supreme right of nature; and consequently does that by this supreme right which follows from the necessity of his proper nature. Every one, therefore, by the supreme law of nature seeks what is good, shuns what is bad, consults his own advantage (Prop. XIX. and XX. above), vindicates his actions (Coroll. 2 to Prop. XL. Pt III.), strives to hold fast what he loves, and endeavours to escape or destroy what he dislikes (Prop. XXVIII. Pt III.). Now, did men live by the rule of reason alone, every one would of his own right possess what he desired without detriment to others (by Coroll. 1 to Prop. XXXV. above). But inasmuch as men are subject to affections which far surpass in power the power of their proper humanity (vide Props. IV. and VI. above), therefore are they often swayed in different directions, and severally set in opposition, because they are not mutually helpful (vide Props. XXXIII., XXXIV., and Schol. to XXXV. above).

That men may live harmoniously together, therefore, and mutually assist each other, it is indispensable that they cede their natural individual rights, and give security to each other that they will do nothing which can lead to the detriment of others. Now, the way in which this can be accomplished—the rule by which men who are necessarily obnoxious to affections, and variable and inconstant in their humours, may be rendered helpful and faithful to each other, is shown in Prop. VII. of this 4th Part, and in Prop. XXXIX. of Part III.; and it is briefly this: that they hold their affections in check—which they can only do by means of another affection more powerful than the one to be restrained; and that they abstain from doing injury to others, which they accomplish by the fear of a greater injury accruing to themselves. A society or state is therefore established through the assumption by the community to itself of the rights possessed by each of its individual members, of defending itself against attack, of deciding what is good and what is evil, and of establishing an authority to prescribe the general mode of living, to institute laws, and to enforce these, not by reason, however, which has no power over the affections, but by threats of pains and penalties (vide Schol. Prop. XVII. above). Now, such a society resting on law, and possessed of powers of self-defence and of self-preservation, is

designated a State or Commonwealth, and they who are protected by its institutions are called its citizens.

From what precedes we readily understand, that in the natural state there can be nothing which by common consent is called good or bad; inasmuch as every one, living in the state of nature, only consults his own convenience, and decides on this or that as good or bad according to his own fancy, and in so far only as his proper advantage is concerned; no one is here held bound by any law save that which he prescribes to himself; so that in the natural state faults, offences, crimes, cannot be conceived. In the state politic, however, where common consent decides on what is good or evil, every one is held bound to obey the civil authority. Offence, crime, therefore, is nothing but disobedience, and is fitly punished by the sole authority of the state. On the other hand, obedience is accounted meritorious in the citizen; and by this alone is he adjudged worthy to enjoy the advantages of citizenship, i. e., of living as a member of a state politic. No one, again, in the state of nature is owner of anything by common consent, nor is there in nature anything which can be said to belong to this man rather than to that, but all things belong alike to all men; so that in such a state there can be conceived no disposition to render to every man or to take from any man that which is his; that is to say, in the state of nature there is nothing done that can properly be characterized as just or unjust; actions can only be so characterized in the state politic, where general consent determines what is justice and what injustice.

From all that precedes, it appears that just and unjust, merit and demerit, or crime, are extrinsic ideas, not attributes which serve to explain the nature of the mind. But of this enough.

PROP. XXXVIII. That which disposes the human body to be affected in several ways, or which renders it apt to affect external bodies in various manners, is useful to man; and it is by so much the more useful as the body is made more apt to be affected in different ways, and in different ways to affect other bodies. On the contrary, everything is hurtful that renders the body less apt to be influenced or to influence in these several ways.

Demonst. The more apt the body to be influenced and to

influence, the more apt becomes the mind to perceive and apprehend (by Prop. XIV. Pt II.); and thus is that which so disposes the body necessarily useful or good (by Prop. XXVI. and XXVII. above); by so much the more useful is it, indeed, as the body is rendered more apt in the directions indicated, as, on the contrary, if the body be made less potent to influence and to be influenced, is the cause of its incapacity detrimental (by the same Props. XIV. Pt II., and XXVI. and XXVII. of the present Part): q. e. d.

PROP. XXXIX. Whatever conduces to the maintenance of the proper ratio between the activity and repose of the several constituent parts of the body is good; and that, on the contrary, is bad which compromises the due ratio required by the several parts of the body in respect of their motion and rest.

Demonst. The human frame requires for its preservation the concurrence of numerous other bodies (by Post. 4, Pt II.). But that which constitutes the reality of the human body consists in this, that the parts of the body reciprocally communicate their motions in certain definite manners (by the Definition preceding Lemma 4 following Prop. XIII. of Pt II.). Therefore, whatever tends to preserve the ratio between the motion and rest which the parts of the human body reciprocate, tends at the same time to preserve the form or reality of the human body, and thereby brings it to pass that the human body is not only affected by, but also affects, external bodies in various ways (vide Post. 3 and 6 of Pt II.); and in so far is this good (by the preceding Prop.).

Again, whatever induces a different ratio in respect of motion and rest between the parts of the human body, brings it to pass that the human frame assumes another form; in other words (as is self-evident, and as has been stated towards the end of the preface to this Part), the body is destroyed, and is consequently rendered wholly unfit to be affected in any way whatsoever. Therefore is this bad (by the preceding Proposition): q. e. d.

Scholium. How and to what extent these things may injure or advantage the mind, will be explained in our Fifth Part. But I have here to observe that I understand the body to die when its parts reciprocally acquire another and different ratio in respect of their motions and rest. I dare not deny,

however, that the human body, the circulation of the blood proceeding as of wont, and the other processes by reason of which it is said to be alive, being duly performed, may nevertheless be changed and assume a nature entirely different from that which properly belongs to it. For no reason forces me to say that the body does not die unless it be changed into a corpse, although experience seems to persuade to the contrary. For it sometimes happens, that men undergo such changes, that we should find some difficulty in asserting positively that they were the same individuals. I remember to have heard of a Spanish poet who was seized by some disease, and who, though he recovered presently from his illness, remained so thoroughly forgetful of his former life, that he did not believe the tales and tragedies he had written to be his, and who indeed might have been aptly regarded as an adult infant had he in addition forgotten his mother tongue.* And if this appear incredible, what shall we say of the infant, whose nature the man of mature years thinks so different from his own, that he could never persuade himself that he too had once been an infant did he not infer so much from what is brought before him every day. But I quit this subject without further development, lest I supply the superstitious with matter for new questions and conjectures.

PROP. XL. All that conduces to the commodity of civil society or that tends to make men live in amity is good; and, on the contrary, whatever brings discord into the state is evil.

Demonst. Whatever leads men to live amicably together secures at the same time that they shall live in conformity

* Cases have actually occurred in which the mother tongue, as well as every other incident of previous life, was entirely forgotten, and in which grown men and women of liberal education began with the alphabet like children, and learned to read for the second time in their lives. In such cases there is undoubtedly partial death of the body, and this may be either temporary, as in fainting and as induced by anæsthetic agents, or permanent. The 'Old Shekarry' is struck on the head by the splinter of a Russian shell at the siege of Sebastopol, and is immediately deprived of all sense and of all motion but that concerned with breathing and deglutition, and this state continues for several weeks, when, transported to England from the Black Sea, a piece of the skull which had been forced in upon the brain is raised, and suddenly he recovers his consciousness, and is restored to such soundness of mind and body that he is able himself to tell the tale. There are other and older cases of the same kind that might be quoted; I only cite the latest and not the least remarkable and authentic on record.—TR.

with reason (by Prop. XXXV. above), and is therefore good (Props. XXVI. and XXVII.); as, on the contrary, whatever excites discord, dissension, &c., is bad: q. e. d.

PROP. XLI. Gaiety (*lætitia*) is not directly evil, but is good; grief or sadness, on the contrary, is directly evil.

Demonst. Gaiety is an affection whereby the power of the body to act is aided or increased (vide Definition of joy in the Schol. to Prop. XI. Pt III.). Grief, on the contrary, is one whereby this power is lessened or repressed; and so is gaiety directly good, grief directly bad (vide Prop. XXXVIII. above): q. e. d.

PROP. XLII. Cheerfulness, Contentment (*hilaritas*), can have nothing of excess about it, but is always good; melancholy, discontent (*melancholia*), on the other hand, is always evil.

Demonst. Cheerfulness is joy (defined in Schol. to Prop. XI. Pt III.), which referred to the body consists in this, that all its parts are affected alike and in like measure, that is, that the power of the body to act is increased or assisted, and in such wise that all its parts acquire reciprocally motion and rest in the same ratio (vide Prop. XI. Pt III.). It is in this way that hilarity or cheerfulness is always good and cannot be excessive (vide Prop. XXXIX. above). Melancholy, on the other hand, is grief (Schol. to Prop. XI. Pt III.), which as referred to the body consists in this, that its power of action is lessened or absolutely abrogated, so that the emotion is always bad (by Prop. XXXVIII.): q. e. d.

PROP. XLIII. Titillation (*titillatio*) * may be excessive; but pain, grief (*dolor*), may be good to the same extent as titillation is bad.

Demonst. The pleasure felt through touch is a joy, which,

* I am at a loss for a proper translation of Titillatio in this place. In the Scholium to Prop. XI. Pt III. the Author gives the words Hilaritas and Titillatio as synonymous, affectum lætitiæ ad mentem relatum titillationem seu hilaritatem voco; but here, in Prop. XLII., he says, Hilaritas knows nothing of excess and is always good; whilst in Prop. XLIII. he says, Titillatio may be excessive and so evil.—TR.

in so far as it is referred to the body consists in this, that one or several of the corporeal parts are more affected than others (see the Def. of Titillation in the Schol. to Prop. XI. Part III.), and the degree of this affection may be such that it exceeds the rest of the bodily actions (by Prop. VI.), and takes such hold of and so influences the body that it is rendered less apt to come under other influences. Thus and in this way may it be evil (by Prop. XXXVIII.). Pain, on the contrary, which is a grief, considered in itself cannot be good (by Prop. XLI.). But as in its strength and increase it is defined the power of an external cause compared with a cause inherent in ourselves (by Prop. V.), an infinite number of degrees and modes of the affection may be conceived (by Prop. III.); we may even conceive it such as to restrain voluptuousness from becoming excessive, and thus (by the first part of this demonstration) bringing it about that the body shall not be rendered less apt for any or all of its offices, so that and in so far pain may be good: q. e. d.

PROP. XLIV. Love and desire may be excessive.

Demonst. Love is a joy (by Def. 6 of the Affections) associated with the idea of an outward cause; titillation, therefore (by Schol. to Prop. XI. Pt III.), the idea of an external cause associated with it, is love; and love (by the preceding Prop.) may consequently be excessive. Again, desire is great as the affection itself from which it arises is greater (by Prop. XXXVII. Pt III.). Wherefore, as one emotion may (by Prop. VI.) surpass the other emotions in force, so may the desire, which arises from the affection thus in excess, also surpass the other desires, and thereby present the same excess we have shown in the preceding Proposition to accompany titillation (*titillatio*): q. e. d.

Scholium. Cheerfulness (*hilaritas*), which I have characterized as good, is more easily conceived than observed. For the emotions that so constantly agitate us are commonly referable to some part of the body affected in a greater measure than the other parts, and by an affection thus for the most part in excess, the mind is kept to the contemplation of one object so fixedly that it can think of no others; and although men are influenced by many emotions, and are very rarely found contending with one and the same emotion only, yet is there no scarcity of those who are obstinately possessed by a single emotion. Men have occasionally been seen so affected by one object, that although it was not before them,

they have, nevertheless, believed that it was; and when such a thing happens to a man awake, we say he is delirious or mad. Nor are they believed the less to rave who burn with the passion of love and dream day and night of the object of their affection, although their passion is apt to excite our laughter. When the miser, however, thinks of nothing but lucre and his hoard, the ambitious man of nothing but glory, &c., they are not said to be mad, though they are wont to be troublesome, and are thought to deserve contempt. Nevertheless, avarice, ambition, lust, &c., are really species of delirium, although they are not ranked among diseases.

PROP. XLV. Hatred never can be good.

Demonst. We would injure, we would destroy him whom we hate (by Prop. XXXIX. Pt III.); that is (by Prop. XXXVII. above), we would attempt something that is bad; therefore, &c.: q. e. d.

Schol. 1. Observe that here and in what follows I only speak of hate with reference to man.

Coroll. 1. Envy, mockery, contempt, anger, revenge, and the other emotions referred to hate, or arising from it, are all bad, as also appears from Prop. XXXIX. Pt III. and Prop. XXXVII. of the present Part.

Coroll. 2. All that we desire when we are moved by hate is base in itself, and, as regards the civil state, unjust; as also appears from Prop. XXXIX. Pt III., and from the Definitions of the terms *base* and *unjust* which will be found in the Schol. to Prop. XXXVII. of this Part.

Schol. 2. I acknowledge a great difference between mockery, which I have but just characterized as bad, and laughter or jest. For laughter and jest, also, are a kind of gladness; and so, if they have nothing of excess about them, are good (by Prop. XLI.). Nothing, indeed, but a sour and gloomy superstition forbids us to enjoy ourselves: why should it be held more seemly to satisfy the cravings of hunger and thirst, than to drive away melancholy? These are my views, these my sentiments. No divinity, none but an envious being, could take pleasure in my helplessness and suffering; nor do tears and sobs, and fear and other affections of the sort, which are but evidences of an abject and feeble spirit, ever lead to virtuous conduct; the more joyfully we feel, on the contrary, to the higher grade of perfection do we rise; in other words, the more do we necessarily partake of the Divine nature. To

use the good things of life, therefore, and to enjoy ourselves in so far as this may be done short of satiety and disgust—for here excess were not enjoyment,—is true wisdom. It is wisdom, I say, in man to refresh and recreate himself by moderate indulgence in pleasant meats and drinks, to take delight in sweet odours [and sweet sounds], to admire the beauties of plants and flowers, to dress becomingly, to join in manly and athletic sports and games, to frequent the theatre, and other places of the sort, all of which may be done without injury to others. For the human frame is compacted of many parts of diverse nature, which continually crave fresh and varied aliment, in order that the whole body may be alike fit for everything whereof by its nature it is capable, and consequently that the mind also may be in a state to take interest in and understand the greatest possible variety of subjects.

Such a mode of life accords entirely with the principles I uphold, and with common practice also; I believe it to be the best that can be followed, and every way to be commended; so that I do not think it necessary to say more on the subject.

PROP. XLVI. He who lives in conformity with the dictates of reason strives to the extent of his power to repay the hatred, anger, contempt, &c., of others, with love and good will.

Demonst. All the emotions connected with hate are bad (by Coroll. to preceding Prop.); and so will he who lives by reason strive as much as possible to escape being agitated by them (by Prop. XIX.), and therefore use his endeavour that another shall not suffer from them (by Prop. XXXVII.). But hate is increased by reciprocated hate, and, on the contrary, may be extinguished by love (by Prop. XLIII. Pt III.); so that hate may even be turned into love (by Prop. XLIV. Pt. III.). Wherefore he who lives agreeably to reason endeavours to return hatred with love, or with kindness (for the Definition of which see the Schol. to Prop. LIX. Pt III.).

Schol. He who avenges injuries by reciprocated hate lives miserably; whilst he who strives to get the better of hatred by love contends with his emotions joyfully and assuredly, he opposes a host with the same ease as a single adversary, and is as little dependent as may be on any aid from fortune. They whom he vanquishes, too, yield gladly, and not because of diminished but rather of increased strength. These

conclusions follow so clearly from the Definitions of love and understanding alone, that it seems unnecessary to insist on them in succession and particularly.

PROP. XLVII. The emotions of hope and fear cannot of themselves be good.

Demonst. The emotions of hope and fear are not experienced without a certain uneasiness or pain. For fear (by No. 13 of the Definitions of the affections) is sorrow, and hope (by 12 and 13 of these Definitions) is not felt without misgivings. These emotions in themselves, therefore, cannot be good; they can only be so in as far as they mitigate excessive joy (by Prop. XLIII.): q. e. d.

Schol. To this it must be added, that these emotions indicate deficiency of true knowledge and impotency of mind. For this reason, also, are the feelings of security, of anxious forecast, of despair, remorse, &c., signs of an impotent spirit. For although elation of mind and a feeling of security are emotions akin to joy, they still suppose something of the misgivings we associate with hope and fear. The more we strive to live by the rule of reason, therefore, the less do we depend on hope, the more do we free ourselves from fear, the more do we endeavour to command fortune, and to make our actions conform to the sure counsels of the understanding.

PROP. XLVIII. The affections of over estimation and depreciation are always evil.

Demonst. These affections are opposed to reason (by Defs. 21 and 22 of the Affections), and so (by Props. XXVI. and XXVII.) are bad: q. e. d.

PROP. XLIX. Adulation is apt to make the man who is its object vainglorious and haughty.

Demonst. If we find any one making more of us than is proper, we are apt to plume ourselves upon the notice we receive, (by Schol. to Prop. XLI. Pt III.), or we are delighted (by No. 30 Def. of Affections), and readily believe all the good we hear of ourselves (by Prop. XXV. Pt III.). Thus do we come through self-love to think more highly of ourselves than is just, i. e., we readily become vainglorious and haughty (by the 28th Def. of Affections): q. e. d.

PROP. L. Commiseration is in itself evil and useless to the man who lives by the rule of reason.

Demonst. Commiseration is a sort of sorrow (Def. of Affections, No. 18), and therefore (by Prop. XLI.) bad in itself. The good that flows from it, such as our endeavour to free the man from his misery who is the object of our pity (by Coroll. 3 to Prop. XXVII. Pt III.), results from the dictates of reason alone (by Prop. XXXVII.). We can, indeed, do nothing which we assuredly know to be good, save by the dictates of reason (by Prop. XXVII.). Commiseration in itself, consequently, in the man who lives by the rule of reason, is bad and of no utility: q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it follows that the man who lives by reason endeavours as much as possible not to be touched by pity or compassion.

Schol. He who rightly knows that all things follow from the necessity of the Divine nature, and come to pass in conformity with the eternal laws of nature, will never meet with anything worthy of hatred or contempt; neither will he commiserate any one; but in so far as human power will bear him out, he endeavours to do well, and, as is said, to go on his way rejoicing. To this let us add that he who is readily touched by pity and moved by the tears and miseries of others, often does things of which he repents afterwards; and this is because we can do nothing from mere affection which we know for certain to be good; and, further, because we are readily deceived by false tears and tales. Here I beg to state that I am speaking expressly of the man who lives in conformity with the rules of reason; for he who is neither moved by reason nor pity to be helpful to others is, indeed, and properly, called inhuman; such a man (by Prop. XXVII. Pt III.) seems to be different from other men.

PROP. LI. Partiality (*favor*) is not repugnant to reason, but may agree with and arise from it.

Demonst. For partiality is love for one who does good to others (No. 19 Def. Affections), and may be referred to the mind in so far as this is moved to action (by Prop. LIX. Pt III.), in other words (by Prop. III. Pt III.), in so far as it understands; and so partiality is not inconsistent with reason: q. e. d.

Otherwise. He who lives by reason finds it good that what he desires for himself should be desired by another (by Prop.

XXXVII. above). Whence it comes that when he sees *one* striving to advantage another, the reasonable man's own beneficent disposition is stimulated; in other words, he experiences pleasure (by Prop. XI. Pt III.) in concomitance with the idea of him who is doing good, and thus he favours or feels a liking for him (by No. 19 Def. Affections): q. e. d.

Schol. Indignation (*indignatio*) as defined by us (vide 20 Def. Affections) is necessarily evil (by Prop. XLV.). But observe, I do not say that the supreme authority in a state is moved by feelings of indignation when it orders the punishment of the citizen who has wronged another, because authority is not incited by hate to destroy an offender, but is led by justice and propriety to punish him.

PROP. LII. Peace of mind, self-content, or acquiescence (*acquiescentia*), may spring from reason; and the self-content alone which springs from reason is the highest that is possible.

Demonst. Peace of mind is joy sprung from man's contemplation of himself and his powers of action (by 25 of Def. of Affections). But man's power of action or virtue is reason itself (by Prop. III. Pt III.), which man apprehends clearly and distinctly (by Props. XL. and XLIII. Pt II.). Therefore does acquiescence or peace of mind arise from reason itself. Again, man in contemplating himself perceives nothing clearly and distinctly except those things which follow from his power of action (by Def. 2, Pt II.), in other words, from his power of understanding (by Prop. III. Pt III.). Consequently, from this self-contemplation alone does the highest possible form of acquiescence take its rise: q. e. d.

Schol. Inward peace or acquiescence is indeed the sum of all we can look for in life. For (as shown in Prop. XXV. above) no one strives to preserve his state of being for the sake of some particular end, and as self-content is ever ministered to and increased by commendation (by Coroll. to Prop. LIII. Pt III.), and on the contrary (by Coroll. to Prop. LV. Pt III.), is more and more disturbed by blame, therefore are we especially elated by praise, and find life scarcely endurable under disgrace and reprobation.

PROP. LIII. Humility is not a virtue; or humility does not arise from reason.

Demonst. Humility is a form of grief or pain arising from the contemplation of our own incapacity (by 26 of Def. of Affections). In so far, however, as a man has a reasonable knowledge of himself, in so far is he supposed to understand his essential nature, in other words, the powers with which he is endowed (by Prop. VII. Pt III.). Wherefore if a man in considering himself becomes aware of any incapacity, this is not because of the understanding he has of himself, but because he feels himself coerced in his powers of action (as has been shown in Prop. LV. Pt III.). But if we suppose a man to conceive himself incompetent, because he apprehends something more powerful than himself, the knowledge of which brings his powers of action into play, then do we really presume that the man distinctly knows himself, and thereby is his power of action aided (vide Prop. XXVI. above). Consequently the sense of humility, or the grief which arises from the contemplation of our incapacity, does not proceed from true reflection or reason, and is not a virtue but a passion: q. e. d.

PROP. LIV. Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of any deed he has done is twice miserable or impotent.

Demonst. The first part of this proposition is demonstrated in the same way as the one that precedes. The demonstration of the second part, again, is involved in the definition of the affection in question (see 27 of Def. of Affections). The penitent first suffers himself to be overcome by base desire, and is next subdued by sorrow.

Schol. Inasmuch as men so rarely live by the rules of reason, the two affections of humility and repentance, and those of hope and fear in addition, are, nevertheless, more beneficial than detrimental in the world, and so if men are to sin at all it is good that they sin in a direction that admits of penitence and humility. For if men of feeble souls were all alike insolent and overbearing, took shame to themselves for nothing they did, and had no fears, by what motive could they be coerced or controlled? The multitude are feared, when they do not fear. Whence we are not to be surprised when we find the Hebrew prophets, who consulted the general and not any private interest, so strenuously insisting on humility, reverence, and repentance. And they, indeed, who are under the influence of these affections are much more

easily led to live at length by the rule of reason than those who are under no such influence, i. e., to live in freedom, and enjoy the life of the blessed.

PROP. LV. Extreme haughtiness (*superbia*) or abjectness (*abjectio*) are equivalent terms for complete ignorance of self.

Demonst. This sufficiently appears from the Definitions of these affections, Nos. 28 and 29.

PROP. LVI. Excessive arrogance or abjectness indicates extreme impotence of soul.

Demonst. The foundation of all virtue is the power of self-preservation under the guidance of reason (by Coroll. to Prop. XXII. and Prop. XXIV. above). He who knows not himself is ignorant of the grounds of all virtue, and consequently of all the virtues. And then, to act virtuously is nothing more than to act by the rule of reason (by Prop. XXIV.); and he whose actions are guided by virtue necessarily knows that he acts from reason (by Prop. XLIII. Pt II). He, therefore, who is ignorant of himself in the highest degree, and is thereby most thoroughly ignorant of all virtue, can never or by any means act virtuously; in other words, such a person (by Def. 8 above) is possessed of the most impotent soul. In this way (by the preceding Prop.) do excessive arrogance and excessive abjectness proclaim excessive impotence of soul: q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it clearly follows that the arrogant and the abject are those who are most under the spell of the affections.

Schol. Abjectness, however, is more readily corrected than arrogance, inasmuch as the latter is an affection referable to the joyous, the former to the sorrowful, element of our nature, and we have seen (in Prop. XVIII. above) that joy is a more potent emotion than grief.

PROP. LVII. The vain-glorious man (*superbus*) loves to be surrounded by flatterers and parasites, and hates the independent and self-relying (*generosi*).

Demonst. Arrogance (*superbia*) is a kind of joy arising from this: that a man thinks more highly of himself than is proper (Defs. 28 and 6 of Aff.), and thence adopts an opinion which he is careful to cherish (Schol. to Prop. XIII. Pt III.).

The vain-glorious man, therefore, loves to be courted by flatterers and parasites (definitions of whom I omit as being familiarly known), and shuns the independent and self-sufficing, who estimate him at his proper worth: q. e. d.

Schol. It were too much did I here go on to enumerate all the evils that follow from arrogance and vain-gloriousness; for the proud are slaves of all the passions, and are moved by no affection less than by love and pity. But I must not omit to say that the man who thinks less of others than is right is also called arrogant or haughty (*superbus*); arrogance or haughtiness in this sense should therefore be defined as a species of joy arising from a mistaken opinion which a man entertains that he is better than others; as its opposite, humility, abjectness, is a form of grief arising from a false opinion of relative inferiority. This established, we readily conceive that the arrogant man is necessarily of envious disposition (by Schol. to Prop. LV. Pt III.), hates those more especially who are most lauded for their virtues, does not readily suffer his dislikes to be overcome by love and kindness (vide Schol. to Prop. XLI. Pt III.), and only takes pleasure in the company of those who comply with his impotency of spirit, and do all they can to turn him from the fool he is into a madman. Abjectness, although opposed to arrogance, is yet near akin to it. For though the mean-spirited man suffers from grief arising from the contrast between his own impotency and the power or virtue of others, yet is his dejection removed if his imagination gets engaged in the contemplation of others' vices—that is to say, he then rejoices or feels glad; whence the proverb: The wretched find solace in the wretchedness of others. On the other hand, the mean-spirited or abject man is ever the more deeply immersed in his grief the more he is led to believe himself inferior to others. Whence it comes to pass that none are more subject to the passion of envy than the abject, that none are so much disposed to scan the actions of their fellow-men with a view to find fault rather than with any purpose of bettering them, and finally that they only prize and vaunt themselves on their humility; though this they would still do in such a way as to appear humble. These results, I believe, follow as necessarily from this emotion as from the nature of the triangle it follows that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles; and I have already said that when I call this and other emotions like it evil, I am thinking of human usefulness only. But the laws of nature are in relation to the

general order of nature, of which man is a part, and this I desire to notify by the way, lest it should be thought that it was my purpose here to discuss the vices and foolish actions of men, and not to demonstrate the nature and properties of things. In my Introduction to the Third Part, however, I have said that I investigate the human affections and their properties precisely as I do natural objects in general. And certainly the human affections, if they do not proclaim any special human power, still proclaim powers and aptitudes in the nature of man not less marvellous than many other things we admire, and in the study of which we are wont to take delight. But I proceed to remark on matters connected with the affections which are of use to mankind, and which are also the source of certain disadvantages.

PROP. LVIII. Glory is not opposed to reason, but may arise from it.

Demonst. This appears in No. 30 of the Definitions of the Affections, and also from what is said on integrity (*honestas*) in Schol. 1 to Prop. XXXVII. above.

Schol. What is called vain-glory, is self-satisfaction fostered by mere vulgar opinion; for this ceasing, the self-satisfaction or *summum bonum* which every one loves ceases also (by Schol. to Prop. LII.). Whence it happens that he who glories in vulgar fame bears a load of care incessantly about with him, and all his thoughts and acts are given to retain or increase his celebrity; for the common herd are changeful and inconstant; and unless glory, fame, celebrity be anxiously pursued and closely hugged, they are soon gone. Inasmuch as almost all men, indeed, desire to shine before the world, each in turn may succeed in eclipsing the fame of the other; and then we see that so often as there is a struggle for what is held the *summum bonum* of existence, a mighty desire appears among the ambitious to crush and oppress each other; and he who comes as victor out of the strife is often more elated by the damage he has done to another than by any advantage he has gained for himself. Such glory, such self-satisfaction, therefore, is vain indeed, for truly it is nothing.

What may be said of *shame* is readily to be gathered from what has been delivered on pity and repentance. I only add, further, that as it is with pity, so is it also with shame, which, though no virtue, is yet good, inasmuch as it proclaims that he whose cheek becomes suffused

through shame feels desirous of living virtuously and well; even as pain in an injured limb is good in so far as it declares that the part has not fallen into a state of gangrene. Wherefore, although the man who has done something of which he repents and is ashamed is made obnoxious to grief, still is he a better man than the impudent fellow who feels no desire to live in conformity with reason and propriety.

Such are the views I desired to express on the affections of joy and sorrow.

As regards the *desires* generally, they are either good or evil, as they arise from good or evil affections. But all of them, inasmuch as they originate in ourselves from affections that are passions, are blind (as may readily be gathered from what is said in the Scholium to Prop. XLIV.), and would be without influence could men only be induced to live entirely by the dictates of reason, as I shall now proceed briefly to show.

PROP. LIX. To whatever acts we may be moved by an affection that is a passion, we may also be determined, independently of this, by reason.

Demonst. To act from reason is only to do those things that result from the necessity of our nature considered in itself (vide Prop. III. and Def. 2 of Pt III.). But grief is evil in so far as it curtails or coerces this power of action (by Prop. XLI. above). Therefore we can be led by this affection to do no act which we could not accomplish were we led by reason. And then, joy is not evil save and in so far only as it makes man less capable of acting (by Props. XLI. and XLIII.); so that we can be moved to no act by the emotion of joy which we could not accomplish under the impulse of reason. Lastly, in so far as joy is good, in so far does it accord with reason (for by its essence it aids or increases man's capacity of action); and it is not a passion unless and in so far as the power of man to act fails of such increase through it that he does not adequately conceive himself and his actions (by Prop. III. Pt III. and its Scholium). Were man, therefore, brought by the emotion of joy to such a state of perfection that he conceived himself and his actions adequately, he would be found apt, ay apter, for the actions to which he might be determined by the affections that are passions. But all the affections are referable to joy, sorrow, or desire (vide Explanation 4 of the Defs. of the Affections), and desire (by 1 of Def. of Affections) is nothing but the

wish or will to act. Wherefore we may be determined to all the acts to which an affection that is a passion disposes us, by reason alone and independently of affection: q. e. d.

Otherwise. An action is called bad in so far as it arises from our being affected by hatred or any other base emotion (vide Coroll. 1 to Prop. XLV.). But no action considered in itself is either good or bad (as I have shown in my Introduction to this Part), one and the same action being good or bad indifferently—now good, now bad. Wherefore we may even be led by reason to do acts that are evil, or that are determined by an evil emotion (by Prop. XIX.): q. e. d.

Schol. Let me make the above more clear by an example: The act of striking with the fist, considered physically and in itself, as when a man raises his arm, clenches his hand, and advances it violently or brings it down with force, is a power which arises from the mechanism of the human body. If, therefore, a man moved by anger or hatred is influenced to close his hand and move his arm as in striking, this comes to pass, as shown in our Second Part, because with one and the same action various images of things may be associated, and because we may be incited to the same act by those imaginations of things which we conceive confusedly, as well as by those which we apprehend clearly and distinctly. It therefore appears that every desire which arises from an emotion that is a passion, would be of no avail were man always led by his reason. Let us now see why desire which arises from an affection that is a passion is called blind by us.

PROP. LX. The desire which springs from joy or grief and is referred to one or to several but not to all the parts of the body, has no bearing on utility as regards the whole man.

Demonst. Let us suppose a part of the body, which we designate A, to be so invigorated by the power of some external cause as to preponderate over the other parts (by Prop. VI.), this part will not seek to lose its power, in order that the other parts may duly perform their functions, for this would suppose it possessed of a capacity to abandon its power, which (by Prop. VI. Pt III.) is absurd. The part of the body A, therefore, and consequently the mind also, will strive to preserve their actual state (by Props. VII. and XII. Pt III.); hence the desire which arises from such an emotion of joy is not in true relation to the whole of the bodily parts. For if,

on the contrary, the part A is supposed to be coerced, so that the remaining parts preponderate, it may be demonstrated in the same way, that neither is the desire which arises from sorrow in due relation with the whole of the bodily parts: q. e. d.

Schol. Since joy, therefore, is mostly referable to one part of the body (by Schol. to Prop. XLIV.), we do mostly endeavour to continue in our state of being without reference to the whole of our healthful constitution. To which it may be added that the desires by which we are mostly swayed bear reference to the present only, not to the future (by Coroll. to Prop. IX.).

PROP. LXI. The desire which arises from reason cannot be excessive.

Demonst. Desire considered absolutely is the very essence of man, conceived as determined to act in any way (vide 1 of Def. of Affections). Hence the desire which springs from reason, which, in other words, is engendered within ourselves, in so far as we act (by Prop. III. Pt III.), is the very essence or nature of man, considered as determined to do those things which are adequately conceived by this essence alone (by Def. 2, Pt III.). Could the desire which springs from reason be excessive, therefore, then might human nature, considered in itself, exceed or surpass itself, i. e., accomplish more than it was capable of performing, which is a plain contradiction in terms. Consequently desire sprung from reason can never be excessive: q. e. d.

PROP. LXII. In so far as the mind conceives a thing from the dictates of reason it is equally affected whether the idea be of a future, past, or present thing.

Demonst. Whatever the mind, under the guidance of reason, conceives, it still apprehends, under the same species of eternity or necessity (by Coroll. 2 to Prop. XLIV. Pt. II.), and is affected by the same certainty (by Prop. XLIII. and Schol. Pt II.). Wherefore, whether the idea be of a future, past, or present thing, the mind conceives the thing with the same necessity, and is affected by the same certainty; and the idea, whether it be of a thing to come, that has past, or is present, will still be equally true (by Prop. XLI. Pt II.); in other words, it will always have the

properties of an adequate idea (by Def. 4, Pt II.). And thus the mind, in so far as it conceives a thing, under the guidance of reason, is affected in the same way, whether the idea be of a thing past, present, or to come: q. e. d.

Schol. Could we have an adequate conception of the duration of things, and by our reason determine the time of their existence, we should contemplate things to come and things present with the same affection; and the good which the mind conceived in prospective, it would then desire as though it were present, and so would necessarily neglect the minor present for the greater future good, and by no means desire that which might be a present good, indeed, but the possible cause of a future evil, as I shall presently show. But we can have no other than a very inadequate conception of the duration of things (by Prop. XXXI. Pt II.); for we determine the times of the existence of things by our imagination alone (by Schol. to Prop. XLIV. Pt II.), which is not equally affected by the image of a present and by that of a future thing. Whence it comes to pass that the actual conception we have of good and evil is abstract or general only; and the judgments we form of the order of things and the connection of causes, with a view to determine what is presently good or evil for us, are rather imaginary than real. It is not wonderful, therefore, if the desire which arises from the conception of good and evil in so far as the future is concerned, may be most readily influenced or constrained by the desire of things that are agreeable in the present. On this point see Proposition XVIII. of this Part.

PROP. LXIII. He who led by fear does good that he may escape evil, does not act from reason.

Demonst. All the affections referred to the mind in so far as it acts, that is, all the affections referred to reason, are no other than affections of joy or sorrow (vide Props. III. and LIX. Pt III.). He, consequently, who is moved by fear and does good lest he suffer evil, is not influenced by reason: q. e. d.

Schol. 1. The superstitious, who are more ready to denounce vice than to teach virtue, who do not pretend to lead mankind by reason but attempt to drive them by fear, and who would rather have them shun evil than love virtue, have no object in view but to make others as miserable as themselves; and therefore it is not wonderful that such persons are mostly

looked upon as troublesome and hateful by their fellow-men.

Coroll. The desire which springs from reason leads us directly to pursue the good, and indirectly to shun the bad.

Demonst. For desire proceeding from reason can arise form joyful emotion alone, and this is not a passion (by Prop. LIX. Pt III.), and knows nothing of excess (by Prop. LXI.). Hence does this desire arise from a conception of that which is good, not of aught that is evil (by Prop. VIII.). Influenced by reason, therefore, we directly covet the good, and in doing so we shun the bad: q. e. d.

Schol. 2. This Scholium is illustrated by the example of the sick and the healthy man. The sick man swallows that which he dislikes through fear of dying; but the healthy man relishes his food, and thus enjoys life more than if he dreaded and sought by any direct means to escape death. So also the judge who, from no feeling of hatred or anger, &c., but from regard to the public safety alone, condemns the criminal to death, acts entirely from the dictates of reason.

PROP. LXIV. The knowledge we have of evil is inadequate knowledge.

Demonst. The knowledge of evil as we are conscious of it is sorrow itself (Prop. VIII.). But sorrow is transition from a higher to a lower grade of perfection (by Def. 3 of Affections), which cannot therefore be understood from the essential nature of man considered in itself (by Props. VI. and VII. Pt III.). Sorrow consequently is passion dependent on inadequate ideas (by Prop. III. Pt III.), and the knowledge we have of sorrow, i. e., of evil, is consequently knowledge of the inadequate kind: q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it follows that if there were none but adequate ideas in the mind, it would form no notion of evil.

PROP. LXV. Of two goods we choose the greater, and of two evils we choose the less, under the guidance of reason.

Demonst. The good which should interfere with our enjoyment of a greater good were truly an evil; for good and evil, as shown in our Introduction to this Part, are terms applied to things contrasted with one another; and, for a like reason, a minor evil is verily a good. Wherefore (by Coroll. to preceding Prop.), led by reason, we desire or follow

good only as a something more, evil as a something less: q. e. d.

Coroll. Led by reason we choose a less evil for the sake of a greater good, and we shun a minor good which might be the cause of a greater evil. For the evil which is here characterized as less is really a good, and the good, on the contrary, is an evil. Wherefore (by the Coroll. to preceding Prop.) we desire the one and avoid the other: q. e. d.

PROP. LXVI. Led by reason we desire a greater future good rather than a present minor good, and a present minor evil rather than a future greater evil.

Demonst. If the mind could have adequate knowledge of a future thing, it would be affected by the same emotion towards a future as towards a present thing (by Prop. LXII.). Wherefore, as respects reason itself,—and in this Proposition we are supposed to regard reason alone,—it is the same thing whether it be a greater future or present good or evil that is contemplated. And hence (by Prop. LXV.) we covet a greater good in prospective more than a minor good in the present: q. e. d.

Coroll. Under the guidance of reason, we desire a minor or present evil which is to be the cause of a greater future good, and shun a present minor good which will engender a greater future evil. This Corollary bears the same relation to the preceding Proposition as the Corollary of Prop. LXV. to Prop. LXV. itself.

Schol. If what has just been said be compared with what is delivered in the present part as far as the 18th Proposition on the force of the affections, it will be seen what a difference there is between the man who is led by mere passion or opinion and the man who is led by reason. The former *nolens volens* often does that of which he has no true knowledge; the latter relies on no one but himself, and does that only which he knows to be of essential importance in life, and which he consequently most truly desires. Therefore do I call the former SLAVE, the latter FREE; and I shall here proceed to make a few remarks on the genius and mode of life of each of these—the Bond and the Free.

PROP. LXVII. The free man thinks of nothing less than of death; and his wisdom is meditation of life, not of death.

Demonst. The free man, i. e. the man who lives by the dictates of reason, is not influenced or led to act by fear of death (by Prop. LXIII.); he desires good immediately (by Coroll. to the same Prop.); that is to say, he desires to live and act—to continue his state of being, on the ground of seeking that which is useful to himself (by Prop. XXIV.). Thus does he think of nothing less than of death; his wisdom is meditation of life not of death: q. e. d.

PROP. LXVIII. Were men born free, they would form no conception of good and evil so long as they continued free.

Demonst. I have called him free who is led by reason alone. He who is born free and continues free, therefore, has no other than adequate ideas, and so has no conception of evil (by Coroll. to Prop. LXIV.), and consequently,—good and evil being co-relatives—neither has he any conception of good: q. e. d.

Schol. That the hypothesis on which this proposition rests is not false, appears from Prop. IV. of this Part, and can only be conceived to be so when the nature of man is considered, or rather when God is considered not as he is infinite but only in so far as he is cause why man exists. And this, among other things (which I have already demonstrated), appears to have been signified by Moses in the history of the first man. For therein no other power of God is conceived save that by which he created man, the power, to wit, whereby he only provided for that which should be of use to man. It is on this account, as we learn, that God forbade the free man to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, and that so soon as he should eat of the fruit thereof he would forthwith rather fear to die than desire to live. Further, when the man had found the wife who accorded so entirely with his nature, he knew that there could not possibly be anything in nature more useful to him than she; but after he believed the lower animals to be like himself, he began incontinently to imitate their appetites (vide Prop. XXVII. Pt III.), and so lost his liberty. This, however, the patriarchs subsequently recovered, led by the Spirit of Christ, i. e. by the idea of God, which alone is competent to make man free, and to lead him to desire for others the good he covets for himself, as we have demonstrated above in our 37th Proposition.*

* See an interesting passage on the same subject in Letter XXXIII. to Bleyenberg. Spinoza's grand conception is that the Spirit of all wisdom, inherent in God from eternity and conceived more or less perfectly by man in the

PROP. LXIX. The virtue of the free man appears as distinctly in shunning as in encountering and overcoming danger.

Demonst. An affection can neither be restrained nor subdued save by the power of a contrary and stronger affection (by Prop. VII.). But blind audacity and fear are both affections, which can be conceived of equal potency (by Props. V. and III.). Therefore is equal power of mind or fortitude required to restrain boldness as to overcome fear (vide Schol. to Prop. LIX. Pt III.); that is to say, the man who is free avoids dangers by a like power of soul as that whereby he strives to overcome them: q. e. d.

Coroll. Retreat at the proper moment is therefore held as great a sign of courage in the free man as engaging in a conflict; in other words, the free man elects to retreat or to contend with like courage, with like resolution of soul.

Schol. I have explained in the Schol. to Prop. LIX. Pt III. what I understand by courage (*animositas*). By danger I understand whatever may be the cause of evil, such as sorrow, discord, hatred, &c.

PROP. LXX. The free man who lives among rude uncultivated persons, declines as much as possible to receive favours from them.

Demonst. Every one judges of what is good, from his own point of view (vide Schol. to Prop. XXXIX. Pt III.). The ignorant person, therefore, who confers favours estimates them according to his capacity, and if he sees that a favour is not very highly prized by him on whom it is conferred, he is grieved (by Prop. XLII. Pt III.). The free man, however, desires to bind other men to him in bonds of friendship (by Prop. XXXVII.); he seeks not to pay others back in their own coin, meeting like favours with like; he endeavours himself to walk, and strives to lead others to walk under the guidance of reason, and only does those things he knows to be good and of highest moment. Therefore the free man, in so far as lies in his power, and that he may escape the hate of the ignorant and not countenance their passions, but live under the empire of reason alone, is studious to decline their favours: q. e. d.

idea of God, was manifested more fully in the man Jesus (Jeshua ben Jousouf) than in any other human being.—TR.

Schol. I say *in so far as lies* in his power; for though men are ignorant, still are they men, who in straits and difficulties are able to render human aid—the most precious of all. Hence it often happens that favours are of necessity received from such, and have to be acknowledged in the spirit in which they are proffered. And then, in declining favours a certain delicacy is required, lest we seem to despise the givers, or, from stinginess, to grudge recompensing them, and so, by seeking to escape obligation, incur the risk of giving offence. In declining favours, therefore, we are still to have an eye to the useful and becoming.

PROP. LXXI. The free alone are ever truly grateful to one another.

Demonst. Free men alone are most useful to each other; are especially knit together by the necessities of true friendship (by Prop. XXXV. and Coroll. 1 above), and still strive with like love to do each other service (by Prop. XXXVII.). The free alone, therefore, are ever most grateful to each other: q. e. d.

Schol. The gratitude which men led by blind desire feel for one another, is mostly of the nature of traffic or barter, rather than true thankfulness. Ingratitude, indeed, is not an affection or emotion of the mind; but is a baseness, proclaiming for the most past that he who shows it is possessed by such affections as hatred, envy, anger, pride, covetousness, &c. He who through foolishness does not know how to make a return for benefits received, is not properly ungrateful; much less so is he who is not moved by the gifts of a harlot to gratify her lust, of a thief to conceal his robbery, or anything else of the same sort. He, on the contrary, shows himself possessed of an upright mind and stedfastness of purpose who refuses to be bribed by gifts of any kind to his own degradation and the public detriment.

PROP. LXXII. The free never act deceitfully and with an evil purpose, but always with good faith.

Demonst. Did the free man do anything deceitfully and of evil purpose, inasmuch as he is free, he would do so under the guidance of reason—for only in so far as man acts by the dictates of reason is he really free, as we have shown. To act deceitfully for an evil end, therefore, would be a virtue (by Prop. XXIV. above), and consequently (by the same

Prop.) it would be found most advantageous by every one, in order to continue his state of being, to act wickedly and with guile; that is (as is obvious), it would be good for men to agree in words but in deeds to differ and oppose each other,—all of which, however (by the Coroll. to Prop. XXXI.), is absurd. Therefore the free man does not act deceitfully and for an evil end, &c.: q. e. d.

Schol. If I am here asked, What if a man could free himself by guile and perfidy alone from the danger of present death, would not reason persuade him by all means to be perfidious and so save his life? I reply, Did reason so persuade, the advice were for mankind at large; and so reason would be found persuading men not to unite and have rights in common for other than evil and deceitful ends; that is, that they should not truly have rights in common and live securely, which is absurd.

PROP. LXXIII. The man led by reason is freer when he lives as member of a community, under compact and bond of law, than when he lives in solitude, when he obeys himself alone.

Demonst. He who lives by reason is not moved to obedience by fear (Prop. LXIII.); but desiring to preserve his state of being (by Schol. to Prop. LXVI.) and to live free, he holds on his course, reason and utility pointing the way, and consequently obedient to the laws and decretals of the state whereof he is a member (vide Schol. 2 to Prop. XXXVII.). The man, therefore, who is led by reason and desires to live in freedom is careful to observe the common laws of his country: q. e. d.

Schol. This and other like Propositions that have now been enunciated in connection with THE TRUE FREEDOM OF MAN, are to be referred to fortitude, magnanimity, and independence of character (vide Schol. to Prop. LIX. Pt III.). I do not think it requisite to enumerate in succession all the forms and aspects of this true nobility of nature, and still less to insist on the truth that the generous, magnanimous, self-relying man never yields to hate, envy, anger, spite or spleen, contempt or haughtiness. For this, as well as all else that bears upon *true life* and religion, can readily be deduced from what is said in Props. XXXVII. and XLVI. of this Part. There we have seen how hatred is to be vanquished by its opposite —love, and how every one who lives by the rule of reason de-

sires that the good he covets for himself should be enjoyed by others also. To which must be added what has been said in the Schol. to Prop. L. of this Part, and in various other places besides, viz., that the strong, the self-relying, the generously-constituted man, never forgets that all that happens, happens from the necessity of the divine nature; and that whatsoever he conceives as inconvenient or evil, whatever he views as impious, horrible, unjust, and base, arises from this: that things are conceived imperfectly, partially, and confusedly. For this reason especially does the strong man endeavour to conceive things as they are in themselves, to remove all that stands in the way of true conceptions, all such passions as anger, hatred, envy, mockery, pride, and the like, and thereby, and in so far as he may, strives to do well, and to live in joy. It will be my business in the next Part to show how far human virtue is capable of bringing such things to pass.

APPENDIX.

WHAT has now been delivered in this Part in regard to the right rule of life, is not so disposed that it can be taken in at a glance, but is demonstrated in a somewhat irregular way, and as each Proposition seemed to flow out of the one that preceded it. I shall, therefore, before I conclude present the whole subject under a number of comprehensive heads.

Chapter 1. All our endeavours or desires follow from the necessity of our nature, in such a way, that they can either be understood by this alone as their proximate cause, or in so far as we are a part of nature, which cannot of itself and without taking other individuals into account be adequately conceived.

Chap. 2. The desires which follow from our nature in such a way that they can be understood from that alone, are those which are referred to the mind, in so far as this is conceived as constituted by adequate ideas. But the other desires are not referred to the mind save in so far as it conceives things inadequately, and the strength and growth of these have to be defined not from our human power, but from the power of things external to us. Therefore are the former designated *actions*, whilst the latter are called *passions;* and whilst the former always proclaim our power, the latter declare our incompetence and imperfect conceptions.

Chap. 3. The actions, in other words, the desires which are defined by the proper power or reason of man are

always good; the others, on the contrary, may be either good or bad.

Chap. 4. It is, therefore, of especial importance in life that we perfect our understanding or reason as much as possible; in this alone, indeed, consists the chief happiness or bliss of man; for bliss is nothing less than the repose of soul which springs from the intuitive knowledge of God. Now to perfect the understanding is nothing less than to apprehend God, and the attributes and acts of God which follow from the necessity of his nature. Wherefore the final purpose of reasonable man, the grand moving impulse by which he studies to regulate all other impulses, is the desire he experiences adequately to conceive and to know himself and all things else that fall under the scope of his understanding.

Chap. 5. There is, therefore, no reasonable life without intelligence, and things are only good in so far as they aid man to enjoy his mental existence defined as understanding. That, on the contrary, and that only, which stands in the way of man's perfecting his understanding and enjoying rational existence I call bad.

Chap. 6. But inasmuch as all of which man is himself the efficient cause, is necessarily good, nothing of evil can happen to man save from external causes, viz., in so far as he is a part of nature at large, whose laws human nature must perforce obey, and to whose commands it must accommodate itself in an almost endless variety of ways.

Chap. 7. It is impossible that man should be other than a part of nature, and should not follow and be subject to its common order, when he finds himself among such individuals as agree with his human nature, however his power of action is thereby aided and increased; and, on the contrary, if among such as agree in nowise with his nature, he will scarce be able without great change in himself to accommodate himself to them.

Chap. 8. Whatever there is in the nature of things which we judge to be bad, or which can stand in the way of our existing and passing a rational life, it is permissible for us to remove in the manner that seems to us best and safest; and, on the other hand, whatever there is which we esteem good or useful to our self-preservation and our enjoyment of rational existence, is it lawful for us to appropriate and to use in the way we please. By Natural Right every one is allowed to do absolutely whatsoever he thinks will be of use to him.

Chap. 9. Nothing can agree better with the nature of anything than other individuals of the same species; and so (by chap. 7) nothing can be had by man more essential to his self-preservation and the enjoyment of a rational life than intercourse with reasonable men. Further, as among individual things we know of nothing more excellent than a reasonable man, so, in nothing can man show how much art and ingenuity avail, than in educating men in such wise, that they come at length to live entirely under the empire of reason.

Chap. 10. In the same measure as men are actuated by envy, hatred, &c., are they opposed to one another; and it is on this account that they are then to be more feared as they have more power than the other individuals of nature.

Chap. 11. The heart and understanding of man, however, are not vanquished by force of arms, but by reason, love, and liberal sentiments.

Chap. 12. It is of essential service to men to combine together, to form societies or associations, and to bind themselves to one another by mutual agreements, whereby many are made one as it were, and ends are accomplished that greatly conduce to progress, peaceful relations, and good understanding.

Chap. 13. To do this, however, skill and watchfulness are requisite. For men are fickle (few living by the rules of reason), and envious, and for the most part more disposed to vengeance than to mercy. A peculiar strength of mind is therefore required to enable a man to bear himself among others according to his own ideas, to control himself and not to fall into the habits and adopt the sentiments of those with whom he associates. They, again, who are always carping at their fellow-men, who delight in proclaiming their vices rather than in teaching virtue, who do not know how to strengthen souls but essay to bend and break them, are only troublesome to themselves as well as others. Whence many, through impotence of spirit and false views of religion, have preferred a life among the brutes to one among men; even as boys and young men impatient of the yoke of parental authority will sometimes flee from home, enlist as soldiers, and prefer the hardships of war and the tyranny of foreign discipline to the comforts of home combined with paternal reproof: they patiently endure any burthen that is laid upon them so as they can but be revenged on their parents.

Chap. 14. Although men, therefore, mostly, strive to

arrange things in the way they like, many more advantages than evils nevertheless accrue from their association. It is generally better, therefore, in civil life to bear inconveniences and injuries with equanimity, and diligently to do everything that conduces to concord and engenders friendly feelings.

Chap. 15. The acts that beget concord are such especially as are referred to equity, integrity, candour, and honourable procedure. For men, besides their dislike of what they regard as unjust, are much averse to baseness and underhand dealing of every kind, and will not tolerate attempts against the customary morals of society. To conciliate love, however, all that bears upon religion and piety is more especially and necessarily to be regarded. On the matters here touched on vide Schol. 1 and 2 to Prop. XXXVII., the Schol. to Prop. XLVI., and that to Prop. LXXIII., of Part IV.

Chap. 16. Peace is further frequently secured by fear; but then it is without trust. Add, that fear arises from impotence of soul and therefore is not in the service of reason; neither, moreover, is pity or compassion, although it has an outer air of piety about it.

Chap. 17. Men are yet further conciliated by liberality, especially they who have not the wherewithal to procure the necessaries of life. But to meet the wants of every needy person would far surpass the power, as it would not conduce to the usefulness of any private individual, however affluent. And then the power of an individual is much more limited than the power of a community. Wherefore the care of the poor devolves on society at large and bears upon the common weal alone.

Chap. 18. In accepting favours, and showing gratitude, again, our care must be entirely different, a point that will be found fully referred to in the Schol. to Prop. LXX., and in that to Prop. LXXI. of Pt IV.

Chap. 19. Meretricious love, and indeed all love absolutely that owns any other cause than freedom of soul, turns readily into hatred, unless indeed—and this is still worse—it be a kind of delirium, when it proves a source of discord rather than of concord. Vide Coroll. to Prop. XXXI. Pt III.

Chap. 20. As regards marriage, it certainly consists with reason, if the impulse towards cohabitation is not derived from outward form alone, but also from the desire to procreate children and to educate them wisely; and further, if on both parts—that of the man and woman alike—the love is

not because of externals only, but has freedom of mind for its principal motive.

Chap. 21. Flattery or adulation produces concord, but it does so through the base offence of servility, or perfidy; for none are more taken with flattery than the vainglorious, who still desire to be first, and yet are not so.

Chap. 22. Self-abasement is a kind of false piety or religion; and although humility is opposed to pride or haughtiness, still is the abject man near akin to the haughty. Vide Schol. to Prop. LVII. Pt IV.

Chap. 23. The sense of shame can only conduce to concord in things that cannot be hidden. And then, as shame is a form of sorrow, it has no relation to reason.

Chap. 24. The other depressing or sorrowful emotions are directly opposed to justice, kindliness, honour, piety, and religion; and although indignation has a semblance of justice, yet do they live without law who feel themselves at liberty to criticise the acts of others and are over-forward to assert their own or other people's rights.

Chap. 25. Love of approbation and modesty (*modestia*), that is, the desire to please or be agreeable to others, in so far as it is determined by reason, is referable to veneration or respectfulness (*pietas*), as has been shown in the Scholium to Prop. XXXVII. of Pt IV. But if the love of approval arise from affection, it is then a species of ambition or selfishness, whereby men under a false show of consideration for others are apt to excite discord and sedition. For he who would aid others with advice or more solid evidence of the interest he takes in them, in order that they with himself may enjoy true happiness, will be careful to conciliate their love, but never attempt to seduce them into any such admiration of himself or his deeds as might lead them to make a watchword of his name. He will also be cautious to give no handle for envy or detraction to lay hold of; in public he will avoid speaking of the vices or foibles of mankind, but will be ready at all times freely to descant on the virtues and powers for self-improvement of which they are possessed, whilst he points out the way that should be taken to make these of most avail. By such means will he endeavour to lead men, casting out fear, envy, and mutual distrust, to live under the empire of love and joy prescribed by reason.

Chap. 26. We know nothing in nature except our fellow men that needs be a source of mental enjoyment to us, or that can attach us in the bonds of friendship or custom; so that

whatever there is in the nature of things besides man, we are not required without regard to our convenience to preserve it, but, according to exigency either to preserve, or to destroy, or to adapt it to our wants in the way we judge best.

Chap. 27. The use we make of things external to ourselves, to say nothing of the experience and knowledge we acquire of them from observation, and by causing them to undergo changes in form, &c., bears reference mainly to the preservation of our bodies. For this reason are those things especially useful to us which so nourish our body that all its parts are maintained in a state fit to discharge their functions. For the more apt the body is to be variously affected, and variously to affect external objects, the better fitted is the mind for thought (vide Props. XXXVIII. and XXXIX. Pt IV.). There would seem to be very few minds, however, in this desirable state in nature. A great variety of alimentary matters are required that the body be duly nourished; for the human frame is composed of numerous parts of diverse natures, which require incessant supplies of various aliments in order that the whole organism may be kept in a state fit for all that can possibly follow from its constitution, and, consequently, that the mind also may be maintained equally fit to form the conceptions of which by nature it is capable.

Chap. 28. To secure all this, however, the strength of individuals would scarcely suffice did not men combine and mutually aid each other. But *money* has become the compendious representative of almost everything in the world, and the idea of money engrosses the minds of the vulgar so entirely that there is scarcely any kind of pleasure or enjoyment they imagine which is not associated with the idea of money as its cause.

Chap. 29. But this is only a vice in those who covet wealth not that they may supply their daily wants by its means, but in those who give themselves up to the pursuit of lucre for the sake of making a figure in the world. The money-grub and the miser must feed like other men, but they often starve themselves, for they believe that so much of their pelf as they spend in maintaining their bodies, is but wasted or lost. They, on the contrary, who know the right use of wealth, and who make their wants the measure of their gains, live content with little.

Chap. 30. Since, then, those things are good that support the body and its parts in a state fit for the performance of

their several offices, and as true happiness consists in the maintenance or increase of the powers of man, constituted as he is of mind and body, therefore are all things that give him joy or pleasure good. But on the other hand, as things do not act to the end that we may have pleasure, and their capacities of action are not tempered to our service, and, finally, as pleasure is commonly referred to one part of the body in particular, therefore—and unless reason and vigilance preside—most of the pleasurable emotions, and by consequence the desires they engender, are apt to become excessive [and so evil]. Hence it also happens that the emotion, although experienced in the first instance as agreeable, is not always so regarded by and by. Vide Schol. to Prop. XLIV., and Schol. to Prop. LX. of Part IV.

Chap. 31. Superstition would persuade us, on the contrary, that what brings us pain and sorrow is good, and again that what causes joy and gladness is evil. But as already said (Schol. to Prop. XLV. Pt IV.) nothing but envy and malevolence could take pleasure in our incapacity and misery. For the more joyfully we are affected, to the higher perfection do we mount, and thereby the more do we participate in the divine nature; nor can the joy ever be evil that is tempered by reason and moves in harmony with that which is of use to us. He, on the contrary, who is moved by fear, and does good that he may escape evil, is not led by reason (vide Prop. LXIII. Pt IV.).

Chap. 32. But human power is greatly limited, and is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes; and thus it is that we have no absolute power of adapting to our use things external to ourselves. Still, all that befalls us contrary to what reason requires for our use and convenience, we bear with equanimity, if we but know that we have fairly done our duty, that the power we possess does not extend so far as would have enabled us to escape the evil that has happened, and that we are a part of nature at large, whose order we obey. And understanding so much clearly and distinctly, that part of us which is called intelligence or understanding, in other words, our better part, acquiesces in the conclusion, and seeks to persevere in such acquiescence. For, in so far as we *understand*, we *desire* that only which is *necessary*, and *can* only acquiesce absolutely in that which is *true*; so that, in as far as we rightly understand these things, so far does the inclination or effort of the better part within us accord with the order of nature at large.

PART V.

OF THE

POWER OF THE UNDERSTANDING, OR HUMAN FREEDOM.

INTRODUCTION.

I COME at length to that other Part of Ethics which treats of the manner or way that leads to freedom. Here, therefore, I shall speak of the POWER OF REASON, and show what reason of itself can effect in respect of the emotions, and explain wherein freedom of mind or true happiness (*beatitudo*) consists. From this we shall see how much more excellent is understanding than ignorance. It is not my intention, however, to treat either of the conduct of the understanding, or of the means of maintaining the body in such a state as best enables it to perform its functions, the former subject falling properly under the head of Logic, the latter under that of Medicine. My purpose in this Part, I say, will be to treat exclusively of the Power of the Mind, or of Reason; and, above all, to show the amount and the nature of the empire which reason possesses in restraining or moderating the emotions; for that we have no absolute control over these I have already demonstrated in what precedes. The Stoics, indeed, held that the emotions depended entirely on the Will, and that we could command them absolutely. But on grounds of experience, though not of principle, they found themselves forced to confess that no small measure of habit and study was required to restrain and moderate the emotions; a truth which, if I remember rightly, they were wont to illustrate by the instance of two dogs, one a watch dog, the other a sporting dog, which, nevertheless, by training and habit were by-and-by so changed in disposition that the house-dog became eager in the chase, and the hunting-dog gave up running after game. Descartes shows himself not a little favourable

to the views of the Stoics. He maintains that the mind or soul is especially connected with a certain part of the brain called the pineal gland (Des Passions de l'Ame, Pt I. § 31), by means of which it perceives every motion that takes place in the body, is made sensible of external objects, and, by willing, effects whatever movements it desires to execute. The pineal gland, Descartes thinks, is so suspended in the middle of the brain as to be thrown into motion by the slightest movements of the animal spirits; and is suspended, or swayed in as many different ways as the animal spirits in different ways impinge upon it, and that as many and as various impressions are made on it as there are external objects that propel the animal spirits towards the gland; whence it happens that the gland, having had such a motion communicated to it by the will of the soul as it had formerly received when acted on by the animal spirits impelled towards it, itself propels and determines the animal spirits in the same way as they had formerly been repelled by a similar suspension of the gland. Descartes further maintains that every volition of the soul is by nature connected with a certain motion of the pineal gland; he, for example, who wills to look at a distant object has his pupil dilated in virtue of the volition; did he think of dilating the pupil of his eye, however, he would not be able to do so in virtue of the volition, because nature has not connected the motion of the pineal gland which serves to propel the animal spirits towards the optic nerve for the purpose of causing dilation or contraction of the pupil with the will to influence this part, but with the will to look at nearer or more distant objects. Lastly, Descartes maintains that though each particular motion of the pineal gland appears to be connected by nature from the beginning of our life with each of our several thoughts, still that other thoughts may by force of habit be connected with its motions; a position which he endeavours to establish in article 50 of the First Part of the Treatise on the Passions. From such premises Descartes concludes that there is no soul so feeble but that well directed it may attain to absolute control over its passions. For the passions, according to the definition he gives of them, are perceptions, sensations, or commotions of the soul, especially referred to it, and produced, maintained, and strengthened by certain movements of the spirits (Vide § 27, Pt I., Des Passions de l'Ame). Now, if with such and such a volition we could at pleasure associate such and such a motion of the pineal gland, and consequently of the animal

spirits, and if the determination of the will lay entirely within our power, we should only have to settle the motives of our conduct in life by fixed and definite principles and the will to have such and such motions in conformity with these, to acquire an absolute empire over our passions.

Such, in so far as I can understand him, is the opinion of this distinguished philosopher; and I must confess that had it been less recondite, less ingenious, I should scarcely have expected anything of the kind from him. I cannot, indeed, sufficiently express my wonder that a philosopher who lays it down broadly that nothing is to be inferred save from self-evident propositions, and nothing to be affirmed save that which is clearly and distinctly apprehended, who so frequently charges the schoolmen with attempting to explain things obscure by occult qualities,—that he, I say, should assume an hypothesis more obscure than any the most occult quality. What, I ask, does he understand by the union of the soul and the body? What clear and distinct conception, I demand, has he of thought most intimately united with even the smallest atom of any quantitative thing? I would, indeed, that he had explained this union by its proximate cause. But he had conceived the soul as so distinct from the body that he could neither assign any peculiar cause for this union nor for the existence of the soul itself; so that he found it necessary to have recourse to the cause of the universe at large, i. e. to God. Again, I should particularly wish to know what degrees of motion the soul is able to communicate to this pineal gland, and with what force it can hold the same suspended? For I know not whether the gland is more slowly or more quickly acted on by the soul than by the animal spirits, and whether the motions of the passions which we connect so closely with our decisions cannot be again dissevered from these by corporeal causes; whence it would follow that although the mind had firmly resolved to meet a certain danger, and with this resolve had associated the needful courage, nevertheless, in presence of the danger, the suspension of the gland might be such that the mind could think of nothing but flight. And indeed as there is no ratio between the will and motion, neither can there be any comparison between the powers or strength of the mind and that of the body, and consequently the powers of this can in nowise determine the powers of that. To all which let us add that neither is the pineal gland situated in the midst of the brain in such a way that it can be acted upon on every side so easily and in such a variety of

ways [as Descartes supposes], nor are all the nerves produced or extended to the cavities of the brain. I say nothing of what Descartes asserts in regard to the will and its freedom, inasmuch as I shall sufficiently and more than sufficiently show that his views on this subject are mistaken. Wherefore, and inasmuch as the power of the mind, as I show above, is defined by the intellect alone, the remedies against or means of controlling the emotions which all experience, indeed, but which all, as I believe, do not accurately observe nor distinctly apprehend, are only to be found in the knowledge of the mind, from which we shall deduce whatsoever bears upon peace of mind or true beatitude.

AXIOMS.

1. If two contrary actions are excited in the same subject, a change must necessarily take place either in one or in both, until they cease to be contrary.

2. The power of an effect is defined by the power of its cause; in so far as the essence of an effect is explained or defined by the essence of its cause.

This axiom is obvious from Prop. VII. Pt III.

PROPOSITIONS.

PROP. I. In precisely the same way as the thoughts and ideas of things are arranged and connected in the mind, are the affections or images of things rigidly ordered and concatenated in the body.

Demonst. The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things (by Prop. VII. Pt II.); and *vice versâ*, the order and connection of things is the same as the order and connection of ideas (by Corolls. to Props. VI. and VII. Pt II.). Wherefore, even as the order and connection of ideas take place in the mind according to the order and concatenation of the affections of the body (by Prop. XVIII. Pt II.), so and in the same way, *vice versâ*, are the order and connection of the affections of the body affected as the thoughts and ideas of things are ordered and concatenated in the mind (by Prop. II. Pt III.): q. e. d.

PROP. II. If we dissever an emotion or affection of the mind from the thought of its external cause, and with

it associate other thoughts, then will love or hatred towards the external cause, as well as the agitations of mind that arise from these emotions, be superseded.

Demonst. For that which constitutes the form of love or hatred is joy or sorrow, connected with the idea of an external cause (by Def. 6 and 7 of the Affections). If this, then, be superseded, the form of love or hate is at the same time annulled, and so are these emotions, or such emotions as spring from them, annulled also: q. e. d.

PROP. III. An emotion which is a passion ceases to be so as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it.

Demonst. The emotion which is a passion is a confused idea (by the General Def. of the Affections). If, therefore, we form to ourselves a clear and distinct idea of the emotion itself, this idea, as referred to the mind alone, is not distinguished save by reason from the emotion (by Prop. XXI. Pt II. with Schol.), and so (by Prop. III. Pt III.) the emotion ceases to be a passion: q. e. d.

Coroll. An emotion is therefore by so much the more under our control, and the mind suffers less from it the better it is understood by us.

PROP. IV. There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form some clear and distinct conception.

Demonst. Things that are common to all cannot be conceived otherwise than adequately (by Prop. XXXVIII. Pt II.). Consequently (Prop. XII., and Lem. 2 which follows the Schol. to Prop. XIII. of Pt II.) there is no affection of the body whereof we cannot form some clear and distinct conception: q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it follows that there is no emotion of which we cannot form a clear and distinct conception. For, an emotion is the idea of an affection of the body, and must therefore (from the preceding proposition) involve some clear and definite conception.

Schol. Inasmuch as there is nothing from which some effect does not follow (by Prop. XXXVI. Pt I.), and whatever follows from the idea within us adequately conceived, is clearly and distinctly understood (by Prop. XL. Pt II.), it is deducible that every one has the power of clearly understanding himself and his affections, if not absolutely, yet partially;

and consequently of suffering less from them. The grand thing, therefore, here to be aimed at is this: that each of us as far as possible should clearly apprehend his several affections, so that the mind may be determined by affection to think of those things only which it perceives clearly, and in which it acquiesces completely. By this will the affection itself be dissevered from thoughts of an external cause and associated with true thoughts; and then will it come to pass that not only love, hate, &c., will be controlled or subdued (by Prop. II. above), but that the appetite or desire which is wont to arise from an affection shall not become excessive (by Prop. LXI. Pt IV.). For it is particularly to be noted, that it is from one and the same appetite that man is said to act as well as to suffer. For example, when we showed human nature so constituted that every man inclines to have all the world live after his particular fashion (vide Schol. to Prop. XXXI. Pt III.), this disposition, in him who is not led by reason, is a passion, which is called ambition, and does not differ much from haughtiness; whilst in the man who lives by reason it is, on the contrary, an action or virtue that is called good-will (*pietas*). Vide Schol. 1 to Prop. XXXVII. Pt IV., and the 2nd Demonst. of the same Prop. In this way we perceive that all the appetites or desires are passions only in so far as they arise from inadequate ideas; and that they are to be referred to virtue when they are excited or engendered by adequate ideas. For all the desires whereby we are determined to do anything may arise from or be produced by adequate as well as inadequate ideas (vide Prop. LIX. Pt IV.).

Nothing in our power can be conceived of greater excellence than this remedy for the affections—returning from this digression—which resides in a true knowledge of their nature; for there is no other power of the mind than that of thinking and forming adequate ideas as we have shown above (vide Prop. III. Pt III.).

PROP. V. The affection we feel for a thing *per se*, simply, and not as either necessary or possible or contingent, is, *cæteris paribus*, the strongest of all.

Demonst. Our affection for a thing which we imagine as free is greater than that we conceive for a thing we imagine to be necessary (by Prop. XLIX. Pt III.), and consequently is still greater than for a thing which we fancy to be merely

contingent (by Prop. XI. Pt IV.). But to imagine a thing as free can only be to imagine a thing simply and in itself, whilst we are ignorant of the causes by which it was determined to action (by what is shown in the Schol. to Prop. XXXV. Pt II.). Wherefore the affection we experience for a thing which we imagine simply *per se*, is greater, *cæteris paribus*, than for a possible or contingent thing, and is consequently the greatest of all: q. e. d.

PROP. VI. In so far as the mind understands things as necessary, in so far has it a greater power over the affections, or suffers less from them.

Demonst. The mind understands all things to be necessary (by Prop. XXIX. Pt I.), and is determined to exist and to act by an infinite concatenation of causes (by Prop. XXVIII. Pt I.); therefore (by the preceding proposition) does it suffer less from the affections that arise from necessary causes (by Prop. XLVIII. Pt III.), and is less powerfully affected in their respect, than by others that depend on contingent causes: q. e. d.

Schol. The more that this knowledge of all things being necessary is made to bear upon particular things, which we imagine more distinctly or vividly, the greater is the power of the mind over the affections, a truth which is also confirmed by experience; for we see that grief for the loss of anything good is moderated so soon as he who suffers the loss considers that he could in no possible way have retained what is gone. So also do we see that no one commiserates an infant because it cannot speak or walk or reason,—in fine, that it has to pass so many years of its life in a kind of unconscious state. But were the greater number of persons born adults and one or two here and there produced as infants, then would every one pity these infants; because infancy would now appear not as a natural and necessary state, but as a vice or failure of nature. It would be easy to adduce a great many similar illustrations.

PROP. VII. The emotions that spring from or are excited by reason are, as regards time, more potent than those that are referred to individual things contemplated as absent.

Demonst. We do not contemplate a thing as absent from the emotion whereby we imagine it, but from this, that the

body is affected by another emotion which excludes the existence of the thing in question (by Prop. XVII. Pt II.). Wherefore the emotion that is referred to a thing contemplated as absent is not of such a nature as exceeds the other actions and powers of man (on which see Prop. VI. Pt IV.), but, on the contrary, its nature is such that it can be controlled in some sort by those affections which exclude the existence of its external cause (by Prop. IX. Pt IV.). The affection, however, which arises from reason is necessarily referred to the common properties of things (vide the Def. of Reason in the 2nd Schol. to Prop. IX. Pt II.), which we always contemplate as present—there being nothing that can exclude their present existence—and which we also always imagine in the same manner (by Prop. XXXVIII. Pt II.). Wherefore an affection of this kind always continues the same; and affections consequently (by Ax. 1) opposed to it and not fostered by its outward causes, must accommodate themselves more and more to it until they are at length no longer in opposition, and the affection arising from reason becomes in so far the stronger: q. e. d.

PROP. VIII. The greater the number of causes that simultaneously concur to excite an emotion the more powerful it is.

Demonst. A greater number of causes acting together are more powerful than a smaller number (by Prop. VII. Pt III.), and so must the emotion excited by a greater number of causes acting simultaneously be stronger than one excited by a smaller number: q. e. d.

Schol. This Proposition is also elucidated by Axiom 2 above.

PROP. IX. An affection referred to several and diverse causes contemplated by the mind simultaneously with the affection, is less hurtful, is less a cause of suffering to us, and we are less powerfully affected in regard to it, than we should be by another equally strong affection referred to a single cause, or to a smaller number of causes.

Demonst. An emotion is only bad or hurtful in so far as the mind is prevented by it from thinking (by Props. XX.

and XXVII. Pt IV.). Consequently the emotion by which the mind is led to the simultaneous contemplation of several objects, is less hurtful than another equally strong emotion which by its own peculiar force so holds the mind to the contemplation of one or a small number of objects, that it cannot think of any others. This in the first place. Again, since the essence, i. e., the power, of the mind consists in thought exclusively (by Props. VII. and XI. Pt III.), therefore does it suffer less from an emotion whereby it is determined simultaneously to contemplate several objects, than from an equally great emotion which holds it bound in the contemplation of one object only, or of a smaller number of objects. This in the second place. Lastly, the affection (by Prop. LVIII. Pt III.) that is referred to several external causes must, as regards each of these individually, be less hurtful: q. e. d.

PROP. X. So long as we are not agitated by emotions opposed to our nature, so long have we the power of ordering and concatenating the affections of the body in consonance with Intellectual order.

Demonst. Affections contrary to our nature, and therefore bad (Prop. XXX. Pt IV.), are evil in so far as they stand in way of the mind's comprehending (Prop. XXVII. Pt IV.). So long, therefore, as we are not agitated by affections opposed to our nature, so long is that power of the mind whereby it seeks to understand things not impeded (Prop. XXVI. Pt IV.). Consequently, so long has it the power of forming clear and distinct ideas, and of deducing others from these and from yet others in succession (by Schol. 2 to Prop. XL., and Schol. to Prop. XLVII. Pt II.); and so long, further, have we the power of ordering and concatenating the affections of the body conformably to the order of the understanding: q. e. d.

Schol. It is in virtue of this power of rightly ordering and concatenating the affections of the body that we can bring ourselves to resist being readily influenced by evil affections. For (by Prop. VII. above) a greater force is required to restrain affections arranged and enchained according to Intellectual order, than such affections as are vague and uncertain. The best we can do, therefore, so long as we have not a perfect knowledge of our affections, is to conceive a rational mode of living, to lay down certain precepts for the conduct of our lives, to commit these to memory, and to

apply them strictly to the particular incidents encountered in the world, so that, being always at hand for application, our imagination may be constantly influenced by them. For example, we have laid it down among the rules for the conduct of our lives (vide Prop. XLVI. Pt IV. and its Schol.), that hate is to be overcome by love or magnanimity, not to be paid back or balanced by reciprocated hate. Now that we may always have this prescription of reason at hand, when occasion makes its application necessary, we should ever and anon be thinking over the common causes of offence among men, and meditating how and in what way these are best to be got the better of by kindness and magnanimity. For thus shall we have the image of an injury in connection with the imagination of a wholesome precept, always present to our mind when offence is given or injury is done us (vide Prop. XVIII. Pt II.). If we also keep steadily in view what is truly useful and even good for us, think of the benefits that accrue from friendship and social life, what peace of mind ensues from living in conformity with reason, and further that men, like all things else, act by the necessity of their nature, then will dislike or hatred, such as is wont to be excited by an injury done, make the smallest possible impression on the imagination and be most easily overcome; or, should the anger that is wont to be aroused by greater injuries not be so easily subdued, subdued it will be nevertheless, although not without mental struggle, continued however for a much shorter time than if such premeditations had not been present to the mind (vide Props. VI., VII., and VIII. above).

The same train of reflection may be pursued with respect to the courage that is required to get the better of fear: the common dangers of life are to be noted and frequently thought over, and the presence of mind and fortitude whereby they are best avoided or overcome made familiar by reflection. But here it is to be observed, that in ordering our thoughts and imaginations we are still to attend to those things that are good under all circumstances and in every place (vide Coroll. to Prop. LXIII. Pt IV. and Prop. LIX. Pt III.); so that we are always to be moved to action by the emotion of joy. For example: if any one sees that he is too fond of fame, too eager for glory, he is forthwith to bethink him of the right use of glory, of the purposes, the ends for which it is to be pursued, and the means by which it is to be won; but he is not to think of its abuse, of the fickleness of mankind or

such idle vanities as brain-sick men alone consider; for they are the vain-glorious only who torture themselves with such reflections, especially when they despair of achieving the glory to which they aspire; desiring to appear sages, they only proclaim their folly. It is certain that they are often the most eager for fame who cry out against its abuse, and most loudly denounce the vanities of the world. Nor, indeed, is this peculiar to the vain-glorious and ambitious, but is common to all to whom fortune is unpropitious and who are of feeble soul. For the envious or covetous poor man is for ever speaking of the abuses of wealth and the vices of the rich, whereby he does but torment himself and shows plainly that it is not only his own poverty he bears impatiently, but the wealth of others which he begrudges them. So also does he who is indifferently received by his mistress think of nothing but the fickleness, the inconstancy, and the other accredited shortcomings of woman, all of which, however, are forgotten the moment he is again taken into favour. He, therefore, who would study to moderate his affections and appetites, through pure love of liberty, strives with all his strength to acquire a knowledge of the virtues and their causes, and to fill his mind with the joy that springs from the perfect apprehension of these; but he never dwells on the vices of mankind; he takes no delight in detraction, and never deceives himself with any false show of freedom. Whoever diligently considers and faithfully puts in practice the foregoing precepts—and they are by no means difficult—will speedily be able to make his conduct square with and conform to the commands of reason.

PROP. XI. The greater the number of things with which the image of some particular thing is associated, the more frequently does it recur to and occupy the mind.

Demonst. The more an image or affection bears on a number of things, the more causes are there by which it can be excited or kept alive, all of which things the mind (by hypothesis) contemplates simultaneously with the affection itself. And thus does the affection recur more frequently to and engage the mind: q. e. d.

PROP. XII. Images of things are more easily connected with images referred to things clearly and distinctly apprehended, than with others not so apprehended.

Demonst. The things we clearly and distinctly understand are either the common properties of things, or such as are deduced from these (vide Schol. 2, Prop. XL. Pt II.), and are consequently (by preceding Prop.) more frequently excited in us. Thence it comes to pass that we contemplate such things more readily in association with these than with those; and consequently (by Prop. XVIII. Pt II.) connect them more easily with these than with those: q. e. d.

PROP. XIII. The more any image is associated with several others, the more vividly does it present itself to the mind.

Demonst. For the greater the number of images with which a particular image is associated, the greater the number of causes by which it may be excited: q. e. d.

PROP. XIV. The mind has the power of referring all the affections of the body, or images of things, to the idea of God.

Demonst. There is no bodily affection of which the mind cannot form a clear and distinct conception (by Prop. IV. above); and so cause all (by Prop. XV. Pt I.) to be referred to the idea of God: q. e. d.

PROP. XV. He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his affections loves God, and that by so much the more as he the more intimately understands himself and his affections.

Demonst. He who comprehends himself and his affections clearly and distinctly, rejoices (by Prop. LIII. Pt III.), and this in concomitance with the idea of God (by the preceding Prop.). Thus does he love God (vide 6 of Def. of Aff.); and, for the same reason, loves God ever the more, as he better understands himself and his affections: q. e. d.

PROP. XVI. The love of God ought chiefly to occupy the mind.

Demonst. For this love is conjoined with all the affections of the body (by Prop. XIV.), by all of which it is cherished

(by Prop. XV.). Therefore ought it chiefly to engage the mind: q. e. d.

PROP. XVII. God is without passions; and is not affected by any emotion of joy or sorrow.

Demonst. All ideas in so far as they are referred to God are true (by Prop. XXXII. Pt II.), that is (by Def. 4, Pt II.), are adequate, and so (from the general definition of the Affections) God is without passions. Again, God can neither pass from a greater to a less, nor from a less to a greater, state of perfection (by Coroll. 2 to Prop. XX. Pt I.), and so (by 2 and 3 of the Defs. of the Affections) can be affected by no joy nor sorrow: q. e. d.

Coroll. Properly speaking, God loves no one, neither does he hate any one; for God, as we have just seen, is affected by neither joy nor sorrow, and consequently can neither love nor hate any one: q. e. d.

PROP. XVIII. No one can hate God.

Demonst. The idea of God within us is adequate and perfect (by Prop. XLVI. and XLVII. Pt. II.); in so far as we contemplate God, therefore, to the same extent do we act (by Prop. III. Pt II.); and consequently (by Prop. LIX. Pt III.) there can be no pain or sorrow associated with the idea of God; in other words (by 7 of the Def. of Aff.) no one can have God in hate: q. e. d.

Coroll. Love towards God cannot be turned into hate.

Schol. Here, however, it may be objected to me that as we know God to be the cause of all things, so must we also regard him as the cause of our sorrows. But to this I reply, that in so far as we understand the cause of sorrow, to the same extent does sorrow cease to be a passion (by Prop. III. above), i. e., it ceases to be sorrow (by Prop. LIX. Pt III.), so that in so far as God were conceived to be the cause of our sorrows, in so far should we be gladdened.

PROP. XIX. He who loves God cannot seek to have God love him in return.

Demonst. Did man look for such a thing, he would thereby desire (by Coroll. to Prop. XVII. above) that God, whom he loves, should not be God; and consequently (by Prop. XIX. Pt III.) would desire to be grieved, which (by Prop. XXVIII. Pt III.) is absurd. Wherefore he who loves God, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. XX. Love towards God can be sullied by no feeling of envy or of jealousy, but is the more cherished the greater the number of men we imagine to be linked to God in like bonds of love.

Demonst. This love towards God is the *summum bonum*, the supreme good, which man under the dictates of reason can desire (vide Prop. XXVIII. Pt IV.). It is further common to all mankind alike (by Prop. XXXVI. Pt IV.), and we can desire that all alike should enjoy it (by Prop. XXXVII. Pt IV.). Love of God, therefore, cannot be sullied either by emotions of envy or of jealousy, (vide Prop. XVIII. above, and the definitions of envy and jealousy in the Schol. to Prop. XXXV. Pt III.); on the contrary (by Prop. XXXI. Pt III.), it must be cherished the more, the greater the number of our fellow-men we imagine to enjoy it: q. e. d.

Schol. It were easy in the same way to show that there is no emotion directly opposed to this love, none whereby it can be obscured or destroyed; so that we conclude love towards God to be of all the emotions the one which is most constant; and in so far as it is referred to the body, that it can only be destroyed with the body itself. As to the nature of this affection, and in how far it is to be referred to the mind alone, these are points that will fall under consideration by-and-by.

In what precedes I have included all the means that are remedial against excess in the affections, or all that the mind, considered in itself, can effect against the emotions; whence it appears that the power of the mind over the emotions consists:

1st, In the conception *per se* of the emotions (vide Schol. to Prop. IV. above).

2nd, In the separation of emotion from the conception of an external cause, which we imagine confusedly (vide Prop. II. and its Schol. and Prop. IV. above).

3rd, In the time wherein emotions referred to things we comprehend, surpass those referred to things we conceive confusedly or imperfectly (vide Prop. VII. above).

4th, In the multiplicity of causes whereby the emotions referred to the common properties of things, or to God, are excited (vide Prop. IX. and XI. above).

5th, In the order in which the mind can arrange and connect its emotions with one another (vide Schol. to Prop. X., and further to Props. XII., XIII., and XIV. above).

But that we may have a better conception of the power of the mind over the emotions, it is proper to observe that the emotions are by us called great or powerful when, comparing the emotions of one man with those of another, we perceive that one is more strongly affected by the same emotion than another; or when, contrasting the emotions of the same man with each other, we perceive that he is affected in a greater degree by one emotion than by another. For (by Prop. V. Pt IV.) the power of each emotion is defined as the power of an external cause compared with that which is in ourselves. But the power of the mind is defined as understanding alone; and impotence or passion is regarded as simple privation of understanding, i. e., privation of the power by which ideas called adequate are conceived. Whence it follows that that mind suffers most which is principally constituted by inadequate ideas. A mind so constituted is indeed distinguished rather by what it suffers than by what it effects. That mind, on the contrary, has the largest sphere of action whose greater part is made up of adequate ideas. Such a mind, although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former, is still rather distinguished by the ideas that are associated with human virtue than by those that argue human impotency. Further, it is to be observed that mental perturbations and misfortunes mainly take their rise from too great a love of things exposed to many vicissitudes and of such as we can never have entirely in our power. For no one is eager or anxious about a thing unless he loves it, nor do suspicions, evil inclinations, enmities, &c., arise save from love of things which no one can truly possess and control. From these considerations we readily perceive what a clear and distinct conception is, and especially do we understand what can be effected against the emotions by that third kind of knowledge whose foundation is the conception of God (vide Schol. to Prop. XLVII. Pt II.), emotions which, if not absolutely suppressed as passions (see Prop. III. and the Schol. to Prop. IV.), are at all events made to constitute the very smallest part of the mind. This knowledge further engenders love for the immutable and eternal Being, which we may be said to have in our power, which can be sullied by none of the vices that inhere in vulgar love, but that may go on increasing continually more and more, and so come at length mainly to possess the soul (by Props. XV. and XVI.) and influence it in the most decided manner.

In what precedes I conclude all I had to say of matters

pertaining to this present life. By attending to what is noted at the beginning of this Scholium, to our definitions of the mind and its emotions, and lastly to Propositions I. and III. of our Third Part, it will be seen that I have embraced a consideration of all the means we possess of controlling our emotions. It is time, therefore, that I pass on to the consideration of that which pertains to the duration or continuance of the mind without relation to the body.

PROP. XXI. The mind can imagine nothing, neither can it remember anything that is past, save during the continuance of the body.

Demonst. The mind does not express the actual existence of its body, neither does it conceive the affections of the body as actual, save whilst the body endures (Coroll. to Prop. VIII. Pt II.); and consequently (by Prop. XXVI. Pt II.) conceives no other body as actually existing save whilst its own body continues. Hence, also, the mind can neither imagine (vide Def. of Imagination in Schol. to Prop. XVII. Pt II.) nor recollect (vide Def. of Memory in Schol. to Prop. XVIII. Pt II.) things past, except during the persistence of its body: q. e. d.

PROP. XXII. In God, however, there must necessarily exist an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity.

Demonst. God is not only the cause of the existence of this or that human body, but also of its essence (Prop. XXV. Pt I.), which must therefore be necessarily conceived by the very essence of God (by Ax. 4, Pt I.), and this in virtue of a certain eternal necessity (Prop. VI. Pt I.); a conception which indeed must necessarily have place in God (Prop. III. Pt II.): q. e. d.

PROP. XXIII. The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed along with the body; something of it remains which is eternal.

Demonst. There is necessarily in God a conception or idea which expresses the essence of the human body (by the preceding Prop.), and this therefore is necessarily something that pertains to the essence of the human mind (by Prop. XIII. Pt II.). But we ascribe no duration to mind

that can be defined by time, save only and in so far as the actual existence of the body, which is explained by duration and may be defined by time, is expressed; that is to say (by Coroll. to Prop. VIII. Pt II.), we do not ascribe duration to the mind except in connection with the body. As, however, there is necessarily a something which by a certain eternal necessity is conceived by the very essence of God (by the preceding Prop.), this something pertaining to the essence of the mind will necessarily be eternal: q. e. d.

Schol. This idea which expresses the essence of the body under an aspect of eternity is, as said, a certain mode of thought, which belongs to the essence of mind, and is necessarily eternal. Still it is impossible that we should have any recollection of ourselves before the existence of our bodies, inasmuch as there is neither a trace of anything of the kind in the body, nor can eternity be defined by time, or be properly said to have any relation to time. Nevertheless we feel and are persuaded that we are eternal. For the mind does not less truly perceive those things it conceives by the understanding than those it remembers. For Demonstrations are the very Eyes of the mind by which it perceives and observes things. Although we have no remembrance, therefore, of any existence previous to the existence of the body, we are yet persuaded that our mind, inasmuch as it involves the essence of the body under a form or aspect of eternity, is eternal, and that this its existence cannot be defined by time or explained by duration. Our mind, therefore, can only be said to endure, and its existence to be defined in respect of a certain time, in so far as the actual existence of the body is involved; and in so far only has it the power of determining the existence of things in time, and of conceiving them with reference to duration.

PROP. XXIV. The better we understand individual things the more do we know God.

Demonst. This is comprised in the Coroll. to Prop. XXV. Pt I., to the effect that particulars as things are nothing more than modes by which the attributes of God are expressed in a certain and determinate manner; wherefore the better we understand, &c.: q. e. d.

PROP. XXV. The highest effort of the mind and the highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of intellection.

Demonst. The third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate conception of the essence of things (vide the Def. of this in Schol. 2 to Prop. XL. Pt 2); and the more we understand things in this way, much the more do we know God (by the preceding Prop.). Consequently the highest virtue of the mind (by Prop. XXVIII. Pt II.), that is, the power or nature of the mind (by Def. 8, Pt IV.), in other words (by Def. 8, Pt IV.), the highest effort of the mind (Prop. VII. Pt III.), is to know things according to the third species of knowledge or intellection : q. e. d.

PROP. XXVI. The more apt the mind is to understand things by the third kind of intellection, the more does it desire to understand things by this kind of knowledge.

Demonst. This is obvious : for in so far as we conceive the mind disposed and apt to understand things by this kind of knowledge, the more do we conceive it disposed to understand them by the same, and consequently (by 1 of the Defs. of the Affections) the more apt the mind is for this, the more is such knowledge desired by the mind : q. e. d.

PROP. XXVII. From this third kind of intellection arises the highest contentment or acquiescence of mind.

Demonst. The highest virtue of the soul is to know God (by Prop. XXVIII. Pt IV.), or to understand things by the third kind of intellection (by Prop. XXV. above); and this virtue itself is by so much the greater, as the mind more perfectly apprehends a thing by this power (by Prop. XXIV. above). He therefore who knows things in this way attains to the highest grade of human perfection, and is consequently (by 2 of the Defs. of the Affections) moved by the highest joy, and this in connection with the idea of himself and his virtue (by Prop. XLIII. Pt II.). Thus and in this way, from this kind of intellection, proceeds the highest satisfaction of Soul that man can know (vide 25 of Defs. of the Affections) : q. e. d.

PROP. XXVIII. The endeavour or desire to know things by the third kind of intellection cannot arise from the first, but proceeds from the second, species of intellection.

Demonst. This proposition is self-evident. For whatever we understand clearly and distinctly, we understand either by and through the thing itself, or by and through something else which is conceived by itself; that is to say, the ideas that are clearly and distinctly within us, or that are referred to the third kind of intellection (vide Schol. 2 to Prop. XL. Pt II.), cannot follow from confused and imperfect ideas referable to intellection of the first kind, but from adequate ideas or intellection of the second and third kinds. Therefore (by 1 of Defs. of Affections) the desire of knowing things by the third kind of intellection cannot arise from the first, but must arise from the second: q. e. d.

PROP. XXIX. Whatever the mind understands under the form of eternity, is not understood because the mind conceives the present actual existence of the body, but because it conceives the essence of the body under the form or aspect of eternity.

Demonst. In so far as the mind conceives the present existence of its body, to the same extent does it conceive duration which can be determined by time, and to the same extent only has it the power of conceiving things in relation to time (by Prop. XXI. above, and Prop. XXVI. Pt II.). But eternity cannot be explained by duration (by Def. 8, Pt I., and its Explanation). Consequently and in so far, the mind has not the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity. But as it pertains to the nature of reason to conceive things under the form of eternity (by Coroll. 2 to Prop. XLIV. Pt II.), and to that of the mind also to conceive the body under the form of eternity (by Prop. XXIII. above), and nothing belongs to the essence of the mind but these two (by Prop. XIII. Pt II.); therefore does the power of conceiving things under the form of eternity pertain to the mind only in so far as it conceives the essence of the body under the form of eternity: q. e. d.

Schol. Things are conceived by us as actualities in two ways: either as they exist in relation to a certain time and place, or as we conceive them to be comprised in God and to follow from the necessity of the Divine nature. The things, however, that by this second mode are conceived by us as true or real we conceive under the form of eternity; and ideas of these involve the eternal and infinite essence of God,

as has been shown in Prop. XLV. Pt II., to which I refer as well as to its Scholium.

PROP. XXX. Our mind in so far as it knows itself and the body under the form of eternity, in so far has it necessarily a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God.

Demonst. Eternity is the very essence of God, inasmuch as this involves necessary existence (by Def. 8, Pt I.). To conceive things under the form or species of eternity, therefore, is to conceive things as real entities, even as they are conceived by the essence of God, or as they in themselves through the essence of God involve existence. Wherefore our mind, inasmuch as it conceives itself and the body under the form of eternity, insomuch has it necessarily a knowledge of God,—knows that it is in God, and is conceived by and through God: q. e. d.

PROP. XXXI. The third kind of intellection depends on the mind as its formal cause, in so far as the mind itself is eternal.

Demonst. The mind only conceives things under the form of eternity in so far as it conceives the essence of the body under the form of eternity (by Prop. XXIX. above); that is (Props. XXI. and XXIII. above), as it is itself eternal. Wherefore the mind as an eternal thing has a conception of God, and this conception is necessarily adequate (by Prop. XLVI. Pt II.). Therefore is the mind as an eternal entity fitted to apprehend all that can follow from this conception of God (by Prop. XL. Pt II.), i. e., to know things by the third kind of intellection (vide Def. of this in Schol. 2 to Prop. XL. Pt II.), of which the mind as a thing eternal (by Def. 1, Pt II.), is, therefore, the adequate or formal cause: q. e. d.

Schol. The further advanced we are in this kind of knowledge, the more conscious are we of ourselves and of God; that is, the more perfect and blessed are we, as will appear more clearly from the Propositions that follow. It is well to observe in this place, however, that although it be certain that the mind is eternal in so far as it conceives things under the form of eternity, it is convenient for the purpose of better explaining and more readily understanding what we have

still to say, to consider the mind as if it were beginning to be, and as if it were but just commencing to conceive things under the form of eternity, as we have hitherto done. And this we may be permitted to do without any risk of error, provided always that we come to no conclusion save on the clearest and most assured premisses.

PROP. XXXII. Whatever we understand through the third kind of intellection, we take delight in, and our joy is associated with the idea of God as its cause.

Demonst. From this kind of knowledge arises the most perfect acquiescence or peace of mind, i. e., the highest joy (by 25 of the Defs. of the Affections), associated with the idea of the mind itself (by Prop. XXVII. above), and consequently (by Prop. XXX. above) also with the idea of God as its cause: q. e. d.

Coroll. From the third kind of intellection necessarily arises the INTELLECTUAL LOVE OF GOD. For, from this kind of intellection proceeds perfect joy, associated with the idea of God as its cause; that is to say, Love of God, not as we imagine God to be present (by Prop. XXIX. above), but as we understand him to be eternal, and this it is which I call the intellectual love of God.

PROP. XXXIII. The intellectual love of God which arises from the third kind of intellection is eternal.

Demonst. For the third kind of knowledge is itself eternal (by Prop. XXXI. above, and Ax. 3, Pt I.), and the love that springs from it is therefore eternal also: q. e. d.

Schol. Although this love of God shall have had no beginning (by the preceding Prop.), it has, nevertheless, all the perfections of love, precisely as it would had it arisen in the way we have supposed in the Corollary to the preceding Proposition. And there is no difference here, save that the mind will have had those perfections eternally which we have feigned it as beginning to acquire, associated with the idea of God as their eternal cause. If joy consist in a transition from a lower to a higher state of perfection, true felicity must surely consist in the consciousness that the mind itself is endowed with perfection.

PROP. XXXIV. The mind is not obnoxious to the emotions

that are regarded as passions except during the continuance of the body.

Demonst. Imagination is an idea by which the mind contemplates a particular thing as present (vide the Def. of Imagination in the Schol. to Prop. XVII. Pt II.), which, however, rather indicates the present state of the body than the nature of an external object (by Coroll. 2 to Prop. XVI. Pt II.). An emotion or affection is consequently an imagination in so far as it indicates the present state or condition of the body, and so the mind is not liable to emotions of the nature of passions save during the continuance of the body (vide Prop. XXI. above): q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it follows that no other than intellectual love can be eternal.

Schol. When we regard the common opinions of men we perceive that they are indeed conscious of the eternity of their souls; but that they confound this eternity with duration, and ascribe to the soul imagination or memory, which they believe to be continued after death.

PROP. XXXV. God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.

Demonst. God is absolutely infinite (by Def. 6, Pt I.), or the nature of God involves infinite perfection (Def. 6, Pt II.) (by Prop. III. Pt II.) accompanied by the idea of himself as Cause (by Prop. XI. and Ax. 1, Pt I.); and this is what we have characterized as intellectual love in the Coroll. to Prop. XXXII. of this Part.

PROP. XXXVI. The intellectual love of the mind for God is the very love of God,—the love wherewith God loves himself, not as he is infinite, but as he can be interpreted by the essence of the human mind considered under a species of eternity; in other words, the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself.

Demonst. This intellectual love must be referred to the actions of the mind (by Coroll. to Prop. XXXII. above, and by Prop. III. Pt III.), and is, therefore, identical with that love by which the mind contemplates itself, the idea of God being associated as cause (by Prop. XXXII. above and

Coroll.); that is to say, it is an action whereby God, in so far as he can be explained by the human mind, contemplates himself, associated with the idea of himself (vide Coroll. to Prop. XXV. Pt I. and Coroll. to Prop. XI. Pt II.). Wherefore (by the preceding Prop.) the intellectual love of the mind for God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself: q. e. d.

Coroll. Hence it follows that God, in so far as he loves himself, loves mankind, and consequently that the love of God for man, and the intellectual love of the mind of man for God, are one and the same.

Schol. From this we clearly understand wherein our salvation, our true felicity, our liberty consists. It is in this: unswerving and eternal love of God, or the eternal love of God for us. This love in the sacred Scriptures is spoken of as glory;* and with justice; for whether it be referred to the mind of man or to God it is rightly designated peace of mind, which is not in fact to be distinguished from the glory of Scripture (by 25 and 30 of the Defs. of the Affections). For in so far as it is referred to God (by Prop. XXXV.) it is joy or happiness,—if I may be permitted still to use the words—associated with the idea of himself (Prop. XXXV.); and, referred to the mind of man, it is still the same (Prop. XXVII.). Again: as the essence of our mind consists in understanding alone, the principle and foundation whereof is God (Prop. XV. Pt I., and Schol. to Prop. XLVII. Pt II.), we have it made plain to us how and in what way our mind in respect of its essence and existence results from the divine nature and ceaselessly depends on God. I have thought it desirable to revert to this matter here, that I might show the importance of that cognition of individual things which I have called intuitive or of the third order (vide Schol. to Prop. XL. Pt II.), and how much more excellent is such knowledge than that which is general or, as I have designated it, of the second order. For although in my First Part I have shown generally that all things—the human mind inclusive—depended on God according to essence and existence, still the demonstration there, although legitimate and placed beyond the reach of doubt, does not affect our mind in such a way as when it is arrived at from the essence of the individual thing itself, which, as we have said, depends on God.

* Isa. vi. 3; Psal. viii., v., cxiii., &c.

PROP. XXXVII. There is nothing in nature opposed to this intellectual love or that can abrogate it.

Demonst. Intellectual love follows necessarily from the nature of the soul, in so far as by the nature of God it is regarded as an eternal truth (by Props. XXXIII. and XXIX. above). If, therefore, anything were opposed to this love, it would be opposed to truth; so that anything that should abrogate this love would have the effect of making that false which is true, which is obviously absurd. Wherefore there is nothing in nature opposed to intellectual love, &c.: q. e. d.

Schol. The Axiom at the beginning of the Fourth Part refers to individual things, considered in so far as they are in relation with a certain time and place, of which I presume no one will doubt.

PROP. XXXVIII. The greater the number of things the mind knows according to the second and third kinds of intellection, the less does it suffer from the passions that are bad, and the less does it fear death.

Demonst. The very essence of the mind is intellection (by Prop. XI. Pt II.). The greater number of things the mind knows by the second and third kinds of intellection, therefore, the greater is the part of it engaged in knowing (by Props. XXIX. and XXIII. above), and consequently (by the preceding Prop.) the greater the part that is not touched by the emotions which are opposed to our [higher] nature, or are evil (by Prop. XXX. Pt IV.). The greater the number of things, therefore, the mind understands by the second and third kinds of intellection the larger is the part of it that is unaffected by, and that consequently escapes suffering from, the emotions: q. e. d.

Schol. Hence we may understand that which I merely glanced at in the Schol. to Prop XXXIX. Pt IV., and which I promised to explain at greater length by-and-by; viz., that death is by so much the less destructive as the clear and distinct cognition of the mind is greater, and as God consequently is loved the more. Further, inasmuch as the most perfect peace of mind arises from intellection of the third kind (by Prop. XXVII. above), it follows that the human mind may be of such a nature that what we have shown as liable to pass away or to perish with the body (vide Prop.

XXI. above), when contrasted with that which remains unchanged, may be of no significance. But of this more by-and-by.

PROP. XXXIX. He who has the body apt for or capable of many things, has a mind the greatest part of which is eternal.

Demonst. He who has a body capable of the greatest variety of action, is less disturbed by evil passions (by Prop. XXXVIII. Pt IV.), that is, by passions opposed to our proper nature (by Prop. XXX. Pt IV.). He, therefore, who is so constituted (by Prop. X. above), has the power of ordering and arranging the affections of his body according to the dictates of his understanding, and consequently of referring all his corporeal affections to the idea of God (by Prop. XIV. above); whence it comes to pass (by Prop. XV. above) that he is moved by love of God, which (by Prop. XVI. above), as it occupies or constitutes the greatest portion of his mind, so has he a mind the greatest part of which is eternal: q. e. d.

Schol. Inasmuch as human bodies are capable of a great variety of actions, it is not doubtful that their nature may be such as to be referable to minds which have extensive knowledge of themselves and of God, and of which the greater or principal part is eternal, so that they have scarcely any fear of death. But that this may be more clearly understood it may be observed that we live in a state of incessant change, and that as we alter for the better or the worse, therefore are we said to be happy or unhappy. The infant that dies or changes into a corpse is said to be unfortunate or unhappy; and on the other hand, he is called happy or fortunate whose life runs on from birth to old age with a healthy mind in a healthy body. And indeed he who as child or youth has an imperfect body, good for very little, and greatly dependent on outward things, has a mind which, considered in itself alone, has scarcely any consciousness either of itself or of God or of objects; as he, on the contrary, who has a body possessed of great and various aptitudes, has a soul which, considered in itself, is greatly conscious of itself, of God, and of things. In this life, therefore, we do our best to insure that the body of the child shall be developed into one which, in so far as its nature permits, is apt for many things and is associated with a mind largely

conscious of itself, of God, and of objects; and this in such wise that all that pertains to memory or imagination shall, in comparison with that which belongs to understanding, bear the smallest possible proportion, as I have just said in the Scholium to the preceding Proposition.

PROP. XL. The more of perfection each individual thing possesses, the more does it act and the less does it suffer; and the more it acts, the more perfect it is.

Demonst. The more perfect anything is, the more reality has it (by Def. 6, Pt II.); and consequently (by Prop. III. Pt III. and Schol.) the more does it act and the less does it suffer. The demonstration here, but following an inverse order, is the same as that of the Proposition which immediately precedes. Hence it follows that the more perfect a thing is, the more active it is: q. e. d.

Coroll. From the above it follows that the part of the mind which remains, whatever its amount, is more perfect than the rest. Now the eternal part of the mind is the understanding (by Props. XXIII. and XXIX. above) by which alone we say we act (by Prop. III. Pt III.); but the part that perishes we have shown to be that wherewith imagination is connected (by Prop. XXI. above); by this part alone, however, do we suffer (by Prop. III. Pt III. and the general definition of the affections), and therefore is the former part of the mind, whatever its amount, the more perfect part: q. e. d.

Schol. I here conclude what I had to say of the mind in so far as it may be considered without reference to the existence of the body. From what immediately precedes, and also from Prop. XXI. Pt I., and others, it appears that our mind in so far as it is possessed of understanding is an eternal mode of thought, which is determined by another eternal mode, this by another, and so on to infinity, so that all together constitute the eternal and infinite intelligence of God.

PROP. XLI. Although we did not know that our mind was eternal, piety, religion, and all besides that has been shown in our Fourth Part to pertain to magnanimity and uprightness, would have to be held in the highest estimation.

Demonst. The chief, the only foundation of virtue or the

rational life is the pursuit of that which is truly useful to us (by Coroll. to Prop. XXII. and by Prop. XXIV. Pt IV.). But we were without the means of judging of what in the eye of reason is useful, and had no ground for concluding that the mind was immortal until we came to this our Fifth Part. Although then uninformed of the eternity of the mind, we nevertheless saw grounds for holding that all that pertains to magnanimity and integrity is of the first importance. And even now, and supposing we were still uninformed on this head, we should continue to regard our conclusion as the prime prescription of reason: q. e. d.

Schol. Vulgar belief would seem to run counter to this. For most men appear to think themselves free only when they can give full play to their lusts, and fancy they are hindered of their rights when held to live in conformity with the prescriptions of the Divine law. They, therefore, esteem piety and religion, and everything absolutely that is referred to magnanimity of mind, to be loads which they hope to lay down after death, when they hope they will receive the reward of the slavery—the piety and religion, to wit—which they have endured in life. Nor are they even entirely led by such hope as this to live, in so far as the poverty and impotency of their minds permit them, in conformity with the commands of the divine law; it is much rather the fear of frightful punishment after death that influences them. Were not such hope and fear implanted in mankind, it is said, were they to believe, on the contrary, that the mind or soul perishes with the body and that there was no immortality in store for the wretched toiling, sinking, under a load of pious observances, they would yield to their natural bent, give the rein in all things to their lusts, and make fortune rather than themselves the guide and arbiter of their lives. But such notions seem to me not less absurd than it were to suppose that a man, because he did not believe he could nourish his body with wholesome food to all eternity, should put himself upon a regimen of poisons; or because not believing that his soul was eternal or immortal, he should therefore elect to live like one demented and without reason; such absurdities I do not deem worthy of serious discussion.

PROP. XLII. Beatitude is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; nor do we enjoy true happiness because we restrain our lusts; on the contrary, it is because we enjoy true happiness that we are able to restrain our lusts.

Demonst. Beatitude consists in love towards God (by Prop. XXXVI. and its Scholium above), love which springs from the third kind of intellection (by Coroll. to Prop. XXXII. above). This love must therefore be referred to the mind in so far as it is active (by Props. LIX. and III. Pt III.), and consequently is virtue itself (by Def. 8, Pt IV.). So much in the first place. Further, the more the mind enjoys of this divine love or true felicity, the larger is the sphere of its understanding (by Prop. XXXII. above), i. e., the more complete control has it over the emotions (by Coroll. to Prop. III. above), and the less does it suffer from those among them that are hurtful (by Prop. XXXVIII. above). It is thus, and because the mind enjoys this divine love or perfect bliss, that it has the power of controlling the lusts of the body,—it is because our human power of controlling affection consists in understanding alone. No one, consequently, enjoys beatitude because he controls his affections; on the contrary, the power of controlling the affections arises from beatitude itself: q. e. d.

Conclusion. In what precedes I have delivered all I wished to say in connection with the freedom of the mind. And now are we able to appreciate the wise at their true worth, and to understand how much they are to be preferred to the ignorant, who act from mere appetite or passion. The ignorant man, indeed, besides being agitated in many and various ways by external causes, and never tasting true peace of mind, lives in a state of unconsciousness of himself, of God, and of all things, and only ceases to suffer when he ceases to be; the wise man, on the contrary, in so far as he is truly to be so considered, scarcely knows what mental perturbation means; but conscious of himself, of God, and of that special eternal necessity of things, never ceases from being, but is always in possession of true peace of mind. Should the way I point out as leading to such a conclusion appear extremely difficult, it may nevertheless be found. And that truly must needs be difficult which is so seldom attained. For how should it happen, if the soul's well-being were at hand and to be achieved without great labour, that it is so universally neglected? But all good things are as difficult of attainment as they are rare.

THE END.

JOHN CHILDS AND SON, PRINTERS.

CORRIGENDA.

Page 2, *line* 13 *from below, for* inaugurater *read* inaugurator
— 12, *line* 13, *for* wrought *read* they wrought
— 18, *line* 10, *for* mentally *read* mental
— 35, *line* 3 *from below, for* definitely *read* definitively
— 53, *line* 13 *from below, and elsewhere, for* Van den *read* Van der
— 137, *line* 13, *for* Golloys *read* Galloys
— 141, *line* 14, *for* will it, is *read* will, it is
— 157, *line* 2, *for* Leibnitz's *read* Leibnitz;
— 175, *bottom line, for* Sterne *read* Stirne
— 184, *line* 4 *from below in note, for* indefensible *read* indefeasible.
— 201, *line* 19, *for* soul *read* son
— 238, *line* 11 *from below, for* your *read* you
— 260, *in the note, for* κινοὑμεθα καὶ ἰσμὲν *read* κινούμεθα καὶ ἰσμὲν
— 277, *line* 4 *from below, for* in mind *read* in my mind
— 282, *line* 12, *for* what Infinite is that which can *read* what the Infinite is that can
— 349, *line* 6 *from below, dele* who
— 418, *line* 8 *from below, for* VI. *read* VII.
— 425, *line* 11 *from below, for* Prop. I. *read* Prop. XI.
— 426, *bottom line, for* VII. *read* VI.
— 428, *line* 12 *from below, for* as *read* than
— 428, *line* 19 *from below, for* VII. *read* VIII.
— 455, *line* 4 *from below, for* Def. *read* Prop.
— 474, *line* 2 *from below, for* The idea *read* The ideas
— 493, *line* 17 *from below, for* XLIII. *read* XLIV.
— 509, *line* 3, *for* IX. *read* IV.
— 512, *line* 13, *for* VI. *read* IX.
— 538, *line* 19 *from below, for* which *read* and
— 551, *line* 14 *from below, for* XXXII. *read* XXVII.
— 557, *line* 8 *from below, for* LII. *read* LVI.
— 566, *line* 6, *for* II. *read* III.
— 576, *line* 10, *for* XXIII. *read* XXVIII.
— 581, *line* 5 *from below, dele* not
— 581, *line* 8 *from below, for* to *read* of
— 627, *line* 11, *for* IX. *read* LX.
— 627, *bottom line, for* XX. *read* XXVI.
— 628, *line* 13, *for* LVIII. *read* LXVIII.
— 635, *line* 11 *from below, for* VI. Pt XI. *read* XVI. Pt I.
— 637, *line* 7, *for* Pt II. *read* Pt IV.

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on 02 July, 2018